The Day after the Kadima Primaries

People have been wrongly predicting the downfall of Ehud Olmert for two years now. Has his reign finally come to an end?

If exit polls for the Kadima primaries prove accurate, Tsipi Livni will be elected leader of Olmert's Kadima Party tomorrow. Prime Minister Olmert has previously announced that he would tender his resignation immediately following the results of the Kadima primaries. But there is a chance that we will be seeing Olmert on the throne for quite a bit longer. Both the legal (by which I mean the Basic Laws, not the possible indictment of Olmert by the Attorney-General) and political situations are complicated. 

According to Israel's Basic Laws on the Government 30 (c) (Hebrew, English), 

A Prime Minister who has resigned shall continue to carry out his functions pending the constitution of the new Government. If the Prime Minister has died, or is permanently incapacitated, from carrying out his duties, or if his tenure was ended because of an offense, the Government shall designate another of the Ministers who is a member of the Knesset and of the Prime Minister's faction to be Interim Prime Minister pending the constitution of the new Government.

Thus, when Olmert resigns, he can continue to run the country as head of an interim government until new elections are called. 

The Jerusalem Post claims that

Should Olmert resign after the primary, the cabinet also resigns and the government becomes a transitional government, with Olmert at its head, that remains in power until a new government is formed. This could take least a few weeks, but might only happen after a general election, probably in the spring.

By law, no minister or party may leave a transitional government. Thus, even if he is subsequently indicted, Olmert would be locked in as head of the transitional government, whether he - or anyone else - likes it or not.

I am not sure on which article of the Basic Law on the Government this interpretation is based, but if true, we may be seeing a lot more of Olmert.

Meanwhile, the political situation is dynamic, with the Labor Party threatening to leave the government, Shas trying to extract concessions in return for staying, and the opposition, led by the Likud, renewing calls for elections. 

Elections would not be held until the spring, at which point many things can change dramatically. In the next few days, we should see whether Olmert decides to stay on as interim Prime Minister or whether he will suspend himself from his post and let her take the reigns until elections are called. 

Meet Tzipi Livni, Spartan -- but wears jeans!

Watch out for this one (Photo: NYT)

The Sunday NYT Magazine's cover story today is a profile of Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. The author is Roger Cohen, a regular Page 2 columnist for the International Herald Tribune. At the IHT, his stuff is savvy commentary on Europe from an American perspective. In the Livni profile, he sets out to explain to an American reader largely unfamiliar with contemporary Israeli politics and culture what makes Tzipi tick. So it's half a not so sympathetic deconstruction of a tough cookie, and half primer on the predicament of Israel today, decadent in its post-heroic age, paranoid about the future, but unwilling to make the hard sacrifices to secure it. The article is worth looking at for two reasons. First, you get a sense of Livni's vision, which is to say, her platform for the PM job. Time is not on Israel's side, she argues. In fact, the state, the Jewish character of the state of Israel, is being delegitimated. You could also say that Livni seems to be going for a "post-ideological" posture -- a new way forward. She's almost Obama-esque both in the content of her tirelessly forward-looking message and in her delivery. Which brings me to my second point. One thing that Cohen misses, for all the pretense of getting beneath the surface, is just how clever a politician Livni is. I think she puts one over on her interviewer, though he, in starting the article by relating an anecdote about her nerves and desire not to be seen as a tight-ass, thinks it's the other way around. What I mean is that this is clearly someone capable of using the foreign media to bolster her position in Israel and vis à vis her rival, PM Olmert. Somewhat ironically, Cohen mentions the FM vs. PM struggle to dominate the relationship with Washington as a recurrent feature of Israeli politics. Livni plays this game very well. And, disappointingly, that part of her story isn't at all covered in a profile in a US newspaper that dwells on her brief (but sexy?) stint in the Mossad and misses that she has strong US connections and speaks perfect English!

The Races - Labor and the Presidency

Who will be the next mukhtar of Israel?

UPDATE (June 6): The increase in entropy that Jeha was talking about seems to be kicking in. Barak has joined up with Ofir Pines-Paz (Labor) and is now saying that if elected to head Labor, he would take the party out of the government, unless Olmert resigned. It's pretty clear that this is a move aimed at differentiating himself from the Peretz-Ayalon camp. This latest news is somewhat ironic, given Ayalon's earlier "principled stance" against Olmert, and Barak's waffling on the question. It's a big gamble, to be for sure.


