UNIFIL Hunting Israeli Spies in Southern Lebanon?

BY AMOS

Relatively little has been reported in the Israeli media about the Israeli espionage network allegedly discovered in Lebanon over this past month. The Lebanese have announced several arrests of various figures, including some senior former officers. Now, in a strange episode, the Spanish commander of the UNIFIL forces in Lebanon seems to have inadvertently revealed that Spanish units participated in the hunt in southern Lebanon (Ha'aretz, ABC.es, Ha'aretz English). If this is true, Israel should take immediate measures. Helping the Lebanese security forces hunt down Israeli spies is not part of UNIFIL's mandate. The fallout could be very serious and it certainly undermines future UNIFIL missions. 

Open Thread: Hillel Halkin on Bashir

BY NOAH K

I must admit, I had a tepid reaction to "Waltz with Bashir," Ari Folman's Oscar-nominated animated film about his experiences during the First Lebanon War and after it, when he seems to have suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. The dream sequences were indeed seductive, particularly the young soldier floating back to Israel (or Israeli-occupied buffer territory below the Litani line), the lone survivor of his unit, adrift at sea, forgotten or at least unrecognizable to his own army, safely "stateless" in a way out there in international waters.

But as for the politics? What is there to make a fuss about? What were the film's politics? Or did it have any? Was it just too post-Zionist, too Etgar Keret? I took from the film some bite-size lessons: war, in general, corrodes our moral constitution -- it breaks people; the massacres of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila were committed by Christian militiamen, not by the IDF; however, some IDF leadership looked the other way, while some soldiers on the ground were to a certain, undefined degree culpable -- not only for inaction but for rendering specific services to the Phalangists, which, at least in hindsight, made the massacre possible.

Hillel Halkin's review in Commentary makes to my mind a rather jejune complaint about the film's lack of "historical context." The only "context" he adds to the what the film depicts in that case of the massacres are his imaginative reconstructions of "what really happened:" maybe, he reckons, Israeli soldiers were unwilling to wake up their superiors in the middle of the night to investigate the activities of the Phalangists in the camps; maybe they were scared to go in; maybe they were happy to unleash their local allies on their eternal foes...I don't know, yeah, maybe...maybe Folman nudges the viewer in the direction of some of these interpretations. Maybe he doesn't nudge enough.

True, the film doesn't provide an historical context for the conflict as a whole. Israel's 1982 geo-strategic gambit isn't laid out. Nothing of the war's objectives, the internal Israeli debates that preceded it, the machinations of the PLO and its Syrian backers, etc. These omissions produce, in Halkin's mind, a generic "anti-war" film, which, he condemns as intellectually deficient. Fair enough. Still, the film was about experience; it wasn't didactic. And the reviewer's war experience, as it turns out, was one of trying to explain the war with his fellow reservists as he trained in southern Lebanon in the run-up to the war; of trying to explain the massacres in their immediate aftermath. Folman had a different experience, clearly. Now, it's quite a different thing to accuse the film of providing fodder for anti-Semitism insulting the honor of the veterans, and splashing shame on the Jewish state. It seemed to me that Halkin's review almost makes that leap.

How is that possible? Halkin, naturally, interprets the film as an Israeli; I, on the other hand, as an American (Jew). And, as Halkin points out in introducing the film, Israelis and the rest of us saw this film differently. How else to explain the mild reaction of the domestic audience and the wild accolades it has garnered abroad? The review, even more than the box office receipts, points up the wide (and at times widening) gap between the way Israelis see themselves and the way the rest of the world sees them (see Roger Cohen in the NYT, whatever you think of his opinions). Note that the "hero" of "Waltz with Bashir" has to go abroad (like Oedipus of old) to gather clues about who he really is.

I am puzzled by extreme reactions to this film. Did you have one?

Here's one from the Commentary website, a response to Halkin by a certain Jerome Kaufman:

"The film blames the entire massacre in the Sabra and Shatila camp on the Israelis."

Is this guy serious?

And why did Halkin have to diss the score? I liked the music!

Northern Front Erupts

The katyusha rockets fired at the northern Israeli town of Nahariya today from southern Lebanon have raised the stakes of the current conflict significantly. They raise the specter of wide-scale bombardment of the north of the sort we saw in the summer of 2006.

 On December 25, 2008, a number of katyusha rockets, apparently all aimed at Nahariya, were discovered by Lebanese security forces in southern Lebanon. They were disarmed shortly before their launch times. 

This time around, the Lebanese army did not reach the rockets in time, and UNIFIL has been shown to be incapable of stopping such attacks. As Lebanese sources rushed to declare, the rockets were most likely not fired by Hizbullah, but rather by one of the Palestinian factions allied with it. Nevertheless, it would be hard to imagine that Hizbullah did not know about the firing of these rockets. Nasrallah so far has stayed away from involving Lebanon in the Gaza conflict; he may have gotten a soft go-ahead from the Iranians or Syrians, to give a green light to Palestinian proxies. 

It remains to be seen whether this will lead to a major escalation. Israel will have to weigh its response carefully. Reservists are available to operate in the north, but Israel cannot afford to see Haifa, Nahirya, and who knows what other cities engulfed by Hizbullah fire. For now, it must attempt to curtail any escalation. 

War of the Missiles Redux

Most of the IDF activity is taking place around Jabaliyah (Map: Perry Castaneda, click to enlarge)

What we are seeing so far is eerily reminiscent of the beginnings of the war between Israel and Hizbullah in the summer of 2006. So far, Hamas has demonstrated that its rocket attacks can reach at least as far as Ashqelon, and that it is capable of firing hundreds of missiles a day, if it so desires. IDF activity, so far taking place at the brigade level (Givati) and consisting of infantry forays together with armored units, engineers, and air force, has made no dent whatsoever in the qassam firing while killing many civilians, including children - though it has also managed to engage Hamas fighters. The army has even made statements to the effect that its activity in Gaza is not directly related to the rocket launchings; the claim seems to be that it is pursuing larger tactical or strategic aims.

