More Thoughts on Protests

Comparing the photographs from Egypt in 2011 to those from the post-election demonstrations in Iran in 2009 - there are almost no women demonstrating in Egypt. In the Iranian protests, women were front and center, at least on the documentary record. Says quite a bit about the differences between these two societies and the protest movements.

Some people are worried that Egypt might turn into another 1979. I think it would be hard to repeat an Islamic Revolution in Egypt today. Even if Mubarak were to fall, it's unlikely that a militant cadre of Islamists would be able to turn the whole protest movement into a revolutionary transformation of Egyptian society, eliminating other opposition movements and cutting off ties to the West.

Arab Positions on Iran in WikiLeaks and Juan Cole's Efforts to Downplay their Significance

BY AMOS

For me, the biggest story of the latest WikiLeaks release so far is the documentation of active Arab lobbying against Iran and repeated calls for aggressive American intervention. In the leaked reports, Saudi and several other Gulf state officials repeatedly urge America to keep the military option on the table. It's interesting to see Juan Cole and others downplay the significance of these revelations. For Cole, it's all about Israel, even though Saudi and other officials hardly mention the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in these cables (see here, for example):

It is no secret that the Sunni Arab leaders in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have been alarmed by the rise of Iran as a regional power. That rise has taken place for three reasons. First, the worrisome deterioration in the condition of stateless Palestinians under rightwing governments of Israel since 2001, and that country's increasing belligerence toward neighbours, as with the 2006 Lebanon war, have inflamed passions throughout the region, allowing Iran to position itself as a champion of the weak.

The rise of Iran as a regional power has very little to do with the alleged deterioration in the condition of the Palestinians since 2001. There is nothing new about rejectionist (anti-U.S.) powers in the region supporting the cause of the Palestinians, rhetorically and financially. Egypt did this under Nasser and the Syrians have presented themselves as the patron of radical Palestinian factions for a long time. Neither regime owed its rise to Israeli policy or the conditions of the Palestinians.

Cole wants to minimize the real fears of the Gulf states about Iran's ambitions and its pursuit of nuclear weapons to achieve them. Of course, he's right that the "street" in the Arab world supports Iran for its virulent stands against Israel. But the people do not rule in any of the Gulf states. They are far from positions of political responsibility, which might actually make them to identify with the interests of their states in the global arena or to articulate realist political stances.

Lastly, Cole makes an argument from absence about Egypt's position on Iran:

Despite the breathless headlines they generated, the yield of the documents is actually thin. The most populous and militarily most important Arab state, Egypt, appears not to have been among those urging military action. There is no sign in the diplomatic cables of any practical steps toward an Arab attack on Iran, no evidence of logistical or military preparations. At most there is high-level gossip in Arab capitals that something should be done, and by someone else. In any case, if this is the anti-Iranian Arab axis, Tehran can sleep peacefully at night.

In fact, the cables show great Egyptian concern over Iranian meddling in Arab affairs, especially closer to home. I think the jury is still out on Egypt's position. Cole somehow wants to continue to insist in the face of the leaks that only the Americans and the Israelis are bothered by Iran. He believes that the leaders of the region should share view that there is "no evidence" that Iran has a nuclear weapons program or that it aspires  to achieve this capability. Ergo, everyone should rest easy. Those who disagree, he implies, are either trying to manipulate the situation to advance their imperialist interests in the Middle East.(the U.S. and Israel) or being manipulated by imperialist powers.

What's really funny is that Juan Cole is so obsessed with Israel that on his blog he highlighted a cable from January 2007 as one of the most revelatory documents released. He interprets the following passage

Thoughtful Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Iran did not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland, the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons would completely transform the Middle East strategic environment in ways that would make Israel’s long-term survival as a democratic Jewish state increasingly problematic. That concern is most intensively reflected in open talk by those who say they do not want their children and grandchildren growing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.

 as evidence that Israel sees an Iranian nuclear program as a threat to Jewish immigration and the demographic balance of the country. He then goes on to sound the trumpet about the inevitability of a binational state or the Lebanonization of Israel "in the next five decades." Cole is still convinced by the old story of low Jewish birthrates and the specter of net migration out of the country. Lastly, he wants to blame Israeli lobbying for the Iraq war and for a potential American invasion of Iran.

Not wanting your children and grandchildren to grow up in an Israel facing a nuclear Iran does not mean that you plan on emigrating from Israel. The kind of declaration cited in the cable simply underscores the resolve of Israelis not to allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. We don't know how ordinary Israelis would respond to a nuclear Iran; I am not convinced that there would be an exodus.

