Hamas Economy

I'm not holding my breath for a popular uprising in Gaza against Hamas, but I found this article by Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel interesting because it highlights the economic and political structures on which Hamas, like the Palestinian Authority, depends for its hold on power. Apparently, Hamas has been unable to pay its many "civil servants" their wages for the past two months.

Third Intifada?

BY AMOS

If the recent unrest in Jerusalem spirals out of control, the international news media will surely rush to find some symbolic spark. Perhaps, they will blame the announcement of the Ramat Shlomo expansion. Or maybe the dedication of the restored Hurva Synagogue in the eastern part of the city. They will ignore the wave of Jerusalem-related incitement in the past year, and especially in the last few months, by Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and the Arab states, including countries allied or enjoying in-the-closet relations with Israel. The rhetoric, which includes a smear campaign alleging that Israel plans to "Judaize" Jerusalem by destroying Muslim antiquities, has been employed by the nationalists as well as the Islamists. It has gone hand-in-hand with the patently absurd efforts to deny any legitimate Jewish religious claims to Jerusalem and other sites. In all of this, Jewish attachment to places such as Hebron is dismissed as extremist political posturing by settlers - as if the religious sentiments of Jewish settlers have less legitimacy than those of Palestinian Muslims.

The Dubai Affair

BY AMOS

Photo Source: Wikimedia Commons

Dubai's police chief, Lt.-Gen. Dahi Khalfan Tamim, has been indefatigably reporting his new discoveries in the Mahmoud al-Mabhouh case to international media, turning him into the darling of Arab and European media. He now claims to have evidence of the involvement of nearly 30 agents in the killing of the Hamas operative. What's more, Tamim has announced new plans to train UAE security officials in recognizing Israelis trying to enter the country with foreign passports by their appearance and manner of speaking. This should be a lot of fun. Meanwhile, Britain and Australia have dispatched investigators to Israel to question those dual nationals whose identities were allegedly used by the suspects. Of course, everything is based on the release of their photos by Tamim, who probably could have saved these people a great deal of grief by being more circumspect. But both he and the Dubai police seem to be enjoying the attention, judging by the agency's web site.

Photo Source: Dubai Police

It's hard to take seriously the outrage of the British about the use of their passports. Do MI-6 agents on sensitive missions routinely travel with the Queen's documents? Prime Minister Brown is certainly aware of the hypocrisy of his position. But once Tamim publicized the origins of the passports used by the alleged assassins, those governments could not but react.

For all of Tamim's crowing about a "99% certainty" that the Mossad assassinated al-Mabhou, no evidence has yet come to light that conclusively links Israel to the killing. Interestingly enough, the U.S. has refused to comment at all on the matter. It is hard to believe that if this was indeed a Mossad operation that American intelligence officials were not apprised of it beforehand or actually involved in it.

There are many commentators who have judged the operation a failure, due to the negative publicity. But condemnations of Israel in the international media come and go - one cannot base policy on them. The more relevant yardstick for an intelligence agency and a country's leaders is whether the investment in resources can be justified by the return. If Israel was behind the operation, one would hope that the disruption to Hamas's weapons smuggling networks will actually prove significant enough to affects the organization's usual functioning. Perhaps the killing will sow more fear among Hamas cadres about internal leaks. But Tamim may ultimately be replaced by someone equally or even more capable than him.

Jimmy Carter's Hamas Delusion

BY AMOS

Jimmy Carter is in Damascus today and had the following to say after his meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and before checking in with Hamas head Khalid Mishal:

"I don't believe there is any possibility to have peace between the Palestinians and Israel unless Hamas is involved directly in harmony with Fatah.

"My own preference is for the United States government to find a way at a very [early] date to have direct discussions with the Hamas leadership.

"The first step has to be reconciliation between the Palestinian leaders to have a stable foundation to negotiate effectively with the Israeli leaders.

"I will be discussing with [Hamas] if they are willing to make the commitments for peaceful relations with Israel in the future and accept the overall requirements for peace and accommodation."

This is all silliness. The only terms under which Hamas would agree to any sort of "harmony" with Fatah is if such an agreement were to extend the Islamists' power and legitimacy. If Fatah does agree to such a settlement, it will mean that its leadership has effectively surrendered. In any case, any Fatah-Hamas reunion is not in Israel's interest nor in that of the U.S. At least not as long as we are talking about the same Hamas that exists today.

Hamas today derives its power from Syrian and Iranian money, training and weapons, and from its security organization in Gaza. Its legitimacy in Palestinian society is based on its religious vision, social welfare organizations, electoral success, and its uncompromising stance against Israel, which it has demonstrated with its successful terrorist attacks. Neither its bases of legitimacy nor its sources of power make a rapprochement with Israel at all likely. Hamas is therefore irrelevant to a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It thus has very little to offer to the U.S. The U.S., like Israel, would do much better to focus on the West Bank, at least as long as Fatah maintains power there.

In the meantime, Israel will probably have to live with Gaza being ruled by Hamas. Unfortunately, the scenarios in which Hamas might be removed from power are limited to the following,

1. internal revolt
   
2. military defeat of Hamas as political and security force
   
3. end of sponsorship by Iran and Syria
   

none of which will take place any time soon.

Avigdor Lieberman's Interview to the Austrian Kleine Zeitung

BY AMOS

Over the weekend Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman gave a long interview to the Austrian Kleine Zeitung, based in Graz, Styria. I cannot figure out how this paper, literally "The Little Newspaper," managed to secure the interview; it is a regional daily that appears mainly in the Austria provinces, with a circulation of 300,000. Most Austrians would go to the Viennese Presse (right-center) or Standard (left) for news of this sort. The interview, while occasionally vague and evasive, is surprisingly reasonable. Conclusion: Lieberman sounds much better in German than in Hebrew. The interview was probably conducted in Russian and then translated by the interviewer, Christian Wehrschütz, a correspondent with extensive experience in the Balkans as well as in Ukraine and Russia.