בכירים אומרים בנוסף כי ההחלטה להמשיך בפעילות היא ללא כל קשר למספר הקסאמים שנורים מהרצועה לעבר ישראל, וכי הצבא ממליץ על שורה של צעדים כנגד החמאס ולא להסתפק בתגובות נקודתיות בהתאם לשיגור הרקטות

Senior figures added that the decision to continue the activity is without any connection to the number of qassams that are fired from the Strip at Israel, and that the army recommends a series of steps against Hamas and not to make do with pin-point responses to rocket launchings (Ha'aretz).

The army appears to be testing the waters before embarking on a larger ground offensive. Barak may very well be unable to resist the calls (indeed it serves him in his own political aims against Olmert) for the "real thing" - the much-anticipated ground operation - if qassams hit a strategic installation in Ashqelon, end up killing a family, or strike a target similar to the train depot in Haifa during the Lebanon war.

What we have not seen so far are significant casualties of IDF soldiers. This suggests that the forays are still being conducted fairly cautiously, even though the military has apparently entered heavily defended areas.

UPDATE: As I write this, there is a report of 5 "seriously injured" soldiers.

Right now, it appears that Hamas is trying hard to force Israel into a truce that would see an end to the threats of assassinating the remaining political leadership. Israel, in the meantime, hopes to achieve some kind of near-knockout blow that would make it look as if it had won this round of the conflict. Destroying a few Hamas outposts will not do for this aim. If there is no large-scale ground offensive, we may see an attempt to assassinate a key Hamas figure before this fighting ends.

One thing that Israelis and Americans must get into their heads is that neither this activity, nor the assassinations, nor a large-scale ground operation will by themselves bring about regime change. The goal of regime change will continue to elude the allies. That is not to say that there isn't a great of dissatisfaction with the Hamas government in Gaza. But a revolution from below is a very unlikely prospect, especially while Gaza is under attack.

INS Hanit

The Israeli Navy Ship Hanit ("Spear")

There is an excellent article by the ever-dependable Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff detailing, for the first time, the "intelligence failure" (it was more complicated than that), which led to the near-sinking of the INS Hanit by Hizbullah on the night of July 14, 2006. Readers will recall the discussion with Hazbani about this a few months ago.

The article also makes interesting points about the intense qassam firing of the past week.

Human Rights Watch on Hizbullah

Human Rights Watch has published a detailed report on Hizbullah's rocket attacks on Israeli towns and villages during last summer's war. The report, "Civilians under Assault," includes a number of "case studies" describing attacks on a number of sites in the north. The conclusion is hardly surprising; according to the report,

Hezbollah forces in Lebanon fired thousands of rockets into Israel, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian structures. Hezbollah’s means of attack relied on unguided weapons that had no capacity to hit military targets with any precision. It repeatedly bombarded cities, towns, and villages without any apparent effort to distinguish between civilians and military objectives. In doing so, Hezbollah, as a party to an armed conflict governed by international humanitarian law, violated fundamental prohibitions against deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians.

Human Rights Watch has previously issued sharp condemnations of Israel's bombing of Lebanon, which led to the deaths of hundreds of Lebanese civilians. Hizbullah, it appears, is less eager for this latest report to become public knowledge in Lebanon. Earlier today, Human Rights Watch staffers reported that the group as well as the Lebanese government are trying to silence them.

Rocket Wars of Attrition: the Lessons from Summer 2006

Antidote to the post that follows below: Shlomi Saranga and Moshik Afia, "Sweet Dream" (2002)

I have not seen a great deal of discussion about a recent report, citing unnamed UN officials, that Iran is deploying missiles in Syria. Obviously, Syria already possesses a significant arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles as well as the type of katyusha rockets used with such effectiveness by Hizbullah against Israel in last summer's war. It should surprise no one that in the wake of Israel's failure to stop Hizbullah's fire on the country's civilian population, the Syrians see these kinds of missiles as their best strategy. The question is, what can Israel do about it?

The Israeli military has yet to come up with a military doctrine to counter a rocket-based war of attrition, as the surrender of Sderot to the Palestinian qassams showed. Worse, it does not look like the Israeli military and government have explained to the public what exactly the country is up against. Despite Gabi Ashkenazi's replacement of Dan Halutz as Chief of the General Staff, a great deal of air force spin continues to dominate assessment of the last war. One of the myths still circulating is that the air force's "launcher hunting" doctrine was able to take out most of Hizbullah's Iranian-supplied long-range missiles. A report by Uzi Rubin of Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies released this month argues that the "intensity of long-range rocket attacks" in fact "remained fairly constant" throughout the war, averaging 4 per day (Rubin, "The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War," p. 25).

Rubin makes it clear that Hizbullah "dominated the battle of the rockets" (p. 13). Neither the air force nor the late ground invasion (and definitely not the aimless artillery barrages) succeeded in stopping or diminishing the intensity of Hizbullah's attack. While it is true that toward the end of the war the air force managed to destroy every launcher from which rockets had been fired - reducing the sensor-to-shoot time to one minute (an unprecedented achievement) - as every resident of the north can attest, Nasrallah was able to give Israeli civilians a bitter reminder of who owned them until the last day before the cease fire (see all of Carmia's entries from August 13 for a taste).

All this was accomplished using very simple weapons. Rubin concludes that few if any Iranian rockets hit Israel, one of the exceptions being a Fadjr-3 240 mm rocket that struck Haifa. Another Iranian rocket may have surfaced in Beirut, after an air force attack blew it up, sending a large cylindrical object flying into the air; some enthusiastic Hizbullah fans at the time mistook it for a downed Israeli F-16 (see J.'s post).

