Coalition Building - Bibi's Nonsense

It's a travesty that the press is uncritically regurgitating the notion that Bibi has a higher chance of forming a government than Livni. This is not at all true when one looks at the numbers, even if they change by one or two seats in favor of the right-wing after the soldiers' and absentee voters' ballots are counted.

Although Netanyahu has been arguing that he won a decisive victory, I don't think he is thrilled about forming a far-right government. He knows that this will cause him a lot of problems on the international stage, which will in turn impede his ability to advance his policy aims. Furthermore, he would need both ultra-Orthodox parties to form the "nationalist" government that so many people are dreaming about.

Here is what such a coalition would look like:

Likud + Yisrael Beitenu + Shas + Jewish Home + National Union + Torah Judaism 

= (27 + 15 + 11 + 3 + 4 + 5) seats

= 65 seats  [out of a total of 120]

That's a very weak government, considering that it commands just 4 seats more than the minimum. Plus, can you imagine the headaches with Shas, the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox, and Lieberman all in one coalition?

Both Shas and Yisrael Beitenu have been posturing that they would prefer a Netanyahu government. There is bad blood between Shas and Livni, so perhaps Shas will under no circumstances sit in her government. But Lieberman's public expressions of support for a Netanyahu government should be read as attempts to strengthen his bargaining position vis-a-vis Livni. The same of course goes for Barak's remarks about Labor returning to the opposition. Nothing is a given. Neither Kadima nor Labor have any compunctions about sitting in a government with Lieberman. Moreover, Shas and Yisrael Beitenu would probably be willing to bury the hatchet, at least temporarily, if the right conditions are met.

There is thus a distinct possibility of a Kadima + Labor + Yisrael Beitenu + Shas coalition

 = (28 + 13 + 15 + 11) seats

= 67 seats. 

As always, the remarks to the press and leaks by the various candidates and their parties should be viewed with a great deal of skepticism. As much as certain candidates may insist that they will never sit in a government with X or Y, or that they would never consider conceding on issue Z, everything is up for grabs. 

18th Knesset Elections 2009 - Predictions

In less than a week, on Tuesday, February 10, Israelis will elect the 18th Knesset. There has been quite a bit of movement in the polls over the last week. The latest results are showing a tight race between Likud and Kadima, and a surge in support for Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beitenu party.  Candidates on the various party lists are competing for 120 seats. Here are my predictions for the elections results.

Likud: 29

Kadima: 23

Yisrael Beitenu: 16

Labor: 15

Shas: 10

United Torah Judaism: 6

Meretz: 5

National Union: 5

Jewish Home: 2

Hadash: 4

Ra'am Ta'al: 3

Balad: 2

I see Likud widening its lead over Kadima again in the last days before the vote. The last poll is tomorrow, it may still predict a close race between the two parties, but Kadima's lead is heavily dependent on quiet. I am predicting that Lieberman will fall slightly from the current projections but that his party will still beat Labor. 

The next order of business will be to determine who will sit in the government and in what capacity. A key question will be whether the Labor Party will give Ehud Barak the go-ahead to join a coalition with Netanyahu and Lieberman. I think he will twist the right arms to be able to maintain his tenure in the Defense Ministry. According to the polls, there is a possibility that a secular coalition comprising Likud, Kadima, Yisrael Beitenu, and Labor could rule without Shas or UTJ. 

Also interesting to consider - the candidate lists for Labor, Yisrael Beitenu, Kadima, and Likud. These will be important to peruse as the cabinet seats are divvied up.

Knesset Elections 2009 - Early Trends

Foreign Minister and Kadima chairwoman Tsipi Livni is no longer wasting time on Ehud Barak. She is interpreting the election campaign as fight between her and Likud chairman Benjamin Netanyahu (English, Hebrew). Having watched the Likud gain several high-profile additions from the right these past few days, Livni went on the attack. She challenged Netanyahu and his supporters to formulate a platform with a vision of the future rather than a series of negations - no to negotiatons, no to territorial concessions, no to a Palestinian state. 

If Livni proves able to stay on the offensive, to challenge Netanyahu to present his own plan for securing Israel's safety and prosperity in the long-term, the Israeli public might ultimately side with her. The truth is that Israel's democratic right has no vision. It offers no solutions to the current impasse, other than a continuation of the status quo, with which most Israelis (rightly or wrongly) are deeply unsatisfied. 

Of course, "creative" policy proposals are plenty on the anti-democratic right, which believes that peace can be achieved by offering the Palestinians a menu of delectable choices, ranging from  forced expulsion, to voluntary transfer, to second-class citizenship. Even someone as cynical as Netanyahu, however, is unlikely to embrace such policy proposals.  He will be hard-pressed to devise a clear and plausible policy sufficiently different from Livni's for centrist voters to choose him over her.

