Sad Comment on Israeli Archaeology

Construction in Maaleh Hazeitim (Photo: cnn.com)

BY NOAH K.

This may seem like utter trivia, pure kishkushim just one day after Bibi met Obama, but excuse me, this is important: a ceramic vessel with a Hebrew inscription was found in East Jerusalem. Excavations in the Ras al-Amud section of the city uncovered a "water pitcher" bearing the name "Menachem," according to Ha'aretz, "marking the first time such a handle bearing this name has been found in Jerusalem." Never mind that the Israeli Antiquities Authority people who put out this information to the press don't/can't date the vessel anymore precisely than "somewhere between the Canaanite era (2200 - 1900 B.C.E.) and the end of the first Temple period (the 7th - 8th centuries B.C.E.) [sic]," which I suppose means either that they haven't looked at it very closely in their haste, or that it's the kind of household ware that sometimes doesn't change significantly for centuries, even for a millenium. Never mind the gross hazards of trying to identify this particular Menachem, with, say, some pharaonic official in the region. The point is if course that the IAA found an Israelite in East J-lem.

So what's the big deal? As I have noted before on this blog, the legal status of excavations and of antiquities uncovered in East Jerusalem (and perhaps elsewhere in the territories), both under Israeli law and under international agreements on cultural heritage, is at best murky. What drives archaeology in East Jerusalem is settler money. And the IAA and other relevant authorities tend to look the other way when enforcement of the law conflicts with the objectives of organizations like the Ir David Foundation. Here, we have something slightly different -- a salvage excavation. Construction of a "girl's school" uncovered some ancient remains that, presumably, were then taken out scientifically. Just like nearby Siwan, another hotspot neighborhood, Ras al-Amud has attracted both controversial settlement building, at Maaleh Hazeitim, and archaeological interest. As Nadav Shragai wrote last year in Ha'aretz:

"Right-wing activists ascribe great significance to widening Jewish construction in Ras al-Amud, and to realizing ownership of lots and buildings that it has managed to acquire in recent years in that vicinity.

According to their thinking, Maaleh Hazeitim makes it harder to create a Palestinian territorial corridor, a sort of "safe passage" between the West Bank to the east, and the Temple Mount."

For me, this is very disconcerting; obviously a combustible situation . The best way to avoid another outbreak of violence like the one we saw surrounding the Dung Gate controversy is to depoliticize archaeology as much as possible in greater Jerusalem.

"Health Expo" Exposed: Undercover Missionaries

BY CARMIA

I picked up a flyer last week at the Haifa Cinematheque advertising a "Health Expo" at the Auditorium, to take place from May 3-8. The expo promised free medical checks such as blood pressure, body fat percentage, and best of all, free massages. Yesterday I finally had some free time to check it out, but the experience turned into something completely different from what I had expected. It's interesting to see how missionary groups operate in Israel.

I had the choice of doing registration in English, Russian, or Romanian, oddly enough. The young man who took my details told me he had moved to Israel two weeks ago with his wife. I was then ushered to the first "station," where I was measured and weighed. Each of the attendants manning the stations wore a white overcoat and was either Romanian or Russian, with limited Hebrew. All of the attendants were either from abroad or fairly new to Israel, and were exceptionally nice.

The next stations were blood pressure and the peak flow metre. After doing the lung capacity test, I was encouraged to leave my contact information on a form and tick off the "courses" in which I was interested (cardiovascular disease, stop smoking, new start, happy life seminar, etc.). The form was titled 'Folow Up Interest' [sic], and the logo included the slogan "Association promoting activities on education, health, and family." My registration form also included the following invitation:

IF YOU CARE FOR YOUR HEALTH AND HAPPINESS!

If you want to continue to learn more on how you can prevent and treat disease, learn practical solution for a healthier life, and share your experience with other people interested in same area:

YOU ARE INVITED TO THE HAIFA HEALTH CLUB!

I was also given an assortment of brochures with the following titles (translated from Hebrew): Rest, Moderation, (Fresh) Air, Physical Activity, Sunlight, Water, Proper Nutrition, and Faith.

I didn't have a chance to look at the brochures until the exercise pulse and pulse recovery rate station when I had to sit quietly for five minutes. I noticed that the pamphlet on faith, even though written in Hebrew, used a lot of the key words and phrases that I've come across in Christian literature. It stressed "a personal connection with G-d" and that in order to trust G-d, we must get to know Him, which can be done by reading Holy Scriptures. These pamphlets, by the way, were also available in Russian and Romanian (but not English). After the "biological age" station, the Swedish massage, and the cholesterol and glucose station, I sat down to wait my turn for the last station, a personal meeting with a doctor. While waiting, I told the young woman next to me that I thought this event may actually be a missionary Christian event. She expressed complete surprise and doubt, but said, in Russian-accented Hebrew, that now she would 'davka' go in order to see what this was all about. I afterwards saw her speaking with her (boy?)friend, who I understood worked at the event. When I asked him about his involvement, he said he only handed out flyers. I also saw her speak to another attendant, who then came straight over to me and told me that I had nothing to worry about. The doctor told me I should change my lifestyle.

I was becoming more and more curious if my theory was correct when I finally came across the sentence,

"המנוחה האולטימטיבית נמצאת בישוע. תנו לאלוהים את הקשיים והצרות שלכם ותקבלו את מחילתו ואת שלומו"

The ultimate respite lies in Jesus. Give G-d your difficulties and burdens and receive His absolution and peace.

almost at the very end of the Rest pamphlet.