The Awakening Councils and the Future of Iraq

The New York Times reported today that Sunnis in Iraq formerly allied with the U.S. appear to be (re)joining the Qaeda-led insurgency. The article cites militia leaders in Salah ad Din, Diyala, and Baghdad governorates. The Awakening Councils played a critical role in defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq, initially in Anbar province. (For a compelling interpretation of how this actually happened, see John McCary's The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives.) Although the Iraqi central government politicians interviewed in the article deny that such defections are taking place, there seems little reason to doubt that fighters are leaving the employ of the government or threatening to do so. Apparently, the tribal militiamen and their commanders have had enough of the Iraqi central government refusing to pay them or grant them immunity from prosecution. They see little reason to co-operate with the Shi'i-dominated federal government. With American forces leaving Iraq, the Sunni tribes in places like al-Anbar are now renegotiating their role in the Iraqi order. It is unlikely that they will want to surrender their sources of income to al-Qaeda, as they almost did in the bad years of the insurgency. But they need more assurances than they have been getting from Baghdad and from the U.S. The Iraqi security forces are not strong enough to govern areas dominated by the tribes in western Iraq and in the Sunni governorates. Whoever ends up taking charge in Baghdad will have to make concessions to them.

Richard Allen: WTF?

Reading over Richard Allen's op-ed in the New York Times today, I asked myself whether the author isn't suffering from the same mental infliction suffered by his beloved President Ronald Reagan. Allen, U.S. national security adviser in the early '80s, recalls his memory of Reagan's reaction to Israel's strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 (twenty-nine years ago today) only to compare it, shamefully, with the recent Mavi Marmara debacle. He does so with an insidious mixture of nostalgia and dementia that must be making Reagan smile in his grave.

The point of Allen's narrative is to caution against knee-jerk negative reaction to "daring, risky" Israeli military operations. Even high-ranking officials in Reagan's administration, including VP George H.W. Bush, Chief of Staff James Baker, and presidential aide Michael Deaver, advocated punitive actions against Israel in the wake of the surprise strike on Saddam's nuclear materials testing reactor in 1981, Allen remembers. But the most sober and far-sighted in the situation room--Reagan himself--after hearing all points of view on Israel, only "smiled and turned to the papers on his desk," and, when he did speak directly on Israeli policy, offered only private and pithy pearls of wisdom such as "Boys will be boys." There seems to be an implicit warning here to President Obama to curb any enthusiasm he might possibly have for condemning Israeli military policy, in this case regarding the Gaza blockade - or, more ominously, potential future Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Beyond the Alzheimerish absurdity of comparing a planned strike with botched crowd control, I find this an example of the worst kind of American staythecoursiveness with regard to Israel.

Worried about Iran?

With all due respect, this is much scarier. The Iranian problem is nothing compared to the challenge that India and the West (indeed, truly the whole world) face in Pakistan. 

Several current officials said that they were worried that insurgents could try to provoke an incident that would prompt Pakistan to move the weapons, and perhaps use an insider with knowledge of the transportation schedule for weapons or materials to tip them off. That concern appeared to be what Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was hinting at in testimony 10 days ago before the House Appropriations Committee. Pakistan’s weapons, she noted, “are widely dispersed in the country (NYT).”

AIPAC Case to be Dropped

The JTA is reporting that the charges against former American Israel Public Affairs (AIPAC) staffers Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman have been dropped. The espionage accusation against the two have been a gift to the self-appointed regulators of the "Israel Lobby." When you read someone like Juan Cole, you'd think the case against them was air-tight the moment the indictments were first announced. But for Cole and his gang, this will be just another piece of evidence for the suffocating power of AIPAC over American foreign policy. One hopes that they might be a tad less gleeful though.

Iran's Jews

Roger Cohen's op-ed on Iran in the New York Times today is an insult to journalism. He made himself the perfect tool of the Iranian government. Is it too much to expect just a little bit of skepticism? 

Accepting, I inquired how he felt about the chants of “Death to Israel” — “Marg bar Esraeel” — that punctuate life in Iran.

“Let them say ‘Death to Israel,’ ” he said. “I’ve been in this store 43 years and never had a problem. I’ve visited my relatives in Israel, but when I see something like the attack on Gaza, I demonstrate, too, as an Iranian.”

This was the kicker:

Perhaps I have a bias toward facts over words, but I say the reality of Iranian civility toward Jews tells us more about Iran — its sophistication and culture — than all the inflammatory rhetoric.

That may be because I’m a Jew and have seldom been treated with such consistent warmth as in Iran. Or perhaps I was impressed that the fury over Gaza, trumpeted on posters and Iranian TV, never spilled over into insults or violence toward Jews. Or perhaps it’s because I’m convinced the “Mad Mullah” caricature of Iran and likening of any compromise with it to Munich 1938 — a position popular in some American Jewish circles — is misleading and dangerous.

Oh, I'm sure the fact that Roger Cohen is an internationally-known, Western journalist has nothing to do with the civility accorded to him. As for that pithy sentence about facts and words, it would be better applied to Iran's denial of its nuclear ambitions. And do bombing Jewish community centers and arming Hizbullah also amount to "mere words"?

The Iranian Nuclear Program

The snippet of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released on December 3 was a blow to those supporting tighter sanctions against Iran. The report, based on data from sixteen American agencies as well as shared information from the larger intelligence community - most significantly from the United Kingdom, but also from France, Italy, and even Israel (see Melman's piece in Ha'aretz) - argued that "in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." For many of those who opposed stricter measures against Iran (Russia and China) and those luke-warm about more meaningful steps (Germany), the report was welcome ammunition in the international war of words. A number of analysts declared that this American own-goal had wiped the military option off the table.