Some of the highlights follow with my quick and dirty translation.

On the peace process:

Wir hatten Regierungen, die aus politischen Tauben bestanden. Seit der Vereinbarung von Oslo, 1983 [SIC, should be 1993], haben ebendiese Regierungen sehr große Anstrengungen unternommen, eine dauerhafte Regelung für den Frieden zu finden. Wir haben die Hälfte von Judäa und Samaria sowie auch den Gaza-Streifen aufgegeben. Wir haben Tausende Juden umgesiedelt und Milliarden Schekel in die Palästinenser-Gebiete investiert. Trotzdem ist der Friedensprozess blockiert. Daher helfen uns die bisher gegebenen, vereinfachenden Antworten nicht weiter. Gewöhnlich waren das zwei: Besatzung oder jüdische Siedlungen. Es wäre allerdings ein Missverständnis, zu glauben, dass Besatzung und Siedlungen die Ursache für den Konflikt zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern sind. Denn wenn man weiter zurückgeht, vor 1967, gab es auch keinen Frieden im Nahen Osten, sondern nur Blutvergießen und Terrorismus. Und zwischen 1948 und 1967 hatten die Palästinenser sehr wohl einen Chance einen eigenen Staat zu bilden. Sie wurde nur nicht genützt.

We had governments that consisted of political doves. Since the Oslo agreement, these governments especially undertook great efforts to arrive at a lasting peace settlement. We gave up half of Judea and Samaria as well as the Gaza Strip. We evacuated thousands of Jews and invested tens of millions of shekels in the Palestinian territories. Despite this, the peace process is blocked. The simplifying answers offered until now do not help us move further. Usually these were two: occupation or Jewish settlements. However, it would be a mistake to believe that occupation and settlements are the origins for the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. For if you go back further, before 1967, there also was no peace in the Middle East, only bloodshed and terrorism. And between 1948 and 1967 the Palestinians certainly had an opportunity to form their own state. It was simply not exploited.

On his role in the coalition:

Wir wollen sehr aktiv die Initiative ergreifen. Wir haben viele Ideen. Dabei ist heute ist meine persönliche Position nicht so wichtig. Ich bin ein Spieler in einem großen Team, und versuche meine Koalitionspartner zu überzeugen. Doch ich bin überzeugt, dass es dieser Regierung schließlich gelingen wird, eine gemeinsame Plattform zu schaffen und vorwärts zu kommen. Dabei wollen wir die Vision einbringen, eine stabile in sich schlüssige, dauerhafte Lösung ohne Blutvergießen zu schaffen.

We want to grasp the initative very actively. We have many ideas. My personal position is not so important in all this. I am a player on a large team and I try to persuade my coalition partners. But I am convinced that this government will ultimately succeed in creating a common position and to move forward. To this effect, we want to bring the vision that will create a final, lasting solution without bloodshed.

The pitch for an "economic peace process":

Der politische Prozess ist nicht vorrangig der Schlüssel für eine dauerhafte Friedenslösung. [...] Das wichtigste für die Palästinenser ist der Aufbau der Wirtschaft, denn man kann sich vorstellen, was in Österreich geschehen würde, wenn die Arbeitslosenrate 40 Prozent betragen und der Lohn nur 150 Euro pro Monat, wie das bei den Palästinensern der Fall ist.

The political process is not the key to a permanent peace solution [...] The most important for the Palestinians is the development of the economy, because you can imagine what would happen in Austria if the unemployment rate were 40% and the salaries were 150 euros a month, as is the case for the Palestinians.

How to achieve this - Lieberman was vague:

Außerdem darf die Rolle der USA, der EU und von Japan nicht nur sein, Geld an die palästinensische Verwaltung zu überweisen. Die müssen vielmehr in konkrete Projekte investieren um die Arbeitsplätze für die Palästinenser zu schaffen.

The role of the US, EU, and Japan should not be only to transfer money to the Palestinian Authority. They ought, rather, to invest in concrete projects to create jobs for the Palestinians.

Reasons for Hamas's Success:

Denn die Hamas hat die vergangenen Wahlen nicht wegen ihrer extremen Ideologie gewonnen; vielmehr stand ihr eine sehr korrupte Palästinenser-Verwaltung gegenüber, die weder effektiv noch effizient war. Im Gegensatz dazu hat die Hamas sehr viele soziale Aktivitäten gesetzt. Sie hat Schulen errichtet und eine medizinische Versorgung angeboten. Das waren die Gründe für den Wahlsieg der Hamas.

Hamas won the past elections not because of its extremist ideology but because it opposed a very corrupt Palestinian administration (Palestinian Authority?), which was neither effective nor efficient. In contrast, Hamas founded many social programs. It established schools and offered health care. Those were the reasons for Hamas's victory in the elections.

No negotiations with Hamas:

Wie soll die israelische Regierung mit jemandem verhandeln, der jeden Tag sagt, ich will Israel zerstören oder alle Juden töten? Die Hamas übt weiter Terror aus, schmuggelt nach wie vor Waffen und bereitet Anschläge vor.

Why should the Israeli government negotiate with someone who says, every day, 'I want to destroy Israel" or kill all Jews? Hamas continues to engage in terrorism, smuggles weapons as before, and prepares attacks.

On Syria:

Wir müssen die Realitäten sehen. Bis heute beheimatet Syrien die Hauptquartiere der Terror-Organisationen Hamas und Djihad. Syrien unterstützt die Hisbollah und ihren Waffenschmuggel in den Südlibanon. Syrien unterstützt auch das Atomprogramm des Iran und ich sehe bis zum heutigen Tag nur eine Festigung der Beziehungen zwischen dem Iran und Syrien. Daher kann ich in Syrien keinen wirklichen Partner für irgendeine Vereinbarung sehen. Bevor wir verhandeln können, muss zuerst die Unterstützung für den Terrorismus eingestellt werden.

