Iraq Election Law Vetoed by Sunni Vice President

BY AMOS

UPDATE: Here is some more behind-the-scenes detail as well as speculation about Hashimi's vote. The author suggests that Hashimi is trying to position himself as a nationalist but is actually following a line that benefits Kurdish interests. He breaks down some of the seat numbers and explains why the Kurds are also interested in the minorities clause (it has to do with increasing Kurdish influence over Shabak and Yezidi lists).

Last week, the Iraqi parliament passed an elections law that was to have resolved some of the contentious issues surrounding voter eligibility. But today, one of Iraq's two vice presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi, vetoed the bill. Hashimi belongs to the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni Islamist coalition. He objected specifically to some of the details of the proposed legislation which limited the representation of "minorities" and Iraqi refugees living abroad to 5%, according to the New York Times. Most of the 2 million Iraqi refugees residing outside the country are Sunnis; their numbers constitute 8% of the country's population of 25 million.

Initially, it seemed that the bill's handling of Kirkuk voter lists - it decided that 2009 lists of city inhabitants would be used - favored Kurdish interests, since it is widely believed that the Kurdish share of Kirkuk's population has increased significantly in the last 5 years. But on Tuesday, the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani, expressed his opposition to the law, threatening a Kurdish boycott in response to the seat allocation (i.e., the 5% limit). Apparently, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, who is a Kurd, had also threatened to veto the bill, already before Hashimi did so (NYT).

New Election Law in Iraq

BY AMOS

The Iraqi parliament passed a crucial elections law yesterday, which is said to end a political stalemate that had prevented any progress on the road to holding new elections. The electoral law specifically addresses the thorny issue of voter lists in Kirkuk, the oil-rich city in northern Iraq, home to a mixed population of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmens.

Located in the Kirkuk Governorate, outside of the present borders of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which is currently comprised of the Iraqi governorates Arbīl, As-Sulaymāniyyah, and Duhok , the former Ottoman city's political future is still uncertain. As is well-known, Saddam Hussein settled large numbers of Arabs in the city to reduce Kurdish influence there. In the post-Saddam era, large numbers of Kurds have moved to Kirkuk. Arabs and Turkmens in the city and the Iraqi central government fear that Kirkuk will fall under KRG control. They have thus far insisted that future Iraqi elections, to be held in early 2010, would use 2004 voters' lists for Kirkuk. These lists would presumably have fewer Kurdish eligible voters for Kirkuk than lists compiled in 2009. As a result of the political stalemate among the various interested parties, a comprehensive elections law has languished.



The bill that passed yesterday, appears on the face of things to favor the Kurds. Under the new elections law, Kirkuk voter eligibility will be determined by 2009 residents' lists. Such lists would increase the Kurdish share of the vote and political representation of the city. As Juan Cole, translating and paraphrasing Al-Zaman, writes, Kurdistan Alliance MPs were jubilant at the passage of the bill. Cole believes that American Vice President Joe Biden must have lobbied hard with Arab leaders to achieve the passage of this bill (he takes issue with another blogger on this point):

Steve Clemons reports that Vice President Joe Biden played a central role in the negotiations. Clemons stresses his calls with Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani. But since the legislation was a big win for the Kurds, the hard talk must have been with Arab leaders such as PM Nuri al-Maliki, who gave up a lot on Kirkuk.

The New York Times quotes both Turkmen and Arab legislators from the city, reporting that

[t]he compromise satisfied each of the groups competing for dominance in Kirkuk. “We have passed a stage, a crisis, and no one is a loser,” said Abbas al-Bayti, a Turkmen legislator.

Osama al-Najafi, an Arab legislator, said: “There will be no injustice for the people of Kirkuk. This is a great victory for their historical rights.”

There is a proviso in the elections law intended to prevent voter registration fraud in Kirkuk, but that in itself does not seem enough to assuage the fears of Arabs and Turkmens that they might find themselves under Kurdish rule. Does anyone know how the impasse was really resolved? My suspicion is that some high-stakes wrangling was involved that included more far-reaching guarantees to the various parties, all backed by the U.S. government.

Troubles in Turkey

Two issues are currently occupying a great deal of public attention in Turkey: the Armenian genocide resolution in the US Congress, and PKK activity in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. While the former has also received significant press coverage in the US, there seems to be very little awareness in the American and European media about the latter. For the Turks, the lack of concern shown by the Europeans and the Americans for the dangers posed to the country by PKK attacks is a source of deep frustration and a sense of abandonment. People in the government and the press are openly questioning the value of Turkey's partnership with America and the West. Indeed, many are implicating the US in the terrorist attacks by the PKK, referring repeatedly to the alleged discovery of American weapons in PKK hands. The Armenian genocide resolution seems to these critics of the US yet another indication of America's evil intentions (or, at best, indifference) with respect to Turkey. Rather than interpreting the genocide resolution as a product of America's democratic culture, the Turks seem to be reading it as another example of Western hypocrisy and imperialist interference in Turkish affairs. Furthermore, it is hard to ignore the thinly-veiled expressions of anger at "the Jewish lobby," which some Turkish commentators are now depicting as part of an anti-Turkish alliance with "the Armenians."

