Northern Front Erupts

The katyusha rockets fired at the northern Israeli town of Nahariya today from southern Lebanon have raised the stakes of the current conflict significantly. They raise the specter of wide-scale bombardment of the north of the sort we saw in the summer of 2006.

 On December 25, 2008, a number of katyusha rockets, apparently all aimed at Nahariya, were discovered by Lebanese security forces in southern Lebanon. They were disarmed shortly before their launch times. 

This time around, the Lebanese army did not reach the rockets in time, and UNIFIL has been shown to be incapable of stopping such attacks. As Lebanese sources rushed to declare, the rockets were most likely not fired by Hizbullah, but rather by one of the Palestinian factions allied with it. Nevertheless, it would be hard to imagine that Hizbullah did not know about the firing of these rockets. Nasrallah so far has stayed away from involving Lebanon in the Gaza conflict; he may have gotten a soft go-ahead from the Iranians or Syrians, to give a green light to Palestinian proxies. 

It remains to be seen whether this will lead to a major escalation. Israel will have to weigh its response carefully. Reservists are available to operate in the north, but Israel cannot afford to see Haifa, Nahirya, and who knows what other cities engulfed by Hizbullah fire. For now, it must attempt to curtail any escalation. 

The Syrian Front

Some very brief, related and unrelated thoughts on the news from today about peace talks with Syria.

1. Contrary to the claims of Shelly Yachimovich this is not a diversion. Neither the talks nor their acknowledgment have been orchestrated to save Olmert's political career. If anything, these talks put Olmert in an even more precarious position domestically than he is now.

2. We do not know what the Americans think about all this, but the agreement goes entirely against the spirit of Bush's policy since 2003. Did the Turks keep the Americans apprised of developments in the process?

3. These negotiations cannot extract Syria from the Iranian embrace. They will not deliver Hizbullah or Hamas to Israel. All they can aim at is the formalization of the relative calm that has existed on the Syrian-Israeli border since 1973 - in itself hardly be an insignificant feat.

4. The recent Doha agreement, engineered by Qatar, formally delivered Lebanon into the hands of Hizbullah and the Iranian-Syrian-(Qatari?) axis. It diverges radically from the US-Saudi policy on Lebanon that has endured until now.

Ha'aretz's (Poor?) Coverage of Lebanon

Walid Jumblatt, Leader of the PSP (Photo: Wikipedia)

Like most of the Western media, Ha'aretz has done a very poor job of covering the events that transpired in Lebanon last week. With Hizbullah having imposed a de facto blackout early on in its coup attempt, few people inside or outside the country were in a position to gain a sense of what was happening on the ground. Hizbullah's own media war has added to the confusion, so that it is not at all clear who won, if anyone. Thus, I was more than a little annoyed by the coverage of Zvi Barel, who seems to have bought the line that Hizbullah scored a major victory:

Sad and tired, wearing shabby clothes and with tears in his eyes, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt stood on the veranda of his luxurious home in Beirut's Clemenceau neighborhood and explained his decision to television viewers. A few hours before the interview, he had called his political rival, Talal Arsalan, and asked him to coordinate with Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah the cessation of the fighting in Mount Lebanon, Aley, Chouf and the Maten region, the power centers of the Druze. In return, Jumblatt ordered his people to lay down their arms and hand them over to the Lebanese Army. Within the framework of the well-planned battle Hezbollah is conducting with the aim of changing the balance of power in Lebanon, the Mount Lebanon struggle, involving rival Druze families, might constitute Nasrallah's most important victory.

Contrast this with Tony Badran's (fiery) analysis over at Across the Bay:

Hezbollah had another thing coming. For three days of intensive fighting in the Shouf, and contrary to the lying info ops and disinformation of Hezbollah water carriers like this clueless Hezbollah willful tool (on whose propaganda for Hezbollah I've written in the past and will soon be ripping to shreds once again), not a single village in the Shouf fell to Hezbollah. Not Niha, like that Hezbollah watercarrier MacLeod wrote, not anything.

Quite the contrary. According to the PSP and other local sources, more than three dozen Hezbollah fighters were killed and a number of their vehicles were destroyed. The fact that they had to introduce artillery and vehicles (mounted with heavy machine guns, like so, and recoilless rifles, like so) only showed that they could not make advances into the villages.

Not just that, but Hezbollah's attack has led Talal Arslan's fighters to switch and fight alongside the PSP against Hezbollah, undermining Hezbollah's tiny Druze ally -- which is precisely why Jumblat put him in the forefront from the get go (it was not, as shrill commentators and dishonest flacks read it, a sign of "weakness." It was a shrewed move by a master tactician.).

At the end of the day, the PSP maintained control of the strategic hills of the Barouk to the east and Ras al-Jabal west of Aley, overlooking the Dahiyeh.

Hizbullah is not Hamas; Beirut is not Gaza

The reports from Beirut look eerily similar not only to scenes from the annals of Lebanese civil war but also to what we saw in Gaza before Hamas's takeover. Again, it looks like well-equipped but unmotivated US-backed militias are surrendering to their disciplined anti-American counterparts. At least this is the impression that one would get from the coverage in Ha'aretz and the Western media. The following description is rather typical:

Hezbollah took control of Muslim west Beirut on Friday, tightening its grip on the city in a major blow to the U.S.-backed government. Shi'ite opposition gunmen seized control of several Beirut neighborhoods from Sunni foes loyal to the United States-backed government, street battles that left 11 dead and 30 wounded, security officials said (Ha'aretz).