The majority of the rockets fired at Israel were 122 mm Grad rockets with 50 km range, 220 mm (70 km), and some 302 mm (90-100 km). Most of these were fired from launch batteries with 4 tubes; at least one launcher had 12 tubes. For the heavier rockets, Hizbullah tended to use mobile launchers, which it fired from residential areas. The lighter rockets, on the other hand, appear to have been fired using stationary launchers that were camouflaged and hidden slightly underground in agricultural areas. Katyusha crews would use hydraulic mechanisms or manual levers to raise these launchers up and then fire them using remote controls. These stationary launchers were set up long before the war, and each one was aimed at a different destination in Israel. They would be fired once every twenty-four hours - but Hizbullah may have had up to 150 such sites (Rubin, p. 9).

Altogether, Hizbullah's "strategic rocketing" killed 41 Israeli civilians, and 12 soldiers (the Kfar Giladi incident), seriously wounded 250 noncombatants, and caused 100,000-250,000 to flee their homes. It also destroyed 2,000 dwellings. Ironically, "passive defence" saved the most Israeli civilians' lives. More specifically, early warning systems, staying in bunkers and safe rooms, or following the instructions about retreating to the south side of apartments in many cases prevented casualties(here's a related sample of unfunny humor from those times: "It would be nice to shower first but the bathroom faces north (that's bad, not because of the feng shui)) .

Recently, I came across something that Nobody wrote, in which he mentioned the dangers of taking for granted Israel's supposed military superiority as well as its permanent presence in the region. I don't remember his exact wording, but he seemed to be taking on one of his favorite targets, reckless "peace lunatics." I have to say that when it comes to Syria, we would do very well to heed the advice of Nobody as well as of our Lebanese friends. I, too, have been guilty of enthusiasm about Syrian "channels." But as this latest missile deployment and their intertwined strategies in Lebanon show, the Syrians and the Iranians are committed to an alliance that will take a lot more than engagement to undo.

Behind the UNIFIL Attack

(Click to enlarge. Go to the link for even more detail. Map: Perry-Castaneda)

Today, what appears to have been a suicide car bombing killed 3 Spanish and 3 Colombian UNIFIL soldiers traveling in an armored troop carrier, somewhere between the towns of Marj 'Ayoun and Khiyam (circled in blue on the modified map above). The area of the attack is a few kilometers north of the Israeli town of Metulla, and just west of the Hazbani River. Two other Spanish peacekeepers were injured.

In the wake of the katyusha attack that hit Qiryat Shmonah on June 17, Spanish UNIFIL officers in particular assured the Israelis that they would do their utmost to prevent further attacks. Around the same time, rumors circulated in the press to the effect that the Italians had reached some kind of deal with Syria that would protect their UNIFIL soldiers from being hurt in attacks. I remember wondering whether the Spaniards might not regret their energetic efforts to carry out the mandate of the UN force in Lebanon. I do not think that it is an accident that Spanish troops were targeted in today's bombing, which has so far claimed the lives of 5 soldiers.

To borrow a phrase from Jeha, Syria still has enough "plausible deniability" to make the useful idiots as well as the malicious cast doubt on that government's involvement. Others, however, will probably agree that Syria has decided to play its third card. After the failure of the Fath al-Islam uprising attempt in northern Lebanon, Syria has decided to cause trouble in the south - most likely through Palestinian proxies rather than Hizbullah, which went as far as to condemn the attack (Ha'aretz) - perhaps an indication of the declining approval for explicitly pro-Syrian actions inside Lebanon. The country's rallying behind the Lebanese army throughout the ongoing campaign at Nahr el-Bared seems to have constrained the flexibility of Hizbullah as well as Aoun's FPM.

I thought it was interesting also to see the response to this latest bombing. Israel may yet be provoked into a response against Hizbullah or Syrian-backed Palestinian groups in the south, but right now, it is hoping to use these provocations to bolster the UNIFIL mandate.

Southern Lebanon has posed a security challenge to Israel since the country's independence; indeed, attacks on Jewish settlements in the Galilee go back three decades earlier still ("Tel Hai," English, Hebrew). Over the past 60 years, Israel's strategic aims in the northern Galilee and southern Lebanon have been mostly uniform - but one can isolate two distinct strands. Early Zionist leaders and some Israeli policy-makers saw control of Lebanon's south as necessary (or at least desirable) in order to assure access to water (1). However, the far more important determining factor since the 1960s has been security (2). To counter the threats posed by irregulars operating in southern Lebanon, Israel has resorted to a variety of defensive and offensive measures. UNIFIL, too, has played a small role in this strategy before. Given last summer's failure in Lebanon, Israel now seems more willing than ever before to give UNIFIL a bigger share in countering the threats (to Israel as well as Lebanese security) emanating from Lebanon's south.

Labor Party Primaries

MK Ami Ayalon (Labor)

As many expected, the Labor Party primaries did not yield a clear winner in the first round. At the end of the day, with a 65% turnout among party members, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak received 34%, while upstart Ami Ayalon finished with 32% of the votes. Defense Minister and current party leader Amir Peretz came in third with 22% - a relatively high number considering all that has happened.

The run-off, which will take place in a month, pits Barak against Ayalon. Barak is the more experienced politician and the man with more funds to dispense, while Ayalon can claim the mantle of reform, with Avishai Braverman at his side. Both candidates have solid security credentials. Barak, who served in the Sayeret Matkal, is one of Israel's most decorated soldiers and a former chief of staff; Ayalon, who served in the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit, is a former commander of the navy and a retired director of the Shin Bet. While Barak might be vulnerable to critiques of his unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon as well as his reforms of the army (to which Hazbani alluded earlier), Ayalon lacks experience as a policy-maker.

