The Michael Oren Pick and Lieberman Shenanigans

Photo: Shalem Center

BY AMOS

Ambassador Michael Oren

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu picked Michael Oren (b. 1955) as Israel's next ambassador to the United States. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has endorsed the appointment, and it will now have to be approved by the cabinet.

Oren, a professor with a Ph.D. from Princeton's Near Eastern Studies department, is a brilliant pick. An American Jew who immigrated to Israel in 1979 and served in the Paratroopers Brigade during the Lebanon war, and in numerous positions of leadership in the army thereafter, is truly at home in both Israel and the United States. He is the author of the definitive account of the Six-Day War that we have today (it will be definitive until Arab archives are opened up), and of another book on American conceptions of the Middle East. Oren is also a fantastic communicator who knows how to speak to different audiences. Having just finished a term as a visiting professor at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, he is primed to go. 

There are few Israeli prime ministers who would have been able to pull off such an appointment. So many of Israel's ambassadors these days, even to important posts, are mediocre political appointees. American Jews, in the past two decades, have been shut out of such postings. In choosing Oren, Netanyahu showed his ability to think outside of the box and that he is not afraid to be challenged. Oren, though affiliated with the right-of-center Shalem Center, is a pragmatist who knows that Israel cannot indefinitely occupy the West Bank. He is someone who understands what is going on in the White House these days. 

Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman

It is still not clear to me what the Foreign Minister himself is doing these days. Ha'aretz has a somewhat disturbing review of Lieberman's activities so far. 

Here are a few highlights:

Lieberman's schedule has become one of the Foreign Ministry's best-kept secrets. Aside from [...] a select few, no one - including very senior officials in his ministry - is privy to what Lieberman does with his time.

This secrecy has led to several embarrassing faux pas, such as when a meeting with a foreign counterpart had to be rescheduled and none of the participants were notified.

Okay, that happens. But:

Lieberman has made other contentious procedural changes within the realm of his public relations. Although the ministry has an entire publicity department comprising some 20 expert diplomats, Lieberman made the unprecedented decision to appoint newcomer Sivan Raviv - who has no prior experience - as his spokesman.

Is that wise?

And speaking of appointments:

He has named Bedouin diplomat Ishmael Khaldi as his ministerial adviser on the Arab world. The appointment was leaked to the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth under the headline "Lieberman's Arab advisor", hinting that it was an attempt to gloss over Lieberman's alleged racism.

Since then it has emerged that Khaldi has next to no Foreign Ministry experience in dealing with the Middle East, having never served as a representative in an Arab state or in a relevant branch.

Associates of Lieberman have stressed that despite Khaldi's lack experience in the region, the motive behind his appointment was "promotion of minorities in the Foreign Ministry."

I don't know what is worse, the pick or the statement, thereafter, that it was an "affirmative action" appointment. But who knows, maybe Khaldi will perform admirably in this job.

Is this a luke-warm endorsement or what?

Sources present at Lieberman's meetings with foreign officials have testified that his level of English is "good" and that he "succeeds in getting across his message."

There are many more anecdotes in the article itself. The last paragraph, which explains that Lieberman's office refused to answer a list of 12 questions submitted by Ha'aretz, testifies to a worrying break in relations with the media. It sounds as if Lieberman has written off Ha'aretz as irrelevant.

Here's Ha'aretz's take on the Kleine Zeitung interview discussed in my earlier post:

Foreign Ministry officials heard of [Lieberman's interview with the Austrian daily Kleiner Zeitoung [sic] last month, in which he declared his opposition to negotiations with Syria.] only when it was leaked to Israeli media. Only after an in-depth investigation did it become clear that this unknown newspaper was actually a local tabloid

It's pretty funny that it took an "in-depth investigation" to figure out that this "unknown newspaper" was a "local tabloid." I think the latter description is not entirely accurate; "small regional newspaper" would do it more justice. Also, as an Austrian friend of Noah K., L.E., has pointed out and as I also emphasized in my post, Christian Wehrschutz, who conducted the interview, is a respected journalist with extensive experience. L.E. adds, however, that

The question is only why he chose to put the interview [in the Kleine Zeitung] and not in the Presse, Standard or even NZZ (Swiss), with which he also has regular connections.