There is very little that the Turks can do to directly influence Congress at this stage. The White House's furious diplomatic activity against passage of the House resolution to recognize the Armenian genocide seems doomed to failure. Likewise, Turkey's power to take direct action against either the Iraqi Kurdish government or the PKK is also somewhat limited. This does not mean that the Turks will be able to hold off indefinitely public opinion calling for some kind of response. But it seems that the Turkish military and government realize the risks and difficulties of a more extended cross-border operation. Economic sanctions against the Iraqi Kurds are also a possibility - but they may also hurt Turkish interests in the area.

This leaves Turkey with a more indirect option. While the Turks have been thwarted in their attempts to project direct military force in the region (mainly because of the presence of the Americans), they do have the ability to disrupt significantly American strategic aims with respect to Iran and Russia. Turkey is the key to two planks of American energy policy: 1) to isolate Iran, and 2) to provide an alternative to Europe-bound Russian oil and gas pipelines.

The Americans have been watching Turco-Iranian energy cooperation with a great deal of concern. But the lack of American concern for Turkish interests in Iraq, has pushed the country to drop its inhibitions about upsetting the Americans on this front. Indeed, some Turkish politicians seem to be advocating cooperation with the Iranians on the Kurdish issue as well. As for Russia, despite Turkey's investment in American-backed infrastructure projects in the South Caucasus, the Turks have no qualms about serving as another gate for Gazprom energy to Europe and the Levant. The more the merrier.

Anti-Defamation League in Hot Water over Armenian Genocide

A Jewcy Banner in a petition that calls on the ADL to recognize the Armenian Genocide

UPDATE: There have been some very interesting new developments, on which I have posted over on Genats-Lehayim. First, the ADL published an "open letter" maintaining their previous position. Today, Foxman finally retracted.

The municipal council of Watertown, Massachusetts, which together with Glendale, California is one of the major Armenian centers in the U.S., last Tuesday voted unanimously to pull out of the "No Place for Hate" tolerance-education program. The reason? The program is funded by the Anti-Defamation League, whose national board, the council alleges, has not been forthright in recognizing the Armenian Genocide.

Among other developments, the controversy has led to the firing of the New England Regional Director of the ADL, Andrew Tarsy, after he defied the national leadership of the organization and called on it to refer to the killing of 1.5 million Ottoman Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Now, some people are hoping that the scandal will lead to the "implosion" of the Anti-Defamation League and the sacking of its controversial leader, Abe Foxman.

One of the people who has been leading the campaign against the ADL is Joey Kurtzman over at Jewcy, who in a July post, Fire Foxman, "broke the news" of a February 2007 meeting between Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul and American-Jewish organizations, at which the latter allegedly agreed to oppose a House bill that would recognize the Armenian Genocide. For some thoughts on this meeting, see my post, "Recognizing the Armenian Genocide: Another Round."

I have very little sympathy for some of Kurtzman's other aims, which apparently include "the end of the Jewish people." Unlike Kurtzman, I hardly think the ADL is redundant. And while I can imagine how gratifying it is for a spunky, young Heeb to bash someone like Abe Foxman, I wish Kurtzman could have spared us the self-righteous universalist moralizing. Furthermore, Kurtzman's polemics against the ADL's anti-Mel Gibson campaign are a scandal, as is his pooh-pooing of antisemitism.

Nevertheless, I say mabrouk to the man for his spirited coverage of the Watertown-ADL controversy. To me, the whole episode illustrates something that I have repeated like a broken record on this blog: the American Jewish grassroots overwhelmingly support U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide. It's too bad that an excellent program, the ADL's "No Place for Hate," ended up being cut to send a message.

It is clear that there is a split between the grassroots and local leaders on one hand and the diplomatic activity of the larger organizations on the other. The directors are thinking geopolitics. When the Turkish foreign minister invites them to make a pitch for action against an Armenian Genocide resolution by Congress, they are not going to tell him "no" to his face, especially when he joins his plea to the status of the Jewish community in Turkey and to Turkish-Israeli as well as Turkish-American relations. The foreign policy departments of the premier American Jewish diplomatic organizations, such as the American Jewish Committee, are focused on the Middle East today; they are doing everything they can to keep Turkey on America's side, and at least somewhat close to Israel.

The question is whether historical truth, moral integrity, and diaspora Armenians should all suffer for the pursuit of these interests. I say pursuit because I am not convinced that being "neutral" on the Genocide issue - i.e., basically supporting Turkey's denialist status quo - is really furthering concrete interests on the ground. I have talked off-the-record to someone in one of the major foreign-policy oriented Jewish organizations in the U.S. , who supports the traditional line toward Turkey (on Genocide recognition and other issues), and I was surprised by the lack of flexibility and what seems to me unawareness of the dynamic situation we are facing in the region. It reminded me a little bit of Israel's reluctance to seize opportunities in Iraqi Kurdistan, on which Zvi Bar'el had the following to say in Ha'aretz recently:

Israel now fears that renewing the ties with the Kurds will harm its strategic relations with Turkey, which, as a matter of fact, is doing very good business with Kurdistan: Hundreds of Turkish commercial firms have investments there.

Nor does Israel want to clash with American interests. Washington views the Kurds' ambitions for a federation as an effort to undermine Iraqi unity - Washington's great goal. This is the same Washington that doesn't yet know who is a friend and who an enemy in Iraq, but is conveniently ignoring the Kurds and even their request for an American military base to be built in Kurdistan.

Note: this is an expanded version of my post on Genats-Lehayim.

