Obama's Moves

BY AMOS

Watching Obama maneuvering the treacherous terrain of Middle East policy has been a pleasure. History will show that those who regarded him as a naive idealist did so at their peril. Netanyahu is slowly waking up to reality; others might do so too late and find themselves under the White House steamroller. The Obama administration is as serious about its ideals and goals as it is cunning about achieving them. 

The decision to start off by challenging Netanyahu on settlement construction was nothing short of brilliant. Simply put, Obama and America had nothing to lose by pressuring Bibi on this. No serious person in American politics would today sacrifice their credibility by arguing that Israel should be allowed to expand settlements as it sees fit. In the U.S., there is a small number of (mostly religious) American Jews who still believe in the enterprise, but they were against Obama from the beginning, and the delusions in which they have been living are now colliding with the hard facts. The only remotely palatable argument, voiced by Netanyahu's propagandists such as Charles Krauthammer, that Israel should at least be allowed to expand settlements in order to accommodate "natural growth" in these communities, is itself a huge concession. Moreover, it too has been rejected by the Americans. 

As other commentators have observed, the more Netanyahu and the Israeli lunatic fringe (like it or not, this is how policy makers in Washington view everyone right of Netanyahu) fight with Obama, the more pathetic and/or racist clamoring emanates from their midst, the more U.S. diplomats stand to gain in their negotiations with the Middle East's other regional powers and domestically. 

 

The strategy followed by the Obama administration vis-à-vis the Israeli-Arab conflict and the region is best described as Machievallian liberalism. Right now, he is trying to make the Israelis understand the limits of their power and to force them to make policy choices in response to these constraints. These constraints have in fact always existed, but in the past Israel benefited from subsidies of good will (on the part of the U.S.)  to overcome them. But over time, subsidies of this nature cause inefficiencies and distortions that become unsustainable. 

Now, for the first time in a while, Israeli leaders are being forced to act as consumers (and producers) in a free market, where prices reflect the supply and demand of political, military, and economic power. Unfortunately, the subvention of lunacy has rendered some groups in Israeli society extremely uncompetitive in the marketplace of political ideas and in the practice of power. The settlers, for example, who think Israel can do just fine without America, are suffering from delusions of grandeur typical of corporations who have benefited from state largesse for years. 

The new calculus is very simple. You want to keep building settlements? Pay for it. You want to waffle on a two-state solution? It will cost you. You want to be able to shape responses to the Iranian problem? Quid pro quo. 

Obama and Netanyahu

BY AMOS

(Photo: Wikimedia Commons)

Aluf Benn provides an  excellent analysis of Netanyahu's Washington-strategy. Many commentators are convinced that Israel's new prime minister is on a collision course not only with the Europeans but also with the White House. Benn contrasts Netanyahu's strategy so far with that of his predecessor, Ehud Olmert, in order to explain what Bibi might be thinking:

The prime minister is aware of the assumption of many that his rejection of the idea of a Palestinian state, and opposition to withdrawals from the West Bank and the Golan Heights, will result in an inevitable crisis in relations with Obama and propel Israel into political isolation. But he is not afraid. The way he sees it, it's better to come to the White House with a list of demands and requests, and to condition any concession on a quid pro quo, than it is to play the role of yes man to the president and gain nothing in return. 

Ehud Olmert emerged from his many talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with the impression that, because of the Palestinians' positions on the so-called core issues, there is no chance for a final-status accord with them - which is why he opted to emphasize Israeli generosity to secure international support. Netanyahu prefers to enter into negotiations with maximalist positions rather than to begin with concessions that may win the world's approval but won't satisfy the other side. He is ready to pay the political price this will exact abroad for the sake of appearing consistent in his positions and preserving his coalition at home (Ha'aretz). 

We will see what happens, but for now, Benn's reading seems more persuasive than the hysterical fears of a collapse of US-Israeli relations and of Israel's position in the West. Netanyahu does not seem fazed by the missteps of his foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman. My sense is that Lieberman will not play a major role in foreign policy at all - Bibi will hold the reins tight here as well as in his economic policy.