L.E.'s conclusions:

This interview appears where it does due to personal or newspaper politics. The [other] question would then be why he got that interview in the first place.

The last question is important indeed. If Wehrschutz presented himself as a freelancer, why was this one of the first interviews granted by Lieberman's office, specifically by his personal secretary Sigalit Levi, to a foreign journalist?

I'm really wondering in what language this interview was conducted - whether a translator was used or not.

Erratic Behavior: Sign of Things to Come with the Netanyahu Government?

BY AMOS

One day Lieberman "cannot see Syria as a real partner for any kind of settlement" (see previous post), and the next he is "willing to negotiate," albeit "without preconditions" (Ha'aretz). This is diplomatic silliness. It looks we are going to see a lot of instant reversals with this new government. If you play hard to get on Saturday, you can't suddenly drop your skirt (or pants) on Sunday. The Prime Minister's Office has been strangely silent. Maybe they are hoping that Lieberman will render himself irrelevant. 

Avigdor Lieberman's Interview to the Austrian Kleine Zeitung

BY AMOS

Over the weekend Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman gave a long interview to the Austrian Kleine Zeitung, based in Graz, Styria. I cannot figure out how this paper, literally "The Little Newspaper," managed to secure the interview; it is a regional daily that appears mainly in the Austria provinces, with a circulation of 300,000. Most Austrians would go to the Viennese Presse (right-center) or Standard (left) for news of this sort. The interview, while occasionally vague and evasive, is surprisingly reasonable. Conclusion: Lieberman sounds much better in German than in Hebrew. The interview was probably conducted in Russian and then translated by the interviewer, Christian Wehrschütz, a correspondent with extensive experience in the Balkans as well as in Ukraine and Russia.

Some of the highlights follow with my quick and dirty translation.

On the peace process:

Wir hatten Regierungen, die aus politischen Tauben bestanden. Seit der Vereinbarung von Oslo, 1983 [SIC, should be 1993], haben ebendiese Regierungen sehr große Anstrengungen unternommen, eine dauerhafte Regelung für den Frieden zu finden. Wir haben die Hälfte von Judäa und Samaria sowie auch den Gaza-Streifen aufgegeben. Wir haben Tausende Juden umgesiedelt und Milliarden Schekel in die Palästinenser-Gebiete investiert. Trotzdem ist der Friedensprozess blockiert. Daher helfen uns die bisher gegebenen, vereinfachenden Antworten nicht weiter. Gewöhnlich waren das zwei: Besatzung oder jüdische Siedlungen. Es wäre allerdings ein Missverständnis, zu glauben, dass Besatzung und Siedlungen die Ursache für den Konflikt zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern sind. Denn wenn man weiter zurückgeht, vor 1967, gab es auch keinen Frieden im Nahen Osten, sondern nur Blutvergießen und Terrorismus. Und zwischen 1948 und 1967 hatten die Palästinenser sehr wohl einen Chance einen eigenen Staat zu bilden. Sie wurde nur nicht genützt.

We had governments that consisted of political doves. Since the Oslo agreement, these governments especially undertook great efforts to arrive at a lasting peace settlement. We gave up half of Judea and Samaria as well as the Gaza Strip. We evacuated thousands of Jews and invested tens of millions of shekels in the Palestinian territories. Despite this, the peace process is blocked. The simplifying answers offered until now do not help us move further. Usually these were two: occupation or Jewish settlements. However, it would be a mistake to believe that occupation and settlements are the origins for the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. For if you go back further, before 1967, there also was no peace in the Middle East, only bloodshed and terrorism. And between 1948 and 1967 the Palestinians certainly had an opportunity to form their own state. It was simply not exploited.

On his role in the coalition:

Wir wollen sehr aktiv die Initiative ergreifen. Wir haben viele Ideen. Dabei ist heute ist meine persönliche Position nicht so wichtig. Ich bin ein Spieler in einem großen Team, und versuche meine Koalitionspartner zu überzeugen. Doch ich bin überzeugt, dass es dieser Regierung schließlich gelingen wird, eine gemeinsame Plattform zu schaffen und vorwärts zu kommen. Dabei wollen wir die Vision einbringen, eine stabile in sich schlüssige, dauerhafte Lösung ohne Blutvergießen zu schaffen.