It looks like Ami Ayalon and Amir Peretz have joined forces to give Ehud Barak a run for his money in the Labor primaries. It remains to be seen how the rest of the party responds, but this might just be a winning combination.

Peretz can still deliver some votes, and he is again pitching himself as the representative of the "social camp." The pair made their first joint appearance in the Negev development town Ofakim, not too far from Sderot. The town's Labor party members are solidly behind Peretz; Ayalon received only a small number of votes there. Indeed, most of the Labor members from the south of the country, will vote for Peretz. Ayalon, meanwhile, will draw in the kibbutzim and the voters in Tel Aviv. He also has the support of some of Labor's new faces, such as Avishai Braverman and Shelly Yehimovich [NOTE: Yehimovich later announced her support for Barak!].

Our readers from Lebanon and elsewhere are probably not terribly interested in the intricacies of Israeli domestic politics - so to cut to the chase, what's the fallout from this latest development? I think it will further bolster Olmert's chances of staying in power. Peretz and his supporters have the most to lose from new elections, so he has essentially committed Ayalon to staying in the government - even if the latter has been coy about admitting as much in public.

Did anyone else notice the English headline of Mikhal Grinberg's article on the Ayalon-Peretz combination, which cited Peretz as saying that "Ayalon and I together appeal to all ethnic groups"? The term "ethnic groups" is probably confusing for foreign readers, especially for those who speak of Israel as an "ethnocracy." At first I thought that the phrase was a translation of the word עדה ['edah] or its plural עדות ['edot], literally "communities," which is used to refer to various groups in Israeli society. Thus, 'edot ha-mizrakh are the "communities of the orient," etc. I have also heard someone on the radio giving a shout-out to ha-'edah ha-Tsharkessit [the Circassian community], which means that the term no longer refers only to the various Jewish "ethnicities." But the original Hebrew article did not use this word at all; rather, it referred to מגזרים [migzarim], lit. "sectors." In Israel, the word sector is most often used when referring to Arabs or the religious: people frequently talk of המגזר הערבי [the Arab sector] or המגזר החרדי/הדתי [the haredi/religious sector]. Needless to say, this is quite different from "ethnicity."

The other stabilizing factor for Olmert is Peres's candidacy for the presidency. A few months ago, most people would probably have picked MK Reuven Rivlin (Likud), a widely respected parliamentarian, as the favorite in this race. But Peres is campaigning hard, and he has managed to secure the support of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, and therefore of Shas. Who knows what deals were made to score these votes. He is also recruiting other MKs. A while ago, Rivlin made some remarks to the effect that the post of the presidency should go to the most qualified person rather than the most prestigious one. Perhaps he's right, but Peres remains the darling of European statesmen and media people (few of them have probably kept up with his move from Labor to Kadima - for them, he is still the Oslo man); this should be an asset for Israel. Colette Avital (Labor), unfortunately, will finish third, if she decides to run at all.

In any case, Peres is a stabilizer because he is desperate for votes and needs Olmert's support. His own backing of the Prime Minister during Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni's quasi coup attempt is paying dividends. The election of Rivlin, on the other hand, would be a clear blow against Olmert. The Likud members will certainly vote for him, as will the national religious camp. Ra'am Ta'al's chairman, MK Ibrahim Sarsur recently listed conditions for its backing: promises to release Arab Israeli security prisoners and support for a two-state solution (Ha'aretz). Interestingly enough, however, two of the MKs of his faction, Ahmad Tibi and Talab El-Sana have so far supported Rivlin. Every vote counts, and the Arab parties have ten among them.

Labor Party Primaries

MK Ami Ayalon (Labor)

As many expected, the Labor Party primaries did not yield a clear winner in the first round. At the end of the day, with a 65% turnout among party members, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak received 34%, while upstart Ami Ayalon finished with 32% of the votes. Defense Minister and current party leader Amir Peretz came in third with 22% - a relatively high number considering all that has happened.

