Ashqelon Hit Hard

The katyusha or Grad rocket attack on Ashqelon today surely marks a new chapter in the war between Israel and the Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza. Since the disengagement from Gaza, we have seen a steady erosion of red lines, as more and more Israeli civilians have come under fire from Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups in the Strip. It may be important at the political level to distinguish among the various factions carrying out the rocket attacks and to evaluate particular motives. For the military, however, these kinds of considerations are irrelevant. What matters is that Palestinian terrorist groups have acquired and preserved the means to strike major Israeli population centers, despite a much-maligned "siege" of Gaza and numerous air force as well as ground operations. And even though the latter have often claimed the lives of many Palestinians - civilians and fighters - Israel has not been able to establish effective deterrence. Neither diplomatic nor military means have so far been able to protect Israeli civilians from these attacks. Despite countless announcements about an imminent truce this past year, we seem no closer to calm on the southern border than before. With Prime Minister Olmert's political career in limbo and Defense Minister Ehud Barak (Labor) possibly facing challenges from inside and outside the party, we may end up seeing the kind of major ground operation that the Israeli right has been agitating for. Such an operation may also be accompanied by assassinations of Hamas's political leadership.

Hizbullah is not Hamas; Beirut is not Gaza

The reports from Beirut look eerily similar not only to scenes from the annals of Lebanese civil war but also to what we saw in Gaza before Hamas's takeover. Again, it looks like well-equipped but unmotivated US-backed militias are surrendering to their disciplined anti-American counterparts. At least this is the impression that one would get from the coverage in Ha'aretz and the Western media. The following description is rather typical:

Hezbollah took control of Muslim west Beirut on Friday, tightening its grip on the city in a major blow to the U.S.-backed government. Shi'ite opposition gunmen seized control of several Beirut neighborhoods from Sunni foes loyal to the United States-backed government, street battles that left 11 dead and 30 wounded, security officials said (Ha'aretz).

In reality, however, the situation in Beirut is quite unlike what transpired in Gaza; furthermore, various factions' pro- or anti-American orientations are less relevant than this kind of reporting assumes.

First, the military "victory" that Hizbullah and co. are now celebrating will not automatically give the party political power. Whereas in Gaza, one entity, Hamas, basically faced another, Fatah, the Lebanese political landscape is far more fractured. Hizbullah and its allies will not be able to impose their will on the Lebanese population. In fact, while Hamas could make claims about having public opinion behind it, the sectarian politics of Lebanon make this impossible for Hizbullah. The humiliations endured by Future Movement fighters and by Sunni civilians will only stiffen their resolve against Hizbullah. The latter's claims to representing all of Lebanon and its (quickly-forgotten) promises to use its weapons only against Lebanon's enemies have been unmasked once and for all.

What then can Hizbullah gain from its victories on the ground? No one doubted that Hizbullah had the most formidable military force in Lebanon, so a demonstration of its power is not a real gain. Did the party hope to showcase the impotence of the Lebanese Army and security forces? What purpose did forcing Hariri's TV station off the air serve? All of these actions look like bullying without a clear plan. Furthermore, the longer Hariri and Jumblatt as well as Beirut's pro-government Sunni, Christian, and Druze populations stay under siege, the more restive their coreligionists in northern Lebanon, Beqaa, and the Chouf will grow. These frustrations can hardly bode well for the Shiite population, which despite the patronage of Hizbullah and Iran, is hardly economically self-sufficient.

Seeing that it cannot gain much from a military victory, Hizbullah may, as Jeha writes, very well be "looking for surrender."

For coverage see Jeha's blog (with the usual awesome graphics), Blacksmiths of Lebanon, and Charles Malik.

The Economist on Israel

I do not have time for an extended analysis of the Special Report on Israel in The Economist, but I will say that it is a 60th birthday present that the country can easily do without. Not content with a decidedly one-sided critique of Israel's security challenges, The Economist exerts itself to expose the weaknesses of Israel's economy and society, in what amounts to a rather eager prophecy of the coming end of the Zionist dream.

