The Syrian Economy

Please take a look at this excellent post by Ehsani for Josh Landis's Syria Comment on the economic reforms in Syria. The process described in this post are much more important than the blips on Zvi Bar'el's radar.

Erratic Behavior: Sign of Things to Come with the Netanyahu Government?

BY AMOS

One day Lieberman "cannot see Syria as a real partner for any kind of settlement" (see previous post), and the next he is "willing to negotiate," albeit "without preconditions" (Ha'aretz). This is diplomatic silliness. It looks we are going to see a lot of instant reversals with this new government. If you play hard to get on Saturday, you can't suddenly drop your skirt (or pants) on Sunday. The Prime Minister's Office has been strangely silent. Maybe they are hoping that Lieberman will render himself irrelevant. 

Fallout from the Gaza War

Hamas agrees to allow Fatah forces to patrol Rafah crossing (Ha'aretz):

The London-based Asharq al-Awsat reported Saturday that Hamas has suggested representatives of the Palestinian Authority be stationed at the Rafah crossing, but that they be residents of Gaza, not the West Bank. 

Also on Saturday, Hamas officials laid out some of their conditions for a continuation of the Gaza truce and for the release of captured Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit. 

Hamas spokesman Ayman Taha told Asharq Al-Awsat that his group wants European Union and Turkish troops to patrol Gaza's border crossings with Israel

I'm sure the heads of Hamas made these suggestions on their own initiative.

Assad  congratulates Hamas on 'victory' over IDF in Gaza (Ha'aretz)

According to the article, Assad told Meshal, currently in exile in Damascus, that the Palestinian peoples' response to Israel Defense Forces operation "Cast Lead" was evidence of their "commitment to their inalienable rights to their land and homes, and of their deep faith in their ultimate victory over occupation and aggression." 

More cheap words from Assad.  

The delegation reportedly told Syrian officials that Syria is the first stop in a tour of countries in the Middle East in order to "express their gratitude to them for standing by the Palestinian people during the aggression."

Mubarak must be ecstatic.

Egyptian official: Israel achieved all of its military goals in Gaza (Ha'aretz)

An Egyptian official has said that Israel achieved all of its military objectives during "Operation Cast Lead" in the Gaza Strip, having exacted serious blows to Hamas and it's infrastructure, according to an article published in the Arabic-language daily Al-Hayat on Saturday. 

The official is quoted in the article as saying that senior Hamas leaders are still in hiding out of fear of Israel Defense Forces strikes, and that Israel is not interested in pursuing a new calm or Tahadiyeh with the militant group. 

Egypt is not letting Hamas forget this.

ANALYSIS / The IDF model that failed in Lebanon succeeded  in Gaza (Amos Harel, Ha'aretz)

The Egyptian daily Al-Ahram reported this week that the head of Hamas' political bureau in Damascus, Khaled Meshal, expressed disappointment at the Arab reaction to the operation during a closed session of the Arab summit in Qatar. Not only did Hamas remain almost alone in the campaign against Israel, it also suffered a painful blow in the military confrontation. The best proof of this was its agreement to an unconditional cease-fire while IDF troops were still in the Gaza Strip. Al-Ahram reports that Meshal admitted that he had not expected the Israeli reaction to be so severe and sustained - the same sentiment that was expressed by Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon two and half years ago. 

Outwardly, Hamas broadcast a different message. Military Intelligence tends to give Hamas high grades for the credibility of its announcements in ordinary times. But since the start of the ground operation, Hamas' fabrications have gone off the charts. One of the organization's spokesmen claimed this week that Hamas had expelled the IDF from the Gaza Strip. The spokesman of the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military wing, admitted to losing only 48 of its men in the fighting. And how many Israeli soldiers were killed? Forty-nine, according to Hamas (in reality, 10 soldiers were killed). Conversations with residents of Ramallah and East Jerusalem indicate that from their point of view, Hamas won. They claim that Hamas withstood Israeli military pressure and that the IDF struck only civilians in the Gaza Strip. Asked why they think Hamas stopped firing rockets, they explain that it was a good-will gesture to Barack Obama on the occasion of his inauguration.

