Showing posts with label Korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Korea. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 02, 2007

On the Face

Orange might be back in style. Photo: Anti-disengagement poster
in Jerusalem, December 2005. The Hebrew caption reads, "Again expulsion?"


It looks as if Tsipi Livni has taken a horrible dive. The situation is truly "on the face." How did she let Olmert play her like this? It is remarkable to watch Israel's own "slippery eel" (this is actually what the Koreans call UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon) holding and holding on.

Only two other Kadima MKs joined Livni's "revolt" - the head of the coalition, Avigdor Yitzhaki, and the backbencher, Marina Solodkin. Minister of Internal Security Avi Dichter (Kadima) shed a few crocodile tears and remarked that it would be a shame if Livni were sacked from the foreign ministry.

Of course, Shimon Peres (Kadima) still knows how to pick a winner; he is coveting Livni's post for himself, and who knows, maybe he'll even want to succeed Olmert as Kadima's candidate in the next election, which he would lose like nearly every other election he has run in. For what it's worth though, President Jimmy Carter gave Peres a ringing endorsement at a Berkeley lecture earlier today. He couldn't remember Livni's name, but he said that she might be the other politician, beside Peres, whom he would like to see as the next Israeli PM.

The other Olmert apparatchik thinking about the future is Minister of Housing and Construction, Meir Sheetrit, who will surely be rewarded with a promotion for his loyalty. Sheetrit has already announced his plans to run for the head of the party in future Kadima primaries. Meanwhile, Olmert is mulling over what he should do to Livni. It's hard to see her staying in her current post, not after publicly calling on Olmert to resign, but stranger things have happened- I give her a 20% chance. Livni has been keeping a low profile for so long, it's truly bizarre that Olmert seems to have found an opportunity to purge her like this; especially the day after the release of a report that basically handed him a sword to fall into, while singling out Livni for praise.

We live in interesting times. But this story is not over. While Amir Peretz, too, believes that he can stay in power, he faces far more determined opposition from his own Labor party, with plenty of disgruntled people in the Ami Ayalon camp, and a few looking to former PM Ehud Barak. Plus, Olmert may feel that if he wants to stay in power, he should sack or move Peretz to shore up his right flank. Who knows what forces that might set in motion?

Finally, we have good old 'am yisro'el, the people that all these clowns are supposed to be representing. This עם קשה עורף [stiff-necked people] might have a few tricks up its sleeves too, though it is equally likely that most Israelis are too disillusioned to care, especially when the prime minister has shown such contempt for public opinion.

The question is how broad of a coalition the demonstrations planned for Thursday can draw to protest against the government. I have a feeling that the protest will be a sea of orange. The settlers and the religious Zionist youth are extremely organized and committed to this kind of activism. They also have a score to settle with Olmert, the man who helped Sharon take them out of Gaza and threatened to force them into making 'aliyah from Judea and Samaria to the State of Israel. But if the blues don't show up, then it will be easy for Olmert and his loyalists to dismiss the demonstration as a sectarian affair, not representative of the Israeli public at large. It would also make Labor MKs more reluctant about leaving the government and going into new elections. But perhaps the reservists, the bereaved parents, Meretz, the students, and Uzi Dayan will be able to turn this into a more representative coalition.

Wednesday, March 14, 2007

Talking to Syria

Sunset in the north (January 2006)

One of the obstacles to negotiations with Syria frequently cited by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is American opposition to talks with Assad. Olmert did not conjure these objections out of thin air. But it is fairly obvious that invoking American opposition as the determining factor in Israel's decision not to engage the Syrians was a convenient charade (perhaps for both parties). Now, the Americans are sending signals that the Israelis are going to have to supply their own alibi.

At a closed meeting with academics at Hebrew University on Monday, U.S. Ambassador Richard Jones said that the U.S. is not blocking Israel from conducting talks with Syria. Asked to comment on Ambassador Jones's statement, the deputy press attache of the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv, Geoffrey Anisman, told Ha'aretz that
we are unaware that any U.S. official has ever expressed an opinion on what Israel should or should not do with regard to Syria.
It is hard not to chuckle at this pithy response; the Anismanian delivery came through even in print.

