Shmuel Rosner: "I do not eat pumpkin. That is true."

I just caught a lecture by Shmuel Rosner, former chief of news at Ha'aretz, as well as their Washington correspondent, and now a highly influential blogger at the J-Post. The lecture, which was co-sponsored by the Judaica collection of the Doe Library and the Berkeley journalism school, concerned media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Arab conflict. Rosner spoke from a lectern that has also belonged recently to Benny Morris, and the journalist at times struck the historian's muscular pose, affected the same contempt for naiveté and for leftist partisanship. I eagerly anticipated his views on Ha'aretz. He said the left-of-center daily is at times too critical of Israel, and may even have caused the IDF excessive pain. Rosner's goal was to describe the community of reporters and organizations covering Israel, and to brief us on how to discern bullshit.

As for the Israeli media, those of us who rely on the Anglophone Israeli media are woefully out of touch with the internal political discourse in Israel. That discourse is created, he argued, on TV, and in the pages of Yediot, Maariv, and, now, Yisrael Hayom.

But the foreign media was the real focus.

The lecture was full of lists. The four cardinal sins of foreign journalists in the Middle East:

1. Obsession

2. Prejudice

3. Ignorance

4. Condescension

5. Unprofessionalism -- chiefly a matter of dereliction of fact-(re)-checking. (Not officially on the list, but something he lingered over later with regard to the unreliability of the Palestinian media, as well as the merely innocuous nature of the Swedish reporter who accused the IDF of harvesting Palestinian organs).

Rosner's rules for readers of foreign reporting:

1. What leaders say behind closed doors doesn't matter. What matters is what they say in public, to their own people, in their own language.

2. Israelis and Palestinians can't keep secrets. You will know what you want to know...eventually.

3. Commissions and reports of all types have little value.

4. Envoys of the US and other world powers are always too optimistic -- and almost bound to fail.

5. Do not overestimate the impact of the White House or other foreign intervention.

6. Just because someone doesn't speak English, it doesn't mean they're dumb.

7. Arabs generally have a lot of patience.

8. Never underestimate the power of domestic politics to dictate events.

9. Beware of predictions.

10. Beware of polls.

11. Beware of reporters with political biases.

12. There are many groups in the Middle East that hate each other, but they all agree on at least this: Americans are naive.

I found the scolding of foreign journalists quite satisfying. Rosner painted a vivid picture of what I imagined as a horde of professional gawkers gathering their luggage and translators at the carousel at Ben Gurion Airport, and then greedily speeding to as close to the scene of the carnage as they could get during the last two wars. And with print media downsizing everywhere, the correspondents are becoming ever less versed in the local cultures they cover. The result is a foreign media that covers Israel as a conflict, not as a country. Sounds problematic to me. We get the Israeli leadership's sound-bite, then the Palestinian's. Gazans are suffering these deprivations; now, look -- look how much it sucks to live in Sderot! The foreign media makes our heads swivel like the cat at the window watching the movements of birds outside. But what would the alternative be? What would covering Israel as a country really look like? I am not sure, and I wish I would have asked Rosner. To him, Israel as a country does have to be explained to (certain) Americans. Take his audiences at the American War College in Pennsylvania. Part of what is culturally idiosyncratic about Israel, Rosner explained to them, is the lack of distance between civil society and the military. "Everyone is a civilian, everyone is a soldier," said Rosner, unapologetically. But in fact, the image of Israel as a face-to-face society, where everyone knows someone who is affected by war, the rigors of the occupation, terrorism should be very familiar to readers of, say, the New York Times. This may be the way Israel really is, but it's also something that Israelis desperately want us outsiders to know. I find that very interesting.

A face-to-face society with 5 million cell phones, boasted Rosner, offers the determined journalist an almost unique opportunity to recover the truth about complex events. His paradigmatic example was the so-called massacre of Jenin in 2002. How did his team at Ha’aretz debunk the rumors of a massacre? By calling the soldiers, particularly reservists, they knew. “They couldn’t all be lying,” claimed Rosner. These informants were the “cousins’ best friends" of Rosner’s news division. Social proximity for him is a comparative advantage over foreign media in terms of access, not a journalistic liability. The fog of war was lifted, a little too effortlessly. On the other hand, Rosner insisted on the incompatability of perceptions born of different cultural contexts. Shimon Peres, so his opening joke went, isn’t the same Shimon Peres at home as abroad. Here, I thought Rosner combined not-so-satisfactorily a post-modern uncertainty about what we can really know with great faith in the capacity of the critical reader or journalist to get to the bottom of things. American journalistic pretension to objectivity almost sounded like the American naiveté he seizes upon. But his epistemology is certainly practical. There are things we can know (the Jenin massacre didn’t happen), and things we can’t (what happened to Muhammed al-Durrah).

Granted the last question, I asked about my personal cause celèbre: archaeology in East Jerusalem driven by vulgar ideology. I offered myself up as the guinea pig here. It's an Israeli media story that, for me, is opaque. I read about it in English in Ha'aretz and on the website of the Israeli Antiquities Authority. But I can't seem to figure it out. Are all the projects undertaken in the Ir David legal or illegal (under Israeli, not international law)? Was there a "cultural context" that Rosner could provide that would explain the seemingly contradictory reports? Rosner's answer, and he must have been fatigued at this point, was to draw again a distinction, however provisory, between the forces of objectivity and those of subjectivity. There are the "objective" archaeologists, and there are the ideologically driven right-wing zealots who fund and support the dubious excavations. At this point, Rosner could have taken a line from the Berkeley-version of Benny Morris, who, when an audience member complained that a faulty microphone rendered his lecture inaudible, explained bluntly, "This is the situation." In the final analysis, Rosner admitted, we have to trust someone. "I trust reporters, not newspapers," he said, naming a few of his favorite colleagues' names. Indeed, this is the situation. I agree.

Natan Sharansky, from Refusenik to Likudnik to Publicist

 

BY NOAH S.        

Natan Sharansky, the famous Soviet dissident and Israeli political leader, spoke yesterday evening at the University of California, Berkeley. Freshly appointed by Prime Minister Netanyahu to head the Jewish Agency for Israel, Sharansky is touring college campuses in an attempt to foster a more positive image of Israel among American youth. The audience in the large lecture hall, however—considering the stature of the guest and the amount of publicity for the event—was surprisingly sparse and composed largely (in this author’s estimation, at least) of non-students who were old enough to remember Sharansky when he was a hero for Americans and Jews during the Cold War. But then, this is Berkeley—a “haven” for “anti-Israel forces,” as the student organizers put it—the speaker was Sharansky—famous now more as George W. Bush's favorite author than anything else—and the event was part of the dubiously titled “Caravan for Democracy” series, which is funded by such local favorites as Media Watch International (a group aligned with Likud) and the Jewish National Fund (among other things, since 1901 a major land-owner in Palestine/Israel which still refuses to lease its land to Arabs). It is a shame, though, that more students were not in attendance, because they would have been challenged by a trenchant thinker with a compelling personal story to think through some of the basic justifications for the existence of a Jewish state.