Labor Wants In

Even though Labor MKs have been boasting that they are not afraid to enter the opposition, they have been increasing the pressure on Livni to include them in the government. That, I believe, is how one should interpret statements by the Labor Party to the media, that the faction will not recommend Livni or Netanyahu to President Shimon Peres to form the next government. The comments of Dan Kurtzer, former U.S. ambassador to Israel, that

the Obama administration would find it politically risky to embrace a government that included Lieberman, who has voiced controversial views about Arabs (Ha'aretz),

also give Labor some added punch in the coalition-wrangling going on. Even though Israeli voters, especially on the right, are on the whole indifferent to these U.S. concerns, the senior figures in each party realize that strained relations with the White House are not in Israel's interest. They will be weighing the various domestic and international costs and benefits carefully.

However, it is unclear whether it is possible for these elections to yield a coalition that might appeal to the American administration - even if that were a priority for Israelis. A Kadima-Likud-Labor unity government (28+27+13 = 68 seats) would be a hard pill for Netanyahu to swallow, seeing as it would mean little change from the current line. Meanwhile, the pressure will be on Livni to explain her negotiations with Lieberman to Israeli voters from the left and, behind closed doors, to members of the Obama administration. Netanyahu knows, a fortiori, that a far-right coalition would spell trouble for American-Israeli relations.

In a comment earlier today, Nobody remarked about the need for electoral reform in Israel. There are two conflicting aims that disinterested voters pursue with reform proposals: 1) "true democracy", or 2) stability. The former is almost impossible to satisfy, as no electoral system is immune from challenges of injustice. With regard to the latter, there are certainly systems that make for more stable government. However, I would argue that Israeli society is more divided - ethnically, religiously, and socio-economically - than those countries that do not enjoy the curse of extreme political fragmentation. Lastly, as any student of electoral systems will tell you, there are no "disinterested" reforms in this sphere of politics. Since the proposed changes are always negotiated by political parties, they tend to favor those currently in power, or are at least designed to advance the interests of incumbents (occasionally there are miscalculations though). I am not sure the electoral system is the problem.

Inaugural

Source

Great interactive tool on the members of the incoming administration.

 

Cast Lead: Achievements So Far

Map showing the Philadelphi Corridor

Although the IDF build-up on the border to Gaza is continuing, there are signs that Israel is hesitant about entering the "third stage" of Operation Cast Lead. The political and military echelons are still assessing whether a significant expansion of operations is worth it. As always in the Middle East, some dramatic event may drastically alter their assessments with immediate consequences. But for now, let us take stock of what has been accomplished and what remains to be done.

1) There is no doubt that at this point in time, Israel has weakened Hamas's political and military organizations. 

2)  the IDF has clearly re-established its deterrence force against the Palestinians and against other actors in the region. 

3) the army and government have made progress in finding ways to reduce Palestinian arms smuggling. 

4) the operation revealed the extent of Hamas's missile capabilities, averting a possible surprise in the future.

5) Cast Lead has managed to dent rocket firing in the short term, and has increased the pressure on Hamas to do so over the long term. 

The means by which Israel has achieved its objectives have not been pretty. From the beginning, the army treated this as a war rather than a policing operation. The IDF assumed correctly that Hamas would use civilian sites for defensive and offensive purposes. Mosques, hospitals, and residences have all served Hamas as storage depots, launching sites, and booby-trapped defensive installations so far in this war.  Thus, the army was aggressive from the outset. Air strikes flattened suspected traps, and ground troops called in planes, helicopters, and artillery whenever they encountered resistance that might embroil them in a deadly ambush or remote-controlled bombing. So far, this strategy has proven very effective at reducing IDF casualties. It has also led to the deaths of many Hamas fighters. Hamas miscalculated in thinking that the IDF would shy away from such tactics and that it would therefore be able to inflict many casualties on the invading forces. The greatest victims of this miscalculation have of course been the civilians of Gaza. I do not share the view that the civilian casualties will strengthen Hamas over the long term. Such an argument could have been made if Hamas had distinguished itself in the fighting; so far it has not done so, and it has proven incapable of protecting its population. 

The question now is whether, given these achievements, Israel is already in a position to force Hamas to agree to a truce that will represent a satisfactory improvement of the status quo ante, or whether such an outcome will require more fighting. Any cease fire must set the conditions for a permanent attenuation of Hamas. The good news is that Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, and the U.S. are all interested in the reduction of Hamas's standing in the region. Egypt has certainly increased its standing vis-a-vis Hamas as a result of the IDF operation, and it will be eager to solidify these gains. It may very well do so by re-inserting forces loyal to the PA into Gaza through a stage-managed "reconciliation." The more difficult problem is finding a way to combat Hamas's ability to smuggle weapons into Gaza. Although a number of options have been suggested, none of them can actually be relied upon by Israel. The various Arab or European offers of help in border monitoring or even tunnel detection will not do the trick. The bulk of the work has to be accomplished during this operation. 