The run-off, which will take place in a month, pits Barak against Ayalon. Barak is the more experienced politician and the man with more funds to dispense, while Ayalon can claim the mantle of reform, with Avishai Braverman at his side. Both candidates have solid security credentials. Barak, who served in the Sayeret Matkal, is one of Israel's most decorated soldiers and a former chief of staff; Ayalon, who served in the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit, is a former commander of the navy and a retired director of the Shin Bet. While Barak might be vulnerable to critiques of his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon as well as his reforms of the army (to which Hazbani alluded earlier), Ayalon lacks experience as a policy-maker.

Until the next round, we are in for a month of backroom deals by these candidates, as they jockey to enlist the support of Peretz's people and the supporters of the other candidates. Here, Barak is probably in a better position than Ayalon. While the latter seems to have won the votes of the kibbutzim and Tel Aviv members, Barak might have an easier time getting the Peretz camp to vote for him - despite his association with the moneyed elite. One thing that Barak has going for him is the fact that he has been very equivocal about leaving the Olmert government, whereas Ayalon has been very critical of the Prime Minister since the Winograd report. Most of the Labor Party members want to avoid elections. They want appointments and a role in the current government; and they are more likely to trust Barak to deliver them than the undiplomatic Ayalon.

Even if Ayalon wins, however, the Labor Party will probably remain in the Olmert government after all - unless of course something very dramatic happens. A whole month is a long time for things to remain as they are.

One matter that is confusing me at the moment is the portfolio most likely to be assigned to the eventual leader of the Labor Party. It seems that the Peretz supporters want the party to claim the Finance Ministry, to finally implement the social agenda on which Peretz ran in the first place. But Barak would surely prefer the Defense Ministry.

"God Saved Us"

Sderot synagogue hit by a qassam. The photograph of R. Ovadia Yosef (right)
and the painting of the youthful Baba Sali [I think] (left) were unharmed (Photo: Ynet)

The photographs and the press reports from Sderot this week are eerily reminiscent of scenes from the north in last summer's war. Of course, the residents of the western Negev have been living with the qassam strikes since before the disengagement from Gaza. But the media spotlight is now back on Sderot, and the pressure on the government is mounting to "do something" about it.

On the airwaves and in the print media, the inhabitants of the Negev town seem unanimous that they have been abandoned by the politicians. I am not sure that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's visit assuaged their fears - some Sderot residents took this as an opportunity to lash out at Olmert as well as Defense Minister Amir Peretz, whose house in the city is apparently a target for the qassam crews.

Shortly after Olmert finished his tea with Peretz and left the town, a rocket struck a synagogue. This strike could very well have resulted in casualties; shortly before the qassam hit, community members had celebrated the dedication of a new Torah scroll. "God saved us," said one of the people on the scene. Ynet's coverage (Hebrew) gives voice to the anger and fear of Sderot residents. These are the words of Aryeh Cohen, who came to Peretz's house to "talk" to the PM:

ראש הממשלה פחדן, באת כמו גנב בלילה עם כל השומרים שלך. זו לא פרובוקציה מה שאני עושה, אני רוצה לדבר איתו. רק אתמול בלילה עברו מעלי טילים. אני רוצה לשמוע את ראש הממשלה נותן לי תשובות. כל הזמן אנחנו שומעים אותך ואתה לא מאפשר לנו להשמיע את קולנו. נכנס לבית של פרץ, פרץ גם עוד יותר פחדן ממך - גר בבית ממוגן ואנחנו - אין לנו מקלטים

The Prime Minister is a coward, you came like a thief in the night with all your guards. What I am doing is not a provocation, I want to talk to you. Only last night missiles passed over me. I want to hear the Prime Minister give me answers. We hear you all the time and you don't allow us to make our voices heard. He went into Peretz's house, Peretz is even more of a coward than you - he lives in a protected house - we don't have shelters.

The truth is that while the IDF may be able to reduce the rocket strikes to a certain degree with some of its current actions, qassams will continue landing on Sderot without a renewal of some kind of hudnah with Hamas. Even that, however, will only reduce the number of rockets, as the Islamic Jihad and wild Fath crews will continue their activities. As the latest eruption of internecine fighting in Gaza made all too clear, no one has a monopoly on violence in the Strip.