Until the next round, we are in for a month of backroom deals by these candidates, as they jockey to enlist the support of Peretz's people and the supporters of the other candidates. Here, Barak is probably in a better position than Ayalon. While the latter seems to have won the votes of the kibbutzim and Tel Aviv members, Barak might have an easier time getting the Peretz camp to vote for him - despite his association with the moneyed elite. One thing that Barak has going for him is the fact that he has been very equivocal about leaving the Olmert government, whereas Ayalon has been very critical of the Prime Minister since the Winograd report. Most of the Labor Party members want to avoid elections. They want appointments and a role in the current government; and they are more likely to trust Barak to deliver them than the undiplomatic Ayalon.

Even if Ayalon wins, however, the Labor Party will probably remain in the Olmert government after all - unless of course something very dramatic happens. A whole month is a long time for things to remain as they are.

One matter that is confusing me at the moment is the portfolio most likely to be assigned to the eventual leader of the Labor Party. It seems that the Peretz supporters want the party to claim the Finance Ministry, to finally implement the social agenda on which Peretz ran in the first place. But Barak would surely prefer the Defense Ministry.

What's going to happen next?

Chameleon holding on for dear life
(Hebrew University, Har ha-tsofim, January 2006)

It's really too bad that none of us were on the ground in Tel Aviv, taking part in and observing the demonstration - we would have gotten a much better sense of the atmosphere. Nevertheless, in response to Ariel's query, I'll put some of my speculation out there.

First, I think that the government will hold on for another month at least.

There is a no-confidence vote scheduled for Monday. I don't think it will garner a majority, despite some of the Labor MKs who will vote against the government. But in another month, the Labor Party will have its primaries, and Peretz will definitely be kicked out.

If Livni resigns, Olmert will replace her with Peres or Sheetrit. If she doesn't resign, however, it will be difficult for Olmert to fire her, as this could upset the coalition (esp. the Labor party). He will definitely have to wait until after the no-confidence vote.

Bibi, as I've said several times before, is in an excellent position. Some people might confuse the Rabin Square protests with anti-war demonstrations; they weren't. People are upset that Israel didn't score a more decisive victory. Most of those who came to demand Olmert's resignation believe that the war was justified but poorly executed. A lot of these people are centrists, but given a choice today, they would probably choose Bibi even over Livni, and certainly over Olmert. However, some of them might warm to Barak or Ayalon too. The key factors for people now are experience in leading the country and a security background.

I think Kadima is there to stay. I don't foresee Livni going over to the Labor Party, and she won't go back to the Likud either. She doesn't have enough followers to start her own movement. The next contest for the party leadership is between her and Sheetrit.

Anyway, I'm not very good with predictions, and I have a sense that we are still in for some big surprises over the next few days. Maybe the coalition will be expanded. Maybe Livni will find her way to the top after all. And maybe, due to a combination of people not showing up to vote and a higher-than-expected anti-Olmert vote among Labor and Kadima, the no-confidence motion will actually pass.

ADDENDUM (Friday): Even if the Labor Party were to leave the coalition, it might be possible for Olmert to stay in power by pulling United Torah Judaism into the coalition. It would be a very slim majority but enough, I think.

Meir Shalev: "Olmert, you're fired"

Meir Shalev's Roman Rusi (1988)

The protest in Tel Aviv's Rabin Square has drawn more than 100,000 demonstrators. Organizers made a deliberate decision not to allow current Knesset members to speak. It looks like they were able to bring together activists from across the political spectrum (see Ynet, Ha'aretz, Ha'aretz English).

Attendees included the novelist Meir Shalev (b. 1948), famous for his depiction of a Jezreel Valley moshav from the time of the pioneers to the 1980s in the novel רומן רוסי [lit. "Russian Novel," but the English title is The Blue Mountain], who called on the prime minister to resign and accused the government of having "wasted the lives of soldiers and civilians" (Ynet).

The size of this demonstration may not force Olmert to step down, but it might embolden Knesset members opposed to him firing Tsipi Livni. Contrary to what I anticipated, the orange camp did not dominate the protest.There are clearly enough people from across Israeli society who want Olmert and co. to take responsibility.

On the Face

Orange might be back in style. Photo: Anti-disengagement poster
in Jerusalem, December 2005. The Hebrew caption reads, "Again expulsion?"

It looks as if Tsipi Livni has taken a horrible dive. The situation is truly "on the face." How did she let Olmert play her like this? It is remarkable to watch Israel's own "slippery eel" (this is actually what the Koreans call UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon) holding and holding on.

Only two other Kadima MKs joined Livni's "revolt" - the head of the coalition, Avigdor Yitzhaki, and the backbencher, Marina Solodkin. Minister of Internal Security Avi Dichter (Kadima) shed a few crocodile tears and remarked that it would be a shame if Livni were sacked from the foreign ministry.

Of course, Shimon Peres (Kadima) still knows how to pick a winner; he is coveting Livni's post for himself, and who knows, maybe he'll even want to succeed Olmert as Kadima's candidate in the next election, which he would lose like nearly every other election he has run in. For what it's worth though, President Jimmy Carter gave Peres a ringing endorsement at a Berkeley lecture earlier today. He couldn't remember Livni's name, but he said that she might be the other politician, beside Peres, whom he would like to see as the next Israeli PM.

The other Olmert apparatchik thinking about the future is Minister of Housing and Construction, Meir Sheetrit, who will surely be rewarded with a promotion for his loyalty. Sheetrit has already announced his plans to run for the head of the party in future Kadima primaries. Meanwhile, Olmert is mulling over what he should do to Livni. It's hard to see her staying in her current post, not after publicly calling on Olmert to resign, but stranger things have happened- I give her a 20% chance. Livni has been keeping a low profile for so long, it's truly bizarre that Olmert seems to have found an opportunity to purge her like this; especially the day after the release of a report that basically handed him a sword to fall into, while singling out Livni for praise.