Historical Note on Turkish-American Relations

The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire

(Perry Castaneda, click to magnify)

Hazbani's questions about U.S. policy toward the Ottoman empire and the Turkish republic after WWI sparked my interest in the history of Turco-American relations.

As Hazbani noted, the U.S. did not declare war on the Ottoman empire in 1917 - a decision in line with the non-interventionist policy it had pursued since the late 19th century. The U.S.'s main concerns then were protecting the investments that American missionaries had made in educational institutions, as part of efforts to convert Ottoman Christian minorities. But the American also had an eye to future economic opportunities. The latter motivations became preeminent after 1918, when most of the Ottoman Christian populations had either left or been killed or deported.

It is interesting that Hazbani mentioned a US Navy paper, on "USN relations with Turkey from 1914-1940," as the person whom many associate with redefinition of American relations with Turkey after the war was Admiral Mark Bristol, the U.S. High Commissioner to Turkey from 1919-1927. Bristol saw economic and investment opportunities for the U.S. in Turkey, and he was not blind to the navy's need for oil (Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide, pp. 185-187).

Another point that Hazbani made was about the relatively benign stance of the U.S. toward the defeated Ottoman empire, especially when compared to the rapacious aims of the British, French, Italians, and Greeks.

Under the Treaty of Sèvres, signed in August 10, 1920, the Ottoman empire was not only stripped of all its non-Turkish territories (in the Balkans and in North Africa), but also of some of its Anatolian possessions. The oil-rich town of Mosul, one of those former Ottoman empire possessions that Melih Can was talking about, was seized by the British as part of the Iraq mandate. The French took Cilisia as part of their Syrian mandate. In Eastern Anatolia, the Allies recognized the Armenian and Kurdish claims to independence. Finally, in May 1919, the Allies approved of the Greek occupation of Smyrna (or Izmir in Turkish) in the west, also on the grounds of national self-determination (Greek statisticians claimed a Greek majority in the city). However, the Italians were allowed to occupy Antalya in SW Anatolia (Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy since 1914, p. 61).

The U.S. did not participate in this, partly because it had not been party to the irresponsible promises of territorial spoils made by the Allies to each other. However, American businessmen were happy to go along with the British in looking for oil in tapping the Mosul oil fields. There actually was a certain convergence of US and British interests here, but the U.S. came to differ with Britain and the other European powers on the future of Turkey. The British, under Lloyd George, hoped to persuade America to guarantee Armenian independence and thereby put in place a check against both Bolshevik and possible Turkish pan-Islamist (or pan-Turkic?) ambitions. The Americans refused, and eventually came to see a strong, nationalist Turkey as a preferred alternative (Bloxham, Ibid., pp. 192-193).

Atatürk (Wikipedia)

In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal had risen to the top of the Turkish nationalist movement. In October 1920, the Bolsheviks had overthrown the Armenian Republic and turned it into a Soviet Republic. But with the Red Army embroiled in a war with Poland, Kemal attacked the Armenian Soviet Republic and regained all the lost Turkish territory, including Batum, Kars, and Ardahan; Batum was later returned, and became part of the Georgian Soviet. Kemal also signed a treaty with France, which returned Cilicia in southern Anatolia as well as arms, in exchange for Tureky's recognition of the French mandate over Syria. Lastly, the Italians surrender their Anatolian claims in return for certain economic stipulations and Turkish acceptance of their possession of Tripoli, the Dodecanese islands, and Rhodes. In August 1922, the Turks took back Smyrna from the Greeks. Finally, the nationalist forces headed north to Constantinople, where the British were still defending the sultan and the Treaty of Sèvres. Soon thereafter, Kemal led the domestic revolution that deposed Sultan Mehmed VI on November 17. The net result: Anatolia had been secured under the leadership of a modern, Western-oriented Turkish Republic.

These Turkish gains were consolidated under the November 20, 1922 Treaty of Lausanne. Armenian and Kurdish independence in eastern Anatolia had been quashed, as had Greek claims in the west (eastern Thrace); only Mosul was lost to the Mesopotamian mandate, and Alexandretta (İskenderun) to France (the latter became part of Turkey again in 1939) (Rich, Ibid., pp. 85-87).

(Map source: Wikipedia)

From 1922 to 1989, American policy viewed a strong, undivided Turkey as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and as a force for stability in the region. Although Turkey's pursuit of an autarkic economic policy and its trade relations with the Weimar Republic and then the Hitler regime during the interwar period and into the 1930s meant that many of America's economic hopes were not realized then, the military and economic aid that poured into Turkey in the 1940s cemented the American role in the country.

Turkey, it seems clear, now wants some of the oil spoils of which it had been deprived by the British after WWI. In addition to protecting its population from terrorist attacks, the country also wants to safeguard its territorial integrity, which it sees threatened by the rise of a Kurdish state on its southern border, and Kurdish control over oil revenues from Kirkuk and elsewhere. The trick for the U.S. will be to determine how to keep the Turks in line with its own interests, at the lowest price possible.

Has Turkey Crossed the Rubicon?

Southeastern Turkey, Syria, and northern Iraq (Perry-Castaneda)

There is currently a media blackout on Turkey's military operation in the south of the country and in northern Iraq. The American as well as the European press have hardly covered it. Initial reports in the international media, which cited Turkish "security circles," spoke of several thousand Turkish soldiers having entered Iraq in a "very limited" operation. These reports, however, were later denied by the Turkish foreign ministry, Iraqi border officials, as well as by the White House.