Aluf Benn lists four different alternatives, faulting Israel's leaders for not having learned from Winograd and ignoring "diplomatic" alternatives. The options he lists are:

• Offering a cease-fire in the West Bank in exchange for a cessation of qassam firing
• Allowing the U.S. to implement the "Dayton Plan" - i.e., training and arming forces loyal to Abu Mazen to fight the qassam crews and weapons smugglers
• Engage in direct talks with Hamas and offer to lift the economic embargo against the PA in exchange for a long-term hudnah
• Meet with Abu Mazen

The last of these is, of course, utterly useless, as Benn acknowledges - we can reject this one out of hand. The second option apparently has a lot of backers in the State Department. There are some who are insisting that Fatah forces are fighting quite well against Hamas. However, even if there is some truth to this (it seems to fly in the face of the evidence), a victory achieved by Israeli-backed units would be meaningless, as it would never have popular legitimacy. Given the political weakness of Abu Mazen, this seems like a waste of time and money.

The first and third options, which involve dealing with Hamas, seem more promising. However, these days it is not at all clear that Hamas can deliver the goods (i.e., no more qassams) any more effectively than Abbas. In any case, both of these scenarios would allow Hamas to build up its forces for a future confrontation; one has to weigh the costs very carefully.

Given that none of the "diplomatic" alternatives above are truly viable, it seems that Israel can only hope to reduce the rocket fire at this point by targeted air force and artillery strikes, and work on reinforcing buildings and bunkers in Sderot. This is pretty much in line with previous escalations in the south. Sooner or later, an errant Israeli artillery shell or air strike will hit a residential building in Gaza, kill a large number of Palestinian civilians, and occasion an international outcry, and put a stop to the operation. Then, things will return to the status quo ante of 10 instead of 30 qassams a day ... until the next round.

The worst thing Israel could do is to embark on a full-scale invasion of Gaza now. It will bring only marginal gains over air strikes, in terms of preventing qassam launches. Let's face it. There is no real solution to the problem of the rockets - at least not one that Israel by itself could achieve.

No Confidence in No-Confidence

Olmert plans to ride it out

The government passed its first post-Winograd and post-demonstrations challenge with flying colors. In three no-confidence votes held in the Knesset, 60-62 MKs voted against the no-confidence motion and 26-28 in favor. Nine MKs abstained in all the votes. The opposition as a whole has 42 seats, while the government commands 78. A large number of MKs did not attend the vote, including several figures from the Labor Party. But overall, Labor legislators voted with the government.

A telephone poll commissioned by the staff of Ehud Barak, who is currently not in the government but is hoping to enter through the backdoor of the Labor primaries (May 28), showed that most Labor central committee members (they elect the leader of the party) oppose early elections. This is good politics. Elections now will bring the Likud to power. Holding on helps both Kadima and the Labor Party.

Given that Labor has quite a bit to lose from early elections, does the party still have leverage over Olmert - i.e., can it threaten to pull out of the coalition unless certain conditions are met? It all depends on the ability of Labor to convince Olmert that he has more to lose from elections than it does.

To outflank the threat from his left, Olmert has been making overtures to the Likud on the right - offering Netanyahu the defense ministry in exchange for a promise to stay loyal until the end of next year, thus giving Kadima a chance to recover and perhaps to neutralize the Likud. Bibi has rejected this offer, but who knows what backroom negotiations are currently taking place. Netanyahu knows that he can replace Olmert if the government falls and elections are called.

Despite Netanyahu's hardline stance against Olmert and his previous statements in public, it is possible that the prime minister will try to assemble a right-wing coalition of

Kadima (29) + Likud (12) + Shas (12) + Yisrael Beitenu (11) + Pensioners (7) + United Torah Judaism (6) = 77,

which is just one seat less than the current coalition.

But the prospect of sitting in the same government as the Likud might be enough to provoke a second go at a palace coup by Livni, Peres, and Dalia Itzik. There is still a chance that Olmert will succumb to pressure from inside Kadima and allow the formation of a new government with Peres at the helm - but certainly not before the Labor primaries, and probably not until after the Winograd committee releases its final report in the summer. There is, finally, the possibility that the criminal investigation into some of Olmert's dealings will yield some fruit.

The consternation expressed by government sources about U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's canceled visit (she was set to come on May 15) can mean one of two things. Either, Rice realized that the proposed list of benchmarks for the PA and Israel are completely unrealistic, and that there is therefore nothing to talk about; or, this is a no-confidence vote in the Olmert government.

What's going to happen next?

