Obama's Moves

BY AMOS

Watching Obama maneuvering the treacherous terrain of Middle East policy has been a pleasure. History will show that those who regarded him as a naive idealist did so at their peril. Netanyahu is slowly waking up to reality; others might do so too late and find themselves under the White House steamroller. The Obama administration is as serious about its ideals and goals as it is cunning about achieving them. 

The decision to start off by challenging Netanyahu on settlement construction was nothing short of brilliant. Simply put, Obama and America had nothing to lose by pressuring Bibi on this. No serious person in American politics would today sacrifice their credibility by arguing that Israel should be allowed to expand settlements as it sees fit. In the U.S., there is a small number of (mostly religious) American Jews who still believe in the enterprise, but they were against Obama from the beginning, and the delusions in which they have been living are now colliding with the hard facts. The only remotely palatable argument, voiced by Netanyahu's propagandists such as Charles Krauthammer, that Israel should at least be allowed to expand settlements in order to accommodate "natural growth" in these communities, is itself a huge concession. Moreover, it too has been rejected by the Americans. 

As other commentators have observed, the more Netanyahu and the Israeli lunatic fringe (like it or not, this is how policy makers in Washington view everyone right of Netanyahu) fight with Obama, the more pathetic and/or racist clamoring emanates from their midst, the more U.S. diplomats stand to gain in their negotiations with the Middle East's other regional powers and domestically. 

 

The strategy followed by the Obama administration vis-à-vis the Israeli-Arab conflict and the region is best described as Machievallian liberalism. Right now, he is trying to make the Israelis understand the limits of their power and to force them to make policy choices in response to these constraints. These constraints have in fact always existed, but in the past Israel benefited from subsidies of good will (on the part of the U.S.)  to overcome them. But over time, subsidies of this nature cause inefficiencies and distortions that become unsustainable. 

Now, for the first time in a while, Israeli leaders are being forced to act as consumers (and producers) in a free market, where prices reflect the supply and demand of political, military, and economic power. Unfortunately, the subvention of lunacy has rendered some groups in Israeli society extremely uncompetitive in the marketplace of political ideas and in the practice of power. The settlers, for example, who think Israel can do just fine without America, are suffering from delusions of grandeur typical of corporations who have benefited from state largesse for years. 

The new calculus is very simple. You want to keep building settlements? Pay for it. You want to waffle on a two-state solution? It will cost you. You want to be able to shape responses to the Iranian problem? Quid pro quo. 

The Michael Oren Pick and Lieberman Shenanigans

Photo: Shalem Center

BY AMOS

Ambassador Michael Oren

Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu picked Michael Oren (b. 1955) as Israel's next ambassador to the United States. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has endorsed the appointment, and it will now have to be approved by the cabinet.

Oren, a professor with a Ph.D. from Princeton's Near Eastern Studies department, is a brilliant pick. An American Jew who immigrated to Israel in 1979 and served in the Paratroopers Brigade during the Lebanon war, and in numerous positions of leadership in the army thereafter, is truly at home in both Israel and the United States. He is the author of the definitive account of the Six-Day War that we have today (it will be definitive until Arab archives are opened up), and of another book on American conceptions of the Middle East. Oren is also a fantastic communicator who knows how to speak to different audiences. Having just finished a term as a visiting professor at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, he is primed to go. 

There are few Israeli prime ministers who would have been able to pull off such an appointment. So many of Israel's ambassadors these days, even to important posts, are mediocre political appointees. American Jews, in the past two decades, have been shut out of such postings. In choosing Oren, Netanyahu showed his ability to think outside of the box and that he is not afraid to be challenged. Oren, though affiliated with the right-of-center Shalem Center, is a pragmatist who knows that Israel cannot indefinitely occupy the West Bank. He is someone who understands what is going on in the White House these days. 

Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman

It is still not clear to me what the Foreign Minister himself is doing these days. Ha'aretz has a somewhat disturbing review of Lieberman's activities so far. 