We want to grasp the initative very actively. We have many ideas. My personal position is not so important in all this. I am a player on a large team and I try to persuade my coalition partners. But I am convinced that this government will ultimately succeed in creating a common position and to move forward. To this effect, we want to bring the vision that will create a final, lasting solution without bloodshed.

The pitch for an "economic peace process":

Der politische Prozess ist nicht vorrangig der Schlüssel für eine dauerhafte Friedenslösung. [...] Das wichtigste für die Palästinenser ist der Aufbau der Wirtschaft, denn man kann sich vorstellen, was in Österreich geschehen würde, wenn die Arbeitslosenrate 40 Prozent betragen und der Lohn nur 150 Euro pro Monat, wie das bei den Palästinensern der Fall ist.

The political process is not the key to a permanent peace solution [...] The most important for the Palestinians is the development of the economy, because you can imagine what would happen in Austria if the unemployment rate were 40% and the salaries were 150 euros a month, as is the case for the Palestinians.

How to achieve this - Lieberman was vague:

Außerdem darf die Rolle der USA, der EU und von Japan nicht nur sein, Geld an die palästinensische Verwaltung zu überweisen. Die müssen vielmehr in konkrete Projekte investieren um die Arbeitsplätze für die Palästinenser zu schaffen.

The role of the US, EU, and Japan should not be only to transfer money to the Palestinian Authority. They ought, rather, to invest in concrete projects to create jobs for the Palestinians.

Reasons for Hamas's Success:

Denn die Hamas hat die vergangenen Wahlen nicht wegen ihrer extremen Ideologie gewonnen; vielmehr stand ihr eine sehr korrupte Palästinenser-Verwaltung gegenüber, die weder effektiv noch effizient war. Im Gegensatz dazu hat die Hamas sehr viele soziale Aktivitäten gesetzt. Sie hat Schulen errichtet und eine medizinische Versorgung angeboten. Das waren die Gründe für den Wahlsieg der Hamas.

Hamas won the past elections not because of its extremist ideology but because it opposed a very corrupt Palestinian administration (Palestinian Authority?), which was neither effective nor efficient. In contrast, Hamas founded many social programs. It established schools and offered health care. Those were the reasons for Hamas's victory in the elections.

No negotiations with Hamas:

Wie soll die israelische Regierung mit jemandem verhandeln, der jeden Tag sagt, ich will Israel zerstören oder alle Juden töten? Die Hamas übt weiter Terror aus, schmuggelt nach wie vor Waffen und bereitet Anschläge vor.

Why should the Israeli government negotiate with someone who says, every day, 'I want to destroy Israel" or kill all Jews? Hamas continues to engage in terrorism, smuggles weapons as before, and prepares attacks.

On Syria:

Wir müssen die Realitäten sehen. Bis heute beheimatet Syrien die Hauptquartiere der Terror-Organisationen Hamas und Djihad. Syrien unterstützt die Hisbollah und ihren Waffenschmuggel in den Südlibanon. Syrien unterstützt auch das Atomprogramm des Iran und ich sehe bis zum heutigen Tag nur eine Festigung der Beziehungen zwischen dem Iran und Syrien. Daher kann ich in Syrien keinen wirklichen Partner für irgendeine Vereinbarung sehen. Bevor wir verhandeln können, muss zuerst die Unterstützung für den Terrorismus eingestellt werden.

We have to see the reality. Until today, Syria hosts the headquarters of the terrorist organizations Hamas and Jihad. Syria supports Hizbullaha and its weapons smuggling to southern Lebanon. Syria also supports the Iranian nuclear program and I am only seeing a strengthening of the relations between Iran and Syria. This is why I cannot see Syria as a real partner for any kind of settlement. Before we can negotiate, the support for terrorism must end.

On "land for peace":

Bis heute hat das Konzept "Land für Frieden" keine wirklichen Ergebnisse gebracht. Was war das Ergebnis aller Rückzüge? Doch nur: Hisbollah und Raketen.