At this point, we can only speculate about what is truly transpiring. Clearly, the Turkish military is engaging in a large-scale operation against the PKK within its own borders; most likely, it has also carried the fight into Iraq. The Kurdish separatist group has stepped up its terror campaign inside Turkey in the past few months, providing the Turks with plenty of reasons for a response in southern Turkey as well as against hide-outs and camps across the border.

Turkey has conducted many cross-border raids in the past, and aside from denying that Turkish troops are in Iraq, both the U.S. and the Turks are publicly playing down the scope of this operation. However, there are people in Turkey who are hoping and/or expecting this to be a far more significant move than that. Dr. Melih Can, an "international relations expert," has a long article in Today's Zaman, which I think expresses some of the foreign policy aspirations and grievances of members of the Turkish elite, as they have developed since the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

I previously encountered Can's name last August, when he published a piece on Russian policy in the Middle East. The article, "Did Russia have a hand in stopping Israel?" was a mixture of analysis and wishful (though not entirely unrealistic) thinking that resembles his more recent piece about Turkish ambitions in the region. Writing in the wake of the Lebanon war, Can seemed to me a bit too convinced that Israel had suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of Hizbullah:

The war Israel waged against the Hezbollah will go down in history for destroying the Israeli army’s image of invincibility as much as for the massacres of civilians (Zaman, August 17, 2006).

Can attributed special significance to Hizbullah's supposed successes against Israeli tanks:

Known as the source of Israeli military might and named the “mountain steel,” the Israeli-made Merkava tanks, destroyed one by one by the Hezbollah became a symbol for this crushing defeat.

This, of course, is nothing but hyperbole. Hizbullah actually did not destroy Israeli tanks "one by one." It is true that one older Merkava model was blown up by a massive mine in the initial pursuit across the border, after Hizbullah's kidnapping action. It is also correct that, after the war, Israel complained that Russia had armed Hizbullah with advanced anti-tank missiles (of the type Metis), and that a few of these put some older Merkava tanks out of commission. However, the main damage that Israeli troops incurred at the hand of this weaponry was not to tanks but to soldiers sleeping in houses.

The main point that Can was trying to make in that piece, however, was about Russia's moves to thwart American and Israeli power in the region in order "to continue in its traditional role of selling arms, directly or indirectly, to Middle Eastern governments and organizations," and to "rectify[...] the role of Russian businessmen in the region’s energy sector" (Zaman). Interestingly enough, the article does not mention Turkey's role in these moves at all. In his latest contribution to the debate, Can lets the cat out of the bag.

While Can's more recent article is not explicitly pro-Russian, it brims with resentment about American limitations on Turkish ambitions in the region. The sense of wounded pride is especially palpable in the penultimate paragraph of the article, in which Can gives the US two choices:

either to pull new “canvas sacks” over Turkey’s head or to enter into a fresh compromise with Turkey in the near future (Zaman, June 7, 2007).

The "canvas sacks," I believe, are a reference to the "hood event" in July 2003, when U.S. troops arrested Turkish special forces operating in northern Iraq, and put hoods or canvas bags over their heads. That incident provoked an uproar in Turkey and was apparently the basis of a 2006 feature film based on the television show "Valley of the Wolves" (whose distribution was blocked in the US, in part due to accusations of antisemitism and anti-Americanism)

According to Can, an over-the-border military operation by Turkey would be about much more than a response to PKK terrorist attacks. Rather, he argues, it would be about "Turkey's new role within the Middle East," and whether the country is to follow a "mission appropriate to its own history or a more independent set of policies" (Zaman). By "appropriate to its own history," Can seems to mean a policy in line with its Cold War pro-American alignment - not one that accords with Turkey's "historical destiny." The trans-border operation, in Can's mind, thus figures as a crucible for Turkey - it will clarify both the country's willingness to pursue its real interests, as well as America's stance vis-à-vis a more independent Turkey. In that sense, an "over-the-border operation" marks a crossing of the Rubicon, and seems very much bound up with Turkey's destiny in the region.

Kirkuk (Source: Perry-Castaneda)

Can's claim that "there is an extremely pressing need for a breaking point right now, with this need emerging as an over-the-border military operation," is full of expectation of some change, and the sense that aggressive action is necessary for Turkey to break free from the force containing it. That force, it becomes clear, is the U.S., which has pushed Turkey into a difficult predicament. Can distinguishes 7 sub-forces, almost all of which are closely linked to American involvement in the region:

1. the beginning of America's withdrawal, and its alleged "encouragement of various ethnic and sectarian clashes within the framework of its 'New Middle East Strategy.'"

2. increased awareness of threats to Turkey from northern Iraq, and the "provocation of Turkey by the PKK-Barzani relationship"

3. the danger facing Iraqi Turkmens and Kirkuk

4. "the irresponsible and one-sided stance of the US administration"

5. an "increase in activities aimed at shaking the prestige of Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces"

6. the involvement of other countries in Iraq, most notably Iran

7. Turkey's domestic political situation

I may be misinterpreting Can, but it seems to me that he even accuses the U.S. of being behind #7. He argues that to prevent Turkey's entry into northern Iraq, "the US is using all possible tools and national dynamics possible in Turkey ... [and that] this is how the current domestic political crisis, blockages and lack of stability in Turkey need to be understood." I am not sure whether Can is implying that the U.S. is supporting Erdogan in his recent show-down with the military and secularists or the latter. It is also possible that he is alluding to U.S. support for the Kurds in Turkey (unlikely), or perhaps even the Armenian Genocide resolution in the American Congress (also unlikely).