On my way out, I saw the manager and one of the attendants who had told me my "biological age." I started asking a few questions, but found them to be extremely evasive. For example, I asked to know more about the "faith" which they were advocating in the Faith pamphlet. The manager told me it's just about belief in general - hoping and trusting. I asked to know what exactly that means, but the manager, who was from Romania and didn't know Hebrew, wouldn't really elaborate. He told me that this expo was only about health and feeling good. I asked some more questions, but again, he was very evasive. When I pointed out that a very specific faith, Christianity, was being advocated, the (boy)friend of the woman I spoke to earlier flatly denied it. When I showed them the brochure with the Jesus citation, the manager said he couldn't read Hebrew and didn't know what it said. After the attendant translated for him, the manager told me that this was a (mis?)translation from America. Then the manager went on to tell me that he keeps the Sabbath, eats "kosher vegetarian" food, and reads the Torah.

The attendant, who actually spoke (accented) Hebrew told me that it's about helping people and making them feel good. When I asked him who was finacing the expo, he told me "we're a charity organization," but wouldn't tell me which organization that was. The money apparently comes from donation. Okay, but who would donate money to this? He said many of the donations were from abroad from people who want others to "feel good." He also said, "who else will take care of these people? I see people here who are so unhappy. The woman behind you is 65 and just lost her husband. Who's going to help her, the government?" By now I had understood that this attendant, as some of the others, was an Russian immigrant, probably with some Jewish background, who had been living in Israel for some time.

I also commented that I found it strange that many of the visitors to this expo seemed to actually be friends with the attendants and not random Haifans who had come to check out the Health Expo. It was now after closing hours, and many of the "visitors" had actually stayed on and were chatting with the attendants. The (boy)friend then said, "Yes, we're a small community." At this point, the three finally admitted that they were Adventists. They conceded that part of their "total health" plan included spreading the gospel, but they hurried to reassure me that nothing was being forced on anyone.

After I arrived at home, I started doing my online research to complete the picture. Apparently, the Health Expo is a strategy that the Adventist group uses to evangelicalize around the world, but they seem to be much more open in other places regarding their true message.

The flyers which the group had used to advertise the expo had been printed in Hebrew, Russian, and Romanian. On the flyer, it was mentioned that the fair was being co-sponsored with the non-profit HOR organization, which is a Romanian Jewish association in Israel. I wonder if they realized that Jesus was part of what they were sponsoring.

Natan Sharansky, from Refusenik to Likudnik to Publicist

 

BY NOAH S.        

Natan Sharansky, the famous Soviet dissident and Israeli political leader, spoke yesterday evening at the University of California, Berkeley. Freshly appointed by Prime Minister Netanyahu to head the Jewish Agency for Israel, Sharansky is touring college campuses in an attempt to foster a more positive image of Israel among American youth. The audience in the large lecture hall, however—considering the stature of the guest and the amount of publicity for the event—was surprisingly sparse and composed largely (in this author’s estimation, at least) of non-students who were old enough to remember Sharansky when he was a hero for Americans and Jews during the Cold War. But then, this is Berkeley—a “haven” for “anti-Israel forces,” as the student organizers put it—the speaker was Sharansky—famous now more as George W. Bush's favorite author than anything else—and the event was part of the dubiously titled “Caravan for Democracy” series, which is funded by such local favorites as Media Watch International (a group aligned with Likud) and the Jewish National Fund (among other things, since 1901 a major land-owner in Palestine/Israel which still refuses to lease its land to Arabs). It is a shame, though, that more students were not in attendance, because they would have been challenged by a trenchant thinker with a compelling personal story to think through some of the basic justifications for the existence of a Jewish state.

The talk was brilliantly composed and delivered, though problematic upon close scrutiny. Sharansky structured his argument around “two ideas” which he claims share a “deep connection”: “the desire to be free” and “the desire to belong,” or between “democracy” and “identity.” (The connection between the two forms the basis of a course Sharansky is leading at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem.) Those familiar with his books The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (2004) and Defending Identity: Its Indispensable Role in Protecting Democracy (2008) will recognize the argument. It is directed mainly against those “intellectuals,” as he called them, who believe in “post-identity,” “post-nationalism,” “post-modernism,” and “multiculturalism” - in other words, the relativists who believe that “nothing is different, that everything is equal.” (Berkeley professors?)  In order to illustrate this caricatured line of thought, Sharansky quoted (God help us) none other than the hippie-icon John Lennon, who asked us in 1971 to “imagine” a world in which there are “no countries,” “no religion,” and “nothing to kill or die for.” (Actually, Sharansky only quoted “nothing to die for.”). The logic of Sharansky’s unnamed intellectuals, represented here by the post-Beatle, holds that “strong identities” like nationalism and religion are “the enemies of peace.” Strong identities in Europe supposedly led to two world wars; war is evil; therefore, identity is evil. For them, being a human rights activist and a nationalist is an internal contradiction. And by this logic, the nation-state of Israel, which claims to be a leader of the free world yet retains its identity as the homeland of only one people, is an anachronism in a post-identity Western world. Sharanksy has set out to prove these critics wrong.