Here are a few highlights:

Lieberman's schedule has become one of the Foreign Ministry's best-kept secrets. Aside from [...] a select few, no one - including very senior officials in his ministry - is privy to what Lieberman does with his time.

This secrecy has led to several embarrassing faux pas, such as when a meeting with a foreign counterpart had to be rescheduled and none of the participants were notified.

Okay, that happens. But:

Lieberman has made other contentious procedural changes within the realm of his public relations. Although the ministry has an entire publicity department comprising some 20 expert diplomats, Lieberman made the unprecedented decision to appoint newcomer Sivan Raviv - who has no prior experience - as his spokesman.

Is that wise?

And speaking of appointments:

He has named Bedouin diplomat Ishmael Khaldi as his ministerial adviser on the Arab world. The appointment was leaked to the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth under the headline "Lieberman's Arab advisor", hinting that it was an attempt to gloss over Lieberman's alleged racism.

Since then it has emerged that Khaldi has next to no Foreign Ministry experience in dealing with the Middle East, having never served as a representative in an Arab state or in a relevant branch.

Associates of Lieberman have stressed that despite Khaldi's lack experience in the region, the motive behind his appointment was "promotion of minorities in the Foreign Ministry."

I don't know what is worse, the pick or the statement, thereafter, that it was an "affirmative action" appointment. But who knows, maybe Khaldi will perform admirably in this job.

Is this a luke-warm endorsement or what?

Sources present at Lieberman's meetings with foreign officials have testified that his level of English is "good" and that he "succeeds in getting across his message."

There are many more anecdotes in the article itself. The last paragraph, which explains that Lieberman's office refused to answer a list of 12 questions submitted by Ha'aretz, testifies to a worrying break in relations with the media. It sounds as if Lieberman has written off Ha'aretz as irrelevant.

Here's Ha'aretz's take on the Kleine Zeitung interview discussed in my earlier post:

Foreign Ministry officials heard of [Lieberman's interview with the Austrian daily Kleiner Zeitoung [sic] last month, in which he declared his opposition to negotiations with Syria.] only when it was leaked to Israeli media. Only after an in-depth investigation did it become clear that this unknown newspaper was actually a local tabloid

It's pretty funny that it took an "in-depth investigation" to figure out that this "unknown newspaper" was a "local tabloid." I think the latter description is not entirely accurate; "small regional newspaper" would do it more justice. Also, as an Austrian friend of Noah K., L.E., has pointed out and as I also emphasized in my post, Christian Wehrschutz, who conducted the interview, is a respected journalist with extensive experience. L.E. adds, however, that

The question is only why he chose to put the interview [in the Kleine Zeitung] and not in the Presse, Standard or even NZZ (Swiss), with which he also has regular connections.

L.E.'s conclusions:

This interview appears where it does due to personal or newspaper politics. The [other] question would then be why he got that interview in the first place.

The last question is important indeed. If Wehrschutz presented himself as a freelancer, why was this one of the first interviews granted by Lieberman's office, specifically by his personal secretary Sigalit Levi, to a foreign journalist?

I'm really wondering in what language this interview was conducted - whether a translator was used or not.

Erratic Behavior: Sign of Things to Come with the Netanyahu Government?

BY AMOS

One day Lieberman "cannot see Syria as a real partner for any kind of settlement" (see previous post), and the next he is "willing to negotiate," albeit "without preconditions" (Ha'aretz). This is diplomatic silliness. It looks we are going to see a lot of instant reversals with this new government. If you play hard to get on Saturday, you can't suddenly drop your skirt (or pants) on Sunday. The Prime Minister's Office has been strangely silent. Maybe they are hoping that Lieberman will render himself irrelevant. 