In reality, however, the situation in Beirut is quite unlike what transpired in Gaza; furthermore, various factions' pro- or anti-American orientations are less relevant than this kind of reporting assumes.

First, the military "victory" that Hizbullah and co. are now celebrating will not automatically give the party political power. Whereas in Gaza, one entity, Hamas, basically faced another, Fatah, the Lebanese political landscape is far more fractured. Hizbullah and its allies will not be able to impose their will on the Lebanese population. In fact, while Hamas could make claims about having public opinion behind it, the sectarian politics of Lebanon make this impossible for Hizbullah. The humiliations endured by Future Movement fighters and by Sunni civilians will only stiffen their resolve against Hizbullah. The latter's claims to representing all of Lebanon and its (quickly-forgotten) promises to use its weapons only against Lebanon's enemies have been unmasked once and for all.

What then can Hizbullah gain from its victories on the ground? No one doubted that Hizbullah had the most formidable military force in Lebanon, so a demonstration of its power is not a real gain. Did the party hope to showcase the impotence of the Lebanese Army and security forces? What purpose did forcing Hariri's TV station off the air serve? All of these actions look like bullying without a clear plan. Furthermore, the longer Hariri and Jumblatt as well as Beirut's pro-government Sunni, Christian, and Druze populations stay under siege, the more restive their coreligionists in northern Lebanon, Beqaa, and the Chouf will grow. These frustrations can hardly bode well for the Shiite population, which despite the patronage of Hizbullah and Iran, is hardly economically self-sufficient.

Seeing that it cannot gain much from a military victory, Hizbullah may, as Jeha writes, very well be "looking for surrender."

For coverage see Jeha's blog (with the usual awesome graphics), Blacksmiths of Lebanon, and Charles Malik.

Revenge for Mughniya in Jerusalem?

Map of Jerusalem (ArcIMS), Qiryat Moshe in orange

According to Ha'aretz, Hizbullah flagship station Al Manar reported that the "Liberators of the Galilee - Shaheed Imad Mughniya Group" took responsibility for the shooting which occurred hours ago at the Merkaz ha-Rav Yeshiva in Jerusalem. Needless to say, the authenticity of this claim is highly suspect. It is extremely unlikely that the perpetrators of the attack, which has so far claimed the lives of eight, are Lebanese or directly affiliated with Hizbullah. However, they may have been Palestinians recruited by Hizbullah handlers or sympathizers. To be sure, retaliation for the assassination of Mughniya in Damascus was expected around this time.

The shooting at Merkaz ha-Rav is the worst terrorist attack that Jerusalem has seen for quite some time. The yeshiva is located in the west of the city, in Qiryat Moshe. It remains to be seen what route the terrorists took to reach the site, and where exactly they came from. I was surprised to hear that they may have infiltrated from East Jerusalem. But perhaps they took a more circuitous route.

At this point in time, it is still unclear how many attackers were involved, and what weapons they used. There are reports of one terrorist having fired an AK-47 for several "long minutes." One witness spoke of 500-600 rounds having been shot.

If the police and security forces release details of the origins of the attackers, we can be sure that there will be a major response by the IDF in Gaza or the West Bank. Tensions are already high after a roadside explosive device near the security fence around the Kisufim Crossing in Gaza destroyed an IDF jeep, killing one soldier (a Bedouin tracker). To me, that attack had all the marks of an attempted kidnapping.

Failed Gaza Policies

Map of the Gaza Strip (Source)

The latest Haaretz-Dialog poll shows that a majority of Israelis support direct talks with Hamas in order to achieve a cease fire and free Gilad Shalit. Most Israelis are simply fed up with the continuing rocket fire on Sderot, and they are skeptical about the military's ability to bring about a lasting solution. They also do not want Gilad Shalit to become another Ron Arad. However, significant obstacles stand in the way of such talks. Israel is bound by commitments it has made to the U.S. and the Palestinian Authority's Abu Mazen.

Both Israel and the U.S. have been pursuing a policy of regime change with respect to the Hamas government in Gaza. The aim of the blockade is not only to prevent the smuggling of weapons and materials for rocket production but also to thwart the Hamas government's ability to function. The hope seems to be that Hamas's inability to provide services and the Gaza Strip's growing isolation would lead Palestinians to reject Hamas in favor of Fatah. This policy has so far failed. While Hamas has not necessarily gotten stronger, it has not declined significantly enough. Furthermore, Fatah forces are not ready for a take-over, and even if such a thing were to happen, it is not at all clear that they would have the support of a majority of the population.

Israel's other policy vis-a-vis Gaza has evolved in the face of the continued qassam attacks since the disengagement. Today, it consists of frequent incursions to arrest wanted men, infantry ambushes of Palestinian fighters, air force attacks against qassam crews, and occasionally artillery strikes. The goal has been to dislodge Hamas and other Palestinian forces from the border with Israel. Occasionally, Israel has also assassinated military and political leaders. Alongside this activity, there has been extensive planning for a major ground operation similar to Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in February 2002. The aims of all of these policies are mainly tactical; they do not necessarily seek to bring down the Hamas government but rather try to make it difficult for Palestinian forces to mount attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets.