I had the pleasure of meeting Anisman last summer in Tel Aviv, and he stuck out as one of the young, bright stars in the American diplomatic corps. He also has a great sense of humor, no doubt acquired after years of watching Mel Brooks and Woody Allen films and absorbing Yiddish witticisms told by Anisman Senior.

In all seriousness, the writing is definitely on the wall. Those voices from the State Department long clamoring for a kind of diplomacy that consists of more than threats and refusals to talk to certain states must be feeling emboldened. The turning point was certainly the agreement with North Korea, which, strange as it may seem, could even earn Bush a Nobel Peace Prize. Bitterly opposed by John Bolton, the North Korea deal basically marked a return to the Korea policy of Bill Clinton. America's quiet backing of the Saudi peace initiative, and the March 10 meeting with Iranian and Syrian diplomats in Baghdad are further evidence of a shift in policy.

There are of course valid grounds on which one might continue to object to dialogue with Syria, as our Lebanese friends do not tire of pointing out. I have to confess that I am still sympathetic to some of their warnings. For one, I do not know how long the Assads will stay in power, and what might happen to a peace agreement once they fall. Secondly, I worry about the effects that bolstering the Syrians now will have on Lebanon's future.

On the other hand, the draft framework for a Syrian-Israeli agreement that was leaked in January is an offer that Israel simply cannot refuse.

Sunday, January 28, 2007

Korean Perceptions of Israel

Sattar Kassem and Hong Mi Jung, near Nablus (pressian.com)

Korea has not entered the Israeli imagination in the same way as Japan and China have. Although Samsung cell phones, LG washing machines, and Kia compacts have become consumer staples, Israelis generally have no real mental map of Korea and its place in East Asia. If they did, they would probably discover many commonalities, in addition to the obvious differences between the countries and their cultures. Indeed, many South Koreans, and not only the zealous evangelicals who send missionaries even to Iraq, see themselves as a chosen people whose fate bears strong resemblances to that of the Jews.

Koreans point to their long history of suffering and to the miraculous rise of the Republic of Korea in the past half-century as bases of comparison. They also view the millions of Koreans dispersed in China, the former Soviet Union, and America as diaspora communities with striking similarities to their Jewish counterparts in the world. In the U.S., Korean-Americans, even more than Chinese- or Indian-Americans, resemble American Jews in terms of their occupational patterns and their investment in education - with the Koreans following a pattern set by the Jewish immigrants nearly a century earlier.

For a long time, Korean perceptions of Israel were overwhelmingly positive. When South Koreans encountered Israel and the Jewish people in their school textbooks and in the media, they were presented with a heroic narrative about Israel's perseverance against all odds in the 1948 and 1967. For Koreans of a certain generation (now in its late 30s and early 40s), the word kibbutz still has romantic resonances.

But Israel's stock is rapidly dwindling. The last half-decade has perhaps done more damage than anything else. As in Europe and elsewhere, Israel is now Goliath with the Palestinians (or even the Arabs as a whole) playing David. Some Koreans now identify more with the Palestinians, and see the experience of the latter as akin to their own history under Japanese occupation - never mind that by any objective standards this is a disturbing fallacy of judgment.

A feature that appeared in a Korean internet newspaper yesterday about the the Hamas-Fatah clashes and the anniversary of Israel's "40-year-long occupation" speaks volumes about current Korean attitudes toward Israel. The article was written by a Korean scholar at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Hong Mi Jung, who has developed close friendships with Palestinian academics and professionals, mostly in the West Bank. Its headline asks,
이스라엘 검문소가 관대해진 이유는?
Why have the Israeli checkpoints been eased?
A certain professor Sattar Kassem, a political scientist at Al-Najah University, who spoke to her in Nablus, told Hong that the checkpoints from Ramallah to Nablus had been relaxed due to the Palestinian infighting but that there had been no change in the number of checkpoints on the reverse route from Nablus to Ramallah.