More deadly stupidity.

Gaza agreement eludes Arab leaders (Al Jazeera)

Arab leaders have pledged $2bn to help reconstruct the Gaza Strip after a three week Israeli offensive that devastated the territory's infrastructure, left 1,300 Palestinians dead, and thousands more displaced.

But there have been disagreements over how the aid will find its way into Gaza, with countries including Saudi Arabia concerned about giving funds directly to Hamas, which currently administers the Gaza Strip.

Rifts over Israel

"They [the Arab leaders] decided to confine themselves in a general statement to postpone differences," Al Jazeera's Hashem Ahelbarra reported from Kuwait.

"Saudis and Egyptians are very sceptical of [giving money to] Hamas for one reason," he said.

It will be interesting to see who wins this battle. Qatar's position has been dynamic over the past two years. Once in a while they support the Saudi line and at other times they subtly undermine their bigger neighbor. This time, Qatar has made no bones about its position. The emirate's stance during the Gaza War made it possible to speak of a Syrian-Qatari axis in support of Hamas and aligned with Iran. So far, Qatar has confined its war to one of words, or, more precisely, images - through its widely-watched al Jazeera outlet. The Egyptians and the Saudis must be fuming, but it remains to be seen whether the Arab masses will stay riled up long enough to present a serious threat to the security apparatuses of these regimes. 

The Rice-Olmert Spat and a Unilateral Cease Fire

The bizarre diplomatic spat sparked by Olmert's annoucement that he had intervened with Bush personally to overrule Rice should not be blown out of proportion, but it reveals something about the shortcomings of both of these lame-duck administrations (in Jerusalem and D.C.):

"In Jerusalem, however, officials went to sleep thinking the Americans had only agreed to support a 48-hour humanitarian cease-fire. At 1 A.M., final confirmation came from New York: The U.S. had promised that no cease-fire resolution would be brought to a vote any time soon. An hour and a half later, however, it became clear that not only was the Security Council due to vote on a cease-fire resolution at any minute, but Rice had ordered America's UN ambassador to support it. Olmert promptly telephoned U.S. President George Bush to complain about Rice's behavior and demand that he restrain her. What Bush said to Rice remains unknown. What is known, however, is that the U.S. suddenly changed its vote from "yes" to "abstain." 

The whole story would have ended well had Olmert behaved like a responsible adult and restrained his own impulses. Even his close associates admit that he would have done better to skip the public boasting about how he persuaded Bush to overrule Rice. Quite aside from the fact that this embarrassed the U.S. administration, Olmert's associates understand all too well that this story merely provides fresh ammunition to those who claim the Jews are the ones who really control America. " (Ha'aretz)

If this is correct, the Secretary of State was responsible for a diplomatic screw-up that could have cost Israel dearly, and in fact hurt its position. What matters here is not the substance of the particular resolutions in question but the fact that State had signalled to Israel that there was nothing to worry about. I cannot understand Ha'aretz's concession here to the "Zionist lobby" antisemites. This has nothing to do with Jews "controlling America, but with proper diplomatic coordination among allies.

Meanwhile, the Israeli cabinet is set to vote on a unilateral cease fire. With Hamas having rebuffed the Israeli position, and the Damascus wing of the organization, publicly supported by the presidents of Iran and Syria, continuing to adhere to a totally rejectionist line, I am having trouble making sense of this development. At the moment, Israeli troops are deep inside Gaza. Israel should not withdraw troops without an agreement involving the Palestinians. 

Assad's Hyped BBC Interview - Hamas Agreement to Cease Fire Imminent Nonetheless?

According to reports in the Israeli media, Hamas is close to agreeing to a cease fire that might meet some of Israel's conditions. A statement from the organization is expected at 7:30 pm local time tonight (1:30 pm EST). Meanwhile, Israeli operations appear to be continuing along the lines of the past two days. Air strikes are ongoing, especially in southern Gaza, while on the ground, Israeli units are staying mobile. They are encountering sporadic fire from snipers and small units armed with RPGs and the like, but no systematic ambushes. The military and political echelons are split on whether to expand the operation.