The talk was brilliantly composed and delivered, though problematic upon close scrutiny. Sharansky structured his argument around “two ideas” which he claims share a “deep connection”: “the desire to be free” and “the desire to belong,” or between “democracy” and “identity.” (The connection between the two forms the basis of a course Sharansky is leading at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem.) Those familiar with his books The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (2004) and Defending Identity: Its Indispensable Role in Protecting Democracy (2008) will recognize the argument. It is directed mainly against those “intellectuals,” as he called them, who believe in “post-identity,” “post-nationalism,” “post-modernism,” and “multiculturalism” - in other words, the relativists who believe that “nothing is different, that everything is equal.” (Berkeley professors?)  In order to illustrate this caricatured line of thought, Sharansky quoted (God help us) none other than the hippie-icon John Lennon, who asked us in 1971 to “imagine” a world in which there are “no countries,” “no religion,” and “nothing to kill or die for.” (Actually, Sharansky only quoted “nothing to die for.”). The logic of Sharansky’s unnamed intellectuals, represented here by the post-Beatle, holds that “strong identities” like nationalism and religion are “the enemies of peace.” Strong identities in Europe supposedly led to two world wars; war is evil; therefore, identity is evil. For them, being a human rights activist and a nationalist is an internal contradiction. And by this logic, the nation-state of Israel, which claims to be a leader of the free world yet retains its identity as the homeland of only one people, is an anachronism in a post-identity Western world. Sharanksy has set out to prove these critics wrong.

Born Anatoly Borisovich Shcharansky in Donetsk, Ukraine (then the Soviet Union) in 1948, Sharansky never saw any contradiction between the desire to be free and the desire to belong because under the Soviet regime both were stifled if you were a Jew. He was neither allowed to voice a dissenting political opinion, nor to learn anything about his religious and cultural heritage. When he attempted to immigrate to Israel in 1973 and was refused passage—thus acquiring the title of refusenik—he became an outspoken dissident and spent years in Soviet prisons. He realized that he had found something—his Jewishness—which he was “willing to die for,” and it gave him the strength to withstand the KGB. In this brief biographical narrative, Sharansky did not take time to discuss why the struggle to express one’s political views and the struggle to express one’s cultural identity publicly—which in his case did coincide—should resonate with people growing up in a free world. A tighter case would have to be made; perhaps those who have read his latest book could chime in here. In any case, the argument offers some insight into the psychology of this Soviet dissident turned militant democrat.

In fact, most of the talk was about Sharansky’s own story, and the move from the personal to the contemporary political came only at the very end, in a rhetorical flourish when he accused European intellectuals of “having nothing to die for.” As a result, he claimed, when faced with a very small minority of possible fundamentalist terrorists whose identity is strong and who are willing to die for their cause, they feel bewildered and defenseless. In the wake of World War II, just as Europeans vowed never to fight again, Zionists vowed never to not fight again. Israel has paid the price in its international image for the post-war move toward pacifism and post-identity among "intellectuals," Sharansky claimed, because it became a nation-state precisely at the moment when the idea of the nation-state became unpopular. The Western nations said accusingly, “We have given up our nationalism, our colonialism - why not you?” Sharansky’s answer is that Israelis need to have a strong identity to fight and die (and kill) for if they are to defend against “all these totalitarian regimes” in its region. One senses that Sharansky’s experience in the Soviet prisons has left its indelible mark upon this man’s political philosophy. 

Piracy

I have recently waded into the murky waters of the history of piracy in the Greco-Roman world. As a participant in a graduate seminar here at Berkeley on ancient Greek economic history, I prepared a presentation on a dossier of Greek inscriptions to do with attacks by sea and on the seas, and to do with local efforts to recoup losses, secure captives, and honor the benefactors who bailed the victims out in their time of need. All this amidst the first direct confrontation between the US military and Somali pirates, and more prolific bloggers weighing in on possible connections between the ancient Mediterranean and the contemporary Gulf of Aden.

It is often said that one man's pirate is another man's...well, you get the idea.  There is quite a debate in ancient history about whether piracy should be understood as just another form of economic activity. The Greeks of "Homeric Society," at least were somewhat ambivalent; as Nestor asks Telemachus in the third book of the Odyssey, "Are you a pirate (leistês) or a trader?" And, as Thucydides later noticed, Nestor was basically fine with the visitor being either. The term peiratês, when it appears in the Hellenistic period, is certainly one of abuse. No one self-identifies in our sources as one. Some then would argue that what distinguishes "piracy," which fed into markets for slaves and produced new ones for "protection," from any other normal, albeit violent, economic activity, was merely its lack of a state-issued grant of legitimacy, unlike Sir Walter Raleigh with his "letters of marque," or national armies when they engage in plunder under the cover of their uniforms. 

That isn't my position, but it got me thinking: what if the pirate draws his legitimacy -- and more than enough, at that -- from his immediate societal context? That the reaction of the Somali pirates to the ultimately lethal Navy Seal operation was to retaliate against non-US vessels, one Lebanese, I believe, was another hint that these people are playing by different rules. In other words, they have their own sources of legitimacy.

This is certainly one of the lessons to draw from this BBC interview with an active pirate, twenty-five years old and living in "the notorious den of Harardhere in central Somalia." Somehow, I don't think this is an unedited transcript.

"So it is no surprise to see us in the same water [as migrants], pirating in search of money - there is no difference. We have local support; most of the people here depend on pirates directly or indirectly. Because if there is a lot of money in the town they can get some through friendship, relatives or business. Also our work is seen by many in the coastal villages as legal and we are viewed as heroes."

Speaking of the economics of piracy, how about the significant Israeli presence in the security industry for both cruise and commercial ships in the region? Yet another high-value, specialized security export. On Saturday, a private Israeli security detail beat back pirates from a large German-Italian cruise ship. As it turns out, the Defense Ministry doesn't keep any statistics on the numbers of ex-IDF, many of them with specialized nautical training, working in that sector, though they do for arms dealing. It seems kind of unwise to me. Could we see a situation in the near future where an Israeli national gets more involved out there than the government would prefer?

Benny Morris in Berkeley

This is a team post by Noah K. and Noah S.

On Wednesday, January 28, the University of California-Berkeley's Doe Library hosted Israeli historian Benny Morris. BM was a leading figure among the "New Historians" of the 1980s, a group of scholars who with access to newly opened IDF archives, challenged the then prevailing myths and dogma of Zionist historiography. In 1988, BM published his landmark study The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, which he updated and reissued in 2004. Surrounded by an eager crowd comfortably ensconced on the sofas of the Morrison Room of Doe Library, Morris spoke about his new book, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Morris is often described as a "leftist," and his early work, by presenting the conclusion that thousands of Palestinian Arabs left their homes unwillingly during the 1948 war, must have been warmly received by many critics of the official narrative. Now, he is said to have shifted to the center, perhaps only reflecting the reconfiguration of Israeli politics in the last several decades. Is this new book he's hawking a "centrist" book? At no point in the lecture did BM expressly contradict any of the arguments made in his first book on the refugee problem. The book aims to set his old story of the birth of the refugee problem into a complete narrative of the war, really two wars, a civil war, and a war between the Jews and the Arab states after the initial civil conflict was decided. So the creation of the refugee problem loses something of its status as original sin when set against the backdrop of massacres on both sides -- the kind that BM argues "naturally" occur in civil war -- and against his careful description of the evolution of the war aims of the various parties involved. BM was at a pains to present himself as a dispassionate historian, who writes history "from the documents," and with his conclusions undermines the accounts of Arab propagandists and vulgar Israeli nationalists. He wowed the crowd with dates and figures, citing chapter and verse, but he also made recourse to comparative examples in world history.