There is no doubt that Hamas will use any chance it gets - whether through a formal cease fire, informal truce, or direct talk - to build up its offensive arsenal and its defensive capabilities, taking Hizbullah as its model. Thus, the worst solution would probably be an informal truce or deescalation, of the type that has existed sporadically between Israel and Hamas. While it may guarantee temporary security to the residents of Sderot, it will endanger their lives to an even greater extent in the long-term and yields no real guarantees of any kind in the interim. Direct talks, however, are probably off the table - certainly as long as President Bush is in power. Thus, what we are likely to see is an ongoing war of attrition, that may explode into a full-out IDF offensive when a qassam rocket achieves a direct hit killing a family or a group of schoolchildren. Such an offensive, however, will hardly be able to eradicate the qassam firings. Without a diplomatic horizon, all the IDF can hope to do is to keep the various militant organizations operating in the Strip off-balance. That is a very modest aim that can hardly justify an operation with dozens of IDF casualties.

INS Hanit

The Israeli Navy Ship Hanit ("Spear")

There is an excellent article by the ever-dependable Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff detailing, for the first time, the "intelligence failure" (it was more complicated than that), which led to the near-sinking of the INS Hanit by Hizbullah on the night of July 14, 2006. Readers will recall the discussion with Hazbani about this a few months ago.

The article also makes interesting points about the intense qassam firing of the past week.

Rocket Wars of Attrition: the Lessons from Summer 2006

Antidote to the post that follows below: Shlomi Saranga and Moshik Afia, "Sweet Dream" (2002)

I have not seen a great deal of discussion about a recent report, citing unnamed UN officials, that Iran is deploying missiles in Syria. Obviously, Syria already possesses a significant arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles as well as the type of katyusha rockets used with such effectiveness by Hizbullah against Israel in last summer's war. It should surprise no one that in the wake of Israel's failure to stop Hizbullah's fire on the country's civilian population, the Syrians see these kinds of missiles as their best strategy. The question is, what can Israel do about it?

The Israeli military has yet to come up with a military doctrine to counter a rocket-based war of attrition, as the surrender of Sderot to the Palestinian qassams showed. Worse, it does not look like the Israeli military and government have explained to the public what exactly the country is up against. Despite Gabi Ashkenazi's replacement of Dan Halutz as Chief of the General Staff, a great deal of air force spin continues to dominate assessment of the last war. One of the myths still circulating is that the air force's "launcher hunting" doctrine was able to take out most of Hizbullah's Iranian-supplied long-range missiles. A report by Uzi Rubin of Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies released this month argues that the "intensity of long-range rocket attacks" in fact "remained fairly constant" throughout the war, averaging 4 per day (Rubin, "The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War," p. 25).

Rubin makes it clear that Hizbullah "dominated the battle of the rockets" (p. 13). Neither the air force nor the late ground invasion (and definitely not the aimless artillery barrages) succeeded in stopping or diminishing the intensity of Hizbullah's attack. While it is true that toward the end of the war the air force managed to destroy every launcher from which rockets had been fired - reducing the sensor-to-shoot time to one minute (an unprecedented achievement) - as every resident of the north can attest, Nasrallah was able to give Israeli civilians a bitter reminder of who owned them until the last day before the cease fire (see all of Carmia's entries from August 13 for a taste).

All this was accomplished using very simple weapons. Rubin concludes that few if any Iranian rockets hit Israel, one of the exceptions being a Fadjr-3 240 mm rocket that struck Haifa. Another Iranian rocket may have surfaced in Beirut, after an air force attack blew it up, sending a large cylindrical object flying into the air; some enthusiastic Hizbullah fans at the time mistook it for a downed Israeli F-16 (see J.'s post).

The majority of the rockets fired at Israel were 122 mm Grad rockets with 50 km range, 220 mm (70 km), and some 302 mm (90-100 km). Most of these were fired from launch batteries with 4 tubes; at least one launcher had 12 tubes. For the heavier rockets, Hizbullah tended to use mobile launchers, which it fired from residential areas. The lighter rockets, on the other hand, appear to have been fired using stationary launchers that were camouflaged and hidden slightly underground in agricultural areas. Katyusha crews would use hydraulic mechanisms or manual levers to raise these launchers up and then fire them using remote controls. These stationary launchers were set up long before the war, and each one was aimed at a different destination in Israel. They would be fired once every twenty-four hours - but Hizbullah may have had up to 150 such sites (Rubin, p. 9).

Altogether, Hizbullah's "strategic rocketing" killed 41 Israeli civilians, and 12 soldiers (the Kfar Giladi incident), seriously wounded 250 noncombatants, and caused 100,000-250,000 to flee their homes. It also destroyed 2,000 dwellings. Ironically, "passive defence" saved the most Israeli civilians' lives. More specifically, early warning systems, staying in bunkers and safe rooms, or following the instructions about retreating to the south side of apartments in many cases prevented casualties(here's a related sample of unfunny humor from those times: "It would be nice to shower first but the bathroom faces north (that's bad, not because of the feng shui)) .

Recently, I came across something that Nobody wrote, in which he mentioned the dangers of taking for granted Israel's supposed military superiority as well as its permanent presence in the region. I don't remember his exact wording, but he seemed to be taking on one of his favorite targets, reckless "peace lunatics." I have to say that when it comes to Syria, we would do very well to heed the advice of Nobody as well as of our Lebanese friends. I, too, have been guilty of enthusiasm about Syrian "channels." But as this latest missile deployment and their intertwined strategies in Lebanon show, the Syrians and the Iranians are committed to an alliance that will take a lot more than engagement to undo.