We live in interesting times. But this story is not over. While Amir Peretz, too, believes that he can stay in power, he faces far more determined opposition from his own Labor party, with plenty of disgruntled people in the Ami Ayalon camp, and a few looking to former PM Ehud Barak. Plus, Olmert may feel that if he wants to stay in power, he should sack or move Peretz to shore up his right flank. Who knows what forces that might set in motion?

Finally, we have good old 'am yisro'el, the people that all these clowns are supposed to be representing. This עם קשה עורף [stiff-necked people] might have a few tricks up its sleeves too, though it is equally likely that most Israelis are too disillusioned to care, especially when the prime minister has shown such contempt for public opinion.

The question is how broad of a coalition the demonstrations planned for Thursday can draw to protest against the government. I have a feeling that the protest will be a sea of orange. The settlers and the religious Zionist youth are extremely organized and committed to this kind of activism. They also have a score to settle with Olmert, the man who helped Sharon take them out of Gaza and threatened to force them into making 'aliyah from Judea and Samaria to the State of Israel. But if the blues don't show up, then it will be easy for Olmert and his loyalists to dismiss the demonstration as a sectarian affair, not representative of the Israeli public at large. It would also make Labor MKs more reluctant about leaving the government and going into new elections. But perhaps the reservists, the bereaved parents, Meretz, the students, and Uzi Dayan will be able to turn this into a more representative coalition.

Taking Responsibility

Llamas not taking responsibility for Lebanon War
(Southern Israel, Summer 2006)

In some cultures, people assume responsibility even for the mistakes of their most distant subordinates, not to mention their own errors. In Israel today, even single-digit approval ratings, imminent criminal proceedings, and a scathing report by an independent commission are apparently insufficient. Or maybe not.

It appears as if the show might be winding down at least for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Minister of Defense Amir Peretz. Both of these men seem to have had an interminable supply of tricks up their sleeves until now. One should not count them out yet. Olmert went on a counter-offensive against his Kadima rival, Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni, on Tuesday. Peretz claimed that the Winograd report had actually demonstrated his merit. But the photographs of Olmert that appeared in the media earlier on Tuesday, in the morning after the release of the Winograd Committee's interim report, showed a man who looked utterly demoralized, and very tired.

In January of this year, I told the Head Heeb that I did not believe that Olmert's resignation was imminent then; I also disagreed with his prediction of a "palace coup" (my description) from inside his party. I am not sure who turned out to be right.

One of the scenarios outlined by Jonathan involved Olmert resigning and being replaced by Tsipi Livni, without new elections having to be called. However, according to some reports the Foreign Minister is apparently getting ready to tender her resignation; others indicate that she will merely demand that Olmert step down.

If Livni, who seems to have been one of the few members of the government who received favorable mention in the Winograd report, leaves, she will probably be followed by a number of other Kadima MKs.

There is no point in making further predictions, as news reports are pouring in.

It might be worth looking at the list of MKs (English version) and ministers to determine how the numbers stack up between those who would be interested in new elections and those who would prefer the status quo. For reference on various scenarios, such as the resignation of the Prime Minister, and the formation of a new government, consult the Basic Law on the Government (Hebrew).

Iranians Humiliated?

Ahmadinejad releases Brits
(Photo: Iranian TV screenshot)

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad today announced that his country would release the 15 British sailors and marines that his country captured nearly two weeks ago. He made the surprise announcement at a press conference. It was apparently preceded by one of his infamous tirades, in which he harangued Britain for bringing the case up before the Security Council and complained about the invasion of Iraq.

Even if Ahmadinejad dressed it up as a "present" from the Iranian to the British people, I wonder how many Iranians will be convinced that the abduction was a smart move. There should be no doubt that Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials who supported this operation have suffered a humiliating defeat. On this matter, I could not disagree more with Zvi Bar'el, who sees the whole episode as a victory for Iran. According to the Ha'aretz writer, the British reliance on diplomatic means

will now be used by Iran as proof that even powers such as the U.S. and Britain are limited in their ability to use force when it comes to a minor border incident - and that the threat Iran poses is precisely in initiating local incidents that are not sufficiently important to lead to war.

I see no evidence for this. If this is what the Iranians have concluded, they will continue to make serious miscalculations. At the end of the day, the whole operation was for naught; I cannot see the slightest tangible gain that Iran might have derived from it.

True, the Guardian reports "speculation that the release was prompted in part by an agreement to let an Iranian representative meet five Iranians detained by US forces in Irbil, northern Iraq, in January." However, even if the Iranians obtained the rights to visit their diplomats or intelligence agents, no one is going to confirm this. Especially after the announcements by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair that there would be "no quid pro quo," it will be difficult for the Iranians to point to any sort of favorable outcome. The British have repeatedly presented their GPS evidence to the Iranians and to international bodies; in the court of international opinion, the U.K.'s insistence that its troops were "well inside Iraqi waters" is likely to prevail.

Some might argue that at least the Iranians demonstrated their abilities to cause trouble for coalition forces. I would respond, however, that the British will be much more careful from now in all their patrols. They are unlikely to allow their troops to be captured again without some resistance. As for Iranian meddling in Basra and elsewhere in Iraq, it continues to harm coalition and Iraqi forces. But all this was clear before the Revolutionary Guards brushed up on their Piracy 101 skills. The statement by one British crew member, who thanked Ahmadinejad for his "forgiveness" will be seen by the world for what it is - Byzantine manipulation by a weak regime desperate to cover up its silly miscalculation.