Chameleon holding on for dear life
(Hebrew University, Har ha-tsofim, January 2006)

It's really too bad that none of us were on the ground in Tel Aviv, taking part in and observing the demonstration - we would have gotten a much better sense of the atmosphere. Nevertheless, in response to Ariel's query, I'll put some of my speculation out there.

First, I think that the government will hold on for another month at least.

There is a no-confidence vote scheduled for Monday. I don't think it will garner a majority, despite some of the Labor MKs who will vote against the government. But in another month, the Labor Party will have its primaries, and Peretz will definitely be kicked out.

If Livni resigns, Olmert will replace her with Peres or Sheetrit. If she doesn't resign, however, it will be difficult for Olmert to fire her, as this could upset the coalition (esp. the Labor party). He will definitely have to wait until after the no-confidence vote.

Bibi, as I've said several times before, is in an excellent position. Some people might confuse the Rabin Square protests with anti-war demonstrations; they weren't. People are upset that Israel didn't score a more decisive victory. Most of those who came to demand Olmert's resignation believe that the war was justified but poorly executed. A lot of these people are centrists, but given a choice today, they would probably choose Bibi even over Livni, and certainly over Olmert. However, some of them might warm to Barak or Ayalon too. The key factors for people now are experience in leading the country and a security background.

I think Kadima is there to stay. I don't foresee Livni going over to the Labor Party, and she won't go back to the Likud either. She doesn't have enough followers to start her own movement. The next contest for the party leadership is between her and Sheetrit.

Anyway, I'm not very good with predictions, and I have a sense that we are still in for some big surprises over the next few days. Maybe the coalition will be expanded. Maybe Livni will find her way to the top after all. And maybe, due to a combination of people not showing up to vote and a higher-than-expected anti-Olmert vote among Labor and Kadima, the no-confidence motion will actually pass.

ADDENDUM (Friday): Even if the Labor Party were to leave the coalition, it might be possible for Olmert to stay in power by pulling United Torah Judaism into the coalition. It would be a very slim majority but enough, I think.

Meir Shalev: "Olmert, you're fired"

Meir Shalev's Roman Rusi (1988)

The protest in Tel Aviv's Rabin Square has drawn more than 100,000 demonstrators. Organizers made a deliberate decision not to allow current Knesset members to speak. It looks like they were able to bring together activists from across the political spectrum (see Ynet, Ha'aretz, Ha'aretz English).

Attendees included the novelist Meir Shalev (b. 1948), famous for his depiction of a Jezreel Valley moshav from the time of the pioneers to the 1980s in the novel רומן רוסי [lit. "Russian Novel," but the English title is The Blue Mountain], who called on the prime minister to resign and accused the government of having "wasted the lives of soldiers and civilians" (Ynet).

The size of this demonstration may not force Olmert to step down, but it might embolden Knesset members opposed to him firing Tsipi Livni. Contrary to what I anticipated, the orange camp did not dominate the protest.There are clearly enough people from across Israeli society who want Olmert and co. to take responsibility.

On the Face

Orange might be back in style. Photo: Anti-disengagement poster
in Jerusalem, December 2005. The Hebrew caption reads, "Again expulsion?"

It looks as if Tsipi Livni has taken a horrible dive. The situation is truly "on the face." How did she let Olmert play her like this? It is remarkable to watch Israel's own "slippery eel" (this is actually what the Koreans call UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon) holding and holding on.

Only two other Kadima MKs joined Livni's "revolt" - the head of the coalition, Avigdor Yitzhaki, and the backbencher, Marina Solodkin. Minister of Internal Security Avi Dichter (Kadima) shed a few crocodile tears and remarked that it would be a shame if Livni were sacked from the foreign ministry.

Of course, Shimon Peres (Kadima) still knows how to pick a winner; he is coveting Livni's post for himself, and who knows, maybe he'll even want to succeed Olmert as Kadima's candidate in the next election, which he would lose like nearly every other election he has run in. For what it's worth though, President Jimmy Carter gave Peres a ringing endorsement at a Berkeley lecture earlier today. He couldn't remember Livni's name, but he said that she might be the other politician, beside Peres, whom he would like to see as the next Israeli PM.