Until today, the concept "land for peace" has brought no real results. What was the consequence of all the withdrawals [retreats]? Only Hizbullah and rockets.

Lieberman evades question about "transfer" and loses himself, going off in too many directions at once:

Kleine Zeitung: Was soll stattdessen geschehen? Bei der Zwei-Staaten-Lösung kritisieren Sie, dass zwar die Palästinenser einen Staat ohne Juden bekommen sollen, Israel aber 20 Prozent Araber hat. Daher reden sie auch enormen Umsiedlungen das Wort; doch was ist mit den Arabern in Israel, sprich Palästinensern, die nicht gehen wollen? 

LIEBERMAN: Das ist allerdings nicht nur ein Problem, das Israel hat. Ähnliches gibt es auf der übrigen Welt auch. In Bosnien-Herzegowina zum Beispiel oder in Belgien zwischen Flamen und Walonen. Auch im Kaukasus gab es den Konflikt zwischen Russland und Georgien. Was ich damit sagen will, es gibt nicht nur eine Ursache für das Problem sondern viele. Man darf nicht nur einen Punkt herausgreifen und dann hoffen, das ganze Problem zu lösen; man muss gleichzeitig in viele Richtungen gehen

.

Kleine Zeitung: What should happen instead? You criticize the two-state solution because it gives the Palestinians a state without Jews while Israel's population would still be 20% Arab. This is why you also talk about enormous transfers [resettlements]; but what about the Arabs in Israel, or Palestinians, who do not want to move?

Lieberman: But that is not only a problem faced by Israel. There are similar things in the rest of the world as well. In Bosnia-Hercegovina for example, or in Belgium between the Flemish and Walloons [French-speakers]. In the Caucasus too there was the conflict between Russia and Georgia. What I want to say here is that there is not only one cause of the problem but many. One must not take out only one point and then hope to solve the entire problem; one has to go in many directions at once.

Interviewer asks for clarification:

Kleine Zeitung: Was heißt das konkret, etwa für die jüdischen Siedlungen? Sie selbst leben in einer jüdischen Siedlung in einem Palästinenser-Gebiet. Wären Sie bereit, Ihr Haus aufzugeben? 

LIEBERMAN: Weniger Spannungen, weniger Konflikte, dass wollen alle Völker. Doch es darf keine Illusion geben; kurzfristig, schnell ist das nicht möglich, Hokuspokus gibt es nicht. Doch ich in überzeugt, dass diese Koalition, mehr als jede andere zuvor die Chance hat, sich in die richtige Richtung zu bewegen.

Kleine Zeitung: What does this mean concretely, for example for the Jewish settlements? You yourself live in a Jewish settlement in a Palestinian area. Would you be prepared to give up your home?

Lieberman: Less tensions, less conflicts; all peoples want this. But one must not have illusions; in the short-term, quickly, this is not possible. There is no abacadabra. But I am convinced that this coalition, more than any one before, has the chance to move in the right direction.

On his reputation abroad:

Ich bin über mein Image nicht besorgt; Image ist nur ein Produkt der Massenmedien. Wir haben weit ernstere Probleme als mein Image.

I am not concerned about my image; image is only a product of the mass media. We have far more serious problems than my image.

Ahmadinejad and Iran:

Es ist nicht akzeptabel, dass ein Staatspräsident eines UNO-Mitglieds täglich zur Zerstörung Israels aufruft. Die Kooperation des Iran mit Nordkorea, mit Hugo Chavez und mit Syrien ist die wirkliche Achse des Bösen. Doch das ist nicht nur unser Problem; das ist das Problem der gesamten Region und der gesamten internationalen Gemeinschaft. Auch die Vertreter der arabischen Welt haben mit uns in jüngster Zeit vor allem über den Iran, und nicht über die Palästinenser gesprochen. Denn die Araber verstehen, dass ihre Existenz nicht durch Israel, sondern durch den Iran bedroht wird. 

It is unacceptable that the president of a UN-member country daily calls for the destruction of Israel. The cooperation of Iran with North Korean, Hugo Chavez and Syria is the true axis of evil. But that is not only our problem; that is a problem for the entire region and the whole international community. The representatives of the Arab world have talked to us, in recent times, about Iran, not about the Palestinians. Because the Arabs understand that their existence is not threatened by Israel but by Iran.