He began with his most controversial historical claims. It is a matter of dispute among historians of the Arab-Israeli war about whether the war was, for the Arab armies, jihad, i.e., holy war against infidels. BM seemed convinced that there was sufficient evidence for an answer in the affirmative. He cited Arab generals who compared their war against the Jews to the Muslim struggle against Crusaders in the 12th and 13th centuries, and Sunni religious authorities who issued fatwas against Palestinian Jews just months before the Egyptian invasion. The second, related, claim is that the Arab armies were motivated to a certain extent by antisemitism. He presented very little evidence for the latter argument. He did mention that these arguments were probably responsible for the fact that the publisher that originally commissioned the manuscript—Metropolitan Press—ended up not publishing the book. (Yale University Press did.) More on this below.

BM moved on to a chronological account of the two stages of the '48 war: 1) the civil war between Arab and Jewish militias in Palestine (April/May), and 2) the conventional war between the Jewish armies and Arab state armies.

Appropriately, the first question he addressed had to do with war aims. On the Jewish side, BM argued that the original war aim of the Jewish militias in April, 1948, was mere survival and the eventual establishment of a Jewish state. However, as the war progressed, two further aims developed: territorial expansion (past the borders originally allotted in the U.N. partition plan of 1947); and the aim of ridding the area that would eventually become the Jewish state of Arabs, who presented a fifth column. Regarding the third aim, BM differentiated between expulsion—when Jewish soldiers came to Arab villages and commanded residents to leave their homes within x hours—and flight—when Arabs fled their homes in the course of a Jewish attack on their village (Arab militias were based in Arab villages). However, after Arab refugees are not allowed back to their homes after 1948, one could plausibly claim that the whole event was a de facto expulsion. There was no central command on the expulsion issue from Jewish authorities, BM said; some Jewish generals decided not to expel, which account for the fact that at the end of the war, there were 650,000 Jews and still 150,000 Arabs within Israeli borders (who became citizens of the new state).

"Arab" war aims are more difficult to assess, BM continued, because a) there was no central control among Palestinian Arab militias, and b) Arab archives are closed. What he could say was the following: Common war aims among all Arab armies was 1) the prevention of creation of a Jewish state, and 2) the conquest of as much land as possible in Palestine. BM dismissed the argument that a further aim was to "drive the Jews into the sea" for lack of documentary evidence. He further dismissed the official Arab claim that their goal was to save the Palestinian Arab population.

Moving on to the specific aims of the individual Arab states, BM noted that early on King Abdullah of Jordan accepted the inevitability of Israel's creation and aimed instead "only" to take West Bank for itself. Jordan's aim therefore was not to fight Jews, though it ends up happening anyway. Lebanon, too, despite official propaganda never invaded Jewish territory. These examples throw a wrench in the arguments of Zionist historians who claim that all Arab states wanted to destroy Israel in 1948. Syrian, Egyptian, and Iraqi armies did invade Jewish territory.

BM then addressed the "David and Goliath" myth of traditional Zionist historiography (that the small Jewish army was David compared to the Goliath of the Arab states). It is true, BM said, that in territory and population, Arab states were larger. However, the strength of societies also based on economic power—the yishuv was semi-industrial—as well as on "motivation"—whereas Arab soldiers often traveled long distances to fight their enemy, Jews were fighting for their lives on their own territory. The Holocaust had lent a further sense of urgency. Also, Arabs knew they could flee and live, while Jews felt "at death's door," according to BM. Further, the Jews had better ammunition. Once the U.N. imposed embargo on arms sales to warring parties in the Middle East, the Arab states lost supplies, while the Jewish militias had been stockpiling arms on the black market through Czechoslovakia all along and continued re-supplying throughout the war.

At the tail end of his talk, BM revisited the issue of "war crimes": massacres and the refugee problem. On massacres: BM cited numbers of 800-900 dead Arabs resulting from around two dozen discrete massacres (murders of civilians by Jewish soldiers outside of fighting). There were also massacres of Jews by Arab soldiers, BM said. However, the great disparity between the two numbers was a direct result of the fact that the Jewish militias took 400 Arab towns and settlements, whereas the Arab states conquered only 12 Jewish settlements/kibbutzim. This argument makes numerical sense only if one accepts the argument that massacres are a natural by-product of all wars. BM attempted to put the massacres of the 1948 war into "comparative perspective" by noting that there were days in the Yugoslavian war in which Serbs massacred over 9,000 civilians in just two days. (The number of Bosnians killed there is normally estimated at 8,000.) If there was one point, where, we think, he may have slipped up enough to allow the audience a glimpse of his ideological orientation, it was here. Sure the Hagganah, et al., killed 800 or 900 Arab non-combatants in 1947-8, but the Serbs in Srebrenica in 1995, killed 9,000 in a day! Curiously, he began to call the victims of that massacre "Croats," but caught himself, and said, "I think, no, they were Bosnians." The brutal facts of war, in all their precise and gory details, which BM had so far actually seemed to relish bringing out into the sterile light of our library seemed suddenly less important than the dignity of the Jewish state's first generation

On the refugee problem after the war: There were actually two refugee problems – Palestinian Arabs stranded in Arab countries after fleeing homes in Palestine, and Arab Jews stranded in Arab countries that no longer want them there after 1948. The main difference between these two groups is that the latter were absorbed into Israel, whereas the former group is only partially absorbed into various host countries. BM argued that this situation for the Palestinian Arab refugee was historically anomalous, as normally refugees are assimilated into host countries by second or third generation. Instead, now there are 4.5-5 million Palestinian Arab "refugees" who live off U.N. and other aid.

Explaining why there were expulsions and voluntary flight of Palestinian Arabs:

1) Zionists' explanation for the refugee problem was that the Arab states had a advised Palestinian Arabs to flee their homes in order to clear the battlefield for pan-Arab armies, or in order to justify their invasion of the territory.

2) Arab states' explanation for the refugee problem was that the Zionists had designed from the beginning to dispossess and expel the Arabs.

Truth, BM claimed, lies in between. Most Arabs fled from fighting, not because they were advised to by Arab states or forcibly expelled by Jewish soldiers.

By and large, this lecture was about the historian's craft. Amos once told me that he saw BM on Israeli TV arguing with Ilan Pappe -- another of the so-called New Historians. Pappe told BM, "You're not an historian!" And BM, becoming very agitated, retorted in his Anglophone Hebrew, "I'm not an historian?" Indeed, when Pappe came up in the Q&A, BM discussed Pappe's use of Ben-Gurion's diary in order to demonstrate that his rival isn't in fact an historian. An historian, BM, emphasized, writes history from documents. And in the case of the 1948 war, the documents of the yishuv and the fledgling Israeli state, are all we have to work with. The Arab documents haven't seen the light of day, and they aren't likely to soon. We only perceive the Arab position(s) through western eyes: contemporary diplomatic and intelligence assessments. This is the sad reality of the totalitarian political culture in the Arab states. These are the facts. Inevitably, for the history we write, this is for the worse. Then, BM literally threw his hands up. This sense of helplessness in the face of the perceived inadequacy of one, albeit, a massive, crucial segment of the sources, struck me as worth quarreling with. Is Morris giving up too easy? Take the 1967 war and the Soviet role in that conflict as an example. Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez have recently written a book Foxbats Over Dimona: the Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War, which reinterprets official Soviet documents, known for years, in order to rewrite the story of the outbreak of that war, arguing that the USSR was by May 1967 directly intervening with its military in an effort to prevent Israel from producing operational nuclear weapons. However, it was an oral source, I recall, which originally sent Ginor and Remez reviewing old official documents, looking for new ones, and challenging the historiography of '67. A recent veterans' newsletter of some kind published a Ukrainian marine's memory of his unit's orders to invade Israel by way of Haifa if and when the Israelis crossed certain red lines. Would BM's methodology allow him to be sensitive to similar material?

