The Awakening Councils and the Future of Iraq

The New York Times reported today that Sunnis in Iraq formerly allied with the U.S. appear to be (re)joining the Qaeda-led insurgency. The article cites militia leaders in Salah ad Din, Diyala, and Baghdad governorates. The Awakening Councils played a critical role in defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq, initially in Anbar province. (For a compelling interpretation of how this actually happened, see John McCary's The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives.) Although the Iraqi central government politicians interviewed in the article deny that such defections are taking place, there seems little reason to doubt that fighters are leaving the employ of the government or threatening to do so. Apparently, the tribal militiamen and their commanders have had enough of the Iraqi central government refusing to pay them or grant them immunity from prosecution. They see little reason to co-operate with the Shi'i-dominated federal government. With American forces leaving Iraq, the Sunni tribes in places like al-Anbar are now renegotiating their role in the Iraqi order. It is unlikely that they will want to surrender their sources of income to al-Qaeda, as they almost did in the bad years of the insurgency. But they need more assurances than they have been getting from Baghdad and from the U.S. The Iraqi security forces are not strong enough to govern areas dominated by the tribes in western Iraq and in the Sunni governorates. Whoever ends up taking charge in Baghdad will have to make concessions to them.

Iraq Election Law Vetoed by Sunni Vice President

BY AMOS

UPDATE: Here is some more behind-the-scenes detail as well as speculation about Hashimi's vote. The author suggests that Hashimi is trying to position himself as a nationalist but is actually following a line that benefits Kurdish interests. He breaks down some of the seat numbers and explains why the Kurds are also interested in the minorities clause (it has to do with increasing Kurdish influence over Shabak and Yezidi lists).

Last week, the Iraqi parliament passed an elections law that was to have resolved some of the contentious issues surrounding voter eligibility. But today, one of Iraq's two vice presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi, vetoed the bill. Hashimi belongs to the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni Islamist coalition. He objected specifically to some of the details of the proposed legislation which limited the representation of "minorities" and Iraqi refugees living abroad to 5%, according to the New York Times. Most of the 2 million Iraqi refugees residing outside the country are Sunnis; their numbers constitute 8% of the country's population of 25 million.

Initially, it seemed that the bill's handling of Kirkuk voter lists - it decided that 2009 lists of city inhabitants would be used - favored Kurdish interests, since it is widely believed that the Kurdish share of Kirkuk's population has increased significantly in the last 5 years. But on Tuesday, the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani, expressed his opposition to the law, threatening a Kurdish boycott in response to the seat allocation (i.e., the 5% limit). Apparently, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, who is a Kurd, had also threatened to veto the bill, already before Hashimi did so (NYT).

Hizbullah Stumbles, for Now

From the FPM website: apparently the guy on the groundis a 65-year-old (Aoun supporter?)
being kicked by a Lebanese Forces member (tayyar.org)

The latest attempt by Hizbullah and company to bring down the Siniora government in Lebanon has failed - at least for now. On the streets, Christian pro-government forces held their own against the anti-government Christian backers of Michel Aoun's FMP, while Sunni activists flexed enough muscle to thwart Hizbullah and Amal. But the key was outside intervention, including perhaps a restraining order by the Iranians, after pressure from the Saudis (see Ha'aretz). Or maybe it was the overt backing of King Abdullah as well as the U.S. (which is intent on preventing the victory of the Syrian-Iranian proxies) and France for the government. In any case, Siniora et al. seem to have acquired a new lease on life.

Meanwhile, most of the Sunni Arab world viewed the latest showdown in Lebanon as a must-win confrontation in the regional Sunni-Shi'a showdown. With Iraq in Shi'a hands and Syria in Iran's pockets, the Saudis can capitalize on widespread support from Sunnis who are still fuming about the execution of Saddam Hussein. This, in turn, has emboldened the Sunni supporters of the Lebanese government. Nasrallah has taken notice and trying to tread carefully.

On a related note, the Jordanian Mohammed al-Masri has an op-ed in the Daily Star about Jordan's position on the Sunni-Shi'a rift. The article is about Jordanian encounters with Shi'a Iraqi expatriates in their midst. Apparently, the Jordanian state is following a "zero-tolerance policy toward the public practice of Shiism." However, al-Masri concludes that the real threat to Jordan is not the practice of Shiism in the country or the specter of mass conversions by its Sunni population; rather, the real danger is

political Shiism: support for Shiite political organizations and acceptance of their political paradigms

Al-Masri goes on to say that

the sweeping support for Hizbullah during the war in Lebanon last summer was a clear manifestation of political Shiism,

which is a sneaky way of criticizing the wide-scale support for Hizbullah in the Arab world during the war. Ultimately, he blames Israel for the rise of "political Shiism" - i.e., for the increasing threat to regimes like Jordan by Iran and its proxies:

As much as events in Iraq and interaction with Iraqi communities within Jordan lead to Jordanian antipathy toward Iraqi Shiites and Iran, the Israeli factor and potential conflict between Israel and Hizbullah still encourage support for Hizbullah-style Shiite organizations. Therefore it might be misleading to assume that new anti-Iranian feelings in Jordan are sustainable, when the Israel factor in regional developments could undermine them