We have to see the reality. Until today, Syria hosts the headquarters of the terrorist organizations Hamas and Jihad. Syria supports Hizbullaha and its weapons smuggling to southern Lebanon. Syria also supports the Iranian nuclear program and I am only seeing a strengthening of the relations between Iran and Syria. This is why I cannot see Syria as a real partner for any kind of settlement. Before we can negotiate, the support for terrorism must end.

On "land for peace":

Bis heute hat das Konzept "Land für Frieden" keine wirklichen Ergebnisse gebracht. Was war das Ergebnis aller Rückzüge? Doch nur: Hisbollah und Raketen.

Until today, the concept "land for peace" has brought no real results. What was the consequence of all the withdrawals [retreats]? Only Hizbullah and rockets.

Lieberman evades question about "transfer" and loses himself, going off in too many directions at once:

Kleine Zeitung: Was soll stattdessen geschehen? Bei der Zwei-Staaten-Lösung kritisieren Sie, dass zwar die Palästinenser einen Staat ohne Juden bekommen sollen, Israel aber 20 Prozent Araber hat. Daher reden sie auch enormen Umsiedlungen das Wort; doch was ist mit den Arabern in Israel, sprich Palästinensern, die nicht gehen wollen? 

LIEBERMAN: Das ist allerdings nicht nur ein Problem, das Israel hat. Ähnliches gibt es auf der übrigen Welt auch. In Bosnien-Herzegowina zum Beispiel oder in Belgien zwischen Flamen und Walonen. Auch im Kaukasus gab es den Konflikt zwischen Russland und Georgien. Was ich damit sagen will, es gibt nicht nur eine Ursache für das Problem sondern viele. Man darf nicht nur einen Punkt herausgreifen und dann hoffen, das ganze Problem zu lösen; man muss gleichzeitig in viele Richtungen gehen

.

Kleine Zeitung: What should happen instead? You criticize the two-state solution because it gives the Palestinians a state without Jews while Israel's population would still be 20% Arab. This is why you also talk about enormous transfers [resettlements]; but what about the Arabs in Israel, or Palestinians, who do not want to move?

Lieberman: But that is not only a problem faced by Israel. There are similar things in the rest of the world as well. In Bosnia-Hercegovina for example, or in Belgium between the Flemish and Walloons [French-speakers]. In the Caucasus too there was the conflict between Russia and Georgia. What I want to say here is that there is not only one cause of the problem but many. One must not take out only one point and then hope to solve the entire problem; one has to go in many directions at once.

Interviewer asks for clarification:

Kleine Zeitung: Was heißt das konkret, etwa für die jüdischen Siedlungen? Sie selbst leben in einer jüdischen Siedlung in einem Palästinenser-Gebiet. Wären Sie bereit, Ihr Haus aufzugeben? 

LIEBERMAN: Weniger Spannungen, weniger Konflikte, dass wollen alle Völker. Doch es darf keine Illusion geben; kurzfristig, schnell ist das nicht möglich, Hokuspokus gibt es nicht. Doch ich in überzeugt, dass diese Koalition, mehr als jede andere zuvor die Chance hat, sich in die richtige Richtung zu bewegen.

Kleine Zeitung: What does this mean concretely, for example for the Jewish settlements? You yourself live in a Jewish settlement in a Palestinian area. Would you be prepared to give up your home?

Lieberman: Less tensions, less conflicts; all peoples want this. But one must not have illusions; in the short-term, quickly, this is not possible. There is no abacadabra. But I am convinced that this coalition, more than any one before, has the chance to move in the right direction.

On his reputation abroad:

Ich bin über mein Image nicht besorgt; Image ist nur ein Produkt der Massenmedien. Wir haben weit ernstere Probleme als mein Image.

I am not concerned about my image; image is only a product of the mass media. We have far more serious problems than my image.

Ahmadinejad and Iran:

Es ist nicht akzeptabel, dass ein Staatspräsident eines UNO-Mitglieds täglich zur Zerstörung Israels aufruft. Die Kooperation des Iran mit Nordkorea, mit Hugo Chavez und mit Syrien ist die wirkliche Achse des Bösen. Doch das ist nicht nur unser Problem; das ist das Problem der gesamten Region und der gesamten internationalen Gemeinschaft. Auch die Vertreter der arabischen Welt haben mit uns in jüngster Zeit vor allem über den Iran, und nicht über die Palästinenser gesprochen. Denn die Araber verstehen, dass ihre Existenz nicht durch Israel, sondern durch den Iran bedroht wird. 

It is unacceptable that the president of a UN-member country daily calls for the destruction of Israel. The cooperation of Iran with North Korean, Hugo Chavez and Syria is the true axis of evil. But that is not only our problem; that is a problem for the entire region and the whole international community. The representatives of the Arab world have talked to us, in recent times, about Iran, not about the Palestinians. Because the Arabs understand that their existence is not threatened by Israel but by Iran.

How to deal with Iranian nuclear program:

Was das iranische Atomprogramm betrifft, muss klar sein, dass, sollte der Iran Atommacht werden, es in der Region zu einem schrecklichen nuklearen Rüstungswettlauf kommen würde. Der beste Weg, das Atomprogramm zu stoppen, sind wirklich harte, sehr harte Sanktionen. Die UNO-Resolutionen sind nicht genug; daher müssen der Sicherheitsrat und die EU viel wirksamere und härtere Sanktionen verhängen. Das hat bei Libyen funktioniert. Der Iran muss daher isoliert werden. Nur das kann Ergebnisse bringen. 