Born Anatoly Borisovich Shcharansky in Donetsk, Ukraine (then the Soviet Union) in 1948, Sharansky never saw any contradiction between the desire to be free and the desire to belong because under the Soviet regime both were stifled if you were a Jew. He was neither allowed to voice a dissenting political opinion, nor to learn anything about his religious and cultural heritage. When he attempted to immigrate to Israel in 1973 and was refused passage—thus acquiring the title of refusenik—he became an outspoken dissident and spent years in Soviet prisons. He realized that he had found something—his Jewishness—which he was “willing to die for,” and it gave him the strength to withstand the KGB. In this brief biographical narrative, Sharansky did not take time to discuss why the struggle to express one’s political views and the struggle to express one’s cultural identity publicly—which in his case did coincide—should resonate with people growing up in a free world. A tighter case would have to be made; perhaps those who have read his latest book could chime in here. In any case, the argument offers some insight into the psychology of this Soviet dissident turned militant democrat.

In fact, most of the talk was about Sharansky’s own story, and the move from the personal to the contemporary political came only at the very end, in a rhetorical flourish when he accused European intellectuals of “having nothing to die for.” As a result, he claimed, when faced with a very small minority of possible fundamentalist terrorists whose identity is strong and who are willing to die for their cause, they feel bewildered and defenseless. In the wake of World War II, just as Europeans vowed never to fight again, Zionists vowed never to not fight again. Israel has paid the price in its international image for the post-war move toward pacifism and post-identity among "intellectuals," Sharansky claimed, because it became a nation-state precisely at the moment when the idea of the nation-state became unpopular. The Western nations said accusingly, “We have given up our nationalism, our colonialism - why not you?” Sharansky’s answer is that Israelis need to have a strong identity to fight and die (and kill) for if they are to defend against “all these totalitarian regimes” in its region. One senses that Sharansky’s experience in the Soviet prisons has left its indelible mark upon this man’s political philosophy. 

Worried about Iran?

With all due respect, this is much scarier. The Iranian problem is nothing compared to the challenge that India and the West (indeed, truly the whole world) face in Pakistan. 

Several current officials said that they were worried that insurgents could try to provoke an incident that would prompt Pakistan to move the weapons, and perhaps use an insider with knowledge of the transportation schedule for weapons or materials to tip them off. That concern appeared to be what Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was hinting at in testimony 10 days ago before the House Appropriations Committee. Pakistan’s weapons, she noted, “are widely dispersed in the country (NYT).”

The Michael Oren Pick and Lieberman Shenanigans

Photo: Shalem Center

BY AMOS

Ambassador Michael Oren

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu picked Michael Oren (b. 1955) as Israel's next ambassador to the United States. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has endorsed the appointment, and it will now have to be approved by the cabinet.

Oren, a professor with a Ph.D. from Princeton's Near Eastern Studies department, is a brilliant pick. An American Jew who immigrated to Israel in 1979 and served in the Paratroopers Brigade during the Lebanon war, and in numerous positions of leadership in the army thereafter, is truly at home in both Israel and the United States. He is the author of the definitive account of the Six-Day War that we have today (it will be definitive until Arab archives are opened up), and of another book on American conceptions of the Middle East. Oren is also a fantastic communicator who knows how to speak to different audiences. Having just finished a term as a visiting professor at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, he is primed to go. 

There are few Israeli prime ministers who would have been able to pull off such an appointment. So many of Israel's ambassadors these days, even to important posts, are mediocre political appointees. American Jews, in the past two decades, have been shut out of such postings. In choosing Oren, Netanyahu showed his ability to think outside of the box and that he is not afraid to be challenged. Oren, though affiliated with the right-of-center Shalem Center, is a pragmatist who knows that Israel cannot indefinitely occupy the West Bank. He is someone who understands what is going on in the White House these days. 

Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman

It is still not clear to me what the Foreign Minister himself is doing these days. Ha'aretz has a somewhat disturbing review of Lieberman's activities so far. 

Here are a few highlights:

Lieberman's schedule has become one of the Foreign Ministry's best-kept secrets. Aside from [...] a select few, no one - including very senior officials in his ministry - is privy to what Lieberman does with his time.

This secrecy has led to several embarrassing faux pas, such as when a meeting with a foreign counterpart had to be rescheduled and none of the participants were notified.

Okay, that happens. But:

Lieberman has made other contentious procedural changes within the realm of his public relations. Although the ministry has an entire publicity department comprising some 20 expert diplomats, Lieberman made the unprecedented decision to appoint newcomer Sivan Raviv - who has no prior experience - as his spokesman.

Is that wise?

And speaking of appointments:

He has named Bedouin diplomat Ishmael Khaldi as his ministerial adviser on the Arab world. The appointment was leaked to the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth under the headline "Lieberman's Arab advisor", hinting that it was an attempt to gloss over Lieberman's alleged racism.

Since then it has emerged that Khaldi has next to no Foreign Ministry experience in dealing with the Middle East, having never served as a representative in an Arab state or in a relevant branch.

Associates of Lieberman have stressed that despite Khaldi's lack experience in the region, the motive behind his appointment was "promotion of minorities in the Foreign Ministry."

I don't know what is worse, the pick or the statement, thereafter, that it was an "affirmative action" appointment. But who knows, maybe Khaldi will perform admirably in this job.

Is this a luke-warm endorsement or what?

Sources present at Lieberman's meetings with foreign officials have testified that his level of English is "good" and that he "succeeds in getting across his message."

There are many more anecdotes in the article itself. The last paragraph, which explains that Lieberman's office refused to answer a list of 12 questions submitted by Ha'aretz, testifies to a worrying break in relations with the media. It sounds as if Lieberman has written off Ha'aretz as irrelevant.