The Lies of Students for Justice in Palestine

UC Berkeley's Sproul Hall

Today I received an email from UC Berkeley's Students for Justice in Palestine through my department list calling on students to join a "die in" on Sproul Plaza in protest of "israeli government atrocity" [sic]. The email went on to claim that

the daunting words of israeli deputiy defense minister matan vilnai are
coming true, as a holocaust is bloodying the mediterranean sea under OUR
WATCH. Hundreds of innocent civilians are being gunned down and bombed in
their homes and cities, and we can not sit back and let this happen.

This is a blatant and unacceptable lie. First, the organizers seem to have missed the fact that IDF operations in Gaza effectively ended on Sunday. Second, to say that "hundreds" of innocent civilians are being "gunned down" is a willful distortion of the facts. The SJP has become a mouthpiece for the likes of Khaled Meshal, it appears. It reminds me of the hysterical emails about "massacres" and "holocaust" that were circulated following the IDF incursion into Hebron as part of Operation Defensive Shield in spring 2002. Most of the dead then were armed fighters not civilians.

The "daunting" words attributed to Vilnai are also a distortion. On Friday, the Guardian reported that

An Israeli minister today warned of increasingly bitter conflict in the Gaza Strip, saying the Palestinians could bring on themselves what he called a "holocaust".

But Vilnai actually said the following:

ככל שירי הקסאם גובר ומאריך טווחים, הפלסטינים מביאים על עצמם שואה יותר גדולה

As long as the qassam firing increases and lengthens in distance, the Palestinians bring even greater destruction [shoah] upon themselves.

When people mean "the Holocaust," in Israel, the word "shoah" is preceded by a definite article - "ha-shoah." Of course, even "shoah" by itself is a strong word - but it means destruction or disaster, which is what Vilnai intended. This is quite clear from the context of the word, as it is followed by the modifier "even greater." In any case, to call what happened in Gaza this past weekend, as the SJP did, a "holocaust" in the sense of a genocide claiming the lives of millions of people is disgusting.

What's so galling is that this email claims that Israel's goal is to commit a genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza. There is no context for the IDF operation; it is only part of an eternal campaign of oppression. Never mind the hundreds of rockets that have rained on Israeli cities - with the deliberate intent to kill Israeli civilians.

How long will people keep up the moral obfuscation by which military operations pursuing armed fighters, who hide out in civilian areas, are equated with deliberate efforts to murder families sitting in their homes?

Secularism, Critique, Blasphemy, and the 2006 Jerusalem Gay Pride Parade

Two of the posters ("pashkavilim") shown above are part of the campaign against the gay pride parade in Jerusalem. The one on the right reproduces a headline from Ha'aretz which states that "Religious leaders have warned that the Pride Parade in Jerusalem will cause bloodshed." The second one, on the left-hand side, is from Ma'ariv and cites Shimon Peres as saying that "The homos have crossed the line." I took this photograph in Jerusalem in late June 2006. As always: click to enlarge.

Last Saturday, I had the opportunity to see the New York premiere of "Jerusalem is Proud to Present" (ירושלים גאה להציג, 2007) as part of the Jewish Film Festival at Walter Reade theater. In Israel, it has been shown on Channel 2 and Channel 8 and screened at various film festivals.

This latest documentary by the Israeli director Nitzan Gilady ("In Satmar Custody," 2003) is about the attempts to hold a Gay Pride Parade (מצעד הגאווה) in Jerusalem in the summer of 2006, as part of the international "World Pride" celebrations. The parade, which was to go through the city center, had originally been scheduled for August 6. It was postponed several times, in part because of the war still raging in early August, and in part because of the fears that police would not be able to protect marchers from the wrath of religious protesters. Ultimately, the "march" was held as a rally in a closed stadium, guarded by thousands of police officers, on November 10.

Gilady's film begins with a surreal press conference attended by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim religious leaders in Jerusalem, watching clips from previous gay pride parades in other parts of the world, and denouncing the planned event as an abomination. Throughout, it gives space to both supporters and opponents of the Jerusalem Gay Pride Parade, though it is clear that Gilady, who said after the screening that he had only recently come out to his parents, has chosen a position.

One one side, we see the activists and members of the Jerusalem Open House (English). They include the first openly gay Jerusalem city councilor, Sa'ar Netanel (Meretz), elected at the same time as its first ultra-Orthodox mayor, Uri Lupoliansky; Adam Russo, the victim of a stabbing attack at the first gay pride parade in Jerusalem on June 30, 2005 (the assailant was eventually convicted of attempted murder); Noa Sattat, the director of the Open House; and Boodi, a 19-year-old drag queen from Ramallah, who performs at Jerusalem's only gay club, Shushan (now closed), and eventually seeks asylum in the U.S. after being kidnapped by Hamas militants.

Arrayed against them, we see Mina Fenton, a national-religious municipal politician who not only organizes a group of American-born settler women using her bad English and crude sense of taste (the Americans seem slightly more attentive to public opinion) but also solicits support in Arabic from a hijab-clad by-passer. We also encounter a Brooklyn expatriate, Rabbi Yehuda Levin, a dogged opponent of the "gay political elite." Less openly involved than these somewhat ridiculous figures, are the various religious leaders of Jerusalem - the Christian clergymen, the Muslim sheikhs, and the Sephardi and Ashkenazi rabbis. Finally, we see the anonymous masses of rioting ultra-Orthodox protesters.

As the date of the parade approaches, tensions rise and the incitement on the part of the opponents of the parade becomes ever more murderous. The director and Sa'ar Netanel find themselves surrounded in a car by a mob of haredi hooligans, beating on the windows. What follows is footage from various news channels of several days of rioting in the city by young ultra-Orthodox men. Traffic blockades are set up, dumpsters set on fire, and stones thrown. The police respond mercilessly with water cannons and beatings. One foreign commentator calls it the "intifada of the ultra-Orthodox."

The rhetoric of the Open House activists is unapologetically secularist. Netanel speaks of the forces of "darkness," and the black masses of haredi men who appear in the film, anonymous and often in conditions of near-darkness, only reinforce this rhetoric without problematizing it in any way. For Netanel and others, this is a battle of democracy against theocracy, of tolerance against bigotry, of liberalism against religious fanaticism, of progress against backwardness.

The "ultra-Orthodox" intifada invites comparison with the riots that swept across the Muslim world following the Danish cartoon controversy. In both cases, the aggrieved parties - religious believers -responded with violence to what they saw as symbolic desecration (of the Prophet or of the Holy City). The "perpetrators" of these blasphemies, however, presented their actions as a matter of inherent rights and freedoms, which had to be vigorously asserted.

Last October, I attended a colloquium at UC Berkeley's Townsend Center for the Humanities, which posed the question: Is Critique Secular? The first panel discussion of the day featured a paper read by Talal Asad (Anthropology, CUNY Graduate Center) called "Reflections on Blasphemy and Secular Criticism," with local superstar professors Wendy Brown (Political Science), Judith Butler (Rhetoric), and Saba Mahmood (Anthropology) responding.