Ehud Barak, in the meantime, is pursuing the bankrupt strategy that has bedeviled  the Labor Party since the end of Barak's last government. His political games are squeezing out the vision and experience that the party's committed parliamentarians and ex-ministers could bring to the art of government. Unless he changes tack, Barak will lead his party to the impotence predicted by current polls.  If they become too fed up, those on the left of the party may join Meretz, while those on the right will jockey for positions in Kadima.

Let the Campaigns Begin

With the U.S. presidential election campaigns drawing to a close and Americans waiting eagerly for its outcome, Israeli political machines are in full swing organizing for a showdown of equally historic proportions. It is of course far too early to call the Israeli elections, which will be held on February 10, 2009, but the outlines of the campaigns that the major parties will run are already visible.

The Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, is convinced that it will make a major comeback and determined to sweep to power in convincing fashion. Current polls, have the party running neck-to-neck with Kadima, while they predict that the Labor Party is headed for a devastating defeat. But it is not at all clear whether Netanyahu would be able to form the kind of government that the Israeli right is dreaming of. To be sure, his campaign will attempt to capitalize on widespread discontent in Israeli society about the lack of progress achieved since Sharon's withdrawal from Gaza. Furthermore, the religious and secular right is regrouping around a united Jerusalem and the protection of the West Bank settlements. 

Such a platform, however, will make it difficult for the Likud to bring in Ehud Barak's Labor Party or Tsipi Livni's Kadima into a coalition government. Hence, Netanyahu has two choices: to win at least 40 seats (out of the 120 seats in the Knesset) and to form a coalition with Shas, United Torah Judaism, the National Religious Party, and Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beitenu, or, to back-pedal immediately on all those slogans and bring the Labor Party into the government. 

There is no telling what the next three months will bring to the Middle East. While progress on the Palestinian front appears hopelessly stalled, we may see slightly more movement on the Syrian track. The latter will depend on the policies that the president-elect of the United States decides to adopt. Olmert, as head of the transitional government, has the legal authority to continue negotiations. Will the Syrians take these talks seriously? Will they prefer to wait for a (potentially more right-wing) new government to form in February, or do they believe that they could grasp the most favorable settlemetn now?

While Bibi today looks like the man to beat, Tsipi Livni has distinct advantages over her challenger from the Likud. Netanyahu's government, like Barak's, is not remembered as an especially successful one. Both of these politicians' styles alienated some supporters of their parties. They will have to invest in overturning these perceptions. Livni, on the other hand, does not have such liabilities, despite boasting considerable experience in the executive branch of the government. She remains somewhat enigmatic in the eyes of many voters, but they may respond very favorably to her messages when she devotes herself fully to campaigning.

Ashqelon Hit Hard

The katyusha or Grad rocket attack on Ashqelon today surely marks a new chapter in the war between Israel and the Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza. Since the disengagement from Gaza, we have seen a steady erosion of red lines, as more and more Israeli civilians have come under fire from Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups in the Strip. It may be important at the political level to distinguish among the various factions carrying out the rocket attacks and to evaluate particular motives. For the military, however, these kinds of considerations are irrelevant. What matters is that Palestinian terrorist groups have acquired and preserved the means to strike major Israeli population centers, despite a much-maligned "siege" of Gaza and numerous air force as well as ground operations. And even though the latter have often claimed the lives of many Palestinians - civilians and fighters - Israel has not been able to establish effective deterrence. Neither diplomatic nor military means have so far been able to protect Israeli civilians from these attacks. Despite countless announcements about an imminent truce this past year, we seem no closer to calm on the southern border than before. With Prime Minister Olmert's political career in limbo and Defense Minister Ehud Barak (Labor) possibly facing challenges from inside and outside the party, we may end up seeing the kind of major ground operation that the Israeli right has been agitating for. Such an operation may also be accompanied by assassinations of Hamas's political leadership.

The Races - Labor and the Presidency

Who will be the next mukhtar of Israel?

UPDATE (June 6): The increase in entropy that Jeha was talking about seems to be kicking in. Barak has joined up with Ofir Pines-Paz (Labor) and is now saying that if elected to head Labor, he would take the party out of the government, unless Olmert resigned. It's pretty clear that this is a move aimed at differentiating himself from the Peretz-Ayalon camp. This latest news is somewhat ironic, given Ayalon's earlier "principled stance" against Olmert, and Barak's waffling on the question. It's a big gamble, to be for sure.


It looks like Ami Ayalon and Amir Peretz have joined forces to give Ehud Barak a run for his money in the Labor primaries. It remains to be seen how the rest of the party responds, but this might just be a winning combination.