In retrospect, it appears that the British did the right thing. By staying calm but not backing down on their core positions (at least not in public), they called Iran's bluff. When I heard about the release of the British troops, I wondered if the case might be instructive for other abduction scenarios - such as the one that sparked the Second Lebanon War. But I think that this is not the type of lesson we can draw from this particular incident. The kind of poker game that the British and Iranians were playing relies on the rules of the international system that regulates interactions between states.

Matters change dramatically when states are confronted with non-state actors. As much as I would criticize the nature of Israel's military response to the abductions of its soldiers, first by a Palestinian faction in the south and then by Hizbullah in the north - a response which ultimately proved ineffective - I don't think Israel could have obtained the kind of outcome that the British achieved. Neither the Palestinian factions nor Hizbullah respond to the threats of international sanctions. Their interests cannot be easily damaged, except by direct military confrontation. And even then, the options are very limited and likely to prove unsuccessful.

Rocket Wars

Haifa's oil refineries complex was hit by a rocket in last summer's war

(Photo: Motti Sela, Israel Ministry of the Environment)

A recent headline in Ha'aretz ("Katyusha rocket hit Haifa oil refineries complex during Second Lebanon War") brought back some disturbing memories of last summer's war between Israel and Hizbullah.

That conflict began with Hizbullah's brazen incursion into Israeli territory on a squad of Israeli reservists, on Wednesday, July 12, 2006, which resulted in the deaths of 3 soldiers and the capture of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, who are still being held by the organization today (unless they have been killed already). When ground forces pursued the attackers into Lebanon, Hizbullah fighters blew up an Israeli tank with a massive IED, killing 4 crew members. But what looked like a copy of the Palestinian abduction of Gilad Shalit on June 25 quickly developed into something far more frightening.

Already on July 12, the Israeli home front came under attack, as Hizbullah shelled and rocketed communities in the north of the country, along the border. But the "War of the Missiles" began in earnest on Thursday, July 13, when katyushas killed a woman in Nahariya and a man in Tsfat (Safed). In the evening of that day, Carmia reported the first katyusha attack on Haifa (see also her posts on local reactions that night and on Saturday).

One of the worst days of that war, at least for the home front, was Sunday, July 16, 2006, when a Hizbullah missile struck the Haifa train depot, killing 8 workers, just after 9:00 in the morning. Carmia and I reported live from Haifa, as the city came under attack. At the time, we heard several rumors of strategic sites having been hit. Already, on Thursday night, the New York Times had claimed that a rocket had hit the Haifa port, as Carmia reported. In subsequent days, we heard numerous unsubstantiated reports that Haifa's famous Technion, an institution equivalent to MIT, had been hit, and that katyushas had also landed very close to the "salt-and-pepper shakers" that house Israel's main oil refinery.

Haifa's port is in the background (January 2006)

It now turns out that the refineries complex was indeed hit by a Hizbullah missile during the war, as Ha'aretz reported on March 22. Fortunately, the rocket landed in an open area. A direct hit could have had disastrous consequences - leading to the deaths of hundreds of people

The scary thing is that the IDF still seems no closer than it was last summer to a military solution that might adequately protect these strategic facilities - not to mention Israeli civilians in the north - against short-range rocket attacks. It is possible that the air force's devastating response to Hizbullah, which came with the tremendous cost of hundreds of Lebanese civilian casualties, has somewhat changed the party's calculus. But while Hizbullah listens to its sectarian constituency in Lebanon, and sometimes even to Lebanese public opinion as a whole, the organization owes its power and, indeed, its existence to the Iranians and the Syrians.

The Iranians demonstrated last week that they can still act up when they feel threatened. It remains to be seen how this latest hostage drama plays out, but there is no doubt that elements in the Iranian leadership are willing to take similarly provocative actions in other theaters as well. Meanwhile, Palestinian groups such as the Islamic Jihad may try to force another Israeli offensive into Gaza, by stepping up rocket attacks from there. Such an incursion would surely force Hamas and Fatah into the fray as well. Amir Oren has a worrisome report about state of preparedness for such contingencies in the IDF.

Inside the Merkava

Rear door of Merkava 4 tank, a feature that experts say helps the IDF save lives.

On a recent visit to Israel, I spoke with a member of the IDF's most elite tank unit. I'll call him Amit. My interest in the state of tank warfare in the region had been piqued back in Berkeley by a conversation with an American reserve tank driver. He had contended that the Lebanon War last summer had debunked the myth of the Israeli-made Merkava tank's near invincibility, citing in particular the destruction of the tank, along with all of its personnel, which followed Hezbullah operatives over the border in the conflict's opening moments. The American Abrams tank, he told me, while lacking many of the Merkava's capabilities, had never been known to lose all of its crew in a single hit.

When I tattled on the Merkava to Amos, he quickly pointed out that the tank destroyed by Hezbullah likely wasn't the newest version, the Merkava 4. In Israel, the IDF's Amit confirmed that this tank was in fact an older version, the Merkava 2. The bomb placed under the tank weighed some 500kg. "Would a Merkava 4 have suffered the same fate?" I asked Amit. "No," he said. In fact, he claimed that a Merkava 4 had been hit by a charge nearly as powerful. Of the seven crew members inside, only one, sadly, a close friend of Amit, had perished.

From my conversation with Amit I gained some anecdotal insight into what went wrong in the last war -- at least with regard to tanks. Amit's unit, which only trains on Merkava 4, which is the most prestigious tank unit, and the first sent into combat, had not been inside a tank in full year when the fighting broke out! Why hadn't these soldiers, who went immediately to the front, to Kiryat Shemona and on to Metulla, been in a tank in so long? Quite simply, according to Amit, they had spent their time setting up roadblocks and manning checkpoints in the West Bank, in other words, doing police work.

Of course, the Merkava also faced world-class anti-tank weapons, launched by mobile, elusive two-man teams. Tank drivers, it seems, prefer to engage other tanks. The role of tanks in the so-called "asymmetrical warfare" of contemporary battles remains in flux.