In his paper, Talal Asad argued that

The conflict that many Euro-Americans saw in the Danish cartoons scandal was between the West and Islam, each championing opposing values: democracy, secularism, liberty, and reason on the one side, and on the other the many opposites – tyranny, religion, authority, and unreason (Asad 3).

Referring to secular critique itself as a kind of violence, Asad, while claiming to stake out a position beyond the normative, blasted "Western secularists" who can conceive of blasphemy only as "a constraint on the freedom of speech guaranteed by Western principles and by the pursuit of reason so central to Western culture."

Asad wants us to see blasphemy "not simply as a bid for free speech against irrational taboos but as violence done to human relations that are invested with great value" (Asad 16). I may be wrong, but my intuition is that while such an argument finds an audience in the Western academy when the violent protesters are Muslims upset about an insult to Muhammad, it seems to lose a lot of its force when those rioting against blasphemy are ultra-Orthodox Jews upset about the "desecration" of Jerusalem by homosexuals.

Mearsheimer and Walt at Berkeley

What follows is my paraphrase transcript of today's Berkeley Teach-Ins Against the War (BTIAW) discussion featuring Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer on their recently published book, The Israel Lobby (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, September 2007). I do not have time here to offer an analysis, which I hope will emerge from discussion of the event in future posts. As some of our veteran readers will recall, some of the earliest posts on this blog concerned the original article on the "Israel Lobby" published by Mearsheimer and Walt in 2006. That study, in my opinion, was riddled with small mistakes and careless assertions. The Walt and Mearsheimer that I saw in Berkeley earlier today - especially the Walt - were far more polished and careful than this original study. Walt in particular struck me as very persuasive and as an excellent teacher. Overall, I was very impressed by the level and civility of the discussion. Unlike the previous BTIAW that I attended, this was, for the most part, a model of what our universities should be about.

Needless to say, I continue to have serious disagreements with the claims advanced by Walt and Mearsheimer respectively, although there is also much in this latest version of their thinking that seems indisputable. Briefly, I found least convincing the arguments for

1. a causative link between "the Lobby's" aims and the Iraq war (as Noah K. pointed out, the extent of the connection they postulate is always qualified; M&W spoke of "marked influence," for example)
2. a STRONG connection between American foreign policy toward Israel and the 9/11 attacks (as Asaf pointed out, perhaps speaking about other aspects of their talk, M&W seemed to conflate US policy toward Israel with US policy toward the entire Middle East; I believe that it is the latter, far more than the former, which served as a motivating factor for al-Qaeda). Dan over at The Green Line has previously blogged on this.

I also remain unpersuaded that there is such a "huge gap" between what the American people want and what American foreign policy toward Israel is - a gap, that the authors argue, is explained by the activities of the Lobby.

In reading through this transcript, I think it is worth paying attention to the differences that exist between Walt and Mearsheimer - in substance and form. Mearsheimer was definitely less guarded than Walt. Nevertheless, both were clearly unwilling to endorse the positions articulated by George Bisharat, the discussant, as well as in the question and answer period.

Stephen Walt

Two main questions

1. Is there a powerful, pro-Israel lobby in the US? How does it work?
2. Is its influence positive or negative for US, and positive or negative for Israel?

The Taboo

I want to acknowledge how difficult it is to raise this subject in the U.S. If we were talking about energy or gun control or Indian-American nuclear agreement, it wouldn’t be controversial to talk about oil lobbies, NRA, various Indian-American groups.

Reasons for the Taboo

But with Middle East, when you talk about Israel lobby groups you are grabbing the third rail. This is in part because of the historical experience of the Jewish people – a history which includes the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and accusations of undue influence. It is a history that has to be respected and which requires us to be cautious..

Rejection of Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories

Some may think that we’re saying there’s some kind of secret conspiracy to control American policy, the military, or economy. We reject these antisemitic conspiracy theories. The Israel Lobby is an interest group like lots of other ones. Most of its activities are entirely appropriate. We don’t question Israel’s legitimacy. We believe the US should come to Israel’s aid if its survival were ever in jeopardy. But we ought to be able to talk about the influence of the Israel Lobby in the same way as we might talk about any other groups.

Usual Rationales for US Support for Israel

Rabin: US support for Israel beyond compare in modern history – largest recipient of military aid. Israel’s GDP/capita is 29^th in world. Israel builds settlements. US gives consistent backing to Israel in the UN. Almost always take its side in regional conflicts. Israel is rarely if ever criticized by officials nor anyone who aspires to high office .

The usual rationale given for this support is that Israel is democracy and a strategic asset. Israel may have been a strategic asset during the Cold War; but is it today? Giving Israel unconditional support is one of reasons we have a terrorism problem and makes it harder to address many problems in Middle East. Problems wouldn’t disappear if we had normal relationship. US gets some benefits. But it’s hard to argue that giving Israel so much and unconditional help is making Americans safer. It’s a strategic liability.

True, Israel is a vibrant democracy – but there are many other democratic countries. Further, Israel’s treatments of own Arab citizens and Palestinian subjects is sharply at odds with democratic values. Israel’s behavior no better than that of the Palestinians. Neither side owns moral high ground. Israel hasn’t acted substantially better than other countries. Its behavior isn’t exemplary to justify special treatment.

We think there’s a strong moral case for Israel’s existence, based on the history of antisemitism. But today, Israel’s existence is not in jeopardy.

The Lobby is Behind Israel's Privileged Position

What explains Israel’s privileged position? In our view, the Israel Lobby. Organizations such as AIPAC, ADL, Christians United for Israel, Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Weekly Standard and New Republic. Most special interest groups in US have a number of different components. Environmental movement = research organizations, local chapters, academics, journalists. It’s not a centralized organization. Not everyone agrees. It’s not a cabal or conspiracy that controls US foreign policy. Rather, powerful interest group whose actions are as American as apple-pie.

The lobby is not synonymous with Jewish Americans. Between one quarter to one third don’t care about Israel; some of the organizations aren’t Jewish. Lobby is defined by political positions it favors. We include only those who are actively working to influence US policy.

Small interest groups can sometimes wield strong influence – narrow topic that doesn’t interest so many people. Lobby works in Beltway – giving politicians clear incentives to embrace its positions. AIPAC works 24/7 to convince politicians to follow their views. Annual budget is $50 million – drafting legislation, publishing talking points. Very energetic grassroots base. It doesn’t give money directly to candidates, but it does help steer contributions from individuals. Pro-Israel political action committees gave $55 million to politicians from 1992-2006. Have driven some people from office. Lobby doesn’t control every election, but every Congressman and presidential candidate knows that they’re playing with fire if you question support for Israel.

The second strategy is try to shape public discourse on Middle East and Israel so that the country is viewed very favorable by mainstream Americans. US coverage is very pro-Israel – cf. Europe and Israel. No one like Robert Fisk and Patrick Seale, Akiva Elder, Gideon Levi, Amira Hass. It’s not the former are always right – the point is that critical voices like theirs are almost completely absent from US media. Even so, watchdog groups such as ADL and Camera mount boycotts, Campus Watch monitors universities. When Jimmy Carter published his book, ADL and Camera took out ads with publisher’s phone number. Pressure on CNN advertisers.

Efforts to stifle critical commentary often includes smearing critics by calling them antisemitic. Marty Peretz: Carter will go down in history as a Jew-hater. Distracts people from main issue – American policy. Deters people from criticizing the Lobby. Marginalizes people in the public arena.