Take for example the following claim about the "mirage" that is Israel's "miracle":

Moreover, Israel's ability to capitalise on the internet boom was a lucky one-off. The big innovations of this century, argues Ze'ev Tadmor, of the Technion, a university in Haifa, will be in biotech, nanotech, smart materials, alternative energy and other things that the army's well-funded research units are not particularly interested in. Much of this kind of work must be done in academia, where Israel is weaker. Its seven big universities have a combined government research budget of around $100m, whereas America's Massachusetts Institute of Technology alone gets $950m from the federal government.

I'm sorry Mr./Ms Economist, but I can't think of a more misleading comparison than this one! To pretend somehow that this particular statistic exposes the mortal weakness of Israel's economy is ridiculous.

A New Look at the Surge

The recent civil unrest notwithstanding, one can be sure that John McCain and others will continue to tout the success of the Surge in Iraq. For the observant, the failure of the Maliki government to win the battle of Basra and stabilize the south of the country, not to mention the Sadr City district of the capital, wasn't the first indication that the Surge's gains conceal -- or even generate -- a number of threats to the stability of Iraq and the region. For example, media analysis has questioned the wisdom of the deals struck between the US military and the leadership of various Sunni tribes, most notably in Anbar Province, which created the concerned citizens brigades. These are essentially militias made up of former insurgents and the dispossessed veterans of Saddam's old army, armed by the US to fight Al Qaeda. They number some 90,000. And a sheik who commands 200 militiamen can draw a $100,000 annual salary from the Americans. Moreover, I don't think anyone suggested during the period of quiescence that preceded the recent Iraqi army incursion into Basra that Moktada al-Sadr was reconciled to an American vision of sectarian reconciliation. So an intensive critique of the Surge written by a National Security Council member from the Clinton era is not ground breaking stuff. Nevertheless, the Council on Foreign Relations' Steven Simon, in an essay in the next issue of Foreign Affairs, comes to some novel conclusions.

Steven's main argument is that the Surge, while suppressing American casualties, has deeply harmed the prospects for a unified, stable, friendly Iraq, by "retribalizing" the country. This is Bush's "bottom-up" strategy for Iraq, which the President kicked off in January 2007. Iraqi history, as Steven's sees it, has witnessed the ebb and flow of tribal power. While the Ottomans suppressed the tribes by intervening in settlement patterns, the British built them up as a counterweight to urban nationalism. Saddam's Baathist ideology militated against the power of the tribe, but in practice the strongman ruler turned to his own tribal network time and again, and, in the hard times of the 90s, brought tribal leaders into the fold. Now, tribes, and some vague "tribal identity" are stronger than ever, argues Steven, and it will take a "top-down" strategy to integrate these centrifugal forces, unleashed by the Surge, back into a nation. What Steven's suggest, in a rather milquetoast way, is that a) the US commit to a phased withdrawal, something like a two-year window, thereby generating goodwill inside and out of Iraq, b) the UN send an envoy to the country with a robust mandate, and c) in the space created by these two steps, reconciliation in Iraq takes place amidst heavy multilateral engagement from the likes of the Europeans and regional states who've now been enticed in.

How ironic. The breathing space we were promised with the Surge, that which was supposed to allow Maliki to make progress on political reconciliation, is promised yet again. On the one hand, we've got a firm, albeit unspecific vow to withdraw, subject, as Steven admits, to the whims of the American electorate. On the other, we have the vain hope of real cooperation from a number of quarters on bringing Iraq (back) together -- once the US has ceded meaningful unilateral power. According to Stevens, this is the best of the bad options. Stevens thesis has less weight, I think, than some of his other suggestions and conclusions. For example, he makes a very interesting point about what the goal should be with respect to the Sunni body politic. If we're interested in a stable, unified Iraq, we really need a Sunni nationalist front to reconstitute itself and regain its confidence. This sector of Iraqi politics shouldn't be seen as a bogey man, a relic of the past, an affront to reconciliation or Shiite healing. Sunni revanchist politics organized at the state level is the alternative to the politics of the tribes, which one day will turn their guns away from Al Qaeda and back on the Americans. Stevens also comes up with a surprising scenario for the future of the Iraq Army. Rather than an incompetent fighting force of a sectarian character, Stevens sees a corporate institution that outstrips the authority of an ineffectual central government! Instead of an Iranian vassal state, we end up getting a Baathist-style military junta that may or may not be friendly to US interests! If the military does shape up in this way, are there other models, perhaps Lebanon, that come to mind?