On a related note, Ynet is heralding an  interview given by Syrian President on BBC, in which he allegedly called on Israel to stop its operation but also called for an end to the rocket firing.  If this were true, it would have  to be counted not only as an important achievement for Israel but as an indicator that the rumors about an imminent cease fire announcement by Hamas have credibility. According to Ynet, Assad even addressed the arms smuggling into Gaza and voiced his opposition to it, though he did not make concrete commitments. 

But here is my transcript of the BBC interview. It seems to me that Assad, although endorsing a cease fire along the lines of Security Council resolution 1860 (see full text, summary of debate), is sticking to the old Hamas line and setting the kinds of preconditions for a truce that the organization demanded before operation Cast Lead.  Maybe someone else can enlighten me. I don't see him explicitly calling for an end to the rockets or to arms smuggling. The UN resolution does NOT call on Hamas to end rocket fire into Israel. 

I had to laugh at several points in the interview, most notably when Assad seemed to imply that there had been no Hamas rockets fired at Israel during the truce, and when he claimed that "We don't push anyone; we make dialogue." 

BBC: The Israelis say that the sort of cease fire they want is one where there are no more rockets onto their territory and where the border with Egypt is controlled so there's no arms smuggling across it. Would you accept that?

Assad: Stop sending ... launching rockets means stop assassinating Palestinians by your helicopters and airplanes. So you cannot look at one side and ignore the other side. About smuggling the arms, it is another issue that is part of the bigger solution. Syria is not involved in this issue because we don't have [a] border with Gaza.

BBC: But do you think that should be part of any cease fire?

Assad: Yes, of course. We will support [a] cease fire. We've been working with [pause] many countries, including the French, for the cease fire. 

BBC: Do you support resolution 1860?

Assad: In principle we support most of it, but in the end it is ambiguous. It doesn't have any executive plan, how to implement it, that's the question.

BBC: What about the Hamas rockets into Israel? That's been going on for some time. The Israelis say that any country would respond in the way that they've responded. Do you think that's a fair point? 

Assad: No, because there was truce for 6 months, and during that truce, no one of the Israelis was killed, while 38-40 Palestinians were assassinated publicly by the Israelis. So how could Hamas launch rockets and the Palestinians died? This is not logical.

BBC: But what if someone was firing rockets into Syria? You would have to respond.

Assad: Yah, but it's not only simply rockets. What if you have embargo? Embargo is a war. When the people are going to die and they have to choose between dying slowly and dying fast, they will choose dying fast.

BBC: Syria offers a base to the exiled political leader of Hamas, Khaled Mish'al ... Are you pushing him to accept a cease fire?

Assad: We don't push anyone; we make dialogue. And they accepted the cease fire, they support the cease fire. When you say cease fire, you don't want it to be just for a few days. You want it to be sustainable. Sustainable means you have certain requirements which should be available for cease fire.

BBC: What, for you, is the most important point about sustaining a cease fire then? 

Assad: Israel respecting the cease fire, something never happened before. Second, to lift the embargo. Without this, you won't have sustainable cease fire. 

The Syrian Front

Some very brief, related and unrelated thoughts on the news from today about peace talks with Syria.

1. Contrary to the claims of Shelly Yachimovich this is not a diversion. Neither the talks nor their acknowledgment have been orchestrated to save Olmert's political career. If anything, these talks put Olmert in an even more precarious position domestically than he is now.

2. We do not know what the Americans think about all this, but the agreement goes entirely against the spirit of Bush's policy since 2003. Did the Turks keep the Americans apprised of developments in the process?

3. These negotiations cannot extract Syria from the Iranian embrace. They will not deliver Hizbullah or Hamas to Israel. All they can aim at is the formalization of the relative calm that has existed on the Syrian-Israeli border since 1973 - in itself hardly be an insignificant feat.