Iranians Humiliated?

Ahmadinejad releases Brits
(Photo: Iranian TV screenshot)

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad today announced that his country would release the 15 British sailors and marines that his country captured nearly two weeks ago. He made the surprise announcement at a press conference. It was apparently preceded by one of his infamous tirades, in which he harangued Britain for bringing the case up before the Security Council and complained about the invasion of Iraq.

Even if Ahmadinejad dressed it up as a "present" from the Iranian to the British people, I wonder how many Iranians will be convinced that the abduction was a smart move. There should be no doubt that Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials who supported this operation have suffered a humiliating defeat. On this matter, I could not disagree more with Zvi Bar'el, who sees the whole episode as a victory for Iran. According to the Ha'aretz writer, the British reliance on diplomatic means

will now be used by Iran as proof that even powers such as the U.S. and Britain are limited in their ability to use force when it comes to a minor border incident - and that the threat Iran poses is precisely in initiating local incidents that are not sufficiently important to lead to war.

I see no evidence for this. If this is what the Iranians have concluded, they will continue to make serious miscalculations. At the end of the day, the whole operation was for naught; I cannot see the slightest tangible gain that Iran might have derived from it.

True, the Guardian reports "speculation that the release was prompted in part by an agreement to let an Iranian representative meet five Iranians detained by US forces in Irbil, northern Iraq, in January." However, even if the Iranians obtained the rights to visit their diplomats or intelligence agents, no one is going to confirm this. Especially after the announcements by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair that there would be "no quid pro quo," it will be difficult for the Iranians to point to any sort of favorable outcome. The British have repeatedly presented their GPS evidence to the Iranians and to international bodies; in the court of international opinion, the U.K.'s insistence that its troops were "well inside Iraqi waters" is likely to prevail.

Some might argue that at least the Iranians demonstrated their abilities to cause trouble for coalition forces. I would respond, however, that the British will be much more careful from now in all their patrols. They are unlikely to allow their troops to be captured again without some resistance. As for Iranian meddling in Basra and elsewhere in Iraq, it continues to harm coalition and Iraqi forces. But all this was clear before the Revolutionary Guards brushed up on their Piracy 101 skills. The statement by one British crew member, who thanked Ahmadinejad for his "forgiveness" will be seen by the world for what it is - Byzantine manipulation by a weak regime desperate to cover up its silly miscalculation.

In retrospect, it appears that the British did the right thing. By staying calm but not backing down on their core positions (at least not in public), they called Iran's bluff. When I heard about the release of the British troops, I wondered if the case might be instructive for other abduction scenarios - such as the one that sparked the Second Lebanon War. But I think that this is not the type of lesson we can draw from this particular incident. The kind of poker game that the British and Iranians were playing relies on the rules of the international system that regulates interactions between states.

Matters change dramatically when states are confronted with non-state actors. As much as I would criticize the nature of Israel's military response to the abductions of its soldiers, first by a Palestinian faction in the south and then by Hizbullah in the north - a response which ultimately proved ineffective - I don't think Israel could have obtained the kind of outcome that the British achieved. Neither the Palestinian factions nor Hizbullah respond to the threats of international sanctions. Their interests cannot be easily damaged, except by direct military confrontation. And even then, the options are very limited and likely to prove unsuccessful.

Inside the Merkava

Rear door of Merkava 4 tank, a feature that experts say helps the IDF save lives.

On a recent visit to Israel, I spoke with a member of the IDF's most elite tank unit. I'll call him Amit. My interest in the state of tank warfare in the region had been piqued back in Berkeley by a conversation with an American reserve tank driver. He had contended that the Lebanon War last summer had debunked the myth of the Israeli-made Merkava tank's near invincibility, citing in particular the destruction of the tank, along with all of its personnel, which followed Hezbullah operatives over the border in the conflict's opening moments. The American Abrams tank, he told me, while lacking many of the Merkava's capabilities, had never been known to lose all of its crew in a single hit.

When I tattled on the Merkava to Amos, he quickly pointed out that the tank destroyed by Hezbullah likely wasn't the newest version, the Merkava 4. In Israel, the IDF's Amit confirmed that this tank was in fact an older version, the Merkava 2. The bomb placed under the tank weighed some 500kg. "Would a Merkava 4 have suffered the same fate?" I asked Amit. "No," he said. In fact, he claimed that a Merkava 4 had been hit by a charge nearly as powerful. Of the seven crew members inside, only one, sadly, a close friend of Amit, had perished.

From my conversation with Amit I gained some anecdotal insight into what went wrong in the last war -- at least with regard to tanks. Amit's unit, which only trains on Merkava 4, which is the most prestigious tank unit, and the first sent into combat, had not been inside a tank in full year when the fighting broke out! Why hadn't these soldiers, who went immediately to the front, to Kiryat Shemona and on to Metulla, been in a tank in so long? Quite simply, according to Amit, they had spent their time setting up roadblocks and manning checkpoints in the West Bank, in other words, doing police work.

Of course, the Merkava also faced world-class anti-tank weapons, launched by mobile, elusive two-man teams. Tank drivers, it seems, prefer to engage other tanks. The role of tanks in the so-called "asymmetrical warfare" of contemporary battles remains in flux.