It’s obvious to virtually everyone that America’s Middle East policy has gone off the rails but we don’t debate. It’s often argued that US policy is due to broad support for Israel. This is not persuasive. Americans in part do have a favorable image of Israel; but they don’t think US should give Israel one-sided and unconditional support. Recent survey: 70%+ Americans: be balanced. 87% of Jewish Americans want a two-state solution. Gap between what people want and American policy is due to influence of lobby.

Mearsheimer

The Negative Influence of the Lobby on American and Israeli Policy

Its influence has been largely negative. The Lobby, working with Israel itself, has pushed Israel’s Middle East policy that are not in US’s interest and not in Israel’s. US support for Israel’s policies in occupied territories has helped fuel terrorism against US; role of Lobby in run-up to Iraq war; US policy toward Iran, Syria, and during Lebanon War of 2006 (will not talk about last 3 in this presentation).

Hatred for US is due to Support for Israel

Conventional wisdom among Israel’s supporters: treatment of Palestinians has little to do with US’s terrorism problem and why US is so hated. In fact, Israel = valuable ally. This is wrong. Survey data shows that US support for Israel’s brutal treatment of Palestinians and to colonize these territories angers huge numbers of people in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Citizens in these countries are genuinely distressed at plight of Palestinians and perceived role of US. I’m not saying this is only cause of our terrorism problem but a major cause: motivates some individuals to attack the US. It serves as powerful recruitment tool for terrorist organizations. Since LBJ every president has opposed building of settlements.

Critically important issue when talking about America’s terrorism problem: 9/11’s relation to brutal treatment of Palestinians. It’s common-place to hear people say that Bin Laden didn’t care much about Palestinians until recently; events had nothing to do with Israel; those involved in attack hated us because of who were not our Middle East policy. It is clear from the historical record that Bin Laden has been deeply concerned about plight of Palestinians since he was a young man; reflected in public statements throughout 1990s. Max Rodenbeck, in Economist review of 2 books about Bin Laden: of all the themes the notion of payback for injustices suffered by Palestinians is perhaps most powerfully recurrent in speeches. Major motivating factor of attacks: support for Israel. Bin Laden wanted bombers to attack Congress specifically; move up date in response to events in Israel. Principal architect of attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: animus stems from violent disagreement with US foreign policy favoring Israel (9/11 Commission Report). Hard to imagine more compelling evidence for role that US support for Israel played in inspiring attacks. Present relationship between Israel & US is provoking terrorism problem.

Israel and the Lobby were Main Driving Forces Behind Decision to Invade Iraq

Iraq War = one of greatest blunders in American history. Israel and Lobby were two of the main driving forces behind decision to invade Iraq. Hard to imagine that war happening in their absence. Israel was only country where both government and majority of population favored the war. Israeli government pushed Bush administration hard to make sure it didn’t lose its nerve in months before invasion. Barak and Netanyahu also implored US to take down Saddam Hussein. Israel was pushing so hard for war that its allies in US warned them to damp down rhetoric lest it be seen as war for Israel. President Clinton said in 2006: every Israeli politician I knew thought that Saddam was so great a threat that he should be removed even if Iraq didn’t have WMD. 77% of Israelis said they wanted US to attack Iran in month before war.

There is no question that in early 2002 when Israelis first got wind of Bush administration’s thoughts to attack Iraq that key officials went to Washington to make it clear that IRAN was greater enemy. Important to emphasize, however, that Israel wasn’t opposed to US toppling regimes in Iraq or Syria. Israel simply wanted US to deal with Iran first. But once Israelis realized that war party intended to deal with Iran after finishing job in Iraq, it enthusiastically embraced idea of invading Iraq. Israelis put significant pressure on Bush administration to choose war over diplomacy, while reminding US to deal with Iran after. No evidence that Israel warned US that Iraq would be a quagmire; they thought it would be a cake-walk.

Now that war has gone south, common-place to hear Israel’s supporters say that main organizations in Lobby didn’t push for war. May 2004 editorial in The Forward. As President Bush attempted to sell war in Iraq, America’s important Jewish organizations rallied to his defense – community leaders stressed need to rid world of Saddam and his WMD. Concern for Israel rightly factored in.

Hard evidence that AIPAC lobbied for the war. Its executive director, Howard Kohr, told NY Sun in January 2003: one of AIPAC’s successes for past year = quietly lobbying Congress to approve use of force in Iraq. Neo-cons were main driving force behind war. They initiated idea of toppling Saddam by force; especially after 9/11, they pushed relentlessly for war against Iraq. No other group or institution in US was as seriously committed to invading Iraq. Even after 9/11, there was significant opposition in State Department, uniformed military. Neo-cons are deeply committed to Israel; many are connected to key organizations in the Lobby. Our argument is not that the neo-cons or the leaders of the principal Lobby organizations were pushing a war that was in Israel’s national interest. On contrary, they believed that invading Iraq was in both the American and Israeli national interest. For them, what is good for Israel is good for the US. It was the events of 9/11 that created circumstances to help them convince that invading Iraq was smart idea.

Without Bush or Cheney onboard, there wouldn’t have been a war. If Al Gore had been elected, there would not have been a war. The neo-cons were necessary to have the war but by themselves couldn’t have made the war happen.

We’re sometimes accused of making argument that Iraq war = Jewish war. Polls taken before the war show that American Jews were 10% less supportive of war than general American public. War was due in large part to Israel Lobby, especially the neo-cons within it; not the American Jewish community. Lobby is defined by its political agenda.

What Should the US-Israel Relationship Look Like?

What we think US-Israel relationship should look like. US should treat Israel as a normal country; how it treats other democracies around the world – England, France, Italy, and India. When Israel is acting in ways consistent with American interest, Washington should back the state. When it harms US interests, America should get Israel to change its behavior. US should act as honest broker in Israeli-Palestinian conflict. US should make it clear to Israel that it must abandon occupied territories. Jerusalem should be told that US will oppose Israel’s colonial expansion in the West Bank. US should defend Israel’s right to exist within its pre-1967 borders with some minor modifications. Most importantly, if Israel’s survival is threatened, US should come to its aid.

George Bisharat

Some Adulation and Non Sequiturs

It is an important book because it is about a pivotal, consequential conflict that has emanations and consequences that affect us here within the US. Relationship between the conflict and the war in Iraq. If you think about the domestic dimensions of the so-called “War on Terror” – price of diminished civil liberties – this is another consequence of this conflict that affects each and every one of us in this country. It’s a book about an issue that’s very poorly understood. Lack of understanding is produced, manufactured, maintained – not by control but by substantial influence – over media, public discourse in universities and variety of other places.

Most importantly, the professor have broken a taboo and opened debate on this critical issue. From personal experience, the reality is that people who attempt to speak out on this issue face substantial forms of dissuasion – shall we say. What you have done, professors, was an act of intellectual courage that few people in the American academic community have shown.

No Shout-Out to People who Celebrate Hanukah (or Kwanzaa - NK)

I urge you all to buy the book, give it to your family and friends for Christmas.

Critique of Pivotal Assumptions about Israel's Right to Exist

Some questions: the professors repeatedly state throughout book that history of Christian European antisemitism provides a strong moral basis for Israel’s founding and continued existence. At same time, they argue that Israel’s establishment necessarily entailed crimes (term they use) against the Palestinians, including expulsion of approximately 750,000 Palestinians in 1948, seizure of homes. They also show in some detail that maintaining Israel’s character as a Jewish state requires continuing denial of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. It also entails de jure and de facto discrimination against the Palesitnian citizens of Israel today. They speak of 1992 Basic Law of Human Dignity and Freedom – the professors point out that it does not contain an equality principle (14^th Amendment); such a clause was specifically excluded. Laws that prevent Palestinian Israeli citizens from transferring citizenship to non-citizens whom they marry. How can there be moral justification? Is it appropriate for US to condition aid to Israel on its passage of an equal rights amendment – if not, why not?