Obama and Netanyahu

BY AMOS

(Photo: Wikimedia Commons)

Aluf Benn provides an  excellent analysis of Netanyahu's Washington-strategy. Many commentators are convinced that Israel's new prime minister is on a collision course not only with the Europeans but also with the White House. Benn contrasts Netanyahu's strategy so far with that of his predecessor, Ehud Olmert, in order to explain what Bibi might be thinking:

The prime minister is aware of the assumption of many that his rejection of the idea of a Palestinian state, and opposition to withdrawals from the West Bank and the Golan Heights, will result in an inevitable crisis in relations with Obama and propel Israel into political isolation. But he is not afraid. The way he sees it, it's better to come to the White House with a list of demands and requests, and to condition any concession on a quid pro quo, than it is to play the role of yes man to the president and gain nothing in return. 

Ehud Olmert emerged from his many talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas with the impression that, because of the Palestinians' positions on the so-called core issues, there is no chance for a final-status accord with them - which is why he opted to emphasize Israeli generosity to secure international support. Netanyahu prefers to enter into negotiations with maximalist positions rather than to begin with concessions that may win the world's approval but won't satisfy the other side. He is ready to pay the political price this will exact abroad for the sake of appearing consistent in his positions and preserving his coalition at home (Ha'aretz). 

We will see what happens, but for now, Benn's reading seems more persuasive than the hysterical fears of a collapse of US-Israeli relations and of Israel's position in the West. Netanyahu does not seem fazed by the missteps of his foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman. My sense is that Lieberman will not play a major role in foreign policy at all - Bibi will hold the reins tight here as well as in his economic policy.

Labor Wants In

Even though Labor MKs have been boasting that they are not afraid to enter the opposition, they have been increasing the pressure on Livni to include them in the government. That, I believe, is how one should interpret statements by the Labor Party to the media, that the faction will not recommend Livni or Netanyahu to President Shimon Peres to form the next government. The comments of Dan Kurtzer, former U.S. ambassador to Israel, that

the Obama administration would find it politically risky to embrace a government that included Lieberman, who has voiced controversial views about Arabs (Ha'aretz),

also give Labor some added punch in the coalition-wrangling going on. Even though Israeli voters, especially on the right, are on the whole indifferent to these U.S. concerns, the senior figures in each party realize that strained relations with the White House are not in Israel's interest. They will be weighing the various domestic and international costs and benefits carefully.

However, it is unclear whether it is possible for these elections to yield a coalition that might appeal to the American administration - even if that were a priority for Israelis. A Kadima-Likud-Labor unity government (28+27+13 = 68 seats) would be a hard pill for Netanyahu to swallow, seeing as it would mean little change from the current line. Meanwhile, the pressure will be on Livni to explain her negotiations with Lieberman to Israeli voters from the left and, behind closed doors, to members of the Obama administration. Netanyahu knows, a fortiori, that a far-right coalition would spell trouble for American-Israeli relations.

In a comment earlier today, Nobody remarked about the need for electoral reform in Israel. There are two conflicting aims that disinterested voters pursue with reform proposals: 1) "true democracy", or 2) stability. The former is almost impossible to satisfy, as no electoral system is immune from challenges of injustice. With regard to the latter, there are certainly systems that make for more stable government. However, I would argue that Israeli society is more divided - ethnically, religiously, and socio-economically - than those countries that do not enjoy the curse of extreme political fragmentation. Lastly, as any student of electoral systems will tell you, there are no "disinterested" reforms in this sphere of politics. Since the proposed changes are always negotiated by political parties, they tend to favor those currently in power, or are at least designed to advance the interests of incumbents (occasionally there are miscalculations though). I am not sure the electoral system is the problem.

Another Option: Unity Government

Both Livni and Bibi have expressed their opposition to a unity government. But the numbers, elucidated in my previous post, may make the option of a Kadima-Likud coalition government more appealing. Presumably, such a government would have a rotating premiership shared by Livni and Netanyahu. Here is what it would look like:

Kadima + Likud + Labor + Yisrael Beitenu

= (28 + 27 + 13 + 15) seats

= 83 seats [there are 120 in the Knesset]

It would also be possible without Labor or Yisrael Beitenu, but Kadima would need Labor as a buffer and Likud would need Yisrael Beitenu. Of course, such a government would be handicapped in major policy moves such as peace negotiations, because nearly half of the coalition might oppose them at any time. The key to the puzzle is examining the Likud list and to see what MKs would sit in the Knesset.