Can argues that the Americans aim primarily to have Ankara coordinate its activities with Washington, according to the latter's interests. But Turkey's post-Cold War foreign policy has increasingly diverged from America's, and the U.S.

has become uncomfortable with Turkey's displays of a more independent stance, the attempts to define the agenda, moves to forge new alliances and, as a result, entrance into a new period in the "Turkish-Islamic" world through a venture involving Russia and Iran (Zaman).

Both Turkey's increasingly eastern orientation in the region - Can speaks of shifts in the Ankara-Damascus-Cairo-Riyadh-Tehran-Islamabad line - and its refusal to subordinate itself to America's stance on Russia (the Turks are not cooperating with the U.S. strategic aim of building a gas pipeline network that provides a viable alternative to Russia's Gazprom) testify to a clash of interests. Of particular concern to the U.S., is the possibility that Turkey will go for an even more independent policy vis-à-vis Iran.

Source: Wikipedia

On the other hand, in the Caucasus, American and Turkish interests seem so far to coincide, as both countries have invested a great deal in strengthening Georgia and Azerbaijan (see our post on some of the pipelines). Still, in the Middle East, or as Can says, "in the former Ottoman Empire areas," the Turks are clearly flexing their muscles. Turkey has emerged as a respected (by the Arabs) "mediator" in the region who might undermine American pre-eminence as a broker, and the

respect and esteem achieved by Turkey in the former Ottoman Empire areas following March 1, 2003 have only served to underscore its capacity for changing current regional balances in the future (Zaman).

March 1, 2003, of course, was the date on which the Turkish parliament ended up rejecting U.S. troop deployment in the country ahead of the invasion of Iraq. Turkey, in other words, Can says, is no longer content to play the "memorized roles" that it performed during the Cold War.

It is true, of course, that the PKK's terrorism in Turkish cities is also an important motivating factor for action in northern Iraq. Turkey's patience with U.S. declarations about the problem of attacks carried out from bases in Iraqi Kurdistan has run out. Furthermore, according to Can, the Turkish Army does not take seriously "veiled threats" against the Kurds as well as against Turkish incursions (on the latter, see my January post on former Pentagon Undersecretary Dov Zakheim's op-ed). Turkey's Chief of Staff, General Yaşar Buyukanit has apparently not ruled out a confrontation with American troops, and there is a pro-Russian tendency in the military.

Can's hope - and hence the sense of expectation - is that an "over-the-border operation" will finally address a complicated set of policy problems that require resolution. In particular, he believes that it could clarify

1.Turkish-Western relations (Turkey-US as well as Turkey-EU)

2. Turkish-Russian, Turkish-Iranians, and Turkish-Iranian-Russian relations

3. the future of Iraq and a Kurdish state, and thereby, "the partnership and friendship of Turkey-Syria-Iran"

4. role of the Kurds in the region, especially Kurdish nationalism around the PKK and Barzani

5. Turkey's new regional and global position, especially the question of whether Turkey will be a global player

6. the terror problem in Turkey and "theoretical 'civil war scenarios'"

7. leadership processes in Turkey.

This seems to me a very tall order that will probably be disappointed and thus lead to further frustration. But very much will depend on the American response. It is possible that the U.S. has been denying that anything unusual is taking place precisely because it does not want the "over-the-border operation" to extend beyond the immediate problem of the PKK. News of a large Turkish invasion, with designs on Kirkuk, would be an untenable provocation and force the U.S.'s hand. However, in the meantime, it appears that the Americans have left the Kurds to confront the threat by themselves (a May 30 agreement handed security in three provinces over to the Kurdistan Northern Regional Government), and are waiting things out on the sidelines.

The Hrant Dink Assassination as a Turning Point

Hrant Dink (Source: European Academy Berlin)

There are two ways to read the recent murder of the Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink. Some fear that this is the beginning of an open season on those who, like Dink, challenge the ultra-nationalist vision of Turkey. On the other hand, the public and literary condemnations of the murder may also signal the self-assertion of Turkish liberals.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned the murder in the strongest terms, but critics objected to the manner in which this condemnation was framed, especially in parts of the Armenian diaspora.

"A bullet has been fired at democracy and freedom of expression," Erdogan announced shortly after news of Dink's assassination reached him. But Dink had been prosecuted for exercising his freedom of expression under the infamous article 301 of Turkey's penal code. Prior to his murder, Dink and other Turkish citizens who spoke out against the denial of the Armenian Genocide, discrimination against Kurds, and the lack of tolerance in their society more generally, had been attacked in many of the same newspapers who now claimed that the murder had been a strike against Turkey. These declarations also masked the truth that Dink was singled out as an Armenian by his killer.

But the Turkish media also contained reflections on Turkish society's wider responsibility for Dink's death. Mehmet Ali Birand wrote in the Turkish Daily News that "301 killed Hrant Dink." Omer Taspinar, in Today's Zaman, declared that

We are all complicit in Hrant Dink’s murder. Turkey’s conspiracy-prone public debate is increasingly producing an anti-European, anti-American, anti-Kurd, anti-Armenian and anti-liberal nationalism.