Postscript:

Wow, the talking points on the Surge are really shaping up. The Petraeus hearings today revealed a lot. Some of the hawks want to see the Basra initiative as evidence that Iraq is headed in the right direction. That's what Sen. James Inhofe claimed (R-Oklahoma). Look, he's saying, the central government is finally taking on the centrifugal forces of the militias, militias with which the ruling party shares a sectarian identity! Not only does this misconstrue the relationship between the various Shiite factions, it papers over a stunning military defeat. So who won Basra? The hawks say Sadr gave up, from his base in Iran. So Maliki won somehow, because he took the fight to them. At the same time, they say that Iran is turning Iraq into Lebanon. But if Lebanon and Hezbollah are the model, the Iraqi street doesn't see the Maliki government as the "winners." The Mahdi Army is the "winner." But I would be curious, does anyone on the Iraqi street see things this way? The Green Zone experienced one of its worst days in a long time this week, fighting in Sadr City is fierce. I just don't buy that characterization of the Iraq Street, which came from the American Enterprise Institute's Frederick Kagan on the Newshour with Jim Lehrer.

Also, Obama's comments during the afternoon portion of the hearings, just the Foreign Relations subcommittee, were very impressive. He disarmed ambassador Crocker, and laid out the "no end in sight" problem very well. He also softly took apart the idea that the Mahdi Army is the only Iranian proxy in Iraq. Obama poked fun at the idea that the US would ever rid Iraq of Iranian influence by describing the dream scenario as one in which the Iranian influence in the country is to our likening. I think people like McCain are going to be saying in the next year that Al Qaeda as been defeated by the Sunni Awakening, now it's time to defeat the fifth column of the "Iranian-backed militias." That rhetoric should be attacked wherever it appears.

"Bush's War" on PBS

I just caught part two of the PBS Frontline documentary "Bush's War," produced by Michael Kirk. It's very well done. When I heard Kirk speak at Columbia's journalism school this fall, he emphasized that detailed chronologies were the basis for his films. A solid time line, he said, was his script. This method seemed to me to pay dividends in "Bush's War." So, of course, who remembers exactly which day (or even month) Jay Garner was appointed "viceroy" of Iraq, or when L. Paul Bremmer replaced him? But what I found startling was how compressed certain events were in time. For example, Jay Garner received notice of Bremmer's appointment the first day he actually arrived in Baghdad. Just as he was looking for a functioning toilet in one of Saddam's palaces! Or that within days of arriving in Iraq, Bremmer had disbanded the Iraqi army, not after so much as a photo-op tour of the country.

In his talk at Columbia, Kirk cast himself as a kind of know-nothing interviewer. The guy isn't trying to outsmart his subjects. In fact, he comes off as somewhat amateurish. But he does stick to a policy of not allowing interviewees to set ground rules. That was evident in his handling of Bremmer (and Ahmed Chalabi for that matter). So it turns out Bremmer doesn't remember a meeting that Jay Garner describes in which Garner, and someone from the CIA called "Charlie" confronted Bremmer over then Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith's draconian debathification order. Charlie tells Bremmer that 30,000-50,000 people, closer to 50,000 actually, are about to lose their jobs, their place in the new society. In the documentary, Bremmer seems to panic, he can't remember the meeting, but says the number he heard was 20,000.