Here's Ha'aretz's take on the Kleine Zeitung interview discussed in my earlier post:

Foreign Ministry officials heard of [Lieberman's interview with the Austrian daily Kleiner Zeitoung [sic] last month, in which he declared his opposition to negotiations with Syria.] only when it was leaked to Israeli media. Only after an in-depth investigation did it become clear that this unknown newspaper was actually a local tabloid

It's pretty funny that it took an "in-depth investigation" to figure out that this "unknown newspaper" was a "local tabloid." I think the latter description is not entirely accurate; "small regional newspaper" would do it more justice. Also, as an Austrian friend of Noah K., L.E., has pointed out and as I also emphasized in my post, Christian Wehrschutz, who conducted the interview, is a respected journalist with extensive experience. L.E. adds, however, that

The question is only why he chose to put the interview [in the Kleine Zeitung] and not in the Presse, Standard or even NZZ (Swiss), with which he also has regular connections.

L.E.'s conclusions:

This interview appears where it does due to personal or newspaper politics. The [other] question would then be why he got that interview in the first place.

The last question is important indeed. If Wehrschutz presented himself as a freelancer, why was this one of the first interviews granted by Lieberman's office, specifically by his personal secretary Sigalit Levi, to a foreign journalist?

I'm really wondering in what language this interview was conducted - whether a translator was used or not.

AIPAC Case to be Dropped

The JTA is reporting that the charges against former American Israel Public Affairs (AIPAC) staffers Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman have been dropped. The espionage accusation against the two have been a gift to the self-appointed regulators of the "Israel Lobby." When you read someone like Juan Cole, you'd think the case against them was air-tight the moment the indictments were first announced. But for Cole and his gang, this will be just another piece of evidence for the suffocating power of AIPAC over American foreign policy. One hopes that they might be a tad less gleeful though.

Piracy

I have recently waded into the murky waters of the history of piracy in the Greco-Roman world. As a participant in a graduate seminar here at Berkeley on ancient Greek economic history, I prepared a presentation on a dossier of Greek inscriptions to do with attacks by sea and on the seas, and to do with local efforts to recoup losses, secure captives, and honor the benefactors who bailed the victims out in their time of need. All this amidst the first direct confrontation between the US military and Somali pirates, and more prolific bloggers weighing in on possible connections between the ancient Mediterranean and the contemporary Gulf of Aden.

It is often said that one man's pirate is another man's...well, you get the idea.  There is quite a debate in ancient history about whether piracy should be understood as just another form of economic activity. The Greeks of "Homeric Society," at least were somewhat ambivalent; as Nestor asks Telemachus in the third book of the Odyssey, "Are you a pirate (leistês) or a trader?" And, as Thucydides later noticed, Nestor was basically fine with the visitor being either. The term peiratês, when it appears in the Hellenistic period, is certainly one of abuse. No one self-identifies in our sources as one. Some then would argue that what distinguishes "piracy," which fed into markets for slaves and produced new ones for "protection," from any other normal, albeit violent, economic activity, was merely its lack of a state-issued grant of legitimacy, unlike Sir Walter Raleigh with his "letters of marque," or national armies when they engage in plunder under the cover of their uniforms. 

That isn't my position, but it got me thinking: what if the pirate draws his legitimacy -- and more than enough, at that -- from his immediate societal context? That the reaction of the Somali pirates to the ultimately lethal Navy Seal operation was to retaliate against non-US vessels, one Lebanese, I believe, was another hint that these people are playing by different rules. In other words, they have their own sources of legitimacy.

This is certainly one of the lessons to draw from this BBC interview with an active pirate, twenty-five years old and living in "the notorious den of Harardhere in central Somalia." Somehow, I don't think this is an unedited transcript.

"So it is no surprise to see us in the same water [as migrants], pirating in search of money - there is no difference. We have local support; most of the people here depend on pirates directly or indirectly. Because if there is a lot of money in the town they can get some through friendship, relatives or business. Also our work is seen by many in the coastal villages as legal and we are viewed as heroes."

Speaking of the economics of piracy, how about the significant Israeli presence in the security industry for both cruise and commercial ships in the region? Yet another high-value, specialized security export. On Saturday, a private Israeli security detail beat back pirates from a large German-Italian cruise ship. As it turns out, the Defense Ministry doesn't keep any statistics on the numbers of ex-IDF, many of them with specialized nautical training, working in that sector, though they do for arms dealing. It seems kind of unwise to me. Could we see a situation in the near future where an Israeli national gets more involved out there than the government would prefer?

American Jewish Fiction

Those looking for a great present, for whatever occasion, might consider Josh Lambert's delightful new guide to American Jewish Fiction published by JPS (2009), reviewed in JBooks. Here is a short description:

Roth, Mailer, Kellerman, Chabon, Ozick, Heller, and dozens of other celebrated writers are here, with their most notable works. Each entry includes a book summary, with historical context and background on the author.

Suggestions for further reading point to other books that match readers’ interests and favorite writers. And the introduction is a fascinating exploration of the history of and important themes in American Jewish Fiction, illustrating how Jewish writing in the U.S. has been in constant dialogue with popular entertainment and intellectual life.

Lambert is currently completing his dissertation, Unclean Lips: Obscenity and Jews in North American Literature, at the University of Michigan.

Erratic Behavior: Sign of Things to Come with the Netanyahu Government?

BY AMOS

One day Lieberman "cannot see Syria as a real partner for any kind of settlement" (see previous post), and the next he is "willing to negotiate," albeit "without preconditions" (Ha'aretz). This is diplomatic silliness. It looks we are going to see a lot of instant reversals with this new government. If you play hard to get on Saturday, you can't suddenly drop your skirt (or pants) on Sunday. The Prime Minister's Office has been strangely silent. Maybe they are hoping that Lieberman will render himself irrelevant. 