How to deal with Iranian nuclear program:

Was das iranische Atomprogramm betrifft, muss klar sein, dass, sollte der Iran Atommacht werden, es in der Region zu einem schrecklichen nuklearen Rüstungswettlauf kommen würde. Der beste Weg, das Atomprogramm zu stoppen, sind wirklich harte, sehr harte Sanktionen. Die UNO-Resolutionen sind nicht genug; daher müssen der Sicherheitsrat und die EU viel wirksamere und härtere Sanktionen verhängen. Das hat bei Libyen funktioniert. Der Iran muss daher isoliert werden. Nur das kann Ergebnisse bringen. 

Regarding the Iranian nuclear program, it has to be clear that should Iran become a nuclear power, it would lead to a terrible nuclear arms race in the region. The best way to stop the nuclear program is through very tough, really tough sanctions. The UN resolutions are not enough; the Security Council and the EU must declare much more effective and harsher sanctions. That worked with Libya. Iran has to be isolated. Only that can bring results.

Military option?

Wir sprechen über keinen Militärschlag, Israel kann ein Problem, das ein Problem der ganzen Welt ist, nicht militärisch lösen. Ich schlage vielmehr vor, dass die USA als größte Weltmacht die Verantwortung übernimmt, die Iran-Frage zu lösen." 

We're not talking about any military strike. Israel cannot solve a problem, which is the problem of the whole world, militarily. I suggest rather that the US, as the world's superpower, ought to take responsibility for solving the Iran-question.

Anticipate deterioration in US-Israeli relations?

Nein. Wir haben traditionell wirklich sehr tiefe Beziehungen mit den USA. Sie beruhen nicht nur auf wechselseitigen Interessen, sondern wir teilen auch dieselben Werte. 

No. We traditionally have a very deep relationship with the US. It is not based on our respective interests, rather, we share the same values.

European role?

Allerdings müsste Europa härter gegenüber dem Terrorismus hier auftreten. Hamas und Hisbollah müssen unakzeptable Organisationen sein. Doch ich bin nicht sicher, dass alle europäischen Länder diese meine Meinung teilen.

Europe has to take a harder line against terrorism. Hamas and Hizbullah must be unacceptable organizations. But I am not sure if all the European countries share my opinion. 

Europe's Muslim population:

Das Grundproblem ist auch hier eine Frage der demokratischen Werte. Es ist sehr wichtig, die Werte der freien Welt zu bewahren und an alle Bürger weiterzugeben, unabhängig davon, ob sie Juden, Christen oder Moslems sind, oder ein anderes oder gar kein Bekenntnis haben. Im Falle der Moslems muss Europa auch von den muslimischen Ländern fordern, dass sie zur Demokratie und zu den Menschenrechten finden. Wie sieht es beispielsweise mit Menschenrechten in Saudi-Arabien aus, wo Frauen noch immer kein Wahlrecht haben? Erst wenn Selbstverständlichkeiten wie Demokratie und Menschenrechte in allen moslemischen Staaten zur Realität werden, werden sich auch die Moslems anderswo langsam ändern.

The basic problem is one of democratic values. it is very important to guard the values of the free world and to pass them on to all citizens, regardless of whether they are Jews, Christians or Muslim or even of no faith at all. In the case of the Muslims, Europe has to demand from Muslim countries that they find themselves toward democracy and human rights. How does it look with human rights in Saudi Arabia, for example, where women still cannot vote? Only when things we take for granted, such as democracy and human rights become a reality in all Muslim states will Muslims elsewhere gradually change.

On Israel's Jewish population:

Der Schlüssel für das Zusammenleben heißt Toleranz. Wir müssen in Israel toleranter im Umgang miteinander werden. Nach Israel kamen Menschen aus Asien, Afrika, Europa, der ehemaligen Sowjetunion und Südamerika. Sie alle haben unterschiedliche Vorstellungen, ein unterschiedliches Temperament und eine verschiedene Mentalität. Daher ist es unmöglich, die Vorstellung nur einer Gruppe durchzusetzen. Also können etwa die Vorstellungen der Religiösen nicht säkularen Bürgern verordnet werden und umgekehrt. Wir versuchen daher, den richtigen Zugang zu diesen Problemen zu finden. Das betrifft auch die Zivilehe und andere jüdische Werte. Denn Israel muss ein Platz für alle Juden sein. 