Berkeley Professor: Hizbullah and Hamas "Part of the Global Left"

Saba Mahmood Addresses the Crowd, Thurs., Sept. 7, 2006

A good friend of mine and loyal reader of this blog took issue with the cut-up of the Berkeley Teach-Ins Against War event, that I posted late on Thursday night. He charged that instead of crudely bashing the speakers, I ought to have engaged the "complex arguments" presented by them. I regret to say that I will not be able to do that. I simply did not hear any such arguments. Perhaps I entered the event with the wrong kind of attitude. But I came away with a very different impression of the teach-in than my friend.

It is true that the various panelists repeatedly pointed to the large number of Lebanese civilian deaths caused by Israel's air campaign. I do not object to this. From the first days of the war, we at Kishkushim have expressed our sorrow about the deaths of Lebanese and Israeli civilians in the conflict. The Israeli government and military cannot escape the soul searching that the loss of civilian lives requires of them. I want such soul-searching to take place with the aim of averting more civilian deaths. But that is simply not the type of discussion that I witnessed on Thursday. When all was said and done, I left that teach-in feeling as if I had sat through a sophisticated, two-hour commercial for Hizbullah. I say that not to discredit or smear those who criticize Israel but rather to provide some context for my admittedly harsh attack on the panelists.

Let me begin from the end. Ironically, during the question period after the five speakers had finished, one member of the audience asked Judith Butler why she had included any critique, however weak, of Hizbullah in her discussion. She responded with an astounding statement that N has already cited. “Understanding Hamas and Hizbullah as social movements that are on the global left is important,” she said, “but [it] doesn’t stop us from criticizing them.” I know that some of our readers would applaud such a statement. For them, the global left, in any case, represents hypocrisy, foolishness, terrorist appeasement, and antisemitism. But despite all the terrible things I have seen among movements that identify themselves as “leftist,” I still believe that the “global left” stands or ought to stand for values that are diametrically opposed to those of these two organizations.

In fact, speaker after speaker at the teach-in, made efforts to embrace Hizbullah as part of a “left” opposed to the right-wing forces represented by the US and Israel. Thus, Charles Hirschkind, claimed that “since the end of the occupation, most of [Hizbullah’s] activities have been focused on social services,” and that the movement “increasingly showed itself to be a positive force,” with no desire to create a theocracy in Lebanon. The United States, on the other hand, although it claims to be fighting al-Qaeida with its “war on terror,” is actually trying to liquidate Islamic activists worldwide. Hizbullah is at the top of its list, together with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which Hirschkind described as having been “peaceful since the 1950s” and as one of the key groups involved in the struggle to democratize Egyptian society.

Like a number of other panelists that night, Hirschkind scoffed at the notion that Hizbullah is a terrorist group. “The label ‘terrorist’ is radically inaccurate for describing resistance,” he said. Indeed, Hirschkind’s argument continued, most “terrorists” in the Middle East are not really terrorists, and certainly not Muslim fundamentalists. Suicide bombers share a commitment to resisting foreign occupation, not to Islamism. And suicide bombings are “the strategy of the weak against vastly more powerful adversaries,” which have nothing to do with “a culture of death.”

Saba Mahmood, who opened the talk, also did her best to rehabilitate Hizbullah. In a list of impressive achievements of the Lebanese in recent years, she included “successfully driving out the Israelis.” Of course, Hizbullah has claimed that particular achievement all for itself, so that heralding it as impressive, is another way of giving the organization kudos. But more perversely, she argued that Hizbullah had contributed positively to fashioning a new political ethic in Lebanon that ensured coexistence. As evidence, she cited the lack of Hizbullah reprisals against Christian militia men in southern Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. She also painted a rosy picture of the national dialogue in Lebanon before the 2006 war. Interestingly enough, she did not mention once the assassination of Rafik Hariri by pro-Syrian forces. Indeed, the only person who mentioned Hariri was Zeina Zaatari, in a derisive reference to “clientism.”

Zaatari’s talk, as N has already written, was the most blatantly propagandistic among the five that night. She extolled Hizbullah’s services, and reiterated that “its interest has always been driving out Israel.” Zaatari lauded Nasrallah: “He spoke to the people; he talked their language.” She also made a cryptic reference to the lands that Israel had taken from Lebanon in 1948! “The creation of the state of Israel was a hostile act not just against the Palestinians but also against other Arabs,” she said, “Lebanon lost 7 villages then.” Danny Rubinstein published an article about this claim during the war. Unfortunately, the full text is no longer available online, but an excerpt can be found here (it’s near the bottom of the page, search “Rubinstein”). Yoav Shtern also wrote a longer article about these villages in Ha’aretz, which I have only found in Hebrew. While the Sykes-Picot agreement allotted these 7 Shiite villages to Lebanon, the 1923 border demarcation assigned them to Mandatory Palestine, and the UN recognizes them as belonging to Israel. The point is that Zaatari’s claim, about the seven Shiite villages that Israel “stole,” is embraced by the most ardent rejectionists in Lebanon. It was employed specifically by Nasrallah to justify Hizbullah’s ongoing presence in the south despite Israel’s withdrawal.

Of all the speakers, Beshara Doumani, was the only one who refrained from being sucked into the Hizbullah-propaganda vortex – at least as far as I remember. I found his contribution deeply problematic for a number of other reasons. I hope to deal with these as well as with Butler in more detail in a future post.

Nasrallah's Mea Culpa

"Sorry guys, I screwed up."