Much in the film is eerie in light of current events. New York Times reporter John Burns, who was in Iraq from before the invasion until last summer, in the interview, seemingly reclining on a pillow, notes dryly, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is the kind of man, if he sat on your local school board, you would be worried about him being appointed principal of a high school. Now he's running a country of 30 million. Like Putin, Bush looked him in the eye to see what he's all about. Now Maliki's in Basra, confronting the Sadrists with what seems to be the full force of the Iraqi Army. The Bush people are calling it "courageous," while the British are standing pat at the airport. From the documentary, it seems such an operation was very nearly set in motion many times in the war's early stages. I just hope Maliki knows what he's doing; that John Burns has him wrong.

Barbarians at the Gates

Shimon Peres and Nicholas Sarkozy bumping chests (Photo: Ynet).

Israeli President Shimon Peres inaugurated the literary festival, Le Salon du Livre, in Paris today, capping a warm reception in France that is being widely interpreted as a signal of the revitalized relationship between the two nations. But has the French position on Israel really changed? I'm not sure. But I would tend to see recent developments as the outgrowth of French President Nicholas Sarkozy's own personal preference for close, public ties with the Jewish state, and not as a fundamental reorientation of the French foreign policy (as Le Monde). Sarko is special. First he married Carla Bruni, former femme fatale of the French intelligentsia, now he wants to require every French schoolchild to "adopt" a coeval victim of the Holocaust. What will make things interesting for the outside observer is that the Sarkozy administration contains in addition to the one in the Élysée an equally strong personality on the Quai d'Orsay: foreign minister Bernard Kouchner. He has deep ties to nearly everyone in Lebanese politics -- though it seems he couldn't convince the Lebanese delegation to today's Salon not to boycott, which was indeed a major loss for a Francophonie that is under assault from cultural critics. But those ties, combined with Sarkozy's energetic engagement with the Middle East, which has already included visits from the Maghreb to the Gulf, (where the French are establishing a permanent base in Abu-Dhabi), may pay dividends for the peace process, for the effort to contain Iranian nuclear ambitions, and more. Or maybe I'm too optimistic. At any rate, cheers to the Israelis whose psyches may have been salved today by those gatekeepers of the world community, the French.

Iraqization in Gaza

I find it curious that Israeli patrol that was targeted with an explosive today just north of the border with Gaza is reported to have been hit by "an explosively formed penetrator" (or "projectile"). The American military considers the so-called EFP to be an Iranian device, one that has to a certain extent changed the rules of the game in Iraq. It was this very weapon that the Bush administration pointed to when it accused the Iranian Revolutionary Guard of meddling in Iraq and labeled the group a terrorist organization. In fact, a US Defense Department briefing just Tuesday mentioned again the association between this particular bomb and the Iranians. Of course, the katyusha-style rocket that is now hitting Ashkelon, the "grad," is Iranian made. So what's going on here? There's an Israeli line being retailed that the breach of the border with Egypt allowed lots of weapons into the country, weapons which are now being used against the Israeli border communities. I'm skeptical of that. I view it as part of the propaganda war. These EFPs and grads sound like the most valued and hoarded elements of Hamas' arsenal. On the other hand, if, as in Iraq, the technique of manufacturing the EFP can be imported instead of the actual bomb, we may be seeing the diffusion of know-how either from Iran itself, or, alternatively, from non-Iranian individuals who fought in the Iraqi insurgency and somehow made their way to Gaza. Either way, it's clearly a disturbing development, and will make any ground campaign in the Strip that much more costly in terms of human life.

Revenge for Mughniya in Jerusalem?

Map of Jerusalem (ArcIMS), Qiryat Moshe in orange

According to Ha'aretz, Hizbullah flagship station Al Manar reported that the "Liberators of the Galilee - Shaheed Imad Mughniya Group" took responsibility for the shooting which occurred hours ago at the Merkaz ha-Rav Yeshiva in Jerusalem. Needless to say, the authenticity of this claim is highly suspect. It is extremely unlikely that the perpetrators of the attack, which has so far claimed the lives of eight, are Lebanese or directly affiliated with Hizbullah. However, they may have been Palestinians recruited by Hizbullah handlers or sympathizers. To be sure, retaliation for the assassination of Mughniya in Damascus was expected around this time.