The key to coexistence is tolerance. We have to become more tolerant in Israel in our interactions with each other. People from Asia, Africa, Europe, the former Soviet Union and South America all came to Israel They have different preconceptions, temperaments, and mentalities. Therefore it is impossible to implement the conceptions of one group. The ideas of the religious cannot be mandated for secular citizens and vice versa. We are therefore trying to find the right approach to these problems. This also concerns civil union and other Jewish values [sic]. Because Israel has to be a place for all Jews.

Obama and Netanyahu

BY AMOS

(Photo: Wikimedia Commons)

Aluf Benn provides an  excellent analysis of Netanyahu's Washington-strategy. Many commentators are convinced that Israel's new prime minister is on a collision course not only with the Europeans but also with the White House. Benn contrasts Netanyahu's strategy so far with that of his predecessor, Ehud Olmert, in order to explain what Bibi might be thinking:

The prime minister is aware of the assumption of many that his rejection of the idea of a Palestinian state, and opposition to withdrawals from the West Bank and the Golan Heights, will result in an inevitable crisis in relations with Obama and propel Israel into political isolation. But he is not afraid. The way he sees it, it's better to come to the White House with a list of demands and requests, and to condition any concession on a quid pro quo, than it is to play the role of yes man to the president and gain nothing in return. 

Ehud Olmert emerged from his many talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with the impression that, because of the Palestinians' positions on the so-called core issues, there is no chance for a final-status accord with them - which is why he opted to emphasize Israeli generosity to secure international support. Netanyahu prefers to enter into negotiations with maximalist positions rather than to begin with concessions that may win the world's approval but won't satisfy the other side. He is ready to pay the political price this will exact abroad for the sake of appearing consistent in his positions and preserving his coalition at home (Ha'aretz). 

We will see what happens, but for now, Benn's reading seems more persuasive than the hysterical fears of a collapse of US-Israeli relations and of Israel's position in the West. Netanyahu does not seem fazed by the missteps of his foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman. My sense is that Lieberman will not play a major role in foreign policy at all - Bibi will hold the reins tight here as well as in his economic policy.

Labor Wants In

Even though Labor MKs have been boasting that they are not afraid to enter the opposition, they have been increasing the pressure on Livni to include them in the government. That, I believe, is how one should interpret statements by the Labor Party to the media, that the faction will not recommend Livni or Netanyahu to President Shimon Peres to form the next government. The comments of Dan Kurtzer, former U.S. ambassador to Israel, that

the Obama administration would find it politically risky to embrace a government that included Lieberman, who has voiced controversial views about Arabs (Ha'aretz),

also give Labor some added punch in the coalition-wrangling going on. Even though Israeli voters, especially on the right, are on the whole indifferent to these U.S. concerns, the senior figures in each party realize that strained relations with the White House are not in Israel's interest. They will be weighing the various domestic and international costs and benefits carefully.

However, it is unclear whether it is possible for these elections to yield a coalition that might appeal to the American administration - even if that were a priority for Israelis. A Kadima-Likud-Labor unity government (28+27+13 = 68 seats) would be a hard pill for Netanyahu to swallow, seeing as it would mean little change from the current line. Meanwhile, the pressure will be on Livni to explain her negotiations with Lieberman to Israeli voters from the left and, behind closed doors, to members of the Obama administration. Netanyahu knows, a fortiori, that a far-right coalition would spell trouble for American-Israeli relations.