4. The recent Doha agreement, engineered by Qatar, formally delivered Lebanon into the hands of Hizbullah and the Iranian-Syrian-(Qatari?) axis. It diverges radically from the US-Saudi policy on Lebanon that has endured until now.

More Speculation on the Israeli Airforce Raid

As our commenters have observed, the Israelis have been surprisingly disciplined so far in maintaining silence on the air force raid in Syria that took place earlier this month. Meanwhile, in the American press, the North Korean angle is getting a great deal of coverage.

One of the theories that is gaining increasing traction is that the Israelis targeted an incipient nuclear weapons program, which the North Koreans had just provided to Syria. I continue to be skeptical of this theory, if only because the person behind it seems to be John Bolton. This crank has been a fanatical opponent of the sensible rapprochement with North Korea from the beginning. He is now seeking to undo the one foreign policy success that the Bush administration has to show for itself - the neutralization of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program (something that could have been achieved two terms ago, had it not been for people like Bolton).

If North Korean nuclear weapons were involved, I would expect to see a lot more serious reactions from Christopher Hill and the White House. As it stands, we only have Pyongyang's condemnations to go on, as well as reports of a North Korean ship docked at Tartus. The only North Korean connection that makes sense to me is a shipment of Scuds or other missiles that had been approved a long time ago, before the deal with the U.S. Who knows, perhaps Pyongyang even tipped the Americans off beforehand.

It is obvious that all people in the U.S. and Israel with access to real intelligence on this matter are keeping absolute silence. In fact, based on a conversation with someone close to a Western intelligence agency, it appears to me that almost everyone is in the dark about what happened. However, we are getting some news via the German "spy ship" to which Hazbani alluded several times earlier. Der Spiegel is apparently set to publish a story quoting German military sources, who observed two Israeli F-15s entering Syrian airspace and "being surprised by the speed at which the Syrian air defenses recognized them," Haaretz reports (Hebrew only, at this time). Apparently, the Germans believed that the target was a weapons shipment to Hizbullah.

We may never know what happened, though I believe that in this day and age, it will not take much longer for someone to leak the details. Jeha earlier commented that the raid may have had something to do with the Lebanese presidential elections (so, in other words, some kind of anti-Hizbullah action or operation against other pro-Syrian elements). I am not sure Israel would be maintaining this kind of secrecy in that case, and I don't think we would have seen such a big operation either.

Recent Israeli Air Force Action

I am fairly confident that the recent incident on the Turkish-Syrian border, where Syria alleges it repulsed an Israeli fighter jet from its air space, will not result in military retaliation by Damascus. However, this latest incident might very well be used as a pretext by Syrian proxies in Lebanon and in the territories to attempt some kind of "counter-attack." If successful, such an attack might very well lead to an escalation of Syrian-Israeli tensions.

The incident took place on Thursday at dawn. Only the Turks and Syrians so far have released information based on first-hand observation as well as their own agendas. So far, the Syrians have alleged that the plane dropped munitions on a deserted area, while the Turks have displayed a jettisoned F-15 fuel-tank. Israeli sources have remained silent about the news, and the U.S. has not commented either.

What is the meaning of this report? I think we can safely discard the preposterous web of conjectures spun by Joshua Landis to allege a neo-con, North Korea connection. This is obviously about issues much closer to home. In an earlier post on Thursday, Landis asked, with faux exasperation, "What is this about?" and answered that "One has to believe it is an intentional provocation." This again seems to me off the mark.

I think there are two possible explanations for this incident. The IAF pilot was either engaging in a routine reconnaissance flight over Syria and due to an operational failure strayed into territory covered by the country's anti-aircraft installations, or, more likely, this was an operation designed specifically to test the current state of Syrian anti-air defense. In the latter case, we have to ask whether the IAF's performance can be judged a success. The pilot involved (so far, we know of only one plane, but there were probably others) escaped without harm or damage to the plane but was forced to jettison cargo and munitions, probably to speed up the getaway. On the other hand, given the expectation before the summer that there might be a war between Damascus and Jerusalem, it might have been preferable to avoid detection entirely, or at least to avoid giving Syria concrete proof that an incursion had occurred.