The shooting at Merkaz ha-Rav is the worst terrorist attack that Jerusalem has seen for quite some time. The yeshiva is located in the west of the city, in Qiryat Moshe. It remains to be seen what route the terrorists took to reach the site, and where exactly they came from. I was surprised to hear that they may have infiltrated from East Jerusalem. But perhaps they took a more circuitous route.

At this point in time, it is still unclear how many attackers were involved, and what weapons they used. There are reports of one terrorist having fired an AK-47 for several "long minutes." One witness spoke of 500-600 rounds having been shot.

If the police and security forces release details of the origins of the attackers, we can be sure that there will be a major response by the IDF in Gaza or the West Bank. Tensions are already high after a roadside explosive device near the security fence around the Kisufim Crossing in Gaza destroyed an IDF jeep, killing one soldier (a Bedouin tracker). To me, that attack had all the marks of an attempted kidnapping.

Mishkans and Mishugas: the Power of Acacia

A mountain of acacia chips (source).

Just to lighten the mood a bit...Ha'aretz reports that the former head of the psychology department at Hebrew University has just published an article in the philosophy journal Time and Mind suggesting that ancient Israelites used "psychotropic materials" in ritual. The theory creates a certain naturalistic explanation for the Torah's story of Moses at Sinai. In other words, Moses was tripping. Get this, Prof. Benny Shanon's idea germinated in the Amazon rain forest, where he first ingested the hallucinogenic plant ayahuasca when he participated in a ritual in 1991. Since then, the man has used the drug hundreds of times. I wonder how many other articles he's written since then. But where would the Israelites have found ayahuasca in the Negev or Sinai Deserts? They wouldn't have. And that's where the acacia wood comes in, the same material the Israelites made their tabernacle (mishkan) from. It too has psychotropic properties. Chew on that (maybe).

The Lies of Students for Justice in Palestine

UC Berkeley's Sproul Hall

Today I received an email from UC Berkeley's Students for Justice in Palestine through my department list calling on students to join a "die in" on Sproul Plaza in protest of "israeli government atrocity" [sic]. The email went on to claim that

the daunting words of israeli deputiy defense minister matan vilnai are
coming true, as a holocaust is bloodying the mediterranean sea under OUR
WATCH. Hundreds of innocent civilians are being gunned down and bombed in
their homes and cities, and we can not sit back and let this happen.

This is a blatant and unacceptable lie. First, the organizers seem to have missed the fact that IDF operations in Gaza effectively ended on Sunday. Second, to say that "hundreds" of innocent civilians are being "gunned down" is a willful distortion of the facts. The SJP has become a mouthpiece for the likes of Khaled Meshal, it appears. It reminds me of the hysterical emails about "massacres" and "holocaust" that were circulated following the IDF incursion into Hebron as part of Operation Defensive Shield in spring 2002. Most of the dead then were armed fighters not civilians.

The "daunting" words attributed to Vilnai are also a distortion. On Friday, the Guardian reported that

An Israeli minister today warned of increasingly bitter conflict in the Gaza Strip, saying the Palestinians could bring on themselves what he called a "holocaust".

But Vilnai actually said the following:

ככל שירי הקסאם גובר ומאריך טווחים, הפלסטינים מביאים על עצמם שואה יותר גדולה

As long as the qassam firing increases and lengthens in distance, the Palestinians bring even greater destruction [shoah] upon themselves.

When people mean "the Holocaust," in Israel, the word "shoah" is preceded by a definite article - "ha-shoah." Of course, even "shoah" by itself is a strong word - but it means destruction or disaster, which is what Vilnai intended. This is quite clear from the context of the word, as it is followed by the modifier "even greater." In any case, to call what happened in Gaza this past weekend, as the SJP did, a "holocaust" in the sense of a genocide claiming the lives of millions of people is disgusting.