On the other hand, British intelligence sources disputed the veracity of the report, attributing the conclusions to the U.S. intelligence agents' misinterpretation of Iranian decoy conversations. Meanwhile, Israeli officials, most notably Defense Minister Ehud Barak, have vehemently criticized the American conclusions. Some American as well as Israeli commentators have raised the specter of a U.S. betrayal of its ally.

Of course, any hardline posturing by Barak should be evaluated with an eye to the domestic political front. The Labor Party defense minister in Olmert's government is trying as much as possible to profit from opportunities that the Iranian crisis as well as the ongoing qassam fire from Gaza provide him as he distinguishes his security record from that of Kadima and the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, no one is playing around merely to gain approval ratings. Israel is right to challenge the NIE and the interpretations of it advanced by those who have long been intent on throwing sticks in the spokes of the sanctions-wheel.

Iran did not stop its work out of humanitarian convictions about the evils of nuclear weapons. The regime fears both a preemptive military attack and international isolation. But it also knows the rewards that it would gain from reaching nuclear status. The Iranians, are thus going to do everything possible to continue covert work that would enable them to produce a nuclear weapon within a short period of time, even with a frozen nuclear program. As the NIE acknowledges, Iran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons (NIE, p. 9)."

Unfortunately, the NIE undermines the very mechanisms that led to increased international pressure against the Iranian regime. Without the credible threat of an American military option, the incentives for such states as Russia, China, or even Germany to support tougher sanctions against Iran decline dramatically. Where there were once two sticks - sanctions and a military strike - only one of these remains today. If the world refuses to see a nuclear Iran as a problem, Israel has no choice but to devote all its resources to developing a credible answer to the challenge.

It does not matter whether or not Iran is a "rational" actor. Iran's rise to the nuclear powers' club would be disastrous for American as well as Israeli interests in the region. This is not a moral argument about who deserves to have nuclear weapons but a simple statement of the geopolitics involved. There are some who think that the Middle East will be a better place with the Islamic Republic projecting hard power in the Gulf and in the Levant. Others appear to be longing for a day when the U.S. is no longer able to secure the world's most important oil shipping lanes without the cooperation of other powers. They will regret this when it is too late.

I have to agree with Rosner that this report should never have been published. It may very well have taken the winds out of the diplomatic struggle against Iran's drive for nuclear weapons.

Gender Trouble in Iran

Israel's Dana International (née Yaron Cohen) in her latest single,
"Indian Movie" - a cultural artifact that deserves a separate post

Last Thursday (October 18), I had the privilege of hearing Afsaneh Najmabadi, Professor of History and of Studies of Women, Gender and Sexuality at Harvard University, speak at Berkeley. In a week in which I attended talks and discussions featuring speakers from Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk to anthropologist of religion Talal Asad, her talk on "Transing and Transpassing Across Sex-Gender Walls in Iran" took the crown.

While many of us were busy worrying about Iran's progress toward developing nuclear weapons and the country's hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East, it appears that the Islamic Republic has quietly asserted its dominance in other realms. Most notably, Iran has become one of the global leaders in sex change operations.

Iran's progress in this area, though largely ignored by the intelligence community, has received a fair amount of coverage in the Western press over the past 3 years or so (see this piece, which appeared in the Guardian in 2005). Much of this coverage betrays a mixture of celebration and surprise. Najmabadi, currently in the beginning stages of what will surely be a fascinating work, presented some of the findings of her research conducted in 2006 in Iran, which does much to demystify the accounts in the press.

Iranian clerics today, basing themselves on classical Islamic discourse which posits all bodies have one true sex (either female or male), believe that in some cases medical expertise is needed to reveal what a given individual's true sex is. Having been identified as a female in a male's body (or vice versa), one may choose to have one's body fixed.

Thus, the legal situation in Iran today, based on some pioneering fatwas by Khomeini from the late 1960s, is such that individuals wishing to undergo sex-change operations (male to female or female to male) can do so, provided they a) pass a process of certification that grants them official status as transsexuals, and b) have the necessary funds to pay for the surgery.

The certification process requires producing a plausible narrative to the authorities of one's transsexuality, and passing a test - neither of which are significant obstacles for Iranian transsexuals, who like everyone else in the country are apparently excellent test-takers and have formed support networks to help their peers prepare for the interviews to assure a "pass." The legal recognition of one's transsexuality procures a number of important benefits, including an exemption from military conscription and coverage for particular medical expenses. So much for the good news.

Now the bad news. For one, legal recognition does not mean social acceptance. Here, the problem seems to be far more acute for men wishing to undergo operations to become females. Even after they have undergone operations, M to F transsexuals are stigmatized as men who are "anal" (i.e., on the receiving end of anal penetration). On the other hand, F to M transsexuals, according to Najmabadi often meet with more acceptance by their family (which can sometimes score real economic gains as a result) and experience an elevation in their own social status.