As you have probably all heard by now, Nasrallah recently apologized for being an idiot and having his organization kidnap two IDF reservists in a cross-border raid. This is Nasrallah sounding contrite instead of smug and self-righteous:

I want to be clear in my response, and I hope that people are listening to me now. We did not think even one per cent that the capture of the two Israelis would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude, and if someone asked me why we didn't consider this one per cent, I would say that since 1982 and our relationships with the Israelis and the experience of our resistance with Israel, the operation wouldn't lead to such a result (ABC).

Who knows what kind of game the Hizbullah head is playing here. It looks like he has realized that it is important to at least pay lip service to the idea that he has some kind of responsibility for all of Lebanon's citizens. Furthermore, he seems to be acknowledging some culpability in what transpired. Of course, he pleads ignorance, but like it or not, Nasrallah has admitted that if it hadn't been for Hizbullah's wonderful kidnapping mission, all those Lebanese houses would still be standing today.

Given this admission by Nasrallah, it seems that a "disproportionate" response really was needed to deter Hizbullah.

Dumb UNIFIL, Clever Gorillas

Peekabooooo...

There was an interesting report on Israel's Channel 2 Television News last night. In the report, an embedded Israeli journalist accompanied an IDF reconnaissance unit across the border into Lebanon. The troops did not encounter any resistance or Hizbullah fighters. Their mission was to destroy an elaborate Hizbullah tunnel that had been located earlier. Before mining the tunnel and blowing it up, the troops gave the reporter a tour. The footage I saw showed a very sophisticated tunnel with a ventilation system, concrete-lined walls, provisions, explosives and ammunition. The commander of the unit remarked, with more than a hint of sarcasm, that is was "amazing what can be achieved in six years" (the time that has passed since the Israeli withdrawal). The reporter followed the soldiers, who were under pressure to finish their mission soon because of the fear of mines or an attack by Hizbullah, through the tunnel and to another exit. As they emerged from the other exit, the cameraman panned the surrounding area. Looming no more than 100 metres behind the tunnel exit was a tall, white UNIFIL observation post.

Can one blame Israelis for being suspicious of UNIFIL and for not trusting the European troops that are now being deployed in Lebanon? This was the same force that stood idly by and looked on as Hizbullah prepared to kidnap IDF soldiers in 2000 and then ambushed them. As of now, there is no reason to believe that the Franco-Italian led force will be any more effective. They don't even have clearly defined goals and it is clear that the French and Italian leaders lack the political will to involve their forces in more dangerous missions that might bring them into confrontation with Hizbullah.

Lebanese Gorillas Found Underground

"Hizbullah Gorilla" or Innocent Civilian?

The English-language edition of Ha'aretz reports that the IDF has uncovered a network of tunnels and arms depots used by Hizbullah in southern Lebanon. According to Ha'aretz, military intelligence revealed that

The tunnels had housed Hezbollah Gorillas [sic] and had been used to launch attacks against IDF forces.

Contra Appeasement

Barry Rubin has an interesting piece on "the new era" in the Middle East, which he sees, perhaps in line with Marx's famous dictum, as Nasserism in a new guise. The popular support generated throughout the Arab world by such figures as Osama bin Laden and now Hassan Nasrallah certainly invites such a comparison. Rubin's main claim is that

After the war in Lebanon, the Middle East entered a new era, which was already on the way for a half-dozen years and in which radical Islamism sets the ideological and political agenda. It marks the end of hope for peace or democracy.

This trend, Rubin argues, goes back to the Palestinian leadership's rejection of the Barak offer (whether you think it was generous or not). A consensus has emerged that Israel and the West are weak, and that now a

violent struggle in pursuit of total victory rather than pragmatism, democracy, compromise, and economic construction

can cure all the problems afflicting the Arabs and the Muslim world more generally.

For Rubin, appeasing this new "resistance axis," is the biggest mistake that that West could make (and is making):

If only Iran, Syria, or Hizballah is offered concessions, [those who favor appeasement] argue, the threat will go away. This view actually feeds the problem. The radicals have far-reaching goals (including genocide in Israel) and powerful ideologies that make them not so eager to make any deal.

It is often argued that Israeli actions weaken moderate forces. Thus, the bombing of Beirut rallied the entire Lebanese population to fight Israel and to support Hizbullah. Likewise, many argue that Israel's actions in the territories incite Arabs in Egypt and Jordan against the West and democracy. But few of these critics consider the effects of appeasement on local pro-democracy forces who see the incitement against Israel for what it is. Appeasement bolsters the most intransigent and fundamentalis forces, because

they [the extremists] think they are winning. Western efforts to achieve understandings are consistently viewed as weakness inviting escalation. This is clear in any reading of the radical leaders' speeches. Why should Arab governments, reformers, or Lebanese factions oppose the extremists if they believe--correctly in general--that the West will not help them?