Avigdor Lieberman's Interview to the Austrian Kleine Zeitung

BY AMOS

Over the weekend Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman gave a long interview to the Austrian Kleine Zeitung, based in Graz, Styria. I cannot figure out how this paper, literally "The Little Newspaper," managed to secure the interview; it is a regional daily that appears mainly in the Austria provinces, with a circulation of 300,000. Most Austrians would go to the Viennese Presse (right-center) or Standard (left) for news of this sort. The interview, while occasionally vague and evasive, is surprisingly reasonable. Conclusion: Lieberman sounds much better in German than in Hebrew. The interview was probably conducted in Russian and then translated by the interviewer, Christian Wehrschütz, a correspondent with extensive experience in the Balkans as well as in Ukraine and Russia.

Some of the highlights follow with my quick and dirty translation.

On the peace process:

Wir hatten Regierungen, die aus politischen Tauben bestanden. Seit der Vereinbarung von Oslo, 1983 [SIC, should be 1993], haben ebendiese Regierungen sehr große Anstrengungen unternommen, eine dauerhafte Regelung für den Frieden zu finden. Wir haben die Hälfte von Judäa und Samaria sowie auch den Gaza-Streifen aufgegeben. Wir haben Tausende Juden umgesiedelt und Milliarden Schekel in die Palästinenser-Gebiete investiert. Trotzdem ist der Friedensprozess blockiert. Daher helfen uns die bisher gegebenen, vereinfachenden Antworten nicht weiter. Gewöhnlich waren das zwei: Besatzung oder jüdische Siedlungen. Es wäre allerdings ein Missverständnis, zu glauben, dass Besatzung und Siedlungen die Ursache für den Konflikt zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern sind. Denn wenn man weiter zurückgeht, vor 1967, gab es auch keinen Frieden im Nahen Osten, sondern nur Blutvergießen und Terrorismus. Und zwischen 1948 und 1967 hatten die Palästinenser sehr wohl einen Chance einen eigenen Staat zu bilden. Sie wurde nur nicht genützt.

We had governments that consisted of political doves. Since the Oslo agreement, these governments especially undertook great efforts to arrive at a lasting peace settlement. We gave up half of Judea and Samaria as well as the Gaza Strip. We evacuated thousands of Jews and invested tens of millions of shekels in the Palestinian territories. Despite this, the peace process is blocked. The simplifying answers offered until now do not help us move further. Usually these were two: occupation or Jewish settlements. However, it would be a mistake to believe that occupation and settlements are the origins for the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. For if you go back further, before 1967, there also was no peace in the Middle East, only bloodshed and terrorism. And between 1948 and 1967 the Palestinians certainly had an opportunity to form their own state. It was simply not exploited.

On his role in the coalition:

Wir wollen sehr aktiv die Initiative ergreifen. Wir haben viele Ideen. Dabei ist heute ist meine persönliche Position nicht so wichtig. Ich bin ein Spieler in einem großen Team, und versuche meine Koalitionspartner zu überzeugen. Doch ich bin überzeugt, dass es dieser Regierung schließlich gelingen wird, eine gemeinsame Plattform zu schaffen und vorwärts zu kommen. Dabei wollen wir die Vision einbringen, eine stabile in sich schlüssige, dauerhafte Lösung ohne Blutvergießen zu schaffen.

We want to grasp the initative very actively. We have many ideas. My personal position is not so important in all this. I am a player on a large team and I try to persuade my coalition partners. But I am convinced that this government will ultimately succeed in creating a common position and to move forward. To this effect, we want to bring the vision that will create a final, lasting solution without bloodshed.

The pitch for an "economic peace process":

Der politische Prozess ist nicht vorrangig der Schlüssel für eine dauerhafte Friedenslösung. [...] Das wichtigste für die Palästinenser ist der Aufbau der Wirtschaft, denn man kann sich vorstellen, was in Österreich geschehen würde, wenn die Arbeitslosenrate 40 Prozent betragen und der Lohn nur 150 Euro pro Monat, wie das bei den Palästinensern der Fall ist.

The political process is not the key to a permanent peace solution [...] The most important for the Palestinians is the development of the economy, because you can imagine what would happen in Austria if the unemployment rate were 40% and the salaries were 150 euros a month, as is the case for the Palestinians.

How to achieve this - Lieberman was vague:

Außerdem darf die Rolle der USA, der EU und von Japan nicht nur sein, Geld an die palästinensische Verwaltung zu überweisen. Die müssen vielmehr in konkrete Projekte investieren um die Arbeitsplätze für die Palästinenser zu schaffen.

The role of the US, EU, and Japan should not be only to transfer money to the Palestinian Authority. They ought, rather, to invest in concrete projects to create jobs for the Palestinians.

Reasons for Hamas's Success:

Denn die Hamas hat die vergangenen Wahlen nicht wegen ihrer extremen Ideologie gewonnen; vielmehr stand ihr eine sehr korrupte Palästinenser-Verwaltung gegenüber, die weder effektiv noch effizient war. Im Gegensatz dazu hat die Hamas sehr viele soziale Aktivitäten gesetzt. Sie hat Schulen errichtet und eine medizinische Versorgung angeboten. Das waren die Gründe für den Wahlsieg der Hamas.