He denounced the witch-hunt against Turkish liberals:

Our incorrigible sense of insecurity has turned the founding ideology of the republic into an aggressive reflex against perceived enemies - -- enemies that we often create in our own imagination. How else can one explain the trials of Orhan Pamuk, Elif Safak and Hrant Dink in 2006? What about the shameful treatment of Professor Atilla Yayla for simply voicing an opinion?

And called out Justice Minister Cemil Cicek

who not too long ago blamed the organizers of a conference on the Armenian question for “stabbing the Turkish nation in the back.”

Nevertheless, the more liberal voices in Turkey are well aware of the real and imaginary threats firing nationalist passions in their country. PKK terrorism in southeastern Turkey continues to worry the country's leaders, and the week before the Hrant Dink assassination, Turkey saw a marked escalation in the rhetoric about Kirkuk, from where Iraqi oil is pumped to Ceyhan (see SPIEGEL for more).

Dov Zakheim: Reposition U.S. Troops to Iraqi Borders

Former Under Secretary of Defense Dov Zakheim, in an article published in the Financial Times on January 6, argues that the U.S. should reposition its forces on Iraq's borders rather than committing more troops to Baghdad and other cities. The concerns underlying Zakheim's proposal is very much in line with some of those expressed previously on this blog. Zakheim writes that

There is no doubt that Iraq is enmeshed in a bitter civil war. The US has had minimal impact on the course of that war. Iraqi casualties continue to mount, as do the number of Iraqis who have decided to kill their fellow citizens. Americans are caught in the crossfire. They cannot stop the sectarian forces that are determined to kill one another. The US could not do so in Lebanon during the 1980s and cannot do so today in Iraq.

He argues for a shift in American priorities. Instead of fighting to achieve stability inside Iraq, the U.S. must focus on preserving stability and American interests in the region. To this end, Zakheim suggests stationing a force of two brigades (a brigade is made up of 3,000-5,000 soldiers) In Iraqi Kurdistan, two further brigades in the far west of al-Anbar on the border with Syria, and a division (10,000-20,000 troops) in the south that will guard the border with Iran.

He also argues that

The forces in Kurdistan would help forestall a Kurdish declaration of independence that would prompt a Turkish invasion. The troops in western Iraq would help prevent both terrorist infiltration into Jordan and serious incursions from Syria. They would also indicate to Damascus that it should not misinterpret a readiness to talk as a concession.

and that the division-sized force in the south would send a clear signal to Tehran.

The New Anatolian has a slightly different interpretation of Zakheim's proposal:

U.S. forces should operate from Iraq's borders to stop the country from launching attacks against its neighbors and preventing any intervention by Turkey in the north in response to a Kurdish declaration of independence, the Financial Times said on Friday.

Stationing forces on the border between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey could allow both sides to save face in the case of a Kurdish declaration of independence, by setting limits on Kurdish northward aspirations and Turkish responses. However, I doubt that U.S. President Bush will adopt Zakheim's plan when he declares his new Iraq strategy. The members of this administration appear convinced that anything less than "staying the course" will be disastrous for their long-term political fortunes.

Kurds to Baker-Hamilton: Don't Sell Us Out Again

An old map of Kurdish lands, ca. 1992 (source: Perry-Castaneda Map Collection).

You can read Masrour Barzani's response to the Iraq Study Group Report in the Washington Post or on the Kurdistan Regional Government website. The immediate aim is clearly to prevent a cancellation of the popular referendum planned for Kirkuk. The long-term aim is to safeguard the autonomy of Kurdistan within Iraq - in other words to maintain the decentralized structure outlined in the constitution - and to protect the Kurds from hostile external intervention.

If you recall, the ISG Report warned about the violent fallout such a referendum might engender (see my previous post). Clearly, Baker and Hamilton want to stop such a referendum from taking place - ostensibly to prevent civil strife in Kirkuk but, more importantly, to keep Turkey happy. Turkey, it should be noted, claims that it is concerned about the safety of the Turkman population; it is probably most concerned about ceding any more oil-rich areas and powers to the Kurds. Barzani does not mention Kirkuk at all, but he objects vehemently to the ISG Report's "flippant" treatment of the constitution (after all, it guarantees the right of the Kurds to hold such a referendum). In the Baker-Hamilton report, the words "amending the constitution" often appear immediately before the phrase "settling the future of Kirkuk" (see for example ISG Report, p. 18).

The Baker-Hamilton report takes pains to portray the Iraqi constitution as a partisan document engineered by the Kurds and Shi'a at the expense of the Sunni. Yes, the constitution happens to reflect the interests of Shi'a and Kurds. There's a reason for that - as the report admits, "The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-drafting process." Maybe if they hadn't been so busy killing Americans and other Iraqis, things would look different today. Why should the rejectionist forces be rewarded now? Is it all as part of the imperative to preserve a united Iraq? I think that if the ISG had visited Kurdistan they might have understood better that it's either this kind of Iraq or no Iraq at all for the Kurds.