Apologies for not writing earlier. Temporary time pressures conspired against us, and someone on Kishkushim got married this week (it wasn't me).

al-Manar vs. Israel's Channel 2

One of the more popular characters on Israel's satirical show "Eretz Nehederet"
I spent part of last week in the Arab village of Kofer Musmus, located near Umm al-Fahm, the second largest Arab town in Israel. During my stay there, I had the chance to get a good look at the Hizbullah TV news station, al-Manar, courtesty of my host's satellite dish. The broadcasts were quite professional, something that has already been noted by a number of Israeli and other commentators. Some of the station’s broadcasts certainly have the veneer of credible journalism. There is plenty of commentary and analysis, uninterrupted by commercials or the visual diversions that we’ve come to associate with television. I don’t know if what I saw was representative of their regular programming, but al-Manar’s editors don’t seem overly concerned about scaring off viewers with short attention spans. I was also impressed by their translations of broadcasts from Israeli television which always include Arabic subtitles. However, one only needs to watch the station’s broadcasts for several hours to realize that it’s an incredibly crude propaganda outlet hiding behind the veneer of a respectable news station. In one “news” clip of Olmert addressing the Israeli public, the Prime Minister suddenly morphed into Hitler, complete with a swastika armband and a moustache. This was not some satirical show but a serious news show with some creative AV editors. Instead of commercials, al-Manar runs stirring clips of Hizbullah fighters chanting war songs and engaged in combat with corny battle music playing in the background and captions celebrating the “victory” over Israel. Watching al-Manar pretty much affirmed to me what I’ve been telling critics of the war all along. People in the Arab world are attracted to Hizbullah, because they view it as a winner and because they are attracted by its displays of “heroism”. I think it’s quite similar to the support that Gamal ‘abd al-Nasir attracted in his days.

Visiting Carmia in Haifa, I got the chance to watch Israeli television over the weekend. I don’t have a TV at home for various reasons, so I used this chance to get my dose of news. Anyone who accuses Israeli television of being a propaganda outlet (and there were many who did so during the war) doesn’t know what they are talking about. One trend that I saw on all the major channels (Channel 1, Channel 2 and Channel 10) was the use of live footage shot by soldiers on reserve duty. A lot of this footage was quite genuine – there was one short “film” shot by a reservist about his experience in the war: boredom, contradictory orders, and a lot of wisecracks. Another news segment focussed on the home front and about different people who went out to feed or retrieve abandoned pets or who baked pizzas for returning soldiers. Meanwhile, just as they did at the beginning of the war, different Israeli satirical programs were busy lampooning Israel’s leaders. In one show, two child-like grown-up’s held up stickers (one in blue, one in yellow) declaring “We won” and “No, we did”. I did not get to see Eretz Nehederet, Israel’s leading Friday-night satirical show, but I recall that they had a field day lampooning everyone, from over-patriotic reporters and Israelis trying to get on TV by posing as bombing victims to Nasrallah, the IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and IDF spokesperson Miri Regev. In one awesome segment, the stand-in character “Margol”, who is played by a male actor, but who represents the well-known Israeli (Yemenite) singer Margalit Tzan‘ani, is presented as the IDF’s new secret weapon for winning the war against Hizbullah.

Nasrallah's call to Arab world to fall on deaf ears?

As a follow-up to Amos's earlier posts I re-submit the excellent resource Memri.org, which has linked a translated and subtitled video clip of Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah calling for regional support. Thinktanker Edward Luttwack thinks his call will tank. Evidence vindicating Luttwack's viewpoint can be found on the same memri.org site: an Egyptian journalist who believes - in spite of his admiration for Nasrallah - that raising pictures of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in South Lebanon is not worth spilling Arab blood.

I wonder what it would take to bring the region over to Nasrallah's side. Based on Nasrallah's statements, it seems to me he thought (probably incorrectly) that the time was right to rally Arabs. As Amos suggested earlier, ideology (which they share with Hamas) cannot be discounted as Hizbollah's motivation for attacking Israel, nor can their desire to use the Gaza crisis as leverage for a prisoner swap. But they clearly also want to use Israeli counterviolence to achieve solidarity with Arabs who are normally ideologically opposed to the Hezbollah platform. Witness what they've done with ordinary Lebanese people, many (but by no means all) of whom now see Hezbollah as defenders of the Lebanese people instead of the instigators of their suffering. As Ari Shalit wrote in the English version of Ha'aretz the other day, Israel needs to keep its moral highground in this conflict if it wants to regain international support and keep Arab solidarity against it at bay. Easier said than done, but the bombing can't go on forever.

Hizbullah in Iraq

While many worry that the current conflict in the Levant will lead to conflagration across the Middle East, Tony Blair insists that Iran is already waging a regional war. And the British, who have felt a steady increase in attacks at their once quiet post of heavily Shiite Basra in southern Iraq, have the forensic evidence to prove it. Blair told the House of Commons in today's Guardian:

"Hizbullah is supported by Iran and Syria, by the former in weapons, weapons incidentally very similar if not identical to those used against British troops in Basra, by the latter in many different ways and by both financially."

The spy site Debka goes so far as to link these Basra attacks to the Abu al Fadal al Abas Brigades, a kind of Hezbollah in Iraq "sleeper cell," which, Debka claims, was activated on the Fourth of July. I guess Kim Jong-il wasn't the only one who wanted to rain on our party.

What was Nasrallah thinking? Part Two

There has been a lot of commentary in the past few days on how to interpret the Hizbullah's decision to provoke Israel by launching its raid into Israeli territory. Nasrallah himself explained his decision as a bid to increase pressure on Israel to release the Palestinian, Lebanese and other Arab prisoners that it holds. Nasrallah also said that he wanted to help the Palestinian cause and that his attack came in solidarity with Hamas. We cannot dismiss these rationales as mere pretexts. Hizbullah is an organization with an ideology, and its followers may indeed view this operation as a way to "support" the Palestinians by coming to their need at a time of crisis. However, even if Nasrallah does not genuinely care about the Palestinians or other prisoners held in Israel and is using them only as a pretext to attack, he may have decided to carry out the raid in order to appeal to Lebanese Shi'a and to Arab public opinion as a whole.

