South Ossetia and Abkhazia

Speaking in Sochi and appealing to the "world Jewish community" and to Israel, the president of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity blamed Georgian troops for destroying the Jewish cultural center in Tkhinvali, the separatist region's capital. He also claimed that a "genocide" had been committed by the Georgians in South Ossetia (Ha'aretz Hebrew).

The Russians, South Ossetians, and Abkhazians appear determined to perpetuate the allegations that the Georgians engaged in deliberate killings of non-Georgian civilians. Of course, Russia has given almost no access to independent organizations for the verification of these claims, and the main victims of ethnic cleansing are the thousands of Georgians who used to live in South Ossetian villages. 

Notwithstanding the idle rhetoric of the West, the integration of South Ossetia and Abkhazia into the Russian Federation is quickly advancing. It now looks very unlikely that these territories will be restored to Georgian sovereignty any time soon. The president of Abkhazia, Sergey Bagapsh, is imagining a similar status under Russian auspices for his country as the one enjoyed by Taiwan under U.S. protection. 

Israel, in the meantime, appears determined not to antagonize the Russians and is directing Israeli military contractors to freeze business in Georgia. Russia's message has reached Jerusalem loud and clear. Israel will not risk retaliatory Russian arm sales to Syria, Iran, and others. Meanwhile, the precise nature of Russian-Israeli relations since the Georgian crisis awaits further elucidation. 

The Destruction in South Ossetia

Ethnic diversity in the Caucasus (Source)

The Russian devastation of Georgian positions in the break-away region of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and, now, the Caucasian country's heartland signal a new reality not only in this part of the world but in Russia's role elsewhere.

As so many commentators have pointed out, this was the first time that we have seen Russia's military confront regular armed forces, as part of an international conflict, since its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. One could nitpick and point to the fighting in Chechnya, but here Russia faced a separatist insurgency carried out by irregular though effective bands of fighters. Russia's performance in that earlier conflict, however, was interpreted by many as a symptom of its military's disintegration.

Now, Russia has asserted its supremacy, before its doorstep - in the air, sea, and on (the rather treacherous) land. It faced down a modern fighting force by a small but rising power, whose army has been supplied by Ukraine, the US, and Israel (until recently). Interestingly enough, although the news showed up only on a few tickers several weeks ago, Israel suspended its arms shipments (primarily UAVs) to Georgia - probably after Russian pressure.

After the diplomatic defeat in Kosovo, which the Russians have always argued should also mean a green light for Abkhazian and Ossetian independence from Georgia, Putin and Medvedev have upped the ante - they are talking about an outright annexation of these regions to Russia. The South Caucasus, in retrospect, was a red line for Russia, beyond which it would not allow any more encroachments. With Georgia's foolish decision to launch a preemptive attack on the separatist positions in South Ossetia, Russia has seized the opportunity to take an even larger bite.

The implications for the former Soviet republics are clear - states from Turkmenistan to Ukraine (and their would-be allies in the West or elsewhere) must now own up to the fact that whatever support is delivered to them from afar better be significant if they are to assert themselves against Russia. For the weaker states among these republics, this will mean toeing a more neutral line between Russia and the West. The belligerent factions in Azerbaijan pressing for a renewal of hot war with Armenia, over control of Nagorno-Karabakh, may have been served notice. This would be a dramatic reconfiguration of the South Caucasus, with the the "TBC pipeline powers" folding their cards to Gazprom - though it remains to be seen how Turkey, another state whose current military capabilities in international conflict are still untested will react this state of affairs. To be sure, the reduction of Georgia to a rump state around Tblisi would be good news for the other resource-poor state in the region - the Republic of Armenia.

For larger former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine, Russia's actions will accelerate coalition-building with the West and investment in their armed forces. Apparently, the Ukrainian navy is not standing idly by as Russia attempts to blockade the Georgian coast, to prevent Ukrainian arms dealers from shipping weapons there. But it remains to be seen how much force, if any, Ukraine will be able to wield against Russia in this round.

Beyond its immediate sphere of influence on its frontiers, Russia has made explicit its rejection of an international system that it perceives as stacked in the West's favor. It has also made the Western European powers preaching to it look like paper tigers. Although much of Russia's rhetoric in this conflict has been directed at the US, which it blames for inciting Georgia's attack in the first place, it has become clear that the Americans decided early on that Georgia was not worth an overt confrontation with Russia. No doubt, this will bring joy to many Russian analysts and to others riding the bandwagon of America's decline. They should be careful not to overstep the new borders demarcated for them.

Pipe Dreams: Samsun-Ceyhan-Ashqelon-Eilat

A map showing the B-T-C Pipeline (Source: Wikipedia)

A number of new oil and natural gas pipelines have made the news in the past year. The most high-profile one was the recently completed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and is quickly becoming a major energy hub. This week, a 690 km natural gas pipeline running parallel to it began feeding gas from the Shah Deniz field in the Caspian Sea off Azerbaijan to Georgia and Turkey (Financial Times, December 14, 2006, p. 3).

The new pipeline, built by British Petrol and several partners, connects Baku to Erzurum in eastern Turkey, from where the gas will be fed to the port city of Ceyhan. The pipeline will eventually be able to carry gas to Europe. U.S. policymakers hope that it will challenge Russia's near-monopoly over gas export pipelines out of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Gazprom, Russia's largest company and Central and Eastern Europe's main supplier of gas, has recently raised its prices (even to allies such as Belarus), threatening the economies of U.S. allies Georgia and Ukraine. Notice also that the pipelines draw a big circle around Iran as well as Armenia.

While the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and this new Baku-Erzurum gas corridor aim to provide an alternative to Russian energy with an eye to Europe, a different project announced this week will feed gas, oil, and water from Russia to the Levant and possibly beyond it. Turkey and Israel are cooperating to build an underwater pipeline from Ceyhun to Ashqelon (see Ha'aretz, the Washington Times, and Zaman). Feeders will also provide water and energy to Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. Gazprom is planning to increase gas delivery across the Black Sea to the Turkish city of Samsun from where it will continue to Ceyhan. Check out Encarta's World Atlas for regional maps showing Ceyhan (in the Turkish province of Adana) and Ashqelon.


The Israelis, for their part, will make use of a pipeline from Ashqelon to Eilat. Until now, crude oil has been pumped from Eilat northward to Ashqelon and Haifa. The recently-completed "Reverse Flow Project" will allow oil and gas to be pumped in the opposite direction, from Ashqelon to Eilat (Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company). From the port in Eilat, oil can be shipped further east via the Red Sea - at competitive prices (so argue the backers of the plan). The project has excited India, which is hoping to diversify its energy sources as its economy grows. China and South Korea could also benefit (People's Daily Online).

Israel currently imports most of its oil from Russia by oil tankers, which ship the crude from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus to Haifa, where Israel's refineries are located (Washington Times). Congestion on this waterway has driven up the price of shipping, which was the main reason for the recent cancellation of a deal with Turkey to provide Israel with fresh water (it turned out that the increase in shipping costs made the water more expensive than fresh water produced in Israel by its desalination refineries).

With all these pipelines, the Maccabees probably wouldn't have had to worry about making the oil last. Happy Hanukah - חנוכה שמח!

Addendum: The website of the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company mentioned above has two interactive, animated maps, giving you a very good sense of the movement of oil and gas within Israel, and from Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia to east Asia via Israel.