What I like about Barzani's argument is that it points out the pitfalls of the "realist" bandwagon. The realists have been sharpening their knives against the neo-cons for years. Their current offensive builds on the demonization of neo-conservative visions of the Middle East. To be fair, when turned into policy, those visions have been disastrous. But to imply that Baker & co. represent a more moral approach is perverse. Let's not forget - lest we do, Barzani won't let us - that the report "was partly written by those who orchestrated the saving of Saddam Hussein in 1991." Let's not forget that this act of realism led to the deaths of thousands of Kurds. Yes, today, there are 3,000 Iraqis dying every month. But few of them are Kurds. Why should the Kurds have to pay for the mess that is Iraq? Why should their interests be sacrificed at the expense of those within Iraq and outside its borders who have consistently embraced the rejectionist and obstructionist policies that have led to the daily massacres of Iraqi civilians and the deaths of many American soldiers?

Against the logic of appeasement, which in this case means privileging the interests of regional powers over those of people on the ground, Barzani invokes democracy - he uses the word seven times. One, the constitution reflects a vote by the majority of the Iraqi population (true). Two, Kurdistan's autonomy is firmly anchored in the will of the Kurdish people. It seems bizarre that the only undeniably positive outcomes of the American invasion of Iraq should be sacrificed at the altar of a realpolitik that is likely to make things worse for America in the long-term. At the minimum, those championing this part of the Baker-Hamilton report should not be allowed to get away with presenting themselves as morally superior to anyone. It would behoove them to take note of Barzani's appeal:

Don't sell us out to our authoritarian neighbors and those who are terrorizing our communities. We agreed democratically to participate in this project because we were guaranteed the rights needed to protect our people. We Kurds are asking President Bush and America to remember the sacrifices we have made to keep your loved ones safe in Iraq. We are asking you to keep a promise where those before you have failed.

Unfortunately, in today's political climate, the opponents of Bush are likely to be so blinded by their thirst for revenge against the neo-cons, that they will dismiss this as mere rhetoric.

A "New" Iraq Strategy

A banner from the Kurdistan Regional Government website.
Note the Kurdish (not Iraqi) flag blowing in the wind.

It appears that the White House is leaning toward the plan that U.S. Senator John McCain has been pitching for a dramatic increase in American troops in Iraq. Tens of thousands additional American soldiers are supposed to be deployed in Baghdad at another last-ditch effort to beat the insurgency. The new objective? To end the "cycle" of sectarian violence (New York Times). The idea seems to be that by making Baghdad safe from the Sunni insurgents, the Iraqi government will gain credibility to clamp down on the Shi'a militias, and perhaps public approval.

All this is more wishful thinking. The Shi'a are not going to be won over by the U.S. They will be happy to watch the Americans continue to fight on their behalf, but they know that the U.S. will not be in Iraq forever. Those politicians calling for another troop increase will be sending more American soldiers to their deaths for gains that will be reversed once America finally withdraws - if these gains materialize at all. In any case, it is doubtful that the Shi'i population will credit the U.S. or the Maliki government with such gains. At the end of the day, the residents of Sadr City will see the Mahdi Army as their savior. Like it or not, the militias' sectarian cleansing is also seen by most Shi'a as their ticket to safe neighborhoods. Any attempts by Americans to limit militia activity, on the other hand, is perceived as a deliberate effort to put Shi'a in harm's way.

Meanwhile, the Sunni insurgency, spearheaded mainly by former Baathists but abetted by al Qaeda, is continuing the fight against the Marines deployed in the western provinces, most notably, al-Anbar. Despite the pessimistic reports by such seasoned observers as Col. Peter Devlin (see our earlier post, "Failed Province: Marines Lose Hope in al-Anbar"), the young Marines serving in the province are more optimistic. An acquaintance of mine who is the executive officer (second in command) of a rifle company deployed in al-Anbar told me that the Marines were "laying the smack down" and that things were getting "incrementally better." The Americans in al-Anbar might be embarking on another offensive soon. But to me it seems that failing a deal with credible authorities on the ground, the effects of these operations are likely to prove ephemeral. And of course, the costs are incredibly high. The same officer said that in his company there had been 4 men killed in action and 42 wounded. A company is just under 200 rifle men. The battalion to which his company belongs had lost 16 men and counted 150 wounded. (A battalion is made up of five companies or around 2,000 men).

There is one population that still views the Americans positively - the Kurds. Although they are getting more and more annoyed about being taken for granted (as they were in the Iraq Study Group report), they are America's only reliable ally on the ground in Iraq. The Kurds are enjoying the benefits of relative prosperity and security mainly because there are no Sunni in their territory and because they were able to develop autonomous institutions during the sanctions and no-fly zone period. They have been doing their best to protect Kurdistan from the havoc that rules in most of Iraq. Thus, they routinely turn away Arabs - Shi'a or Sunni - at the border. Unlike other Iraqis, the Kurds know that they could use the help of the U.S. in protecting them from the hostile states surrounding Iraqi Kurdistan. But instead of reassuring the Kurds, Baker, Hamilton and company seem to have gone out of their way to antagonize them. For example, the Iraq Study Group Report refers repeatedly to the "contentious" issue of Kirkuk. Kirkuk, a city in the north of Iraq, is home to a mixed population of Kurds, Turkomans, and Arabs. For years, Kurdish inhabitants of Kirkuk suffered from Saddam's Arabization campaign there. It is, needless to say, a big oil center. In post-Sadddam Iraq, according to the Iraqi constitution, the population of Kirkuk is supposed to hold a referendum on whether the city should join the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The ISG Report warns that such a referendum would spark further violence, and then, in the next paragraph chastises Kurdish (as well as Shi'a) leaders for "not working toward a united Iraq" (ISG Report, pp. 18-19).