Hamas won the past elections not because of its extremist ideology but because it opposed a very corrupt Palestinian administration (Palestinian Authority?), which was neither effective nor efficient. In contrast, Hamas founded many social programs. It established schools and offered health care. Those were the reasons for Hamas's victory in the elections.

No negotiations with Hamas:

Wie soll die israelische Regierung mit jemandem verhandeln, der jeden Tag sagt, ich will Israel zerstören oder alle Juden töten? Die Hamas übt weiter Terror aus, schmuggelt nach wie vor Waffen und bereitet Anschläge vor.

Why should the Israeli government negotiate with someone who says, every day, 'I want to destroy Israel" or kill all Jews? Hamas continues to engage in terrorism, smuggles weapons as before, and prepares attacks.

On Syria:

Wir müssen die Realitäten sehen. Bis heute beheimatet Syrien die Hauptquartiere der Terror-Organisationen Hamas und Djihad. Syrien unterstützt die Hisbollah und ihren Waffenschmuggel in den Südlibanon. Syrien unterstützt auch das Atomprogramm des Iran und ich sehe bis zum heutigen Tag nur eine Festigung der Beziehungen zwischen dem Iran und Syrien. Daher kann ich in Syrien keinen wirklichen Partner für irgendeine Vereinbarung sehen. Bevor wir verhandeln können, muss zuerst die Unterstützung für den Terrorismus eingestellt werden.

We have to see the reality. Until today, Syria hosts the headquarters of the terrorist organizations Hamas and Jihad. Syria supports Hizbullaha and its weapons smuggling to southern Lebanon. Syria also supports the Iranian nuclear program and I am only seeing a strengthening of the relations between Iran and Syria. This is why I cannot see Syria as a real partner for any kind of settlement. Before we can negotiate, the support for terrorism must end.

On "land for peace":

Bis heute hat das Konzept "Land für Frieden" keine wirklichen Ergebnisse gebracht. Was war das Ergebnis aller Rückzüge? Doch nur: Hisbollah und Raketen.

Until today, the concept "land for peace" has brought no real results. What was the consequence of all the withdrawals [retreats]? Only Hizbullah and rockets.

Lieberman evades question about "transfer" and loses himself, going off in too many directions at once:

Kleine Zeitung: Was soll stattdessen geschehen? Bei der Zwei-Staaten-Lösung kritisieren Sie, dass zwar die Palästinenser einen Staat ohne Juden bekommen sollen, Israel aber 20 Prozent Araber hat. Daher reden sie auch enormen Umsiedlungen das Wort; doch was ist mit den Arabern in Israel, sprich Palästinensern, die nicht gehen wollen? 

LIEBERMAN: Das ist allerdings nicht nur ein Problem, das Israel hat. Ähnliches gibt es auf der übrigen Welt auch. In Bosnien-Herzegowina zum Beispiel oder in Belgien zwischen Flamen und Walonen. Auch im Kaukasus gab es den Konflikt zwischen Russland und Georgien. Was ich damit sagen will, es gibt nicht nur eine Ursache für das Problem sondern viele. Man darf nicht nur einen Punkt herausgreifen und dann hoffen, das ganze Problem zu lösen; man muss gleichzeitig in viele Richtungen gehen

.

Kleine Zeitung: What should happen instead? You criticize the two-state solution because it gives the Palestinians a state without Jews while Israel's population would still be 20% Arab. This is why you also talk about enormous transfers [resettlements]; but what about the Arabs in Israel, or Palestinians, who do not want to move?

Lieberman: But that is not only a problem faced by Israel. There are similar things in the rest of the world as well. In Bosnia-Hercegovina for example, or in Belgium between the Flemish and Walloons [French-speakers]. In the Caucasus too there was the conflict between Russia and Georgia. What I want to say here is that there is not only one cause of the problem but many. One must not take out only one point and then hope to solve the entire problem; one has to go in many directions at once.

Interviewer asks for clarification:

Kleine Zeitung: Was heißt das konkret, etwa für die jüdischen Siedlungen? Sie selbst leben in einer jüdischen Siedlung in einem Palästinenser-Gebiet. Wären Sie bereit, Ihr Haus aufzugeben? 

LIEBERMAN: Weniger Spannungen, weniger Konflikte, dass wollen alle Völker. Doch es darf keine Illusion geben; kurzfristig, schnell ist das nicht möglich, Hokuspokus gibt es nicht. Doch ich in überzeugt, dass diese Koalition, mehr als jede andere zuvor die Chance hat, sich in die richtige Richtung zu bewegen.

Kleine Zeitung: What does this mean concretely, for example for the Jewish settlements? You yourself live in a Jewish settlement in a Palestinian area. Would you be prepared to give up your home?

Lieberman: Less tensions, less conflicts; all peoples want this. But one must not have illusions; in the short-term, quickly, this is not possible. There is no abacadabra. But I am convinced that this coalition, more than any one before, has the chance to move in the right direction.

On his reputation abroad:

Ich bin über mein Image nicht besorgt; Image ist nur ein Produkt der Massenmedien. Wir haben weit ernstere Probleme als mein Image.

I am not concerned about my image; image is only a product of the mass media. We have far more serious problems than my image.