What's so galling is that this email claims that Israel's goal is to commit a genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza. There is no context for the IDF operation; it is only part of an eternal campaign of oppression. Never mind the hundreds of rockets that have rained on Israeli cities - with the deliberate intent to kill Israeli civilians.

How long will people keep up the moral obfuscation by which military operations pursuing armed fighters, who hide out in civilian areas, are equated with deliberate efforts to murder families sitting in their homes?

War of the Missiles Redux

Most of the IDF activity is taking place around Jabaliyah (Map: Perry Castaneda, click to enlarge)

What we are seeing so far is eerily reminiscent of the beginnings of the war between Israel and Hizbullah in the summer of 2006. So far, Hamas has demonstrated that its rocket attacks can reach at least as far as Ashqelon, and that it is capable of firing hundreds of missiles a day, if it so desires. IDF activity, so far taking place at the brigade level (Givati) and consisting of infantry forays together with armored units, engineers, and air force, has made no dent whatsoever in the qassam firing while killing many civilians, including children - though it has also managed to engage Hamas fighters. The army has even made statements to the effect that its activity in Gaza is not directly related to the rocket launchings; the claim seems to be that it is pursuing larger tactical or strategic aims.

בכירים אומרים בנוסף כי ההחלטה להמשיך בפעילות היא ללא כל קשר למספר הקסאמים שנורים מהרצועה לעבר ישראל, וכי הצבא ממליץ על שורה של צעדים כנגד החמאס ולא להסתפק בתגובות נקודתיות בהתאם לשיגור הרקטות

Senior figures added that the decision to continue the activity is without any connection to the number of qassams that are fired from the Strip at Israel, and that the army recommends a series of steps against Hamas and not to make do with pin-point responses to rocket launchings (Ha'aretz).

The army appears to be testing the waters before embarking on a larger ground offensive. Barak may very well be unable to resist the calls (indeed it serves him in his own political aims against Olmert) for the "real thing" - the much-anticipated ground operation - if qassams hit a strategic installation in Ashqelon, end up killing a family, or strike a target similar to the train depot in Haifa during the Lebanon war.

What we have not seen so far are significant casualties of IDF soldiers. This suggests that the forays are still being conducted fairly cautiously, even though the military has apparently entered heavily defended areas.

UPDATE: As I write this, there is a report of 5 "seriously injured" soldiers.

Right now, it appears that Hamas is trying hard to force Israel into a truce that would see an end to the threats of assassinating the remaining political leadership. Israel, in the meantime, hopes to achieve some kind of near-knockout blow that would make it look as if it had won this round of the conflict. Destroying a few Hamas outposts will not do for this aim. If there is no large-scale ground offensive, we may see an attempt to assassinate a key Hamas figure before this fighting ends.

One thing that Israelis and Americans must get into their heads is that neither this activity, nor the assassinations, nor a large-scale ground operation will by themselves bring about regime change. The goal of regime change will continue to elude the allies. That is not to say that there isn't a great of dissatisfaction with the Hamas government in Gaza. But a revolution from below is a very unlikely prospect, especially while Gaza is under attack.

Escalations

This map shows Ashqelon, north of Gaza (Map: Perry-Castanada)

Today's escalation in qassam rocket fire makes for an interesting case study. Hamas had been slightly increasing its rocket launchings in the past few days, hitting targets in the western Negev and Sderot that led to casualties. The Israeli air force's operation on Wednesday morning, which seems to have killed at least five members of Hamas's military brigades traveling in a van (New York Times), elicited a massive response from the organization. Hamas is reaching deep into its arsenal, employing those missiles capable of hitting Ashqelon, which suffered several hits today. In response, the Israeli air force struck hard, destroying Palestinian government buildings. One thing that this episode tells us is that Hamas reacts most strongly when senior members of its organization are killed, using its ability to strike Israeli civilian targets as deterrence against Israeli air strikes. For Israel, Ashqelon seems to have become the red line, at which it turns to considering assassinations of Hamas's political leadership.

UPDATE: Amos Harel has a good analysis of the escalation, which I think supports my take.