Berkeley Professor: Hizbullah and Hamas "Part of the Global Left"

Saba Mahmood Addresses the Crowd, Thurs., Sept. 7, 2006

A good friend of mine and loyal reader of this blog took issue with the cut-up of the Berkeley Teach-Ins Against War event, that I posted late on Thursday night. He charged that instead of crudely bashing the speakers, I ought to have engaged the "complex arguments" presented by them. I regret to say that I will not be able to do that. I simply did not hear any such arguments. Perhaps I entered the event with the wrong kind of attitude. But I came away with a very different impression of the teach-in than my friend.

It is true that the various panelists repeatedly pointed to the large number of Lebanese civilian deaths caused by Israel's air campaign. I do not object to this. From the first days of the war, we at Kishkushim have expressed our sorrow about the deaths of Lebanese and Israeli civilians in the conflict. The Israeli government and military cannot escape the soul searching that the loss of civilian lives requires of them. I want such soul-searching to take place with the aim of averting more civilian deaths. But that is simply not the type of discussion that I witnessed on Thursday. When all was said and done, I left that teach-in feeling as if I had sat through a sophisticated, two-hour commercial for Hizbullah. I say that not to discredit or smear those who criticize Israel but rather to provide some context for my admittedly harsh attack on the panelists.

Let me begin from the end. Ironically, during the question period after the five speakers had finished, one member of the audience asked Judith Butler why she had included any critique, however weak, of Hizbullah in her discussion. She responded with an astounding statement that N has already cited. “Understanding Hamas and Hizbullah as social movements that are on the global left is important,” she said, “but [it] doesn’t stop us from criticizing them.” I know that some of our readers would applaud such a statement. For them, the global left, in any case, represents hypocrisy, foolishness, terrorist appeasement, and antisemitism. But despite all the terrible things I have seen among movements that identify themselves as “leftist,” I still believe that the “global left” stands or ought to stand for values that are diametrically opposed to those of these two organizations.

In fact, speaker after speaker at the teach-in, made efforts to embrace Hizbullah as part of a “left” opposed to the right-wing forces represented by the US and Israel. Thus, Charles Hirschkind, claimed that “since the end of the occupation, most of [Hizbullah’s] activities have been focused on social services,” and that the movement “increasingly showed itself to be a positive force,” with no desire to create a theocracy in Lebanon. The United States, on the other hand, although it claims to be fighting al-Qaeida with its “war on terror,” is actually trying to liquidate Islamic activists worldwide. Hizbullah is at the top of its list, together with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which Hirschkind described as having been “peaceful since the 1950s” and as one of the key groups involved in the struggle to democratize Egyptian society.

Like a number of other panelists that night, Hirschkind scoffed at the notion that Hizbullah is a terrorist group. “The label ‘terrorist’ is radically inaccurate for describing resistance,” he said. Indeed, Hirschkind’s argument continued, most “terrorists” in the Middle East are not really terrorists, and certainly not Muslim fundamentalists. Suicide bombers share a commitment to resisting foreign occupation, not to Islamism. And suicide bombings are “the strategy of the weak against vastly more powerful adversaries,” which have nothing to do with “a culture of death.”

Saba Mahmood, who opened the talk, also did her best to rehabilitate Hizbullah. In a list of impressive achievements of the Lebanese in recent years, she included “successfully driving out the Israelis.” Of course, Hizbullah has claimed that particular achievement all for itself, so that heralding it as impressive, is another way of giving the organization kudos. But more perversely, she argued that Hizbullah had contributed positively to fashioning a new political ethic in Lebanon that ensured coexistence. As evidence, she cited the lack of Hizbullah reprisals against Christian militia men in southern Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. She also painted a rosy picture of the national dialogue in Lebanon before the 2006 war. Interestingly enough, she did not mention once the assassination of Rafik Hariri by pro-Syrian forces. Indeed, the only person who mentioned Hariri was Zeina Zaatari, in a derisive reference to “clientism.”

Zaatari’s talk, as N has already written, was the most blatantly propagandistic among the five that night. She extolled Hizbullah’s services, and reiterated that “its interest has always been driving out Israel.” Zaatari lauded Nasrallah: “He spoke to the people; he talked their language.” She also made a cryptic reference to the lands that Israel had taken from Lebanon in 1948! “The creation of the state of Israel was a hostile act not just against the Palestinians but also against other Arabs,” she said, “Lebanon lost 7 villages then.” Danny Rubinstein published an article about this claim during the war. Unfortunately, the full text is no longer available online, but an excerpt can be found here (it’s near the bottom of the page, search “Rubinstein”). Yoav Shtern also wrote a longer article about these villages in Ha’aretz, which I have only found in Hebrew. While the Sykes-Picot agreement allotted these 7 Shiite villages to Lebanon, the 1923 border demarcation assigned them to Mandatory Palestine, and the UN recognizes them as belonging to Israel. The point is that Zaatari’s claim, about the seven Shiite villages that Israel “stole,” is embraced by the most ardent rejectionists in Lebanon. It was employed specifically by Nasrallah to justify Hizbullah’s ongoing presence in the south despite Israel’s withdrawal.

Of all the speakers, Beshara Doumani, was the only one who refrained from being sucked into the Hizbullah-propaganda vortex – at least as far as I remember. I found his contribution deeply problematic for a number of other reasons. I hope to deal with these as well as with Butler in more detail in a future post.

Teachin'

Judith Butler, Zeina Zaatari, Beshara Doumani and Charles Hirschkind

I too attended Berkeley Teach-Ins Against War's event last night. I feel somewhat responsible for the admittedly inflammatory comment, "Judith Butler played the Jewish card." So I want to put that comment in context and offer my impressions.