Regarding the Iranian nuclear program, it has to be clear that should Iran become a nuclear power, it would lead to a terrible nuclear arms race in the region. The best way to stop the nuclear program is through very tough, really tough sanctions. The UN resolutions are not enough; the Security Council and the EU must declare much more effective and harsher sanctions. That worked with Libya. Iran has to be isolated. Only that can bring results.

Military option?

Wir sprechen über keinen Militärschlag, Israel kann ein Problem, das ein Problem der ganzen Welt ist, nicht militärisch lösen. Ich schlage vielmehr vor, dass die USA als größte Weltmacht die Verantwortung übernimmt, die Iran-Frage zu lösen." 

We're not talking about any military strike. Israel cannot solve a problem, which is the problem of the whole world, militarily. I suggest rather that the US, as the world's superpower, ought to take responsibility for solving the Iran-question.

Anticipate deterioration in US-Israeli relations?

Nein. Wir haben traditionell wirklich sehr tiefe Beziehungen mit den USA. Sie beruhen nicht nur auf wechselseitigen Interessen, sondern wir teilen auch dieselben Werte. 

No. We traditionally have a very deep relationship with the US. It is not based on our respective interests, rather, we share the same values.

European role?

Allerdings müsste Europa härter gegenüber dem Terrorismus hier auftreten. Hamas und Hisbollah müssen unakzeptable Organisationen sein. Doch ich bin nicht sicher, dass alle europäischen Länder diese meine Meinung teilen.

Europe has to take a harder line against terrorism. Hamas and Hizbullah must be unacceptable organizations. But I am not sure if all the European countries share my opinion. 

Europe's Muslim population:

Das Grundproblem ist auch hier eine Frage der demokratischen Werte. Es ist sehr wichtig, die Werte der freien Welt zu bewahren und an alle Bürger weiterzugeben, unabhängig davon, ob sie Juden, Christen oder Moslems sind, oder ein anderes oder gar kein Bekenntnis haben. Im Falle der Moslems muss Europa auch von den muslimischen Ländern fordern, dass sie zur Demokratie und zu den Menschenrechten finden. Wie sieht es beispielsweise mit Menschenrechten in Saudi-Arabien aus, wo Frauen noch immer kein Wahlrecht haben? Erst wenn Selbstverständlichkeiten wie Demokratie und Menschenrechte in allen moslemischen Staaten zur Realität werden, werden sich auch die Moslems anderswo langsam ändern.

The basic problem is one of democratic values. it is very important to guard the values of the free world and to pass them on to all citizens, regardless of whether they are Jews, Christians or Muslim or even of no faith at all. In the case of the Muslims, Europe has to demand from Muslim countries that they find themselves toward democracy and human rights. How does it look with human rights in Saudi Arabia, for example, where women still cannot vote? Only when things we take for granted, such as democracy and human rights become a reality in all Muslim states will Muslims elsewhere gradually change.

On Israel's Jewish population:

Der Schlüssel für das Zusammenleben heißt Toleranz. Wir müssen in Israel toleranter im Umgang miteinander werden. Nach Israel kamen Menschen aus Asien, Afrika, Europa, der ehemaligen Sowjetunion und Südamerika. Sie alle haben unterschiedliche Vorstellungen, ein unterschiedliches Temperament und eine verschiedene Mentalität. Daher ist es unmöglich, die Vorstellung nur einer Gruppe durchzusetzen. Also können etwa die Vorstellungen der Religiösen nicht säkularen Bürgern verordnet werden und umgekehrt. Wir versuchen daher, den richtigen Zugang zu diesen Problemen zu finden. Das betrifft auch die Zivilehe und andere jüdische Werte. Denn Israel muss ein Platz für alle Juden sein. 

The key to coexistence is tolerance. We have to become more tolerant in Israel in our interactions with each other. People from Asia, Africa, Europe, the former Soviet Union and South America all came to Israel They have different preconceptions, temperaments, and mentalities. Therefore it is impossible to implement the conceptions of one group. The ideas of the religious cannot be mandated for secular citizens and vice versa. We are therefore trying to find the right approach to these problems. This also concerns civil union and other Jewish values [sic]. Because Israel has to be a place for all Jews.

"I Hate the Name Hamas"

More and more reports are appearing in the international press about dissatisfaction with Hamas in Gaza, though these are balanced by quotations from the official Hamas organs. Thus, in The Guardian, we first read about these thoughts from a Hamas minister:

At the al-Filisteen mosque in the Rimal area of Gaza City on Friday, the imam was preaching the necessity of brotherhood and unity. But on the steps after prayers, Hamas's economics minister explained what the conditions for Palestinian unity involved. Senior Hamas officials are demanding that the conditions for reconciliation should include an end to negotiations with Israel and to the peace process, a unity agreement under a banner of "resistance", and continued Hamas control of Gaza.

"Everyone recognises the need for reconciliation among Palestinians," said Abu Rushdi Zaza. "It will happen immediately if the Palestine Liberation Organisation [dominated by Fatah] can be rebuilt. But it must be understood that Hamas is the government. If international institutions want to do rebuilding projects in Gaza, then that is fine - but they must do it under our supervision.

The paper also quotes at length a pro-Hamas parliamentarian from the West Bank:

Mahmoud Musleh, a Palestinian legislative council member aligned with Hamas, added: "The organisation that should be talking for the Palestinian people is the PLO. But it has not been speaking. If it does not rehabilitate itself, there will be dramatic changes. At present it does not represent the Palestinian people. They can longer make decisions. They do not own the power."

He continued: "There is a new balance of power emerging. For the first time, through the steadfastness of the resistance in Gaza, we have seen Israel's project halted."

And then, in the last paragraph we encounter a passage that is starting to become a cliche of sorts in the Western press. An ordinary Gazan, after checking that no one is listening, pours out his true feelings about Hamas:

And if one place is the symbol of the destruction wreaked in Gaza, it is the demolished houses of the Samouni family in Zeitoun, a place where the stink of death still seeps from out of the rubble.