The other Olmert apparatchik thinking about the future is Minister of Housing and Construction, Meir Sheetrit, who will surely be rewarded with a promotion for his loyalty. Sheetrit has already announced his plans to run for the head of the party in future Kadima primaries. Meanwhile, Olmert is mulling over what he should do to Livni. It's hard to see her staying in her current post, not after publicly calling on Olmert to resign, but stranger things have happened- I give her a 20% chance. Livni has been keeping a low profile for so long, it's truly bizarre that Olmert seems to have found an opportunity to purge her like this; especially the day after the release of a report that basically handed him a sword to fall into, while singling out Livni for praise.

We live in interesting times. But this story is not over. While Amir Peretz, too, believes that he can stay in power, he faces far more determined opposition from his own Labor party, with plenty of disgruntled people in the Ami Ayalon camp, and a few looking to former PM Ehud Barak. Plus, Olmert may feel that if he wants to stay in power, he should sack or move Peretz to shore up his right flank. Who knows what forces that might set in motion?

Finally, we have good old 'am yisro'el, the people that all these clowns are supposed to be representing. This עם קשה עורף [stiff-necked people] might have a few tricks up its sleeves too, though it is equally likely that most Israelis are too disillusioned to care, especially when the prime minister has shown such contempt for public opinion.

The question is how broad of a coalition the demonstrations planned for Thursday can draw to protest against the government. I have a feeling that the protest will be a sea of orange. The settlers and the religious Zionist youth are extremely organized and committed to this kind of activism. They also have a score to settle with Olmert, the man who helped Sharon take them out of Gaza and threatened to force them into making 'aliyah from Judea and Samaria to the State of Israel. But if the blues don't show up, then it will be easy for Olmert and his loyalists to dismiss the demonstration as a sectarian affair, not representative of the Israeli public at large. It would also make Labor MKs more reluctant about leaving the government and going into new elections. But perhaps the reservists, the bereaved parents, Meretz, the students, and Uzi Dayan will be able to turn this into a more representative coalition.

Staying Put?

Can Livni do it? (Photo: Modified from Wikicommons)

It looks like Olmert might be serious about staying put. If the Prime Minister refuses to resign, Peretz will have little reason to leave his post either. Both leaders face significant opposition from their own parties, but that in itself is not enough to compel them to leave. The same thing apparently goes for their dismal public approval ratings. Even if the planned demonstrations in Tel Aviv turn out to draw a large number of protesters (not a given at all), Olmert and Peretz might not yield.

Tsipi Livni, it seems, is still hoping that she will be able to seize the reins from the Prime Minister via a "musical chairs" rearrangement of the cabinet and coalition. Livni would take the premiership, while Labor MK Ami Ayalon would replace Peretz in the defence ministry. But Olmert knows that if he doesn't resign and is forced out by a no-confidence vote, Livni and Ayalon will face first internal primaries and then elections. Two former prime ministers, Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) and Ehud Barak (Labor), both security heavyweights, will surely attempt a comeback, and who can predict whether Livni will end up on top?

Everyone knows the poll numbers, but incumbent MKs will be watching public protests closely. A massive demonstration could convince the MKs of the governing coalition to abandon a sinking ship. Failing that, those MKs on the fence might decide that the Israeli public has as little interest in new elections as they do.

Knesset factions in the governing coalition:

Kadima: 29
Labor: 19
Shas: 12
Yisrael Beitenu: 11
Pensioners: 7
Total: 78

Opposition:

Likud: 12
National Union - NRP: 9
United Torah Judaism: 6
Meretz: 5
Ra'am-Ta'al: 4
Balad: 3
Hadash: 3
Total: 42

Passage of a no-confidence motion requires a simple majority. Assuming that the entire opposition is united behind such a motion, they would still need 19 votes from the coalition. Will enough members of the government vote to imperil their seats in the Knesset and/or their ministerial portfolios?

In Labor, there is widespread dissatisfaction with Peretz, and a feeling that continuing to stay in this government will hurt the party. Many MKs would vote against the government.

Shas will consult its spiritual authorities; they will be very careful in their decision. The party will vote as as a bloc - more likely for the government than against.

Yisrael Beitenu's Avigdor Liberman has been very quiet. He was, needless to say, entirely untouched by the Winograd report and remains a clean candidate. He can bide his time but might gain even more seats in the elections. Decision will depend on a careful reading of the Russian electorate.