However, one of the most pernicious consequences of the current situation, which legalizes transsexuality, has been the increasing strength of a naturalizing and medicalizing discourse, which makes essential distinctions between homosexuality and transsexuality. Homosexuality (technically, the criminal code outlaws sodomy) remains strictly forbidden, with sex change operations promoted as a "cure" to this "disease." Najmabadi attributes the large number of sex-change operations in part to the illegality of homosexuality. The effects of sex-change operations on same-sex partnerships are often devastating for the people involved.

Najmabadi is the author of several other very interesting studies, including a book on Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity - definitely a subject that has long occupied me . She also contributes to Iranian.com; I especially recommend her column, "Some of us like our women hairy" to all those with parsi-ness in them.

Scattered Thoughts on Ahmadinejad

1. The clip of Ahmadinejad denying that there are homosexuals in Iran and the audience's reaction is still making me crack up every time I see it.

2. It wasn't nice or pretty, but Lee Bollinger did the right thing in basically humiliating Ahmadinejad with his introduction and questions.

3. Having said that, I still think Columbia erred in having the man speak at the university. My reasoning: people will believe the most ridiculous things when they are repeated often enough on television. That may sound cynical, but I think the billions of dollars spent on advertising back me up on this. Everyone knew that Ahmadinejad's appearance would draw international coverage, and that his performance would later be watched by millions on television. In effect, Columbia University's decision gave the man yet another opportunity to repeat his lies and idiocy in front of a prime-time audience.

4. Ahmadinejad is probably not all that interested in what Columbia University students think of him. His real intended audience: Arab masses and disgruntled elites (not the Iranian people). His message: Iran is the true protector of Arab and Muslim interests - whether it be in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, or Iraq. His implicit target: the autocratic, US-supported regimes in the Middle East.

Columbia University to Host Ahmadinejad

It looks like Columbia University will indeed play host to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the occasion of his visit to the UN General Assembly. From what I have heard, competition for tickets to the event is fierce. Everyone seems to want to hear this man speak. I think those responsible for this event are making a mistake.

Columbia University President Lee Bollinger believes that he will be able to use the occasion to put "pointed and challenging questions" to Ahmadinejad. In particular, Bollinger seemed to have in mind the Iranian president's record of Holocaust denial. While I applaud the intentions of Bollinger and others, who want to use Ahmadinejad's lecture as a forum to critique the Iranian president's past remarks and the regime's policies, I fear that they are miscalculating.

All of us in the academy are interested in the free exchange of ideas and the pursuit of truth in which it is supposed to result. But we also accept restrictions on the search for knowledge. For example, ethical scholars will not use data acquired from medical experiments that were conducted on human subjects without their permission. The ethical test with respect to having Ahadinejad speak at Columbia University should not be based on his stance toward U.S. policy in the Middle East. Russian President Vladimir Putin or China's Hu Jintao oppose many key aspects of American foreign policy. They also head regimes with less than stellar democratic credentials. But this is not the issue.

What matters most, in the context of an invitation extended by a university, is Ahmadinejad's public denial of the Holocaust in the past. This is not because the Holocaust is inherently "sacred." The same would apply if Ahmadinejad denied that the French Revolution never happened. Rather, his pseudo-academic initiatives to question a supposed "taboo" on free inquiry into the genocide of European Jewry (read: his effort to engage in willful distortion and negation of a subject whose historicity has been confirmed by thousands of scholarly publications) challenge the core of the university's guiding principles. The public sphere that the university presents is not a free-for-all open to every crackpot and conspiracy theorist with a fondness for spinning yarns. Such a model of the university would drive the pursuit of truth into intellectual bankruptcy. Professors and students would be occupied permanently with fending off unlimited attacks from those unbound by the chains of logic, procedure, respect, and the standards of academic disciplines. Unfortunately, the very admission of such individuals into the world of scholarship bestows credibility on them.

While I would not equate Wolf Blitzer of "The Situation Room" with the academy, I think it is worth watching his interview (see YouTube box above) with Holocaust denier David Duke to see how damaging it can be to give people like these even a modicum of respectability. They do not deserve to enter our classrooms and lecture halls.

Unfortunately, Proverbs gives conflicting advice. In 26:4 we read, "Don't answer a fool according to his foolishness, lest you too will be like him," while 26:5 tell us "Answer a fool according to his foolishness, lest he will appear clever in his own eyes."

משלי כו:ד-ה
אַל-תַּעַן כְּסִיל, כְּאִוַּלְתּוֹ: פֶּן-תִּשְׁוֶה-לּוֹ גַם-אָתָּה.
עֲנֵה כְסִיל, כְּאִוַּלְתּוֹ: פֶּן-יִהְיֶה חָכָם בְּעֵינָיו

European Division on Iran

It looks like Sarkozy and Kouchner have dramatically re-oriented French foreign policy on Iran. For the first time, the U.S. is getting rhetorical support from Europe in its attempts to ratchet up the pressure on the Iranian regime. The Germans, on the other hand, have been far more reluctant to endorse calls for more aggressive economic sanctions lately - in part, because as one of Iran's biggest trading partners, they have the most to lose.