In a comment earlier today, Nobody remarked about the need for electoral reform in Israel. There are two conflicting aims that disinterested voters pursue with reform proposals: 1) "true democracy", or 2) stability. The former is almost impossible to satisfy, as no electoral system is immune from challenges of injustice. With regard to the latter, there are certainly systems that make for more stable government. However, I would argue that Israeli society is more divided - ethnically, religiously, and socio-economically - than those countries that do not enjoy the curse of extreme political fragmentation. Lastly, as any student of electoral systems will tell you, there are no "disinterested" reforms in this sphere of politics. Since the proposed changes are always negotiated by political parties, they tend to favor those currently in power, or are at least designed to advance the interests of incumbents (occasionally there are miscalculations though). I am not sure the electoral system is the problem.

Good Morning, Israel. Some Laughs about the Election

There is an English translation by Lisa Goldman in Ha'aretz. 

"אזרחים, אזרחים סוג ב, ערבים." "Citizens, 2nd-class citizens, 3rd-class citizens, Arabs."

Coalition Building - Bibi's Nonsense

It's a travesty that the press is uncritically regurgitating the notion that Bibi has a higher chance of forming a government than Livni. This is not at all true when one looks at the numbers, even if they change by one or two seats in favor of the right-wing after the soldiers' and absentee voters' ballots are counted.

Although Netanyahu has been arguing that he won a decisive victory, I don't think he is thrilled about forming a far-right government. He knows that this will cause him a lot of problems on the international stage, which will in turn impede his ability to advance his policy aims. Furthermore, he would need both ultra-Orthodox parties to form the "nationalist" government that so many people are dreaming about.

Here is what such a coalition would look like:

Likud + Yisrael Beitenu + Shas + Jewish Home + National Union + Torah Judaism 

= (27 + 15 + 11 + 3 + 4 + 5) seats

= 65 seats  [out of a total of 120]

That's a very weak government, considering that it commands just 4 seats more than the minimum. Plus, can you imagine the headaches with Shas, the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox, and Lieberman all in one coalition?

Both Shas and Yisrael Beitenu have been posturing that they would prefer a Netanyahu government. There is bad blood between Shas and Livni, so perhaps Shas will under no circumstances sit in her government. But Lieberman's public expressions of support for a Netanyahu government should be read as attempts to strengthen his bargaining position vis-a-vis Livni. The same of course goes for Barak's remarks about Labor returning to the opposition. Nothing is a given. Neither Kadima nor Labor have any compunctions about sitting in a government with Lieberman. Moreover, Shas and Yisrael Beitenu would probably be willing to bury the hatchet, at least temporarily, if the right conditions are met.

There is thus a distinct possibility of a Kadima + Labor + Yisrael Beitenu + Shas coalition

 = (28 + 13 + 15 + 11) seats

= 67 seats. 

As always, the remarks to the press and leaks by the various candidates and their parties should be viewed with a great deal of skepticism. As much as certain candidates may insist that they will never sit in a government with X or Y, or that they would never consider conceding on issue Z, everything is up for grabs. 

18th Knesset Elections 2009 - Predictions

In less than a week, on Tuesday, February 10, Israelis will elect the 18th Knesset. There has been quite a bit of movement in the polls over the last week. The latest results are showing a tight race between Likud and Kadima, and a surge in support for Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beitenu party.  Candidates on the various party lists are competing for 120 seats. Here are my predictions for the elections results.

Likud: 29

Kadima: 23

Yisrael Beitenu: 16

Labor: 15

Shas: 10

United Torah Judaism: 6

Meretz: 5

National Union: 5

Jewish Home: 2

Hadash: 4

Ra'am Ta'al: 3

Balad: 2

I see Likud widening its lead over Kadima again in the last days before the vote. The last poll is tomorrow, it may still predict a close race between the two parties, but Kadima's lead is heavily dependent on quiet. I am predicting that Lieberman will fall slightly from the current projections but that his party will still beat Labor. 

The next order of business will be to determine who will sit in the government and in what capacity. A key question will be whether the Labor Party will give Ehud Barak the go-ahead to join a coalition with Netanyahu and Lieberman. I think he will twist the right arms to be able to maintain his tenure in the Defense Ministry. According to the polls, there is a possibility that a secular coalition comprising Likud, Kadima, Yisrael Beitenu, and Labor could rule without Shas or UTJ. 

Also interesting to consider - the candidate lists for Labor, Yisrael Beitenu, Kadima, and Likud. These will be important to peruse as the cabinet seats are divvied up.