A member of the family, who lost his father and his son, asks not to be identified for fear of being beaten by Hamas - as others were during the war - for criticising it. "No one from Hamas has come to offer us help. None of the leaders has been here. We were farmers, not fighters with a militant faction.

He pulls out a crumpled photograph showing a wedding scene. "This was my father. This, my son. After what happened to us here, I hate the name Hamas."

Fallout from the Gaza War

Hamas agrees to allow Fatah forces to patrol Rafah crossing (Ha'aretz):

The London-based Asharq al-Awsat reported Saturday that Hamas has suggested representatives of the Palestinian Authority be stationed at the Rafah crossing, but that they be residents of Gaza, not the West Bank. 

Also on Saturday, Hamas officials laid out some of their conditions for a continuation of the Gaza truce and for the release of captured Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit. 

Hamas spokesman Ayman Taha told Asharq Al-Awsat that his group wants European Union and Turkish troops to patrol Gaza's border crossings with Israel

I'm sure the heads of Hamas made these suggestions on their own initiative.

Assad  congratulates Hamas on 'victory' over IDF in Gaza (Ha'aretz)

According to the article, Assad told Meshal, currently in exile in Damascus, that the Palestinian peoples' response to Israel Defense Forces operation "Cast Lead" was evidence of their "commitment to their inalienable rights to their land and homes, and of their deep faith in their ultimate victory over occupation and aggression." 

More cheap words from Assad.  

The delegation reportedly told Syrian officials that Syria is the first stop in a tour of countries in the Middle East in order to "express their gratitude to them for standing by the Palestinian people during the aggression."

Mubarak must be ecstatic.

Egyptian official: Israel achieved all of its military goals in Gaza (Ha'aretz)

An Egyptian official has said that Israel achieved all of its military objectives during "Operation Cast Lead" in the Gaza Strip, having exacted serious blows to Hamas and it's infrastructure, according to an article published in the Arabic-language daily Al-Hayat on Saturday. 

The official is quoted in the article as saying that senior Hamas leaders are still in hiding out of fear of Israel Defense Forces strikes, and that Israel is not interested in pursuing a new calm or Tahadiyeh with the militant group. 

Egypt is not letting Hamas forget this.

ANALYSIS / The IDF model that failed in Lebanon succeeded  in Gaza (Amos Harel, Ha'aretz)

The Egyptian daily Al-Ahram reported this week that the head of Hamas' political bureau in Damascus, Khaled Meshal, expressed disappointment at the Arab reaction to the operation during a closed session of the Arab summit in Qatar. Not only did Hamas remain almost alone in the campaign against Israel, it also suffered a painful blow in the military confrontation. The best proof of this was its agreement to an unconditional cease-fire while IDF troops were still in the Gaza Strip. Al-Ahram reports that Meshal admitted that he had not expected the Israeli reaction to be so severe and sustained - the same sentiment that was expressed by Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon two and half years ago. 

Outwardly, Hamas broadcast a different message. Military Intelligence tends to give Hamas high grades for the credibility of its announcements in ordinary times. But since the start of the ground operation, Hamas' fabrications have gone off the charts. One of the organization's spokesmen claimed this week that Hamas had expelled the IDF from the Gaza Strip. The spokesman of the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military wing, admitted to losing only 48 of its men in the fighting. And how many Israeli soldiers were killed? Forty-nine, according to Hamas (in reality, 10 soldiers were killed). Conversations with residents of Ramallah and East Jerusalem indicate that from their point of view, Hamas won. They claim that Hamas withstood Israeli military pressure and that the IDF struck only civilians in the Gaza Strip. Asked why they think Hamas stopped firing rockets, they explain that it was a good-will gesture to Barack Obama on the occasion of his inauguration.

More deadly stupidity.

Gaza agreement eludes Arab leaders (Al Jazeera)

Arab leaders have pledged $2bn to help reconstruct the Gaza Strip after a three week Israeli offensive that devastated the territory's infrastructure, left 1,300 Palestinians dead, and thousands more displaced.

But there have been disagreements over how the aid will find its way into Gaza, with countries including Saudi Arabia concerned about giving funds directly to Hamas, which currently administers the Gaza Strip.

Rifts over Israel

"They [the Arab leaders] decided to confine themselves in a general statement to postpone differences," Al Jazeera's Hashem Ahelbarra reported from Kuwait.

"Saudis and Egyptians are very sceptical of [giving money to] Hamas for one reason," he said.

It will be interesting to see who wins this battle. Qatar's position has been dynamic over the past two years. Once in a while they support the Saudi line and at other times they subtly undermine their bigger neighbor. This time, Qatar has made no bones about its position. The emirate's stance during the Gaza War made it possible to speak of a Syrian-Qatari axis in support of Hamas and aligned with Iran. So far, Qatar has confined its war to one of words, or, more precisely, images - through its widely-watched al Jazeera outlet. The Egyptians and the Saudis must be fuming, but it remains to be seen whether the Arab masses will stay riled up long enough to present a serious threat to the security apparatuses of these regimes. 

Italian Daily Quotes Gazan Doctor: Casualty Numbers Inflated

Corriere della Sera reported today that Palestinian civilians are accusing Hamas of having prevented civilians from fleeing areas under attack. The article also quote a Gazan physician who argues that the casualty numbers are inflated and that many more of the dead were likely Hamas fighters than has been admitted. Here is the relevant quotation from the Italian paper; read Ha'aretz for an English summary.