The Pensioners will lose in a future election, as people are more likely to vote for established parties given the sense of insecurity. They will support the government, unless they decide to make some kind of moral stand.

Taking Responsibility

Llamas not taking responsibility for Lebanon War
(Southern Israel, Summer 2006)

In some cultures, people assume responsibility even for the mistakes of their most distant subordinates, not to mention their own errors. In Israel today, even single-digit approval ratings, imminent criminal proceedings, and a scathing report by an independent commission are apparently insufficient. Or maybe not.

It appears as if the show might be winding down at least for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Minister of Defense Amir Peretz. Both of these men seem to have had an interminable supply of tricks up their sleeves until now. One should not count them out yet. Olmert went on a counter-offensive against his Kadima rival, Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni, on Tuesday. Peretz claimed that the Winograd report had actually demonstrated his merit. But the photographs of Olmert that appeared in the media earlier on Tuesday, in the morning after the release of the Winograd Committee's interim report, showed a man who looked utterly demoralized, and very tired.

In January of this year, I told the Head Heeb that I did not believe that Olmert's resignation was imminent then; I also disagreed with his prediction of a "palace coup" (my description) from inside his party. I am not sure who turned out to be right.

One of the scenarios outlined by Jonathan involved Olmert resigning and being replaced by Tsipi Livni, without new elections having to be called. However, according to some reports the Foreign Minister is apparently getting ready to tender her resignation; others indicate that she will merely demand that Olmert step down.

If Livni, who seems to have been one of the few members of the government who received favorable mention in the Winograd report, leaves, she will probably be followed by a number of other Kadima MKs.

There is no point in making further predictions, as news reports are pouring in.

It might be worth looking at the list of MKs (English version) and ministers to determine how the numbers stack up between those who would be interested in new elections and those who would prefer the status quo. For reference on various scenarios, such as the resignation of the Prime Minister, and the formation of a new government, consult the Basic Law on the Government (Hebrew).

Tsipi Livni for Prime Minister

Who is behind signs calling on Livni to replace Olmert?
(Photo: Ynet)

Israeli Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni has so far been very cautious about acting on her ambitions to one day succeed Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. With Olmert facing unprecedented disapproval ratings over his handling of the Lebanon war, corruption, and lack of discernible strategy, however, a group of independent activists has apparently decided to promote Livni from outside the party. On Sunday, ads featuring the foreign minister's face, the Kadima logo, and the caption, "honest leadership and a cleaning of hands," appeared around Tel Aviv. The signs called for Livni to replace Olmert as the head of the government (Ynet).

Kadima sources have denied that the foreign minister is behind these signs. Indeed, they believe that the persons responsible for these ads could not have come from the party. They are probably right. Livni is too smart to risk her standing, and Olmert is too clever to let her undermine him in this way. So, the initiative either comes from activists who see Livni as a credible candidate to oppose Bibi's comeback try, or from people trying to bring about some kind of internal Kadima crisis.

In the meantime, Olmert, facing domestic pressure as well as a White House trying to salvage something from two disastrous terms, has hinted at his support for the Saudi initiative for a larger regional peace settlement between Israel and the Arab states. As Aluf Benn notes,

The Saudi initiative gives Olmert a chance to recover, if he can manage to demonstrate political progress. He doesn't have a lot to lose.

For the first time, it also appears that American opposition to (or rumors about U.S. vetoes of) Israeli negotiations with Syria might be softening.

Of course, the Palestinian front remains as fragile as ever. It will be a miracle if the unity government lasts. It is clear that the interests of Fatah and Hamas conflict. Without a major change in Palestinian political culture, it is hard to see how these two sides will agree to share power indefinitely.

The Arab Peace Initiative

(Image: Wikipedia)

At a summit that is to be held in 3 weeks, the Arab foreign ministers are expected to reiterate their commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative announced in Beirut in 2002. Then, the Arab leaders declared

that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance with international legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli government (see full text of the initiative).

In Ha'aretz today, Akiva Eldar excoriates Israel's leadership for ignoring the Saudi peace plan. The peace initiative, to be sure, is not without flaws. Its provision on the Palestinian refugee problem refers only vaguely to UN Resolution 194. In section 2.II, the initiative calls for the

Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194

That UN resolution, which dates to 1948, resolved

that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible (see full text).