Peretz can still deliver some votes, and he is again pitching himself as the representative of the "social camp." The pair made their first joint appearance in the Negev development town Ofakim, not too far from Sderot. The town's Labor party members are solidly behind Peretz; Ayalon received only a small number of votes there. Indeed, most of the Labor members from the south of the country, will vote for Peretz. Ayalon, meanwhile, will draw in the kibbutzim and the voters in Tel Aviv. He also has the support of some of Labor's new faces, such as Avishai Braverman and Shelly Yehimovich [NOTE: Yehimovich later announced her support for Barak!].

Our readers from Lebanon and elsewhere are probably not terribly interested in the intricacies of Israeli domestic politics - so to cut to the chase, what's the fallout from this latest development? I think it will further bolster Olmert's chances of staying in power. Peretz and his supporters have the most to lose from new elections, so he has essentially committed Ayalon to staying in the government - even if the latter has been coy about admitting as much in public.

Did anyone else notice the English headline of Mikhal Grinberg's article on the Ayalon-Peretz combination, which cited Peretz as saying that "Ayalon and I together appeal to all ethnic groups"? The term "ethnic groups" is probably confusing for foreign readers, especially for those who speak of Israel as an "ethnocracy." At first I thought that the phrase was a translation of the word עדה ['edah] or its plural עדות ['edot], literally "communities," which is used to refer to various groups in Israeli society. Thus, 'edot ha-mizrakh are the "communities of the orient," etc. I have also heard someone on the radio giving a shout-out to ha-'edah ha-Tsharkessit [the Circassian community], which means that the term no longer refers only to the various Jewish "ethnicities." But the original Hebrew article did not use this word at all; rather, it referred to מגזרים [migzarim], lit. "sectors." In Israel, the word sector is most often used when referring to Arabs or the religious: people frequently talk of המגזר הערבי [the Arab sector] or המגזר החרדי/הדתי [the haredi/religious sector]. Needless to say, this is quite different from "ethnicity."

The other stabilizing factor for Olmert is Peres's candidacy for the presidency. A few months ago, most people would probably have picked MK Reuven Rivlin (Likud), a widely respected parliamentarian, as the favorite in this race. But Peres is campaigning hard, and he has managed to secure the support of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, and therefore of Shas. Who knows what deals were made to score these votes. He is also recruiting other MKs. A while ago, Rivlin made some remarks to the effect that the post of the presidency should go to the most qualified person rather than the most prestigious one. Perhaps he's right, but Peres remains the darling of European statesmen and media people (few of them have probably kept up with his move from Labor to Kadima - for them, he is still the Oslo man); this should be an asset for Israel. Colette Avital (Labor), unfortunately, will finish third, if she decides to run at all.

In any case, Peres is a stabilizer because he is desperate for votes and needs Olmert's support. His own backing of the Prime Minister during Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni's quasi coup attempt is paying dividends. The election of Rivlin, on the other hand, would be a clear blow against Olmert. The Likud members will certainly vote for him, as will the national religious camp. Ra'am Ta'al's chairman, MK Ibrahim Sarsur recently listed conditions for its backing: promises to release Arab Israeli security prisoners and support for a two-state solution (Ha'aretz). Interestingly enough, however, two of the MKs of his faction, Ahmad Tibi and Talab El-Sana have so far supported Rivlin. Every vote counts, and the Arab parties have ten among them.

Labor Party Primaries

MK Ami Ayalon (Labor)

As many expected, the Labor Party primaries did not yield a clear winner in the first round. At the end of the day, with a 65% turnout among party members, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak received 34%, while upstart Ami Ayalon finished with 32% of the votes. Defense Minister and current party leader Amir Peretz came in third with 22% - a relatively high number considering all that has happened.

The run-off, which will take place in a month, pits Barak against Ayalon. Barak is the more experienced politician and the man with more funds to dispense, while Ayalon can claim the mantle of reform, with Avishai Braverman at his side. Both candidates have solid security credentials. Barak, who served in the Sayeret Matkal, is one of Israel's most decorated soldiers and a former chief of staff; Ayalon, who served in the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit, is a former commander of the navy and a retired director of the Shin Bet. While Barak might be vulnerable to critiques of his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon as well as his reforms of the army (to which Hazbani alluded earlier), Ayalon lacks experience as a policy-maker.

Until the next round, we are in for a month of backroom deals by these candidates, as they jockey to enlist the support of Peretz's people and the supporters of the other candidates. Here, Barak is probably in a better position than Ayalon. While the latter seems to have won the votes of the kibbutzim and Tel Aviv members, Barak might have an easier time getting the Peretz camp to vote for him - despite his association with the moneyed elite. One thing that Barak has going for him is the fact that he has been very equivocal about leaving the Olmert government, whereas Ayalon has been very critical of the Prime Minister since the Winograd report. Most of the Labor Party members want to avoid elections. They want appointments and a role in the current government; and they are more likely to trust Barak to deliver them than the undiplomatic Ayalon.