Interpretations that ascribe this motive to Nasrallah tend to focus on the Lebanese domestic political context and regional public opinion to explain Hizbullah's attack. Lebanon's current Prime Minister, Fuad Siniora, is a member of the “Future Movement” – the anti-Syrian coalition led by Sa‘ad Hariri, the son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. He’s perceived as pro-Western and pro-American. According to some commentators, Nasrallah’s aim was to embarrass Siniora and to expose him as a weakling. Hizbullah is making it very clear that it controls what will happen on the ground, while Lebanon’s Prime Minister is being forced to look on. The Lebanese army can’t intervene now, nor can the Prime Minister and other opponents afford to criticize Hizbullah directly, especially as Lebanon is under attack. Hizbullah supporters are probably gleefully pointing to the refusal of the United States to intervene and telling the Lebanese and all Arabs that Siniora and his American friends are useless. They’re trying to position themselves as fighters and heroes and the only ones who can uphold Arab honour. These claims are of course ludicrous – Hizbullah is the reason for the attacks and the reason why America is not standing by Lebanon. There’s not a chance that a terrorist group implicated in the death of 220 marines (killed by an attack on the American peacekeeping force stationed in Beirut in 1983) is going to get a break from the United States. A propos, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, both allies of the United States, have come out strongly attacking Hizbullah’s foolishness and brazenness.

On the other hand, Hizbullah is being backed by two states that are trying to send a message to America. It’s clear that Hizbullah is a proxy of Iran and Syria, although it is not clear whether instructions were issued for these attacks. Even in a Ha’aretz article by Yoav Stern published today (July 16), a senior Israeli military intelligence officer is quoted as saying that, although Syria has played a “negative role” in the recent events, it is not believed to be “directly involved in the escalation.” The Israelis are also denying that they intend to attack Syria. Instead, Israeli military commentators such as Ze’ev Shiff are saying that Iran is the country that is leading the way in supporting Hizbullah. Many of the rockets, including the advanced missile used to strike at the Israeli frigate, are of Iranian make, apparently. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are also present on the ground in Lebanon and advising Hizbullah. This is obviously a very useful opportunity for Iran to get a look at Israeli capabilities and weaknesses. Hizbullah is indeed an incredibly useful proxy for Iran. However, there’s also a larger picture, one that is well-explained on SyriaComment.com, a blog run by Joshua Landis, an academic who knows Syria, but has been fiercely attacked by a number Lebanese-American academics for acting as a mouth-piece for the Syrian regime. According to Landis, Syria is mad that it has been sidelined by the US ever since 9-11. America has made it harder for Syria to get international financing, has accused Syria of assisting rebels in Iraq, locked Syria out of trade deals with Iraq, pressured it to withdraw from Lebanon and dissed Bashar al-Asad on numerous occasions. Syria wants the Americans to understand that it is a regional power to be reckoned with. In other words, Bashar al-Asad does not want to be considered irrelevant to stability in the Middle East. According to Shiff and others, Iran’s interest is to divert attention from the nuclear issue and to prevent it from being brought to the Security Council. I don’t fully understand how a momentary conflagration could have achieved that, but I do see how, if this turns into a big regional crisis, there might be less unity among Security Council members on the Iran issue. Maybe the Iranians are stirring up trouble between Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinians, to signal that Europe and the US cannot push Iran too far in the nuclear negotiations.

What was Nasrallah Thinking?

I am not sure what the consensus on this is. Perhaps we won't know until many years from now. But I am curious what the motivations for the Hizbullah attack on Israel were. Could it be that Nasrallah simply miscalculated, or did Hizbullah in fact hope to provoke a response of the scale that we are currently witnessing? If Hizbullah's primary motivation was to free prisoners in Israeli jails, then the organization seems to have made a serious mistake. On the other hand, if the goal was to start a war that has potential to turn into a regional conflagration, we have to ask whose interests this would serve. Hizbullah has very little to gain in the long run. Sure, its occasional military successes, such as the kidnapping action, blowing up an IDF tank, the hit scored on the Israeli missile boat, and of course the barrage of rockets that have terrorized Israeli civilians, might boost the organization's approval ratings in the Muslim world. Furthermore, the tragic deaths of innocent Lebanese civilians, killed by F-16 missile strikes, as well as the population's suffering might galvanize Arabs and Muslims further against Israel. But these aims have rather high costs attached to them. In the long run, Israel will probably be able to destroy a significant part of Hizbullah's infrastructure and personnel. Furthermore, as I've said before, without Hizbullah's attack on Israel, these deaths would not have taken place. Perhaps the Lebanese and others will make Hizbullah responsible. A revision of the border is out of the question - here, Hizbullah has no legitimacy whatsoever. So what can Hizbullah actually gain?

I have left out the Syrian and Iranian factors until now. It is true that the Syrians have territorial ambitions - to regain the Golan Heights and the Sheba farms. But they also have a lot to lose in an international climate that is heavily tilted against them. What about the Iranians? Here, one possibility might have been an attempt to divert attention from their nuclear efforts. On the other hand, it is possible to ask whether for them too the motivation is ultimately ideological.