Here are the top 28 Likud MKs (I've included one extra, just in case Likud picks up another mandate when the remaining ballots are counted). There are quite a few unknowns (to me) among them, whose political orientation I cannot predict. It looks like the far-right ("right") and more moderate right ("right-centrist") forces are even. By "right," in this case, I mean MKs who would go as far as voting against the government, i.e., against Netanyahu's instructions, if they felt that a policy contradicted their ideology. It looks like this kind of unity government might be able to function. This is hardly scientific and I am open to correction on all of these. 

Note the number of women on the list, the election of Ayub Kra (a Druze MK), and an Ethiopian immigrant Adamsu on #28 (he came to Israel in 1983 though). 

1. Netanyahu (right-centrist)

2. Gideon Sa'ar (right-centrist)

3. Gil'ad Arden (right)

4. Reuven Rivlin (right-centrist)

5. Benny Begin (right)

6. Moshe Kahalon (right)

7. Silvan Shalom (right-centrist)

8. Moshe Ya'alon (right-centrist)

9. Yuval Steinitz (right-centrist)

10. Leah Nes (?)

11. Yisrael Katz (right)

12. Yuli Adelshteyn (right)

13. Limor Livnat (right)

14. Haim Katz (right)

15. Yosef Feld (?)

16. Michael Eitan (right)

17. Dan Meridor (right-centrist)

18. Tsipi Hutubali (?)

19. Gila Gamliel (?)

20. Ze'ev Alkin

21. Yariv Levin

22. Tsion Pinian

23. Ayub Kra (right-centrist)

24. Dani Danon

25. Karmel Shamah

26. Ofir Akunis

27. Miri Regev (right-centrist)

28. Alali Adamsu (?)

1. בנימין נתניהו	40. הילה -אסנת מארק	79. ישראל אמויאל
2. גדעון משה סער	41. אסף חפץ	80. אסיה אנטוב
3. גלעד ארדן	42. יחיאל (מיכאל) לייטר	81. טליה ארגמן
4. ראובן רובי ריבלין	43. דניאל בנלולו	82. אריאל בולשטיין
5. זאב בנימין בגין	44. עוזי דיין	83. מישאל בן עמי
6. משה כחלון	45. אדמונד חסין	84. גבריאל- חיים ביטון
7. סילבן שלום	46. פנינה רוזנבלום סימונוב	85. טל ברודי
8. משה (בוגי) יעלון	47. זאב -יאיר ז`בוטינסקי	86. יבגניי בריסקין
9. יובל שטייניץ	48. מיכאל קליינר	87. אריק ברמי
10. לאה נס	49. נורית (יונה) קורן	88. יוסף גינו
11. ישראל כץ	50. סמיר קאידבה	89. דוד גולן
12. יולי יואל אדלשטיין	51. יוסף- ספי ריבלין	90. פנחס דלויה
13. לימור אהבה לבנת	52. דוד מנע	91. דוד הרמלין
14. חיים כץ	53. יחיאל- מיכאל חזן	92. יוסף חביב
15. יוסף פלד	54. משה שלמה מוסקל	93. יואב טבול
16. מיכאל - מיקי איתן	55. אליהו גבאי	94. אופיר טוביאנה
17. דן מרידור	56. גיל חדד	95. שלמה טל
18. ציפי חוטובלי	57. אלי אבידר	96. זהר ירמיהו
19. גילה גמליאל	58. חמי - נחמיה דורון	97. אסתר שושנה לזרוביץ
20. זאב אלקין	59. מיכל - דאה כפרי - ירדני	98. פרד מונצ`רס
21. יריב גדעון לוין	60. אתי תלמי	99. עופר מוקה
22. ציון פיניאן	61. בלהה ניסנסון	100. יהונתן מישייב
23. איוב קרא	62. ריכאד חיאדין	101. דוד מימון
24. דני דנון	63. אפריים אבן	102. אליהו מלכה
25. כרמל שאמה	64. איילה שטגמן	103. טובה מעוז
26. אופיר אקוניס	65. מרים ארז	104. סנדרה סגיואן
27. מירי (מרים) רגב	66. עטאף קרינאוי	105. מיכאל סוטובסקי
28. אללי אדמסו	67. יוסף בדש	106. אלון סיסו
29. יצחק (איציק) דנינו