Chi racconta una versione diversa dalla narrativa imposta dalla «muhamawa» (la resistenza) è automaticamente un «amil», un collaborazionista e rischia la vita. Aiuta però il recente scontro fratricida tra Hamas e Olp. Se Israele o l’Egitto avessero permesso ai giornalisti stranieri di entrare subito sarebbe stato più facile. Quelli locali sono spesso minacciati da Hamas. «Non è un fatto nuovo, in Medio Oriente tra le società arabe manca la tradizione culturale dei diritti umani. Avveniva sotto il regime di Arafat che la stampa venisse perseguitata e censurata. Con Hamas è anche peggio», sostiene Eyad Sarraj, noto psichiatra di Gaza city. E c’è un altro dato che sta emergendo sempre più evidente visitando cliniche, ospedali e le famiglie delle vittime del fuoco israeliano. In verità il loro numero appare molto più basso dei quasi 1.300 morti, oltre a circa 5.000 feriti, riportati dagli uomini di Hamas e ripetuti da ufficiali Onu e della Croce Rossa locale. «I morti potrebbero essere non più di 500 o 600. Per lo più ragazzi tra i 17 e 23 anni reclutati tra le fila di Hamas che li ha mandati letteralmente al massacro», ci dice un medico dell’ospedale Shifah che non vuole assolutamente essere citato, è a rischio la sua vita. Un dato però confermato anche dai giornalisti locali: «Lo abbiamo già segnalato ai capi di Hamas. Perché insistono nel gonfiare le cifre delle vittime? Strano tra l’altro che le organizzazioni non governative, anche occidentali, le riportino senza verifica. Alla fine la verità potrebbe venire a galla. E potrebbe essere come a Jenin nel 2002. Inizialmente si parlò di 1.500 morti. Poi venne fuori che erano solo 54, di cui almeno 45 guerriglieri caduti combattendo».

The Rice-Olmert Spat and a Unilateral Cease Fire

The bizarre diplomatic spat sparked by Olmert's annoucement that he had intervened with Bush personally to overrule Rice should not be blown out of proportion, but it reveals something about the shortcomings of both of these lame-duck administrations (in Jerusalem and D.C.):

"In Jerusalem, however, officials went to sleep thinking the Americans had only agreed to support a 48-hour humanitarian cease-fire. At 1 A.M., final confirmation came from New York: The U.S. had promised that no cease-fire resolution would be brought to a vote any time soon. An hour and a half later, however, it became clear that not only was the Security Council due to vote on a cease-fire resolution at any minute, but Rice had ordered America's UN ambassador to support it. Olmert promptly telephoned U.S. President George Bush to complain about Rice's behavior and demand that he restrain her. What Bush said to Rice remains unknown. What is known, however, is that the U.S. suddenly changed its vote from "yes" to "abstain." 

The whole story would have ended well had Olmert behaved like a responsible adult and restrained his own impulses. Even his close associates admit that he would have done better to skip the public boasting about how he persuaded Bush to overrule Rice. Quite aside from the fact that this embarrassed the U.S. administration, Olmert's associates understand all too well that this story merely provides fresh ammunition to those who claim the Jews are the ones who really control America. " (Ha'aretz)

If this is correct, the Secretary of State was responsible for a diplomatic screw-up that could have cost Israel dearly, and in fact hurt its position. What matters here is not the substance of the particular resolutions in question but the fact that State had signalled to Israel that there was nothing to worry about. I cannot understand Ha'aretz's concession here to the "Zionist lobby" antisemites. This has nothing to do with Jews "controlling America, but with proper diplomatic coordination among allies.

Meanwhile, the Israeli cabinet is set to vote on a unilateral cease fire. With Hamas having rebuffed the Israeli position, and the Damascus wing of the organization, publicly supported by the presidents of Iran and Syria, continuing to adhere to a totally rejectionist line, I am having trouble making sense of this development. At the moment, Israeli troops are deep inside Gaza. Israel should not withdraw troops without an agreement involving the Palestinians. 

Hamas Fighters Flee Positions in Gaza City

From Ha'aretz:

Said Sayyam and Salah Abu Shreich, two senior Hamas figures, were killed in an air strike in Jabaliya. The home of another Hamas leader, Mahmoud al-Zahar, is surrounded. Infantry, armor and special forces are operating in the center of the city, very close to the Hamas "security quarter" southwest of the city, where most of the command and control centers of the group are situated. 

Even in the center of the city, Hamas gunmen are opting to avoid direct encounters with the IDF. In most cases they are choosing to escape along with thousands of civilians. The Hamas announcement in Cairo two days ago began the countdown toward a cease-fire. 

The army sensed Hamas' weakness when units left their defensive positions in the Zeytun neighborhood. Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi approved the assault and forces reached the center of the city through the gap. On the way, the IDF killed most of the members of a unit comprising militants trained by Iran. 

The latest move has is risks. The IDF is constantly concerned that a single mistake may lead to mass killing of Palestinian civilians, or a surprise attack by Hamas that may affect public opinion in Israel. 

Hamas-Gaza may try for one more dramatic round, but as of now, it is close to collapse. This does not mean the end of Hamas, but in combination with an effective diplomatic settlement, it implies a significant improvement in Israel's position. The civilian population of Gaza will remember Israel's cruel campaign; however, the Palestinians will also remember the sight of Hamas fighters fleeing before the advancing Israeli forces. Hamas has indubitably been weakened, and in the long term, its shortcomings in this war will make the organization more hesitant about launching attacks on Israel.

As Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff argue, it would be best for Israel to leave a diminished Hamas in power rather than destroying all central authority in Gaza. The key to a post-war settlement will be to involve the Egyptians in a reconstruction of civilian infrastructure in Gaza. B

Hamas's Offer Falls Short

Egyptian FM Ahmed Abu El Gheit (Photo: NATO)

Hamas's press conference did not yield a major breakthrough for Israel. Although Hamas seems to have reversed its earlier opposition to a cease fire, its public statements appear designed to dispel the sense that it is conceding anything. Furthermore, Hamas's various branches are sending out contradictory messages, as usual. It might be best to ignore what they have to say though, and to focus on the messages being sent out by Egypt and by Hamas-Gaza.