With these factors in mind, it is in Israel's interest to prolong the operation, while keeping it at the current intensity. Reserves do not have to be poured into heavy urban combat in Gaza City or the refugee camps. They can continue to chip away at Hamas at the current fashion, in the north of the strip, while in the south, Israel gathers intelligence on and destroys the tunnel networks. The operations in southern Gaza could conceivable continue even after the inauguration of President-elect Barack Obama. Israel and the U.S. share an interest in putting in place mechanisms for a management of the Philadelphi Corridor that will diminish the flow of arms and terrorists from the Sinai Peninsula into Gaza and possibly vice versa.

Some Hasidish Thoughts on the US Presidential Election

Essex and Grand St., January 2008

Overheard at a bakery on the Lower East Side:

Owner: Oy. Gesheft [business].

Customer 1 looks at him.

Owner: A lot of simonim [signs] that moshiach is coming.

Customer 1: Which ones? Do you know any that we don't?

Owner: The world ... the Zoyher [Zohar] .... 

Customer 1: Yes, I read.

Owner: It says someone will become melekh [king] who is not fit to be melekh.

Customer 1: Yes, yes. 

Customer 2 [objecting in some way]: I'm not saying he's good but ...

Customer 1: He has no more qualification to be president than you!

Mumbai

The attacks on Mumbai last week are depressingly familiar in many respects. Once again, Islamist terrorists managed to sow chaos in a major urban center and to exploit, with determined evil, the liberties held dear by open, democratic societies. Once again, the failure by intelligence agencies to prevent these attacks was primarily one of the imagination. But there is another sense in which these attacks are familiar. They represent a problem, going back at least as far as June 28, 1914, that the international community has been unable to solve until now. 

On that date  a Serbian terrorist assassinated the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, Franz Ferdinand. The Habsburg empire at the time ruled over Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the assassin and his colleagues hoped to see united with Serbia proper, the relatively new nation-state of the Serbs. But Gavrilo Princip did not act on behalf of the kingdom of Serbia. He and his fellow conspirators were non-state actors. As Austria-Hungary and many others at the time suspected, however, it was difficult not to assume some kind of link between Princip and the state organs of Serbia. Furthermore, it seemed highly likely that Serbian citizens residing in Serbia had aided in the attack. In order for the killers of the archduke to be brought to justice, Austria-Hungary needed the help of Serbia. Unfortunately, however, relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary were extremely hostile. 

My point here is not that India and Pakistan are on the brink of unleashing another world war, although such an outcome takes hard work to avert. I am pointing rather to the problem posed by the non-state actor with deep state connections. The investigations carried out by Indian authorities so far (see The Hindu for the best round-up) have revealed the involvement in the Mumbai attacks of Pakistani citizens, trained in Pakistan. Locked in a long state of war, the two nuclear powers now again appear to be on a collision course. 

India has long complained about the alliances between Islamist terrorists and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). Setting aside the links between the ISI and Osama bin Laden, the U.S. is growing increasingly antsy about the threats that ISI-supported Islamists are posing to NATO troops in Afghanistan. But so far, Pakistan's rulers have rebuffed American pressure to get at the roots of the problem inside their country. 

It may very well be true that Pakistan is too weak to purge itself of the al-Qaeda-inspired enablers of terrorism that pervade its state.  Furthermore, the U.S. clearly cannot afford to see Pakistan disintegrate into mayhem. But neither can it turn a blind eye to the Pakistani shipping labels on the attacks in Mumbai and in Afghanistan. In both cases, we are seeing a state incapable of reining in its attack dogs. 

Obama raised eyebrows during the presidential campaign when he  spoke about his willingness to attack targets inside Pakistan "with or without approval from the Pakistani government." A month later, NATO and US ground troops entered Pakistan to attack a Taliban stronghold. Pakistan's ongoing protests about these violations of its sovereignty by outside actors ring hollow when it is unwilling to enforce a monopoly of violence inside its own borders.

We will see how the policy of the president-elect and his impressive national security team evolves in the coming weeks.