Even if Ayalon wins, however, the Labor Party will probably remain in the Olmert government after all - unless of course something very dramatic happens. A whole month is a long time for things to remain as they are.

One matter that is confusing me at the moment is the portfolio most likely to be assigned to the eventual leader of the Labor Party. It seems that the Peretz supporters want the party to claim the Finance Ministry, to finally implement the social agenda on which Peretz ran in the first place. But Barak would surely prefer the Defense Ministry.

Generous Offers and Opportunities to Miss Opportunities

The map from Ross's The Missing Peace (Source: Jpundit)

It has become widely accepted among pro-Palestinian advocates that former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's "generous offer" to Yasir Arafat at the July 2000 Camp David summit was, in fact, an insidious attempt to further cement Israeli control over the Palestinians. According to this narrative, which calls itself a corrective to Zionist propaganda, and, which, has even been accepted by many Israeli leftists, the Palestinians were entirely justified in rejecting Barak's overtures, as the offer was not generous at all. Jimmy Carter has given new credence to this myth in his book.

The lies told by the Palestinian leadership and their witting as well as unwitting propagandists in the West are all the more astounding as they contradict the recollections of U.S. President Clinton as well as several key American negotiators. Dennis Ross has tried for years to talk sense into the myth-makers, but apparently it is easier to continue believing that everything Israel does is actually aimed at cementing the oppression of the Palestinians. In an op-ed published in the New York Times earlier today, Ross accuses Carter of

misrepresent[ing] the Middle East proposals advanced by President Bill Clinton in 2000, and in so doing undermin[ing], in a small but important way, efforts to bring peace to the region.

Apparently, Carter in his book contrasted two maps which he labeled the “Palestinian Interpretation of Clinton’s Proposal 2000” and the “Israeli Interpretation of Clinton’s Proposal 2000.” However, as Ross explains,

The problem is that the “Palestinian interpretation” is actually taken from an Israeli map presented during the Camp David summit meeting in July 2000, while the “Israeli interpretation” is an approximation of what President Clinton subsequently proposed in December of that year. Without knowing this, the reader is left to conclude that the Clinton proposals must have been so ambiguous and unfair that Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, was justified in rejecting them. But that is simply untrue.

The Arafat apologists insist to this day that the Palestinian leader made the right choice, dismissing the quip attributed to Abba Eban that "the Palestinians have never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity" as a vicious lie. But considering what the Palestinians could have obtained in 2000 if they had accepted Barak's offer instead of launching the second intifadah, Eban's statement is still right on the money. As Dennis Ross writes,

Put simply, the Clinton parameters would have produced an independent Palestinian state with 100 percent of Gaza, roughly 97 percent of the West Bank and an elevated train or highway to connect them. Jerusalem’s status would have been guided by the principle that what is currently Jewish will be Israeli and what is currently Arab will be Palestinian, meaning that Jewish Jerusalem — East and West — would be united, while Arab East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state.

The Palestinian state would have been “nonmilitarized,” with internal security forces but no army and an international military presence led by the United States to prevent terrorist infiltration and smuggling. Palestinian refugees would have had the right of return to their state, but not to Israel, and a fund of $30 billion would have been created to compensate those refugees who chose not to exercise their right of return to the Palestinian state.

One of the most common arguments advanced by those critical of the "generous offer myth" is that the Clinton plan would not have produced a contiguous Palestinian state. Never mind that the main reason cited by Arafat for his rejection of the proposal was the problem of the refugees (he, of course, insisted that Palestinian refugees and their descendants be allowed to move to pre-1967 Israel). And never mind that few of these critics have ever produced evidence in the form of maps demonstrating that the Clinton plan would result in the West Bank's division into "Bantustans." It's also strange that few of these propagandists have considered the fact that a Palestinian state will not be contiguous anyway, since Gaza and the West Bank are separated by a broad swathe of Israel.

But logic doesn't disturb such useful morons as Miriam Ward, a member of Pax Christi, who declared in a 2002 piece that

In the 1993 Oslo Agreement, by recognizing Israel’s right to exist, Palestinians already gave up 78 percent of their land and accepted the formula “land for peace” within the context of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories. This meant Palestinians were willing to settle for 22 percent of originally mandated Palestine. To put it bluntly: You take $100 from me and later offer to repay $22. I cut my losses and give up $78. Still later you want more of my remaining $22.

By her reasoning, anything the Palestinians concede should be regarded as a favor to Israel, since the land really belongs to the Arabs. Indeed, this is the consensus among the large majority of the post-colonial academic elite in America, and their growing disciples in the world. Using the rhetoric of "indigenous rights," they present Jews as entirely alien to the Land of Israel and to the Middle East.