Needless to say, this is not a tenable option today. Israeli FM Tsipi Livni has been lobbying the Arab leaders to amend this phrasing, but she is the only one who seems to have taken any notice of the upcoming summit to be held on March 28 in Riyadh.

Let us not be mistaken in thinking that the rest of Israel's leadership, most notably Prime Minister Olmert, is ignoring this initiative because it has grasped the strategic ramification such a resolution might have for Israel. There is no evidence that Olmert's inaction is due to any real thinking about or engagement with the future of the State of Israel. Rather, the prime minister is continuing to do what he knows best - bungling his way through office.

Tsipi Livni Goes Solo on Olmert

Israeli FM Tsipi Livni with U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice last February (State Dept.)

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is said to be furious about reports that Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni met with Fatah officials Yasser Abed Rabbo and Salam Fayyad earlier in the week. Livni apparently organized the meetings without Olmert's approval or knowledge. According to Ha'aretz, she

outlined her plan to negotiate with moderate Palestinians and shape the future of the peace process. She advocates an Israeli pullout from the West Bank east of the separation fence and the establishment of a Palestinian state - which would also be the solution to the Palestinian refugee problem - in the evacuated area.

No wonder Olmert is ticked off. Here is someone finally showing initiative and an interest in some kind of progress. In a recent post, Zach, over at Epichorus, quips that

Unlike President George W. Bush, who has conveniently shortened his title of Commander-in-Chief to "The Decider," Prime Minister Ehud Olmert cannot even make the decision whether or not to change his title to "The Vacillitor."

Livni is making him look bad.

I don't know if there is a Tsipi-bandwagon yet, and I'm not sure I would jump on it, but Israel desperately needs some real leadership, and neither Olmert nor Peretz are providing much of anything these days. I don't think Livni shone during the war with Hizbullah, but I think if she had been given more breathing room, she might have made a difference then. As Israel's representative in Europe and the U.S., she has certainly out-performed Olmert.

Olmert Pitches Convergence Plan to the Europeans

An honor guard for Olmert in France (Channel 1)

It is not clear what Israeli PM Ehud Olmert hoped to get out of his trip to Europe other than crumpets and croissants. So far, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac have reacted almost identically to Olmert's declarations about the great concessions he is prepared to make as part of his "convergence" plan: with tired indifference. Contrary to Le Monde, which imagined another instance of Anglo-American perfidy, speculating that

son plan dit de "regroupement" ("convergence" en anglais) ... aurait reçu les soutiens de MM. Bush et Blair [Olmert's "regroupement," or "convergence" plan in English, has received the support of Bush and Blair]

Blair actually did not endorse the convergence plan at all (see Aluf Benn's column in Ha'aretz for an analysis of the British position).

Olmert's plan envisions the "realignment" or bringing into Israel of most West Bank settlements, as well as the inclusion of some land beyond the 1967 borders to make the large, nearby settlement blocs continguous with the pre-1967 lines. It represents the second stage of the withdrawal from the territories acquired by Israel as part of the Six-Day War.

While Blair and Chirac did not express enthusiasm for convergence, they also have not expressed overt opposition to Olmert's plan. Rather, they have chosen to chant the old mantra of negotiated settlements, which Olmert has been clever enough to make a central part of his addresses as well. A unilateral solution, he emphasized several times, would only result if no partner could be found. Along the way, he repeated Israel's desire to work with Abbas, while stressing his opposition to dealing with Hamas, which still has not recognized the Jewish state's right to exist. This latter position too went unopposed by the Europeans. Here it is relevant to note the "overwhelmingly negative" perception of Hamas among Europeans reported in a recent poll by The Israel Project.

The withdrawal from the West Bank will be far more complicated than the "disengagement" from the Gaza strip. This is obviously true with respect to the number of people and settlements that will be evacuated, as well as with regard to the issue of final borders. But on the international front too, certain difficulties loom ominously. The Europeans will balk at recognizing the convergence as a withdrawal "from territories occupied in 1967" without serious efforts at negotiations with the Palestinians. And there is the rub. There is, as of yet, no partner on the Palestinian side who would accept Olmert's plan. Thus, if Israel hopes to attain international recognition of its new borders through another series of unilateral moves, it had better think again.