According to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Hamas has agreed to the Egyptian version of the cease fire, which calls for an immediate end to the "aggression against Gaza," an opening of the crossings, and the withdrawal of the [Israeli] troops from the Strip. The Hamas people ("our brothers in Hamas") have conveyed their agreement to the Egyptians, who will in turn pass it on to the Israelis (Ha'aretz):

שר החוץ המצרי, אחמד אבו אל-ריט אמר הערב, כי החמאס הסכימה לנוסחה המצרית להפסקה מיידית של התוקפנות על עזה, פתיחת המעברים ונסיגת הכוחות בפנים הרצועה. לדבריו, נציגי החמאס הודיעו לאנשי המודיעין המצרי על עמדתם ובכוונת מצרים להעביר לישראל את מה שהושג בדיונים עם האחים מהחמאס. 

These kinds of terms again seem unacceptable to me. Of course, there is a chance that the goal here is to allow Hamas to save face in public. The problem is that Hamas itself seems to think the cease fire makes too many concessions to Israel. Muhamad Nasr, a member of the political wing of Gaza, who took part in the negotiations with Egypt, disagreed with the announcement that Hamas had agreed to the Egyptian initiative. He elaborated that Hamas still has problems with aspects of the agreement:

מוחמד נאסר חבר הלשכה המדינית של החמאס שהיה שותף לשיחות הסתייג מההודעה לפיה היוזמה המצרית מקובלת על החמאס. לדבריו, ההיענות של החמאס למאמצי המצרים, אין משמעותם כי החמאס הסכים ליוזמה המצרית. יש עדיין סוגיות במחלוקת ואנחנו עדיין דוחפים את הנושא.

One positive note is that, at least according to Al-Arabiya, Hamas has agreed to the deployment of Palestinian Authority police officers to guard the Rafah border crossing, together with European monitors. Such an agreement represents a blow to Hamas, which had kicked the PA out of Gaza earlier. It would also amount to a victory for Egypt and for the other powers supporting Abu Mazen. For Israel, on the other hand, this is not a real victory. Assuming that the PA officers manage to stay in control of the crossing, they will be hard-pressed to do Israel's bidding for it. They do not represent a solution of the arms smuggling problem. And what will happen when the PA and Hamas "reconcile"?

All in all, the agreement looks good for Egypt and the PA. It was interesting to read the Hamas delegation's statement that they had considered only the Egyptian initiative. Mubarak must be pleased that his message to Hamas has hit home: we are your only salvation.

For Israel, on the other hand, Hamas's position is wholly unsatisfactory. Obviously, Israel cannot agree to a cease fire under these terms. Fortunately, Israel has some time to formulate its own conditions and to back them up with the threat of "stage 3," even if opposition to the full-scale deployment of ground forces in Gaza is growing in the military and government.

In other news, according to the IDF, Palestinians fired a phosphorus bomb at Israel yesterday. Human rights organizations have previously accused Israel of using white phosphorus in civilian areas, which, many argue, is illegal under the Geneva Conventions. The Israeli military argues that it employs phosphorus mainly for smoke screens and that its use of the chemical does not violate the conventions. Rights groups have also accused the U.S. of having used the weapon against insurgents in Iraq.

Assad's Hyped BBC Interview - Hamas Agreement to Cease Fire Imminent Nonetheless?

According to reports in the Israeli media, Hamas is close to agreeing to a cease fire that might meet some of Israel's conditions. A statement from the organization is expected at 7:30 pm local time tonight (1:30 pm EST). Meanwhile, Israeli operations appear to be continuing along the lines of the past two days. Air strikes are ongoing, especially in southern Gaza, while on the ground, Israeli units are staying mobile. They are encountering sporadic fire from snipers and small units armed with RPGs and the like, but no systematic ambushes. The military and political echelons are split on whether to expand the operation.

On a related note, Ynet is heralding an  interview given by Syrian President on BBC, in which he allegedly called on Israel to stop its operation but also called for an end to the rocket firing.  If this were true, it would have  to be counted not only as an important achievement for Israel but as an indicator that the rumors about an imminent cease fire announcement by Hamas have credibility. According to Ynet, Assad even addressed the arms smuggling into Gaza and voiced his opposition to it, though he did not make concrete commitments. 

But here is my transcript of the BBC interview. It seems to me that Assad, although endorsing a cease fire along the lines of Security Council resolution 1860 (see full text, summary of debate), is sticking to the old Hamas line and setting the kinds of preconditions for a truce that the organization demanded before operation Cast Lead.  Maybe someone else can enlighten me. I don't see him explicitly calling for an end to the rockets or to arms smuggling. The UN resolution does NOT call on Hamas to end rocket fire into Israel. 

I had to laugh at several points in the interview, most notably when Assad seemed to imply that there had been no Hamas rockets fired at Israel during the truce, and when he claimed that "We don't push anyone; we make dialogue." 

BBC: The Israelis say that the sort of cease fire they want is one where there are no more rockets onto their territory and where the border with Egypt is controlled so there's no arms smuggling across it. Would you accept that?

Assad: Stop sending ... launching rockets means stop assassinating Palestinians by your helicopters and airplanes. So you cannot look at one side and ignore the other side. About smuggling the arms, it is another issue that is part of the bigger solution. Syria is not involved in this issue because we don't have [a] border with Gaza.

BBC: But do you think that should be part of any cease fire?

Assad: Yes, of course. We will support [a] cease fire. We've been working with [pause] many countries, including the French, for the cease fire. 

BBC: Do you support resolution 1860?