Kurds, Azeris, and the Disintegration of the Middle East

The Middle East, October 2006

An October 20 post on EurasiaNet reports that "Iranian officials are intent on keeping a lid on ethnic-minority discontent, as the country prepares for pivotal elections." The article focuses on Iranian sensitivity about an apparent resurgence in Azeri self-assertion.

Azeris, who speak a Turkic language and are mostly Shi'a, make up a quarter of Iran's population of 68 million, according to estimates. Most Azeris live in northern Iran, near the borders with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Azeris of Iran were last in the international news spotlight when a state-owned paper published a caricature representing an Azeri as a cockroach. In the wake of that caricature's publication, which also mocked Azeris for not being able to speak Farsi, Azeris staged demonstrations, some of which turned violent. In September, protests flared up again, with a number of Azeri organizations demanding greater cultural rights. Since then, a number of Azeri activists have been arrested.

But until now, Iranian Azeris have been loyal to the state. Azerbaijan has also been careful not to antagonize its powerful southern neighbor. Certainly, tensions between the state and the Azeri minority cannot be compared to the difficult history of the country's Kurds. Iranian Kurdistan is in the northwest of the country, and is home to about 4 million Kurds. Unlike the Azeris, Iranian Kurds do not yet have a state on the other side of the border to which they might turn if things get rough. But the American invasion and subsequent (failing) occupation of Iraq has allowed the Kurds of Iraq to move closer and closer to independent statehood.

What the Kurds and the Azeris share is a history of suppression by one or more of the region's dominant ethnic groups and their representative empires: the (Muslim) Arabs, Persians, and Turks. Their claims to historic territories and to distinctive national identities were not recognized in the post-Ottoman and post-colonial orders. There are a number of other historic ethno-religious minorities in the Middle East: the Druze, Circassians, Assyrians, Armenians, Maronite Christians, and the Jews. Of all these small ethnic groups, the Jews, who benefited from a strong diasporic nationalist movement have been the clear winners of the post-colonial order. Most of the other minorities suffered genocide, deportation, and/or subjugation at the hands of one of the dominant ethnic groups. (Jews suffered the century's most horrific genocide - but mostly on European soil. Though Middle Eastern Jewry faced acute danger from Arab nationalists during and immediately after WWII, and massive displacement post-1948, it was spared genocide, and instead gained sovereign statehood together with European Jews who migrated en masse to the region after the Shoah).

Most of those watching the Iraq war and its fallout have focused on the impact of the American invasion and occupation on Iraqis. One of the most dramatic and lethal consequences of Saddam's collapse has been the civil war between Sunni and Shi'a in the country. But the current carnage represents only the preliminary phase of the far more bloody struggle that will break out to determine the new borders of incipient Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi'a states when partition becomes a real possibility (i.e., when the Americans leave). The fall of the Saddam regime also sounded the death knell for the old, Arab-nationalist (sometimes mistakenly called "secularist" - in fact, no truly secular national identity has ever emerged in the Middle East) visions of the region. The disintegration of Iraq is rendering a non-sectarian Arab national identity impossible. It is also empowering those minorities who never quite fit the paradigm.

It has become increasingly clear that Iraq is headed for a tripartite division among Kurds, Sunni, and Shi'a. While the latter two groups can count on the backing of Arabs (i.e., the Sunni states and the Islamist organizations) and Persians (Iran), the establishment of an independent Kurdistan faces the opposition of all three traditional dominant groups - Arabs, Persians, and Turks. It also unlikely to take place without the type of ethnic cleansing so familiar to 20th-century historians of Europe. In turn, the formation of a Kurdish state would provoke further crackdowns by various regimes against minority populations such as the Azeris in Iran. This would put increasing pressure on "protector states" such as Azerbaijan to attempt interventions against their more powerful neighbors, in order to liberate their irredenta. In short, the potential for momentous border revisions and waves of deadly ethnic strife has never been greater.

Kurds deny Israeli presence in Iraqi Kurdistan

I just heard a Radio Sawa broadcast in which a spokesman of the Kurdish provincial government in Iraq categorically denied allegations that there is an Israeli presence whatsoever in the Kurdish controlled region. Apparently, the Kurds have come under fire for relying on Israeli military and security experts to build an airforce and train their security forces. The Kurdish spokesman emphasized that there are no Israelis in the Kurdish region, but said that the regional government does not discriminate against members of any religion, be they Christians, Muslims, Jews, or Yazidis. He also voiced his anger at the fact that the Kurds are singled out for alleged ties to Israel, while a number of Arab states (Egypt and Jordan) have Israeli embassies. Finally, responding to renewed talk about the historic links between the late Kurdish KDP leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani, father of the current ruling KDP leader Mas'ud Barzani, the spokesman argued that the late Barzani's action have to be viewed in their context and light of the dire situation of the Kurds at the time.

Previous Kurdish denials can be read on the website of the Kurdistan Regional Government (note the lack of an Iraq suffix in the .org domain). The Kurdish Regional Government's professional website full of English commentary is just one more indication of how much better the Kurds have fared in the new Iraq. As much as they might deny it, the Kurds are building a state and they're going about it the right way.