She also investigated the report of gunfire directed at the Canadian mission in Ramallah, and she asked passersby in the city why they were no longer displaying portraits of Abbas. They respond that
"압바스는 이스라엘과 미국에 협력하고 있다"
Abbas is cooperating with Israel and America.
It should hardly come as a surprise that the article is sympathetic to the friends and acquaintances of the writer. But what is most disturbing is that Israelis only appear as soldiers, and that while Hong talks to many ordinary Palestinians, there is no such investigation of life in Israel. Obviously we shouldn't make too much of this - reporters have limited amounts of time, resources, and connections. However, the net effect of stories like Hong is predictable and disturbing: Koreans are getting a vivid sense of Palestinian society by sympathetic reporters and very little in the way of journalism about ordinary Israelis' fears and hopes.

Growing anti-American sentiments in Korea have only exacerbated views of Israel, which has become increasingly linked in the Korean imagination to the U.S. Combine all this with the fact that Korea, just like China and Japan, will depend heavily on Arab and Iranian oil, and the outlook for the future of Korean-Israeli relations might look grim.

However, there is some hope. Unlike Europe, Korea has no history of antisemitism and no Muslim immigrant population to appease. The country's large Protestant population is also likely to continue supporting Israel - although its fantasies about the Holy Land may actually distort bilateral relations more than fostering them. But what Israel really needs to do is to embark on a campaign to win the minds of Koreans by appealing directly to their history, values, and interests. Israelis ignore Korea at their peril. There are obvious cultural bridges that can be built - for example via comparative studies of Korean Confucian philosophy and rabbinic literature, or through exchanges about diaspora experiences. In less lofty domains, the Korean and Israeli economies have a great deal in common and opportunities abound for partnerships that can benefit both countries.

Thanks to Jun for his translations and for teaching me the Korean alphabet among many other things.

Monday, October 09, 2006

Another Colossal White House Failure - North Koreans Test Nuclear Bomb

"Hey Guys!"

Add this one to President Bush's long list of foreign policy failures. North Korea's nuclear test is a product of the US's refusal to engage in bilateral talks with Pyongyang. The North Koreans know exactly what they are doing. Contrary to some descriptions of this regime circulating in the West, Kim Jong-Il is actually behaving quite rationally. The North Koreans realize that there is little anyone can do to them on the diplomatic or military fronts. Japanese indignation is of no consequence whatsoever. Indeed, it will only improve Pyongyang's standing among many ordinary Chinese and South Koreans. The only players with serious leverage are the South Koreans and the Chinese, who supply the isolated regime with food and energy. Neither one of them has any interest in a sudden North Korean collapse (imagine millions of refugees fleeing north and south) or a military confrontation (picture one third of Seoul wiped out by artillery). Of course, given the current crisis over Iran, the Bush administration cannot afford to look weak. For the US it's a lose-lose situation.

So why did the North Koreans test their bomb now? Precisely because they want to make it clear that Bush has misplayed all of America's cards. Kim Jong-Il wants to outlast this lame-duck president. If the Democrats return to power in 2008 or if the GOP candidate sees the light by then, Kim Jong-Il will be able to have his bilateral talks and prolong the existence of his regime for another half-decade.

Were it not for the current nuclear standoff with Iran, the North Korean test would be a lot less scary. Pyongyang is not motivated by millenarian ideology. The North Koreans are not religious fundamentalists, and they are not trying to extend their sphere of influence in the Far East. They are simply trying to get a lease on life. To lump them together with the Iranians was stupid and wrong. It would have been far more sensible to do everything possible to isolate these two fronts from each other in public discourse and in diplomacy. Now that the association has been firmly ingrained, the Iranians cannot but feel emboldened by the North Korean achievement. Bush concessions to the North Koreans will only spur Tehran on further. But are there any alternatives? To me, it looks like the US has no choice but to start bilateral talks with North Korea, while doing everything possible to make this look like the result of compromises and concessions by both Washington AND Pyongyan. But I fear such a diplomatic feat is far beyond the current administration.

Thanks to Jun for the great insights.