The Jewish State Again

Michel Aflaq, Arab nationalist (Photo)

Before I wrote my post on A Jewish State, several weeks ago, a good friend of mine took objection to my lament that no one seems terribly concerned about the fact that there are many "Islamic States" in the world or that various countries in the region define themselves as "Arab states."

I cannot do justice to his entire argument here, and I anticipate that he will view whatever I post as a distortion of what he was saying. Furthermore, since he has not given me permission to do so, I cannot quote his words directly. Nevertheless, here is my attempt.

According to my friend, the comparison of "the Jewish state" with Islamic states lacks rigor. Islamic states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran are "Islamic," he argues, because they derive their laws from shari'ah (Islamic religious law). But Israel's laws are not derived from halakhah (Jewish religious law). Rather, the Jewishness of the state, according to him, is something that resides in people not texts. Citizenship is linked to blood in a way that citizenship in Islamic states and Arab nationalist ones was never conceived. That is, citizenship in Arab states was not a matter of "Arabness" - as evidence, he cites the Armenian citizens in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, and the Kurdish citizens of Iraq.

I think my friend is confused and mistaken on several fronts, but I have a feeling that this argument resonates with some people. I would like to use this opportunity to resume the discussion we began in the last post, by subjecting the argument above to critique in the comments.

Failed Gaza Policies

Map of the Gaza Strip (Source)

The latest Haaretz-Dialog poll shows that a majority of Israelis support direct talks with Hamas in order to achieve a cease fire and free Gilad Shalit. Most Israelis are simply fed up with the continuing rocket fire on Sderot, and they are skeptical about the military's ability to bring about a lasting solution. They also do not want Gilad Shalit to become another Ron Arad. However, significant obstacles stand in the way of such talks. Israel is bound by commitments it has made to the U.S. and the Palestinian Authority's Abu Mazen.

Both Israel and the U.S. have been pursuing a policy of regime change with respect to the Hamas government in Gaza. The aim of the blockade is not only to prevent the smuggling of weapons and materials for rocket production but also to thwart the Hamas government's ability to function. The hope seems to be that Hamas's inability to provide services and the Gaza Strip's growing isolation would lead Palestinians to reject Hamas in favor of Fatah. This policy has so far failed. While Hamas has not necessarily gotten stronger, it has not declined significantly enough. Furthermore, Fatah forces are not ready for a take-over, and even if such a thing were to happen, it is not at all clear that they would have the support of a majority of the population.

Israel's other policy vis-a-vis Gaza has evolved in the face of the continued qassam attacks since the disengagement. Today, it consists of frequent incursions to arrest wanted men, infantry ambushes of Palestinian fighters, air force attacks against qassam crews, and occasionally artillery strikes. The goal has been to dislodge Hamas and other Palestinian forces from the border with Israel. Occasionally, Israel has also assassinated military and political leaders. Alongside this activity, there has been extensive planning for a major ground operation similar to Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in February 2002. The aims of all of these policies are mainly tactical; they do not necessarily seek to bring down the Hamas government but rather try to make it difficult for Palestinian forces to mount attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets.

There is no doubt that Hamas will use any chance it gets - whether through a formal cease fire, informal truce, or direct talk - to build up its offensive arsenal and its defensive capabilities, taking Hizbullah as its model. Thus, the worst solution would probably be an informal truce or deescalation, of the type that has existed sporadically between Israel and Hamas. While it may guarantee temporary security to the residents of Sderot, it will endanger their lives to an even greater extent in the long-term and yields no real guarantees of any kind in the interim. Direct talks, however, are probably off the table - certainly as long as President Bush is in power. Thus, what we are likely to see is an ongoing war of attrition, that may explode into a full-out IDF offensive when a qassam rocket achieves a direct hit killing a family or a group of schoolchildren. Such an offensive, however, will hardly be able to eradicate the qassam firings. Without a diplomatic horizon, all the IDF can hope to do is to keep the various militant organizations operating in the Strip off-balance. That is a very modest aim that can hardly justify an operation with dozens of IDF casualties.