In light of all this, I continue to be amazed by what passes for analysis at the Süddeutsche Zeitung. While the commentator acknowledges that German "skepticism" is based on economic interests, there is no attempt to explain Kouchner's logic or French interests in the matter. Instead, we get a vague mixture of a morality that sees all threats of military force as taboo and the condescension at which the German center-left excels: "Klug war es nicht" ([Kouchner's statement] was not very clever).

Recent Israeli Air Force Action

I am fairly confident that the recent incident on the Turkish-Syrian border, where Syria alleges it repulsed an Israeli fighter jet from its air space, will not result in military retaliation by Damascus. However, this latest incident might very well be used as a pretext by Syrian proxies in Lebanon and in the territories to attempt some kind of "counter-attack." If successful, such an attack might very well lead to an escalation of Syrian-Israeli tensions.

The incident took place on Thursday at dawn. Only the Turks and Syrians so far have released information based on first-hand observation as well as their own agendas. So far, the Syrians have alleged that the plane dropped munitions on a deserted area, while the Turks have displayed a jettisoned F-15 fuel-tank. Israeli sources have remained silent about the news, and the U.S. has not commented either.

What is the meaning of this report? I think we can safely discard the preposterous web of conjectures spun by Joshua Landis to allege a neo-con, North Korea connection. This is obviously about issues much closer to home. In an earlier post on Thursday, Landis asked, with faux exasperation, "What is this about?" and answered that "One has to believe it is an intentional provocation." This again seems to me off the mark.

I think there are two possible explanations for this incident. The IAF pilot was either engaging in a routine reconnaissance flight over Syria and due to an operational failure strayed into territory covered by the country's anti-aircraft installations, or, more likely, this was an operation designed specifically to test the current state of Syrian anti-air defense. In the latter case, we have to ask whether the IAF's performance can be judged a success. The pilot involved (so far, we know of only one plane, but there were probably others) escaped without harm or damage to the plane but was forced to jettison cargo and munitions, probably to speed up the getaway. On the other hand, given the expectation before the summer that there might be a war between Damascus and Jerusalem, it might have been preferable to avoid detection entirely, or at least to avoid giving Syria concrete proof that an incursion had occurred.

With evidence in hand, Syria is likely to do the most it can in the diplomatic realm to force Arab states to take rhetorical "measures." This could be detrimental to Israeli and American efforts at the upcoming peace conference, and it might serve as a handy diversionary measure by Iran and Syria at the UN. Turkey, too, is in an awkward position, as the Israelis most likely did enter the country's air space. We can expect some grandstanding from them, as they try to appease the Syrians and the Arab states, who will seize the opportunity to condemn Turkey for its collaboration with Israel.

There are some who see this incident as related to American plans for an aerial raid on Iran, or a joint Israeli-American offensive against Syria. I don't think either of these conclusions apply, but there is no doubt that Israel, the U.S., Syria, and Iran are paying especially close attention both to the actual evidence being reported and to the gains they may harvest through the information war in the media and the diplomatic sphere. Turkey, too, is doubtlessly probing carefully what Israel and/or the Americans might be up to.

Rocket Wars of Attrition: the Lessons from Summer 2006

Antidote to the post that follows below: Shlomi Saranga and Moshik Afia, "Sweet Dream" (2002)

I have not seen a great deal of discussion about a recent report, citing unnamed UN officials, that Iran is deploying missiles in Syria. Obviously, Syria already possesses a significant arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles as well as the type of katyusha rockets used with such effectiveness by Hizbullah against Israel in last summer's war. It should surprise no one that in the wake of Israel's failure to stop Hizbullah's fire on the country's civilian population, the Syrians see these kinds of missiles as their best strategy. The question is, what can Israel do about it?

The Israeli military has yet to come up with a military doctrine to counter a rocket-based war of attrition, as the surrender of Sderot to the Palestinian qassams showed. Worse, it does not look like the Israeli military and government have explained to the public what exactly the country is up against. Despite Gabi Ashkenazi's replacement of Dan Halutz as Chief of the General Staff, a great deal of air force spin continues to dominate assessment of the last war. One of the myths still circulating is that the air force's "launcher hunting" doctrine was able to take out most of Hizbullah's Iranian-supplied long-range missiles. A report by Uzi Rubin of Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies released this month argues that the "intensity of long-range rocket attacks" in fact "remained fairly constant" throughout the war, averaging 4 per day (Rubin, "The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War," p. 25).

Rubin makes it clear that Hizbullah "dominated the battle of the rockets" (p. 13). Neither the air force nor the late ground invasion (and definitely not the aimless artillery barrages) succeeded in stopping or diminishing the intensity of Hizbullah's attack. While it is true that toward the end of the war the air force managed to destroy every launcher from which rockets had been fired - reducing the sensor-to-shoot time to one minute (an unprecedented achievement) - as every resident of the north can attest, Nasrallah was able to give Israeli civilians a bitter reminder of who owned them until the last day before the cease fire (see all of Carmia's entries from August 13 for a taste).