Coalition Building - Bibi's Nonsense

It's a travesty that the press is uncritically regurgitating the notion that Bibi has a higher chance of forming a government than Livni. This is not at all true when one looks at the numbers, even if they change by one or two seats in favor of the right-wing after the soldiers' and absentee voters' ballots are counted.

Although Netanyahu has been arguing that he won a decisive victory, I don't think he is thrilled about forming a far-right government. He knows that this will cause him a lot of problems on the international stage, which will in turn impede his ability to advance his policy aims. Furthermore, he would need both ultra-Orthodox parties to form the "nationalist" government that so many people are dreaming about.

Here is what such a coalition would look like:

Likud + Yisrael Beitenu + Shas + Jewish Home + National Union + Torah Judaism 

= (27 + 15 + 11 + 3 + 4 + 5) seats

= 65 seats  [out of a total of 120]

That's a very weak government, considering that it commands just 4 seats more than the minimum. Plus, can you imagine the headaches with Shas, the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox, and Lieberman all in one coalition?

Both Shas and Yisrael Beitenu have been posturing that they would prefer a Netanyahu government. There is bad blood between Shas and Livni, so perhaps Shas will under no circumstances sit in her government. But Lieberman's public expressions of support for a Netanyahu government should be read as attempts to strengthen his bargaining position vis-a-vis Livni. The same of course goes for Barak's remarks about Labor returning to the opposition. Nothing is a given. Neither Kadima nor Labor have any compunctions about sitting in a government with Lieberman. Moreover, Shas and Yisrael Beitenu would probably be willing to bury the hatchet, at least temporarily, if the right conditions are met.

There is thus a distinct possibility of a Kadima + Labor + Yisrael Beitenu + Shas coalition

 = (28 + 13 + 15 + 11) seats

= 67 seats. 

As always, the remarks to the press and leaks by the various candidates and their parties should be viewed with a great deal of skepticism. As much as certain candidates may insist that they will never sit in a government with X or Y, or that they would never consider conceding on issue Z, everything is up for grabs. 

18th Knesset Elections 2009 - Predictions

In less than a week, on Tuesday, February 10, Israelis will elect the 18th Knesset. There has been quite a bit of movement in the polls over the last week. The latest results are showing a tight race between Likud and Kadima, and a surge in support for Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beitenu party.  Candidates on the various party lists are competing for 120 seats. Here are my predictions for the elections results.

Likud: 29

Kadima: 23

Yisrael Beitenu: 16

Labor: 15

Shas: 10

United Torah Judaism: 6

Meretz: 5

National Union: 5

Jewish Home: 2

Hadash: 4

Ra'am Ta'al: 3

Balad: 2

I see Likud widening its lead over Kadima again in the last days before the vote. The last poll is tomorrow, it may still predict a close race between the two parties, but Kadima's lead is heavily dependent on quiet. I am predicting that Lieberman will fall slightly from the current projections but that his party will still beat Labor. 

The next order of business will be to determine who will sit in the government and in what capacity. A key question will be whether the Labor Party will give Ehud Barak the go-ahead to join a coalition with Netanyahu and Lieberman. I think he will twist the right arms to be able to maintain his tenure in the Defense Ministry. According to the polls, there is a possibility that a secular coalition comprising Likud, Kadima, Yisrael Beitenu, and Labor could rule without Shas or UTJ. 

Also interesting to consider - the candidate lists for Labor, Yisrael Beitenu, Kadima, and Likud. These will be important to peruse as the cabinet seats are divvied up.