Questions by Bisharat

At a number of points in the book, the professors state that it’s not antisemitic to criticize Israeli policies. It’s not clear whether you believe it’s antisemitic to criticize founding principles of the Israeli state, including the ones that dedicate it to being a state to one people and not of all of its citizens. Is there anything antisemitic about criticizing Zionism, establishing a state based on exclusivist ethnic criteria?

You state that Israeli Lobby acts in ways counter to Israel’s interest. Raises question about relationship between Israeli government and Lobby? Is the Lobby running amok? Or is the Israeli government acting in ways that run counter to long-term interests of its citizens?

I read with great interest section of the book that deals with prescriptions of how to make things better. You clearly state support for a two-state solution to problem. Book claims that other alternatives are undesirable.

How to deal with Lobby? They evaluate weakening it through financing regulations. Look at possibility that Lobby might be countered – they directly note that neither Arab nor Muslim-American community are likely to pose a significant challenge to Lobby. Possibility of transforming the Lobby, making it less maximalist and hardline – they rate it as plausible. The real hope they offer is in opening up public discourse and education. Silent majority is out there, amenable to what they say. But I worry because the Lobby is working overtime; professors were disinvited from prominent forum in Mearsheimer’s hometown. Program of colonization on the ground in Israel is not stopping either.

One of the alternatives they’ve offered to two-state solution: development of apartheid-like solution. Will political power ever be marshaled here or in Israel to stop this colonizing juggernaut? Is there not a point at which we have to admit that repartition of Palestine has become impossible. There is one effective sovereign as we speak; question will be about political principles on which that system should operate. Will it be a system based on equal rights and fundamental human dignity of both peoples.

Questions and Answers

Responses to Bisharat

Mearsheimer

We think that fact there’s a Jewish state is a good thing given history of antisemitism and our understanding of how the world works. Here in the US, we have a melting pot society. This is not a Christian or Anglo-Saxon state. It’s a liberal state. There is no one ethnic or religious group that dominates; it’s a melting pot. I don’t like idea of living in state dominated by one culture. But around world, there are lots of states where people identify themselves largely in terms of culture – Japan: most people consider themselves to be Japanese. Same is true with Israel – it’s a Jewish state; same true for Germany. It’s not the way I like to do business; but it’s perfectly legitimate way to do it in international system today. I believe in national self-determination. Zionism is a form of nationalism and perfectly legitimate one. There is nothing wrong with having a Jewish state. We are arguing that Palestinians are also entitled to have a state of their own. If there’s national self-determination for the Jews, it should also exist for the Palestinians. Principal obstacle to establishing Palesitnian state at this time is Israel. Israel is interested in colonizing the West Bank and giving the Palestinians nothing more than a few enclaves, keeping them disconnected, controlling borders, air and water. As long as that’s the case, Palestinians wont’ have viable state. Same logic that leads us to support Jewish state leads us to support Palestinians State.

Walt

Relationship between Israeli government and Lobby. Impact of Lobby has been unintentionally quite harmful to Israel. There’s nothing unique about that. Governments and special interest groups do stupid things; every government does things contrary to its own interest. 3 examples: many Israelis today would argue that entire settlement project was a “strategic and moral disaster of tragic proportions” (Wieseltier). Immensely costly.

Iraq was a blunder not just for US but also for Israel. It created a failed state in Israel’s neighborhood. Strengthened Iran’s position. Bush didn’t think it was a blunder to go into Iraq; neither did the Israelis. War in Lebanon in 2006 – Hizbullah was a problem, Israel had right to respond; but strategy that Israel adopted by trying to eliminate it from the air, trying to punish from the air – it was boneheaded. Not good for Israel. Aided and abetted by Israel Lobby here.

Some of Israel’s most ardent supporters in US have done it great harm.

Where do we go from here? Look down road where this is all leading. You can imagine expelling all the Palestinians. If you’re of ethnic cleansing, please raise your hands. You can have a binational democracy [strong applause, Walt says: I don’t agree with this] – if you favor that, you don’t favor having a Jewish state. Or you can have apartheid. That has many negative consequences for the Jewish state. Do you want that? If you’re pro-Israel, you should get behind a two-state solution with as much force as you can.

Mearsheimer interjects:

there is significant opposition in Israel to giving Palestinians a state. Most Israelis don’t have a viable state in mind. Very little support in Israel for the Clinton parameters. That means that US has to lean heavily on Israel. All this is heading for apartheid state, if this doesn’t happen. That’s why so much uproar over Jimmy Carter book.

Questions from the Floor - First Round

1. Ideology. Is it worthwhile to pursue notion that Zionism has an effect within substantial part of American Jewish population similar to effect that Stalinism had on Communists?

2. Statistical extrapolations that Arab population will outnumber Jewish one in Israel.

3. How will change in US foreign policy be sparked?

Mearsheimer

1. I think there is hardly any similarity between the two. Zionism is nationalism: Jews should have state of their own. Got started in Europe in late 19^th when nationalism was a very powerful force. There’s nothing unusual about it. It was good old-fashioned European nationalism. Just happened to be that group pushing it was Jewish. Stalinism is an ideology associated with one man and his murderous policies; it has nothing to do with nationalism. Russian and Ukrainian nationalism is roughly equivalent to Zionism. With regard to Zionism’s role in US – there’s large body of literature is that religious part of Judaism no longer very attractive to them; large portions of American Jewish community see Israel as central part of Jewish identity. That’s due in large part to fact that religion isn’t a strong glue anymore. It’s not surprising that inside American Jewish population today there’s substantial support for Israel. Public opinion polls on American Jewish community, 35 or younger, much less identification with Israel.

Walt

2. Changing demographic balance? Israelis are well-aware of this. Explains why Sharon eventually woke up to fact that creating situation that wasn’t sustainable in long term. There’s also shifting demographic balance within Israel.

3. We are under no illusions that Lobby can be turned around instantly. Some cause for optimism: the costs of such a one-sided policy are becoming obvious. Our screwed-up relation with Middle East, our problems, are making people think – of course Israel and Lobby aren’t only source of this. Two: it’s hard to see how policy changes once you change the conversation, shift the discourse. This is why groups in the Lobby have been so energetic in trying to squelch conversation about elephant in the room. Case for unconditional support for Israel is incredibly weak.

Questions from Floor - Second Round

4. Egypt doesn’t have much of Lobby at all. Why are they second in aid?

5. Book explains political and financial aspects. Speaking as Darwinist: isn't this a war between superstitious primitives?

6. Itamar Haritan asked an excellent question which I couldn't get down verbatim - if you are reading this, please correct this very inadequate (and possibly wrong) paraphrase. Itamar asked whether American foreign policy in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America during the Cold War could also be explained with reference to the activities of "the Lobby." He wondered whether it might not be more accurate to see US foreign policy in the Middle East today as related to the structures of American imperialism, including such factors as the power of the military industrial complex.