With evidence in hand, Syria is likely to do the most it can in the diplomatic realm to force Arab states to take rhetorical "measures." This could be detrimental to Israeli and American efforts at the upcoming peace conference, and it might serve as a handy diversionary measure by Iran and Syria at the UN. Turkey, too, is in an awkward position, as the Israelis most likely did enter the country's air space. We can expect some grandstanding from them, as they try to appease the Syrians and the Arab states, who will seize the opportunity to condemn Turkey for its collaboration with Israel.

There are some who see this incident as related to American plans for an aerial raid on Iran, or a joint Israeli-American offensive against Syria. I don't think either of these conclusions apply, but there is no doubt that Israel, the U.S., Syria, and Iran are paying especially close attention both to the actual evidence being reported and to the gains they may harvest through the information war in the media and the diplomatic sphere. Turkey, too, is doubtlessly probing carefully what Israel and/or the Americans might be up to.

War with Syria?

Battle of the Golan Heights, 1967 (Map Source: Wikipedia)

Uri Bar-Yosef is concerned about the lack of interest in negotiations with the Syrians. He argues that Israel is once again underestimating the enemy's willingness to go to war. From 1962 to 1967, Israel's political and military leaders believed that Egypt did not have a military option against Israel because of Nasser's embroilment in the war in Yemen. Hence, Israel persisted in escalating the conflict with Syria. According to Bar-Yosef, it was the domestic pressure inside Egypt, which eventually forced Nasser's hand and compelled him to move his army into Sinai. The lesson for today: pushing Assad into a corner could lead to a Syrian attack on Israel, which would be painful, even if unsuccessful.

Bar-Yosef seems to be arguing for the primacy of domestic politics in understanding the likelihood of a Syrian decision to go to war. This frame of reference, in his view, increases the possibility of Assad turning to a military option. On the other hand, if we were to see foreign policy and such measures as national interest and security as the primary factors, it would seem rather obvious that it is not in Syria's interest to attack Israel.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, West German historians such as Fritz Fischer, in his second work, War of Illusions (1969), and Hans-Ulrich Wehler in his German Empire (1972), suggested that the empire's ruling elite saw the war as a domestic stabilizing factor that would function to safeguard its power from the challenges of democratization. This thesis has since been heavily revised, but few historians today would argue for the absolute supremacy of foreign policy considerations in the decision to go to war.

Does Assad need a war (or peace agreement, for that matter) to stay in power? What would the cost-benefit ratio of such a decision be?

Rocket Wars of Attrition: the Lessons from Summer 2006

Antidote to the post that follows below: Shlomi Saranga and Moshik Afia, "Sweet Dream" (2002)

I have not seen a great deal of discussion about a recent report, citing unnamed UN officials, that Iran is deploying missiles in Syria. Obviously, Syria already possesses a significant arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles as well as the type of katyusha rockets used with such effectiveness by Hizbullah against Israel in last summer's war. It should surprise no one that in the wake of Israel's failure to stop Hizbullah's fire on the country's civilian population, the Syrians see these kinds of missiles as their best strategy. The question is, what can Israel do about it?

The Israeli military has yet to come up with a military doctrine to counter a rocket-based war of attrition, as the surrender of Sderot to the Palestinian qassams showed. Worse, it does not look like the Israeli military and government have explained to the public what exactly the country is up against. Despite Gabi Ashkenazi's replacement of Dan Halutz as Chief of the General Staff, a great deal of air force spin continues to dominate assessment of the last war. One of the myths still circulating is that the air force's "launcher hunting" doctrine was able to take out most of Hizbullah's Iranian-supplied long-range missiles. A report by Uzi Rubin of Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies released this month argues that the "intensity of long-range rocket attacks" in fact "remained fairly constant" throughout the war, averaging 4 per day (Rubin, "The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War," p. 25).