Ahmadinejad and Iran:

Es ist nicht akzeptabel, dass ein Staatspräsident eines UNO-Mitglieds täglich zur Zerstörung Israels aufruft. Die Kooperation des Iran mit Nordkorea, mit Hugo Chavez und mit Syrien ist die wirkliche Achse des Bösen. Doch das ist nicht nur unser Problem; das ist das Problem der gesamten Region und der gesamten internationalen Gemeinschaft. Auch die Vertreter der arabischen Welt haben mit uns in jüngster Zeit vor allem über den Iran, und nicht über die Palästinenser gesprochen. Denn die Araber verstehen, dass ihre Existenz nicht durch Israel, sondern durch den Iran bedroht wird. 

It is unacceptable that the president of a UN-member country daily calls for the destruction of Israel. The cooperation of Iran with North Korean, Hugo Chavez and Syria is the true axis of evil. But that is not only our problem; that is a problem for the entire region and the whole international community. The representatives of the Arab world have talked to us, in recent times, about Iran, not about the Palestinians. Because the Arabs understand that their existence is not threatened by Israel but by Iran.

How to deal with Iranian nuclear program:

Was das iranische Atomprogramm betrifft, muss klar sein, dass, sollte der Iran Atommacht werden, es in der Region zu einem schrecklichen nuklearen Rüstungswettlauf kommen würde. Der beste Weg, das Atomprogramm zu stoppen, sind wirklich harte, sehr harte Sanktionen. Die UNO-Resolutionen sind nicht genug; daher müssen der Sicherheitsrat und die EU viel wirksamere und härtere Sanktionen verhängen. Das hat bei Libyen funktioniert. Der Iran muss daher isoliert werden. Nur das kann Ergebnisse bringen. 

Regarding the Iranian nuclear program, it has to be clear that should Iran become a nuclear power, it would lead to a terrible nuclear arms race in the region. The best way to stop the nuclear program is through very tough, really tough sanctions. The UN resolutions are not enough; the Security Council and the EU must declare much more effective and harsher sanctions. That worked with Libya. Iran has to be isolated. Only that can bring results.

Military option?

Wir sprechen über keinen Militärschlag, Israel kann ein Problem, das ein Problem der ganzen Welt ist, nicht militärisch lösen. Ich schlage vielmehr vor, dass die USA als größte Weltmacht die Verantwortung übernimmt, die Iran-Frage zu lösen." 

We're not talking about any military strike. Israel cannot solve a problem, which is the problem of the whole world, militarily. I suggest rather that the US, as the world's superpower, ought to take responsibility for solving the Iran-question.

Anticipate deterioration in US-Israeli relations?

Nein. Wir haben traditionell wirklich sehr tiefe Beziehungen mit den USA. Sie beruhen nicht nur auf wechselseitigen Interessen, sondern wir teilen auch dieselben Werte. 

No. We traditionally have a very deep relationship with the US. It is not based on our respective interests, rather, we share the same values.

European role?

Allerdings müsste Europa härter gegenüber dem Terrorismus hier auftreten. Hamas und Hisbollah müssen unakzeptable Organisationen sein. Doch ich bin nicht sicher, dass alle europäischen Länder diese meine Meinung teilen.

Europe has to take a harder line against terrorism. Hamas and Hizbullah must be unacceptable organizations. But I am not sure if all the European countries share my opinion. 

Europe's Muslim population:

Das Grundproblem ist auch hier eine Frage der demokratischen Werte. Es ist sehr wichtig, die Werte der freien Welt zu bewahren und an alle Bürger weiterzugeben, unabhängig davon, ob sie Juden, Christen oder Moslems sind, oder ein anderes oder gar kein Bekenntnis haben. Im Falle der Moslems muss Europa auch von den muslimischen Ländern fordern, dass sie zur Demokratie und zu den Menschenrechten finden. Wie sieht es beispielsweise mit Menschenrechten in Saudi-Arabien aus, wo Frauen noch immer kein Wahlrecht haben? Erst wenn Selbstverständlichkeiten wie Demokratie und Menschenrechte in allen moslemischen Staaten zur Realität werden, werden sich auch die Moslems anderswo langsam ändern.

The basic problem is one of democratic values. it is very important to guard the values of the free world and to pass them on to all citizens, regardless of whether they are Jews, Christians or Muslim or even of no faith at all. In the case of the Muslims, Europe has to demand from Muslim countries that they find themselves toward democracy and human rights. How does it look with human rights in Saudi Arabia, for example, where women still cannot vote? Only when things we take for granted, such as democracy and human rights become a reality in all Muslim states will Muslims elsewhere gradually change.

On Israel's Jewish population:

Der Schlüssel für das Zusammenleben heißt Toleranz. Wir müssen in Israel toleranter im Umgang miteinander werden. Nach Israel kamen Menschen aus Asien, Afrika, Europa, der ehemaligen Sowjetunion und Südamerika. Sie alle haben unterschiedliche Vorstellungen, ein unterschiedliches Temperament und eine verschiedene Mentalität. Daher ist es unmöglich, die Vorstellung nur einer Gruppe durchzusetzen. Also können etwa die Vorstellungen der Religiösen nicht säkularen Bürgern verordnet werden und umgekehrt. Wir versuchen daher, den richtigen Zugang zu diesen Problemen zu finden. Das betrifft auch die Zivilehe und andere jüdische Werte. Denn Israel muss ein Platz für alle Juden sein. 

The key to coexistence is tolerance. We have to become more tolerant in Israel in our interactions with each other. People from Asia, Africa, Europe, the former Soviet Union and South America all came to Israel They have different preconceptions, temperaments, and mentalities. Therefore it is impossible to implement the conceptions of one group. The ideas of the religious cannot be mandated for secular citizens and vice versa. We are therefore trying to find the right approach to these problems. This also concerns civil union and other Jewish values [sic]. Because Israel has to be a place for all Jews.