All this was accomplished using very simple weapons. Rubin concludes that few if any Iranian rockets hit Israel, one of the exceptions being a Fadjr-3 240 mm rocket that struck Haifa. Another Iranian rocket may have surfaced in Beirut, after an air force attack blew it up, sending a large cylindrical object flying into the air; some enthusiastic Hizbullah fans at the time mistook it for a downed Israeli F-16 (see J.'s post).

The majority of the rockets fired at Israel were 122 mm Grad rockets with 50 km range, 220 mm (70 km), and some 302 mm (90-100 km). Most of these were fired from launch batteries with 4 tubes; at least one launcher had 12 tubes. For the heavier rockets, Hizbullah tended to use mobile launchers, which it fired from residential areas. The lighter rockets, on the other hand, appear to have been fired using stationary launchers that were camouflaged and hidden slightly underground in agricultural areas. Katyusha crews would use hydraulic mechanisms or manual levers to raise these launchers up and then fire them using remote controls. These stationary launchers were set up long before the war, and each one was aimed at a different destination in Israel. They would be fired once every twenty-four hours - but Hizbullah may have had up to 150 such sites (Rubin, p. 9).

Altogether, Hizbullah's "strategic rocketing" killed 41 Israeli civilians, and 12 soldiers (the Kfar Giladi incident), seriously wounded 250 noncombatants, and caused 100,000-250,000 to flee their homes. It also destroyed 2,000 dwellings. Ironically, "passive defence" saved the most Israeli civilians' lives. More specifically, early warning systems, staying in bunkers and safe rooms, or following the instructions about retreating to the south side of apartments in many cases prevented casualties(here's a related sample of unfunny humor from those times: "It would be nice to shower first but the bathroom faces north (that's bad, not because of the feng shui)) .

Recently, I came across something that Nobody wrote, in which he mentioned the dangers of taking for granted Israel's supposed military superiority as well as its permanent presence in the region. I don't remember his exact wording, but he seemed to be taking on one of his favorite targets, reckless "peace lunatics." I have to say that when it comes to Syria, we would do very well to heed the advice of Nobody as well as of our Lebanese friends. I, too, have been guilty of enthusiasm about Syrian "channels." But as this latest missile deployment and their intertwined strategies in Lebanon show, the Syrians and the Iranians are committed to an alliance that will take a lot more than engagement to undo.

Iranians Humiliated?

Ahmadinejad releases Brits
(Photo: Iranian TV screenshot)

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad today announced that his country would release the 15 British sailors and marines that his country captured nearly two weeks ago. He made the surprise announcement at a press conference. It was apparently preceded by one of his infamous tirades, in which he harangued Britain for bringing the case up before the Security Council and complained about the invasion of Iraq.

Even if Ahmadinejad dressed it up as a "present" from the Iranian to the British people, I wonder how many Iranians will be convinced that the abduction was a smart move. There should be no doubt that Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials who supported this operation have suffered a humiliating defeat. On this matter, I could not disagree more with Zvi Bar'el, who sees the whole episode as a victory for Iran. According to the Ha'aretz writer, the British reliance on diplomatic means

will now be used by Iran as proof that even powers such as the U.S. and Britain are limited in their ability to use force when it comes to a minor border incident - and that the threat Iran poses is precisely in initiating local incidents that are not sufficiently important to lead to war.

I see no evidence for this. If this is what the Iranians have concluded, they will continue to make serious miscalculations. At the end of the day, the whole operation was for naught; I cannot see the slightest tangible gain that Iran might have derived from it.

True, the Guardian reports "speculation that the release was prompted in part by an agreement to let an Iranian representative meet five Iranians detained by US forces in Irbil, northern Iraq, in January." However, even if the Iranians obtained the rights to visit their diplomats or intelligence agents, no one is going to confirm this. Especially after the announcements by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair that there would be "no quid pro quo," it will be difficult for the Iranians to point to any sort of favorable outcome. The British have repeatedly presented their GPS evidence to the Iranians and to international bodies; in the court of international opinion, the U.K.'s insistence that its troops were "well inside Iraqi waters" is likely to prevail.

Some might argue that at least the Iranians demonstrated their abilities to cause trouble for coalition forces. I would respond, however, that the British will be much more careful from now in all their patrols. They are unlikely to allow their troops to be captured again without some resistance. As for Iranian meddling in Basra and elsewhere in Iraq, it continues to harm coalition and Iraqi forces. But all this was clear before the Revolutionary Guards brushed up on their Piracy 101 skills. The statement by one British crew member, who thanked Ahmadinejad for his "forgiveness" will be seen by the world for what it is - Byzantine manipulation by a weak regime desperate to cover up its silly miscalculation.

In retrospect, it appears that the British did the right thing. By staying calm but not backing down on their core positions (at least not in public), they called Iran's bluff. When I heard about the release of the British troops, I wondered if the case might be instructive for other abduction scenarios - such as the one that sparked the Second Lebanon War. But I think that this is not the type of lesson we can draw from this particular incident. The kind of poker game that the British and Iranians were playing relies on the rules of the international system that regulates interactions between states.