Rubin makes it clear that Hizbullah "dominated the battle of the rockets" (p. 13). Neither the air force nor the late ground invasion (and definitely not the aimless artillery barrages) succeeded in stopping or diminishing the intensity of Hizbullah's attack. While it is true that toward the end of the war the air force managed to destroy every launcher from which rockets had been fired - reducing the sensor-to-shoot time to one minute (an unprecedented achievement) - as every resident of the north can attest, Nasrallah was able to give Israeli civilians a bitter reminder of who owned them until the last day before the cease fire (see all of Carmia's entries from August 13 for a taste).

All this was accomplished using very simple weapons. Rubin concludes that few if any Iranian rockets hit Israel, one of the exceptions being a Fadjr-3 240 mm rocket that struck Haifa. Another Iranian rocket may have surfaced in Beirut, after an air force attack blew it up, sending a large cylindrical object flying into the air; some enthusiastic Hizbullah fans at the time mistook it for a downed Israeli F-16 (see J.'s post).

The majority of the rockets fired at Israel were 122 mm Grad rockets with 50 km range, 220 mm (70 km), and some 302 mm (90-100 km). Most of these were fired from launch batteries with 4 tubes; at least one launcher had 12 tubes. For the heavier rockets, Hizbullah tended to use mobile launchers, which it fired from residential areas. The lighter rockets, on the other hand, appear to have been fired using stationary launchers that were camouflaged and hidden slightly underground in agricultural areas. Katyusha crews would use hydraulic mechanisms or manual levers to raise these launchers up and then fire them using remote controls. These stationary launchers were set up long before the war, and each one was aimed at a different destination in Israel. They would be fired once every twenty-four hours - but Hizbullah may have had up to 150 such sites (Rubin, p. 9).

Altogether, Hizbullah's "strategic rocketing" killed 41 Israeli civilians, and 12 soldiers (the Kfar Giladi incident), seriously wounded 250 noncombatants, and caused 100,000-250,000 to flee their homes. It also destroyed 2,000 dwellings. Ironically, "passive defence" saved the most Israeli civilians' lives. More specifically, early warning systems, staying in bunkers and safe rooms, or following the instructions about retreating to the south side of apartments in many cases prevented casualties(here's a related sample of unfunny humor from those times: "It would be nice to shower first but the bathroom faces north (that's bad, not because of the feng shui)) .

Recently, I came across something that Nobody wrote, in which he mentioned the dangers of taking for granted Israel's supposed military superiority as well as its permanent presence in the region. I don't remember his exact wording, but he seemed to be taking on one of his favorite targets, reckless "peace lunatics." I have to say that when it comes to Syria, we would do very well to heed the advice of Nobody as well as of our Lebanese friends. I, too, have been guilty of enthusiasm about Syrian "channels." But as this latest missile deployment and their intertwined strategies in Lebanon show, the Syrians and the Iranians are committed to an alliance that will take a lot more than engagement to undo.

Israeli Arab MK Heaps Vitriol on Syrian Dissident

(Photo source: al-Jazeera)

I'm sure the special effort MK Muhammad Barakeh (Hadash) made to show his disgust for the democratic opposition to the Syrian government will be well rewarded some day. Speaking about Farid al-Ghadiri's visit to the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Barakeh not only said that he disapproved of the Syrian-American politician's trip to Israel but that he "condemns and rejects [it] with disgust." He added that

Al-Ghadiri decided to incite against his countrymen and his homeland and chose to be a mercenary for the Americans. He came to be used as a poor servant of the militarist agenda of the extreme right-wing. Scum is a bad thing, but American scum of this type is the worst of all (Ynet Hebrew).

I have never heard MK Barakeh say one good thing about his fellow countrymen, or one bad thing about Syria's oppressive regime. See also al-Jazeera's coverage (Arabic).

The heavy man in the photograph pointing and yelling at al-Ghadiri, who is ignoring his interlocutor very successfully, is MK Ahmad Tibi (Ra'am Ta'al).