Obama and Netanyahu

BY AMOS

(Photo: Wikimedia Commons)

Aluf Benn provides an  excellent analysis of Netanyahu's Washington-strategy. Many commentators are convinced that Israel's new prime minister is on a collision course not only with the Europeans but also with the White House. Benn contrasts Netanyahu's strategy so far with that of his predecessor, Ehud Olmert, in order to explain what Bibi might be thinking:

The prime minister is aware of the assumption of many that his rejection of the idea of a Palestinian state, and opposition to withdrawals from the West Bank and the Golan Heights, will result in an inevitable crisis in relations with Obama and propel Israel into political isolation. But he is not afraid. The way he sees it, it's better to come to the White House with a list of demands and requests, and to condition any concession on a quid pro quo, than it is to play the role of yes man to the president and gain nothing in return. 

Ehud Olmert emerged from his many talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with the impression that, because of the Palestinians' positions on the so-called core issues, there is no chance for a final-status accord with them - which is why he opted to emphasize Israeli generosity to secure international support. Netanyahu prefers to enter into negotiations with maximalist positions rather than to begin with concessions that may win the world's approval but won't satisfy the other side. He is ready to pay the political price this will exact abroad for the sake of appearing consistent in his positions and preserving his coalition at home (Ha'aretz). 

We will see what happens, but for now, Benn's reading seems more persuasive than the hysterical fears of a collapse of US-Israeli relations and of Israel's position in the West. Netanyahu does not seem fazed by the missteps of his foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman. My sense is that Lieberman will not play a major role in foreign policy at all - Bibi will hold the reins tight here as well as in his economic policy.

Open Thread: Hillel Halkin on Bashir

BY NOAH K

I must admit, I had a tepid reaction to "Waltz with Bashir," Ari Folman's Oscar-nominated animated film about his experiences during the First Lebanon War and after it, when he seems to have suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. The dream sequences were indeed seductive, particularly the young soldier floating back to Israel (or Israeli-occupied buffer territory below the Litani line), the lone survivor of his unit, adrift at sea, forgotten or at least unrecognizable to his own army, safely "stateless" in a way out there in international waters.

But as for the politics? What is there to make a fuss about? What were the film's politics? Or did it have any? Was it just too post-Zionist, too Etgar Keret? I took from the film some bite-size lessons: war, in general, corrodes our moral constitution -- it breaks people; the massacres of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila were committed by Christian militiamen, not by the IDF; however, some IDF leadership looked the other way, while some soldiers on the ground were to a certain, undefined degree culpable -- not only for inaction but for rendering specific services to the Phalangists, which, at least in hindsight, made the massacre possible.

Hillel Halkin's review in Commentary makes to my mind a rather jejune complaint about the film's lack of "historical context." The only "context" he adds to the what the film depicts in that case of the massacres are his imaginative reconstructions of "what really happened:" maybe, he reckons, Israeli soldiers were unwilling to wake up their superiors in the middle of the night to investigate the activities of the Phalangists in the camps; maybe they were scared to go in; maybe they were happy to unleash their local allies on their eternal foes...I don't know, yeah, maybe...maybe Folman nudges the viewer in the direction of some of these interpretations. Maybe he doesn't nudge enough.

True, the film doesn't provide an historical context for the conflict as a whole. Israel's 1982 geo-strategic gambit isn't laid out. Nothing of the war's objectives, the internal Israeli debates that preceded it, the machinations of the PLO and its Syrian backers, etc. These omissions produce, in Halkin's mind, a generic "anti-war" film, which, he condemns as intellectually deficient. Fair enough. Still, the film was about experience; it wasn't didactic. And the reviewer's war experience, as it turns out, was one of trying to explain the war with his fellow reservists as he trained in southern Lebanon in the run-up to the war; of trying to explain the massacres in their immediate aftermath. Folman had a different experience, clearly. Now, it's quite a different thing to accuse the film of providing fodder for anti-Semitism insulting the honor of the veterans, and splashing shame on the Jewish state. It seemed to me that Halkin's review almost makes that leap.

How is that possible? Halkin, naturally, interprets the film as an Israeli; I, on the other hand, as an American (Jew). And, as Halkin points out in introducing the film, Israelis and the rest of us saw this film differently. How else to explain the mild reaction of the domestic audience and the wild accolades it has garnered abroad? The review, even more than the box office receipts, points up the wide (and at times widening) gap between the way Israelis see themselves and the way the rest of the world sees them (see Roger Cohen in the NYT, whatever you think of his opinions). Note that the "hero" of "Waltz with Bashir" has to go abroad (like Oedipus of old) to gather clues about who he really is.

I am puzzled by extreme reactions to this film. Did you have one?

Here's one from the Commentary website, a response to Halkin by a certain Jerome Kaufman:

"The film blames the entire massacre in the Sabra and Shatila camp on the Israelis."

Is this guy serious?

And why did Halkin have to diss the score? I liked the music!

Angry Idiocy

Angry Arab blog entry on Monday:

Monday, March 09, 2009

Zionist games

"During recent months, children in the southern town of Rahat, near Be'er Sheva, have taken up a new and cruel pastime - burning dogs alive." (thanks Dan)

Christopher Hitchens Jumped in Beirut

Christopher Hitchens recently scuffled with Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party members in a cosmopolitan neighborhood in West Beirut after he defaced one of their signs. Here's the play-by-play.