Matters change dramatically when states are confronted with non-state actors. As much as I would criticize the nature of Israel's military response to the abductions of its soldiers, first by a Palestinian faction in the south and then by Hizbullah in the north - a response which ultimately proved ineffective - I don't think Israel could have obtained the kind of outcome that the British achieved. Neither the Palestinian factions nor Hizbullah respond to the threats of international sanctions. Their interests cannot be easily damaged, except by direct military confrontation. And even then, the options are very limited and likely to prove unsuccessful.

From Covert to Overt

Royal Marines practicing an amphibious assault (Photo: Royal Navy)

Until Revolutionary Guards abducted 15 British sailors and marines at gunpoint last week, the war between Iran and the U.S. and Britain had been confined to covert operations. These included kidnappings of Iranian intelligence operatives by American and Iraqi forces on the one hand, and Iranian terrorist attacks on U.S. soldiers on the other. Furthermore, the U.S. has probably been encouraging attacks on military targets in Iranian Baluchistan. The initial response in Britain and elsewhere to the latest Iranian provocation was muted. It is now clear, however, that this operation was not merely a repeat of previous Iranian shenanigans in the Gulf.

It might all end well in the end, but there is something quite different afoot here. In an earlier post, Noah K remarked on the obscurity of the "game of brinkmanship" played by the Iranians. It certainly came as a big surprise. To me, it looks like some radical elements in the Iranian regime are running the show; the preposterous demands for a British apology, and the manipulative use of the captured troops are evidence of that. It seemed possible at the beginning that the Brits might still bow to these ridiculous demands. But the publication of a second letter by the female sailor, obviously dictated by an Iranian interrogator, and the refusal to release her after all, might arouse even the phlegmatic British public. Let's remember that the Second Lebanon War started with the kidnapping of two soldiers by the Iranian-backed Hibullah, also suspiciously close to important deliberations about the Iranian nuclear program. British Prime Minister Tony Blair obviously did not want to walk into a trap, hoping instead that a calm response would do the trick. But things are not looking so great now, especially if it is true that the radicals are in command.

Given how serious the situation appears, it is strange that there have not been more statements by the allies. There has been hardly any saber-rattling from the Americans, for example. The quiet is rather eerie.

The rebuff that the British received at the Security Council, where Russia, China, and possibly others apparently scuttled a sharper condemnation of the incident, which would have declared that the British troops were in Iraqi not Iranian waters, was not widely publicized. Maybe the Russians and the Chinese were worried that an explicit judgment against Iran on the location of the British troops would have provided the Americans and the British with sufficient casus belli that could be invoked by them further down the line. As scary as it sounds, I think that the U.S. is very close to war with Iran right now. It might all blow over, but only if the Iranians flinch. But the Americans and the British will surely make a show of force in the coming days, with the hope that the moderates in Iran will compel the radicals to back down.

Gulf Heating Up

The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (Source: frenchnavy.free.fr)

The US Navy flexed its muscles Tuesday in its strongest show of force in the Persian Gulf since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Two aircraft carriers, 100 warplanes, 10,000 US military personnel participating in war games in the cramped and contested straits of the Gulf, the fabled French carrier Charles de Gaulle nearby -- it all sounds like an attempt to clue Tehran into its own vulnerability.

Yet the entire game of brinkmanship being played out in the Gulf between British, American, and Iranian players is, to my mind, entirely obscure at present. What's behind the Iranians' capture of 15 British sailors? If you believe the notorious John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN, the Iranians timed their stunt to coincide with the Security Council vote last Saturday on tightening sanctions against them. On the other hand, the British, at least some of them, seem to believe that the Iranian's had in mind a prisoner exchange of Brits for Iranian agents captured by the US in Iraq.

Also, does anyone else have the impression that this story isn't drawing the press coverage or comment it merits? Some Brits do. Guardian columnist Max Hastings blames Britain's loss of worldwide moral authority. While that may have something to do with a lack of sympathy coming from some quarters, in Britain and the US, I get the sense that leaders are anxiously awaiting developments. This may explain Tony Blair's cryptic public statement:

"What we are trying to do at the moment is to pursue this through the diplomatic channels and make the Iranian government understand these people have to be released and that there is absolutely no justification whatever for holding them. I hope we manage to get them to realise they have to release them. If not, then this will move into a different phase."

Self-Esteem and the Iranians

Ahmadinejad Spins a Yarn

I've long thought that many in the West underestimate or misunderstand altogether the role of Persian "self-esteem" in propelling the conflict forward. This is something I hope to take up in a future post. Of course this is not entirely off the Bush team's radar. Just last month, in unveiling to the press accusations of Iranian involvement in the production of roadside bombs used in Iraq, Bush spoke of the Iranian people's "proud history." And just last week, R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, said of the Iranians, "They are a proud, well-educated people with a rich history."