Talking to Syria

Sunset in the north (January 2006)

One of the obstacles to negotiations with Syria frequently cited by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is American opposition to talks with Assad. Olmert did not conjure these objections out of thin air. But it is fairly obvious that invoking American opposition as the determining factor in Israel's decision not to engage the Syrians was a convenient charade (perhaps for both parties). Now, the Americans are sending signals that the Israelis are going to have to supply their own alibi.

At a closed meeting with academics at Hebrew University on Monday, U.S. Ambassador Richard Jones said that the U.S. is not blocking Israel from conducting talks with Syria. Asked to comment on Ambassador Jones's statement, the deputy press attache of the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv, Geoffrey Anisman, told Ha'aretz that

we are unaware that any U.S. official has ever expressed an opinion on what Israel should or should not do with regard to Syria.

It is hard not to chuckle at this pithy response; the Anismanian delivery came through even in print.

I had the pleasure of meeting Anisman last summer in Tel Aviv, and he stuck out as one of the young, bright stars in the American diplomatic corps. He also has a great sense of humor, no doubt acquired after years of watching Mel Brooks and Woody Allen films and absorbing Yiddish witticisms told by Anisman Senior.

In all seriousness, the writing is definitely on the wall. Those voices from the State Department long clamoring for a kind of diplomacy that consists of more than threats and refusals to talk to certain states must be feeling emboldened. The turning point was certainly the agreement with North Korea, which, strange as it may seem, could even earn Bush a Nobel Peace Prize. Bitterly opposed by John Bolton, the North Korea deal basically marked a return to the Korea policy of Bill Clinton. America's quiet backing of the Saudi peace initiative, and the March 10 meeting with Iranian and Syrian diplomats in Baghdad are further evidence of a shift in policy.

There are of course valid grounds on which one might continue to object to dialogue with Syria, as our Lebanese friends do not tire of pointing out. I have to confess that I am still sympathetic to some of their warnings. For one, I do not know how long the Assads will stay in power, and what might happen to a peace agreement once they fall. Secondly, I worry about the effects that bolstering the Syrians now will have on Lebanon's future.

On the other hand, the draft framework for a Syrian-Israeli agreement that was leaked in January is an offer that Israel simply cannot refuse.

The Secret Syrian Channel

Golan Heights, January 2007 (Photo: N)

By now, the denunciations of the report in Ha'aretz that Israelis and Syrians engaged in secret talks on a peace agreement from September 2004 until August 2006, well into the war between Israel and Hizbullah, have hit the news tickers. Unnamed cabinet ministers and a former aide to Sharon have called the news "nonsense." Likud MK Yuval Steinitz, who sometimes talks sense and more often goes crazy, referred to the news as "sleight of hand."

I have previously been skeptical of Syrian overtures, and I don't know what it means that this report is coming out now, but if the draft framework for negotiations published in Ha'aretz is accurate, I am willing to lift all objections. Frankly speaking, this agreement is too good to be true for Israel. The draft includes

1. an end to hostilities and the commencement of bilateral relations
2. the establishment of demilitarized zones on the areas of the Golan evacuated by Israel
3. "Zones of reduced military forces ... in Israel west of the international border with Syria and in Syria east of the Golan Heights" whose depths will be in a 1:4 ratio in favor of Israel
4. cooperation in "fighting terrorism of all kinds"
5. "the solution of regional problems related to the Palestinians, Lebanese, and Iran"
6. a settlement on water sources under which Syria promises not to "interrupt or obstruct natural flow of water in either quality or quantity in the Upper Jordan River, its tributaries, and Lake Tiberias"
7. the establishment of a Syrian-administered "Peace Park" east of the border that will be open to Israeli tourists without an entry visa

A waterfall in the Golan

Anyone who rejects such a plan does not have the long-term interests of the State of Israel in mind. If a peace deal along the lines of this draft is still possible, the government of Israel must pursue it.