Addendum: This is from Itamar - an elaboration of what he asked at the lecture:

Many people in this room share your concern about US imperialism and would like to understand it so as to end it. Frequently in our social science classes we draw parallels between US behavior during the Cold War and US behavior today, drawing the conclusion that despite differences between the War on Terror and the War on Communism, the two serve the same purpose of mobilizing America for war, masking its economic interests abroad, and serving the Other through which politicians scare the American people to support their policies. Doesn't your analysis contradict comparisons to previous analyses of American imperialism by saying that this latest wave of aggression is explainable, in large part, by a group of organizations? What of the comparisons that many people see between the US-Israel relationship and US policies toward client states, and between its invasions of Vietnam, Korea, etc. as compared with Iraq? What about the military industrial complex?

Mearsheimer

4. It’s true that Egypt is #2 recipient of US foreign aid, and Jordan is #3. Why are they #2 and #3? After Egypt signed peace treaty with Israel in late 1970s, we greatly increased our aid. Bribe money. Money designed to keep Egypt and Israel on a peaceful footing. Jordan’s aid also shot up after signing peace agreement with Israel. Keep Hashemites in power in Jordan and to make sure that there are good relations with Israel and Jordan over long term. Israel would have had a peace deal with Syria if it had not walked out of it in 2000. Saudis have been pushing peace inititive since 2002.

6. History of American imperialism and how America acted in Cold War in Vietnam. Israel Lobby had virtually nothing to do with it. Our argument is not that US acts in benign and responsible way every place in the world and that it’s only in Middle East that it acts in foolish ways because of Israel Lobby. US has behaved like rogue elephant at different times in different places in world. Nothing to do with Israel Lobby. But if you look at Middle East policy today and you think about what forces are pushing US to pursue the policies in that region you see that Israel Lobby has had marked influence on that policy. Contrary to what one might think, the oil lobby and military-industrial complex and oil-producing states in that region have had nowhere same influence. We are both realists; we have vested interested in discovering that war in Iraq was all about geopolitics and oil because it would support our basic theories of how world works. What we’ve written is a direct contradiction of the theories we’ve spent most of our lives developing. We began to look very closely at Middle East policy and began to understand that our theories didn’t apply very well. We had to admit that domestic politics were playing a key role in shaping Middle East policy. I’m not saying Israel Lobby is principal driving force; but in Middle East last 3 decades, power of Lobby is not to be underestimated.

Walt

5. For some of the inhabitants of region, religious beliefs greatly complicate efforts to solve problems – you see this very closely with Holy Sites in Jerusalem. But I don’t believe that religious convictions determine people’s political stance on this question. You can be Jewish and pro-peace.

Questions from the Floor - Third Round

7. You compare, in your book, terrorist attacks of Zionist groups and Palestinians [...].

8. Don’t you think characterization of Zionism as “good old-fashioned nationalism” would be more accurately rephrased “good old-fashioned European colonialism”?

9. What specifically should US condition its military aid to Israel on?

Mearsheimer

7. Differences in terrorism: there’s rich literature on Zionist terrorism. It’s quite clear that the Zionists indiscriminately killed civilians and idea that they never attempted to kill them and always warned them is not borne out by historical record. The truth is there isn’t a lot of difference between what Zionists did against British and what Palestinians are doing vis-à-vis Israelis. Terrorism is weapon of the weak. They wanted to get the “occupiers” [his quotation marks] out. The Palestinians are doing the same thing. I’m not condoning terrorism here. What the Palestinians are doing today is largely the same thing as what the Zionists did.

8. Person who made that point (about colonialism) is essentially correct [applause]. If you think about situation in Palestine ca. 1900 – there were very few Jews and lots of Palestinians. There was no way that large numbers of Jews or Zionists coming out of Pale of Settlement could enter Palestine without behaving way that European powers behaved around world. It’s hard not to do that. How was US created? White men colonized North America. Same thing is true in Israel. Many American Jews find this hard to understand. You have to do terrible things to local population. Defense has to be: it was absolutely essential for the Jews to create state of their own given what was happening in Europe at that time. It’s too bad from Jews’ point of view that they didn’t have a state earlier, in 1933, because then there wouldn’t have been a Holocaust. This is one of the principal reasons that the Zionists went to the Middle East. But to create that state there is no question that they had to expel large numbers of Palestinians.

Walt

9. I’m uncomfortable conditioning aid on attaching human rights clause to constitution. I don’t think it’s our business to tell Israel that it must have a constitution or what’s in it. We should of course be pressing them to improve the status of Israeli Arabs within Israel = 2^nd class citizens. Most obvious thing we should be conditioning aid on is occupation itself and settlement constructions. Money is fungible – money given as military aid can be used for other purposes. As a practical matter, any peace deal that comes about will involve a substantial amount of money from the US – to Palestinians and to Israelis. EU will also have to pay; given that Europeans had large part in creating this problem, they should pay.

Fourth Round of Questions

10. Set up an Internet-based discussion group; then crazy talk about 9/11 (commission?) lies.

11. Given that you think main players are neo-cons and evangelicals, have you thought of using a different term than "Israel Lobby"?

CORRECTION from Peggy: the questioner offered LEN ("Likudniks, Evangelicals, and neo-cons") as a substitute for "Israel Lobby."

12. Some have argued that Israel wanted Iraq war in order to destabilize entire Middle East to embroil Arabs in inter-tribal warfare. What do you think about this [the questioner seemed to think that was a good explanation].

Walt

10. We actually have regular jobs [so we don't have time for your stupid internet newsgroups].

11. Why did we call it “Israel Lobby” – that is the simplest label for it since what unites all the groups in the Lobby is desire to maintain special relationship between US and Israel, keep US providing large amounts of support. There are disagreements among them on whole range of policy issues. They didn’t all support the Iraq war, but they all agree on special relationship. That would include more moderate or left orientations. Other labels you suggest wouldn’t capture phenomenon accurately. Lobby is defined by political agenda it’s pushing.

Mearsheimer

12. Question whether pro-Israel forces wanted to destabilize entire region – i.e., sort of what we’ve been watching happening in Iraq. Two points for why that’s not case. There is no evidence that neo-cons, who were main driving force behind war, were thinking along those lines. In fact, they were remarkably idealistic when they imagined how they thought it would play out. Walt & I were two of the most outspoken opponents of the Iraq war. We had a big debate on Council on Foreign Relations. We ran up against neo-cons on many occasions before war. Basic story they told about how we would live happily ever after in Iraq was to say that we would see situation in Iraq and elsewhere in Middle East that resembles Europe in 1989. We have tryant in control in Iraq; remove him and democracy will bubble up from the bottom. It was reasonably easy argument to counter over half-hour but not over a few minutes; it did look like history moving in that direction post-1989. They were genuinely shocked, especially Paul Wolfowitz – a very idealistic man, though simplistic in his worldviews, a powerful belief in democracy as an inevitable force. Second reason you’re wrong: no way they could do Syria and Iran and all the other countries on hit list if they got bogged down in Iraq. For neo-con strategy to work, they had to be able to “float like a butterfly, sting like a bee.” Go in, knock off regime in Iraq, have democracy quickly sprout, then go after Iran, and then Syria. Believed that everyone in region would get message and jump on American bandwagon. If we did what you described, we’d end up stuck there with 100,000s troops. General Shinseki was asked how many troops necessary to occupy – he said couple 100,000 – Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld went ballistic about this, because they knew this meant they wouldn’t be able to deal with other countries on the hit list. They believed that democracy would break out. They pooh-poohed State’s extensive plans for occupying Iraq.