I think there are two sides to Butler's presentation of herself as a Jewish critic of Israel. On the one hand, she argues that Jewish values motivate her critique of the state of Israel. That I can't argue with. And that I can respect. On the other hand, after hearing her spiel twice this year, I've gotten the sense that she -- and her partisans -- believe that the fact of her Jewish ethnicity in and of itself renders morally and intellectually credible any and all commentary she offers the public on Israel. It's no accident that her fellow panelists "conscripted" her (in absentia) to speak about Israel, rather than, say, the social services of Hezbullah.

So as a critic of Israel, we're to understand, Butler is authentic. Let me relate her opening words from last night: "To make a set of events thinkable is not to take a normative position. Yet all discourse as public discourse is normative." Is this a person I should take at her word? For me, she doesn't make her criticism relevant by couching it in platitudes about Judaism. But she'd make it relevant by laying bare her ethical stance; by acting as a responsible public intellectual. Her talk at the conference earlier this year on "Is there a New Anti-Semitism" opened with an equally sophistic preamble: "I'll leave questions of historical and social issues to those qualified to address them, but..." And she went on to lecture at length on Primo Levi's relationship to Zionism, cryptically advancing an anti-Zionist position of her own.

Now I went to this most recent Berkeley event because I'm perfectly willing to hear anti-Zionist positions expounded and, preferably, debated. Of course, this wasn't an "Organized Research Unit," or a department that hosted the event. This was a group of people who indeed come together for ideological solidarity. But this was a UC Berkeley-sanctioned event, and, at the risk of sounding like Grover Norquist or Benjamin Netanyahu, I don't think that the taxpayers of California should have to pay for the lights to be on while such vulgar propaganda is spread on a UC campus. The most egregious example of this was the "Hizbullah" speaker (Zeina Zaatari). That was her charge: to speak about the Shiite militia and social movement. So we heard "a message from a Hezbullah woman," who mourned the deaths of martyrs but vowed to continue resistance. Her womb could produce more. One might object: what's wrong with sharing the voice of this woman? Isn't there something to be gained in hearing a perspective? The problem is that this woman's voice was marshalled as part of a vigorous attempt to rehabilitate Hezbullah in the eyes of the audience. As Judith Butler later commented, "Hizbullah and Hamas are part of the global left." So the social service infrastructure of Hezbullah was rehearsed. They have hospitals and schools, all of which, our speaker claimed, were destroyed by Israel. Lest anyone look askance at the organization's finances, she detailed its sources of funding. Some funding, she was willingly to concede, came from Iran (she didn't mention Syria). But, she hastened to add, "They have businesses." It was a crowd that seemed pleased to mock the "mainstream media." So I doubt many will have noticed the recent Washington Post story that detailed just exactly what those "businesses" are.

I don't want to bore or offend anybody. And Asaf is right: group think is stupid, dangerous, and downright embarrassing. I, for one, agree with Butler's point that the line between soldier and civilian is less clear now than it was before the Lebanon War. I am deeply troubled by this. But I see it as part of a trend, a crisis in international politics to which Israel is indeed a party: what are the norms of warfare going to be in this new environment? I don't believe they've been sufficiently worked out yet. But I don't believe in Butler's Original Sin either.

Nasrallah's Mea Culpa

"Sorry guys, I screwed up."

As you have probably all heard by now, Nasrallah recently apologized for being an idiot and having his organization kidnap two IDF reservists in a cross-border raid. This is Nasrallah sounding contrite instead of smug and self-righteous:

I want to be clear in my response, and I hope that people are listening to me now. We did not think even one per cent that the capture of the two Israelis would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude, and if someone asked me why we didn't consider this one per cent, I would say that since 1982 and our relationships with the Israelis and the experience of our resistance with Israel, the operation wouldn't lead to such a result (ABC).

Who knows what kind of game the Hizbullah head is playing here. It looks like he has realized that it is important to at least pay lip service to the idea that he has some kind of responsibility for all of Lebanon's citizens. Furthermore, he seems to be acknowledging some culpability in what transpired. Of course, he pleads ignorance, but like it or not, Nasrallah has admitted that if it hadn't been for Hizbullah's wonderful kidnapping mission, all those Lebanese houses would still be standing today.

Given this admission by Nasrallah, it seems that a "disproportionate" response really was needed to deter Hizbullah.

Dumb UNIFIL, Clever Gorillas

Peekabooooo...

There was an interesting report on Israel's Channel 2 Television News last night. In the report, an embedded Israeli journalist accompanied an IDF reconnaissance unit across the border into Lebanon. The troops did not encounter any resistance or Hizbullah fighters. Their mission was to destroy an elaborate Hizbullah tunnel that had been located earlier. Before mining the tunnel and blowing it up, the troops gave the reporter a tour. The footage I saw showed a very sophisticated tunnel with a ventilation system, concrete-lined walls, provisions, explosives and ammunition. The commander of the unit remarked, with more than a hint of sarcasm, that is was "amazing what can be achieved in six years" (the time that has passed since the Israeli withdrawal). The reporter followed the soldiers, who were under pressure to finish their mission soon because of the fear of mines or an attack by Hizbullah, through the tunnel and to another exit. As they emerged from the other exit, the cameraman panned the surrounding area. Looming no more than 100 metres behind the tunnel exit was a tall, white UNIFIL observation post.

Can one blame Israelis for being suspicious of UNIFIL and for not trusting the European troops that are now being deployed in Lebanon? This was the same force that stood idly by and looked on as Hizbullah prepared to kidnap IDF soldiers in 2000 and then ambushed them. As of now, there is no reason to believe that the Franco-Italian led force will be any more effective. They don't even have clearly defined goals and it is clear that the French and Italian leaders lack the political will to involve their forces in more dangerous missions that might bring them into confrontation with Hizbullah.