Impressions from Syria

There is a fascinating article in Ha'aretz by Danny Rubinstein, based primarily on reports from Martin Schellenberg, a young German historian who visited Syria during the war. Our own man in Damascus, whom I ran into today here in Berkeley, is back safe and sound and we are waiting to hear whether his impressions match these (among others):

In the days that followed, [Schellenberg] also did not see anyone paying any special attention to the war. While he did see new Hezbollah flags and numerous pictures of Nasrallah, he did not encounter organized or popular rallies in support of the movement, or any signs that the Syrian people were preparing for war. In one or two places he saw signs reading, "We identify with our people holding fast in Lebanon," and two or three times, following dramatic events such as the first missile strikes in Haifa, he saw young people driving, honking their horns and leaning halfway out the car windows, waving Hezbollah flags.

Contra Appeasement

Barry Rubin has an interesting piece on "the new era" in the Middle East, which he sees, perhaps in line with Marx's famous dictum, as Nasserism in a new guise. The popular support generated throughout the Arab world by such figures as Osama bin Laden and now Hassan Nasrallah certainly invites such a comparison. Rubin's main claim is that

After the war in Lebanon, the Middle East entered a new era, which was already on the way for a half-dozen years and in which radical Islamism sets the ideological and political agenda. It marks the end of hope for peace or democracy.

This trend, Rubin argues, goes back to the Palestinian leadership's rejection of the Barak offer (whether you think it was generous or not). A consensus has emerged that Israel and the West are weak, and that now a

violent struggle in pursuit of total victory rather than pragmatism, democracy, compromise, and economic construction

can cure all the problems afflicting the Arabs and the Muslim world more generally.

For Rubin, appeasing this new "resistance axis," is the biggest mistake that that West could make (and is making):

If only Iran, Syria, or Hizballah is offered concessions, [those who favor appeasement] argue, the threat will go away. This view actually feeds the problem. The radicals have far-reaching goals (including genocide in Israel) and powerful ideologies that make them not so eager to make any deal.

It is often argued that Israeli actions weaken moderate forces. Thus, the bombing of Beirut rallied the entire Lebanese population to fight Israel and to support Hizbullah. Likewise, many argue that Israel's actions in the territories incite Arabs in Egypt and Jordan against the West and democracy. But few of these critics consider the effects of appeasement on local pro-democracy forces who see the incitement against Israel for what it is. Appeasement bolsters the most intransigent and fundamentalis forces, because

they [the extremists] think they are winning. Western efforts to achieve understandings are consistently viewed as weakness inviting escalation. This is clear in any reading of the radical leaders' speeches. Why should Arab governments, reformers, or Lebanese factions oppose the extremists if they believe--correctly in general--that the West will not help them?

Apologies for not writing earlier. Temporary time pressures conspired against us, and someone on Kishkushim got married this week (it wasn't me).

Fuad Siniora on Hezbollah

Just saw Lebanese PM Siniora on CSPAN. A lot of waffling. Obviously he couldn't really say anything substantive about questions like Iranian and Syrian influence. But one thing I found interesting. Someone asked a question about Hezbollah. At first, he gave the usual garbage about Hezbollah's important contributions to Lebanon, ending the occupation by the Izraeeli army. But then he said: Hezbollah is a Lebanese party, and all its objectives are to further the interests of Lebanon. Then, later, the Sheba farms issue came up, and he said that he'd talked to American officials and there had been progress. So: this stuff about Hezbollah could be interpreted as praise for the organization, but at the same time, it is also an effort to limit its activities. I interpret this as follows: as long as Hezbollah fights for the "liberation" of the farms, its operations will be deemed legitimate. But after that, it's raison d'etre is up. By focusing on LEBANESE interests, Siniora is denying Hezbollah the right to link their cause with the Palestinians. It might be worth it for Israel to show some openness toward a deal, a real settlement that would involve the farms. Of course, Lebanon and Syria have to make the first moves (according to int'l law, the farms are Syrian not Lebanese territory). This could be a very good opportunity to force Syria into doing something that it doesn't really want to do.