Ahmadinejad's mastery of manipulating this emotion can only be gauged by someone who understands Farsi. Still, I thought I would post this notorious clip, which, I'm told, demonstrates this nicely. In it the Iranian President boasts of the native genius of a 16 year-old girl who discovered nuclear energy in her basement! Wikiquote had this translation:

"A high school student contacted me a little while ago, telling me "Mr. [Ahmadinejad]! We got a 13-16 year old girl, third year high school student, majoring in math/physics. She came to me saying, Ms. teacher I've discovered nuclear energy in our house. "Do something about it" I told her to set up a meeting at school, ask [the student] couple of questions, check how serious she is. They hold the meeting, examined her, and realized it looks to be serious. They informed me, [then] I called the head of the Iranian Atomic Agency and told him: "Dear Sir! A high school girl says something like this! Verify [her claim], if she's right then support her" [They] invited our nuclear scientist-whose average age is below 25. [The nuclear scientists] set up a meeting and invited her to inquiry. They found out she is right. They told her let's go to your house and see what are you up to. They went to her house and realized this 3rd year high school girl, with the help of her elder brother, has got some gadgets from the bazaar, assembled them and produced nuclear energy, FOR REAL! So now, [nuclear scientists] have [hired] her- now she's a nuclear scientist too. They have set up an escort for her, [she] comes, goes, has driving service, a chauffeur! This is self esteem!"

Answering Ahmadinejad

The homepage of Yad Vashem's Farsi site

Yad Vashem recently launched a Farsi-language site with information about the Shoah. Since it went online about two weeks ago, more than 20,000 people have accessed the site, including 6,000 from Iran. This is equivalent to the number of people who access the English-language site every year, Ha'aretz reports.

For more details, see my post on Genats-Lehayim.

Iranians in the Gaza Strip?

Scenes from Gaza

The Israeli government has long maintained that Iran is directly involved in funding and training Hamas's military wing. Debka has frequently made sensationalist claims about the presence of Iranian agents in the Gaza Strip. Today, it was Fatah's turn.

According to members of the Presidential Guard or National Security Force, Fatah succeeded in apprehending 7 Iranians and in seizing large quantities of light and heavy weapons after storming the Islamic University in Gaza this Thursday night. Even if this claim, reported by Ha'aretz and the BBC, turns out to be wrong, and I have a strong feeling that it's a Fatah propaganda campaign, one could well regard tonight as another watershed moment. Both Hamas and Fatah appear to be getting large supplies of weapons - Hamas from Iran, and Fatah from the United States with the consent and passive assistance of Israel and Egypt. Perhaps tonight a "preventive battle" is being fought by one side or the other - Hamas could end up depicting its attacks on the Presidential Guard and the alleged arms convoy as a counter-strike against a planned coup. Fatah, for its part, may be raising the specter of Iranian involvement to galvanize Arab and Palestinian support for itself.

What is clear is that this conflict has intensified greatly in past months, surprising many veteran observers. The details of the clashes that broke out between Hamas and Fatah followers last month in the Gaza Strip were not widely reported. Ha'aretz, with its veteran Gaza reporters, Amos Har'el and Avi Issascaroff, was one of the few news sources to describe the viciousness of the unfolding civil war in detail. They described several cases of Hamas fighters surrounding the houses of Fatah-affiliated people, of executions and of torture (one teenager reported having acid thrown in his face after he was taken prisoner).

One of those targeted was Sufian Abu Zaide, a leading Fatah moderate from Gaza, whom I once had the pleasure of hearing, along with Issascaroff, at a conference organized by the Herzog Center at Ben-Gurion University in 2005. Abu Zaide is a member of Muhammad Dahlan's generation: he spent the first intifada in an Israeli prison in Beer Sheva, learned Hebrew, returned to Gaza in the early years of Oslo and maintained close ties to Israelis. As soon as the second intifada broke out in 2000, Abu Zaide left for the UK to begin studying for a Ph.D., which he eventually completed. Last month, Abu Zaide was kidnapped by Hamas, but was later released. What was supposed to be his future home was also leveled by Hamas members. Since then, he returned to Ben-Gurion another time to speak at another Herzog Center conference.

The latest events, and Hamas's role in breaking off the truce that was supposed to be brokered, first by Damascus, then by Riyadh, serves as yet more proof of the futility of negotiating with the movement at this stage. Contrary to the expectations of a number of supercilious observers, Hamas has not turned into the Turkish Welfare Party to which many compared it. Being allowed to participate in politics did not convince Hamas to disband its militia, just as political participation has failed to convince Hizbullah to disarm. Instead, Hamas has ended up using the weapons of its "resistance" against its political rivals. Contrary to what some British legislators have claimed recently, this development is not a response to the isolation of Hamas by western governments. Hamas is flexing its muscles - perhaps, in its view, pre-emptively - because it can. Even before Hamas came to power, the military balance of power in Gaza was in its favour. If Hamas had wanted to break out of the isolation supposedly imposed on it, it could have done so by renouncing its commitment to the destruction of Israel.