Assad: In principle we support most of it, but in the end it is ambiguous. It doesn't have any executive plan, how to implement it, that's the question.

BBC: What about the Hamas rockets into Israel? That's been going on for some time. The Israelis say that any country would respond in the way that they've responded. Do you think that's a fair point? 

Assad: No, because there was truce for 6 months, and during that truce, no one of the Israelis was killed, while 38-40 Palestinians were assassinated publicly by the Israelis. So how could Hamas launch rockets and the Palestinians died? This is not logical.

BBC: But what if someone was firing rockets into Syria? You would have to respond.

Assad: Yah, but it's not only simply rockets. What if you have embargo? Embargo is a war. When the people are going to die and they have to choose between dying slowly and dying fast, they will choose dying fast.

BBC: Syria offers a base to the exiled political leader of Hamas, Khaled Mish'al ... Are you pushing him to accept a cease fire?

Assad: We don't push anyone; we make dialogue. And they accepted the cease fire, they support the cease fire. When you say cease fire, you don't want it to be just for a few days. You want it to be sustainable. Sustainable means you have certain requirements which should be available for cease fire.

BBC: What, for you, is the most important point about sustaining a cease fire then? 

Assad: Israel respecting the cease fire, something never happened before. Second, to lift the embargo. Without this, you won't have sustainable cease fire. 

Cast Lead: Achievements So Far

Map showing the Philadelphi Corridor

Although the IDF build-up on the border to Gaza is continuing, there are signs that Israel is hesitant about entering the "third stage" of Operation Cast Lead. The political and military echelons are still assessing whether a significant expansion of operations is worth it. As always in the Middle East, some dramatic event may drastically alter their assessments with immediate consequences. But for now, let us take stock of what has been accomplished and what remains to be done.

1) There is no doubt that at this point in time, Israel has weakened Hamas's political and military organizations. 

2)  the IDF has clearly re-established its deterrence force against the Palestinians and against other actors in the region. 

3) the army and government have made progress in finding ways to reduce Palestinian arms smuggling. 

4) the operation revealed the extent of Hamas's missile capabilities, averting a possible surprise in the future.

5) Cast Lead has managed to dent rocket firing in the short term, and has increased the pressure on Hamas to do so over the long term. 

The means by which Israel has achieved its objectives have not been pretty. From the beginning, the army treated this as a war rather than a policing operation. The IDF assumed correctly that Hamas would use civilian sites for defensive and offensive purposes. Mosques, hospitals, and residences have all served Hamas as storage depots, launching sites, and booby-trapped defensive installations so far in this war.  Thus, the army was aggressive from the outset. Air strikes flattened suspected traps, and ground troops called in planes, helicopters, and artillery whenever they encountered resistance that might embroil them in a deadly ambush or remote-controlled bombing. So far, this strategy has proven very effective at reducing IDF casualties. It has also led to the deaths of many Hamas fighters. Hamas miscalculated in thinking that the IDF would shy away from such tactics and that it would therefore be able to inflict many casualties on the invading forces. The greatest victims of this miscalculation have of course been the civilians of Gaza. I do not share the view that the civilian casualties will strengthen Hamas over the long term. Such an argument could have been made if Hamas had distinguished itself in the fighting; so far it has not done so, and it has proven incapable of protecting its population. 

The question now is whether, given these achievements, Israel is already in a position to force Hamas to agree to a truce that will represent a satisfactory improvement of the status quo ante, or whether such an outcome will require more fighting. Any cease fire must set the conditions for a permanent attenuation of Hamas. The good news is that Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, and the U.S. are all interested in the reduction of Hamas's standing in the region. Egypt has certainly increased its standing vis-a-vis Hamas as a result of the IDF operation, and it will be eager to solidify these gains. It may very well do so by re-inserting forces loyal to the PA into Gaza through a stage-managed "reconciliation." The more difficult problem is finding a way to combat Hamas's ability to smuggle weapons into Gaza. Although a number of options have been suggested, none of them can actually be relied upon by Israel. The various Arab or European offers of help in border monitoring or even tunnel detection will not do the trick. The bulk of the work has to be accomplished during this operation. 

With these factors in mind, it is in Israel's interest to prolong the operation, while keeping it at the current intensity. Reserves do not have to be poured into heavy urban combat in Gaza City or the refugee camps. They can continue to chip away at Hamas at the current fashion, in the north of the strip, while in the south, Israel gathers intelligence on and destroys the tunnel networks. The operations in southern Gaza could conceivable continue even after the inauguration of President-elect Barack Obama. Israel and the U.S. share an interest in putting in place mechanisms for a management of the Philadelphi Corridor that will diminish the flow of arms and terrorists from the Sinai Peninsula into Gaza and possibly vice versa.

Update on Diplomatic Initiatives

Officers of the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah at a Medal ceremony. 

The mission has been on standby since June 9, 2007 (EU BAM Rafah)

Israel has agreed to setting up a "humanitarian corridor," which amounts to a daily, unilateral cease fire around Gaza City, between 1 and 4 pm. This will take some of the pressure off the Foreign Ministry as the diplomatic initiatives being discussed by various powers multiply.

The Israeli cabinet's deferral of a vote (Ha'aretz English) on expanding the ground operation must also be viewed as an attempt to show Israel's interest in a cease fire rather than the continuation of war. However, the conditions for a cease fire to go into effect are strict: an end to rocket fire and a commitment by the powers to combating the arms smuggling in a viable and proactive manner. It's unlikely that these prerequisites can be met soon. For one, Hamas's latest statement rejecting  a permanent truce with Israel only serve to strengthen arguments against a cease fire. More importantly, the proposal to internationalize the struggle against the arms smuggling tunnels still faces Egyptian opposition. It will be difficult to arrive at a solution that significantly upgrades border security. No one will accept a return to the days when impotent EU monitors "observed" the Rafah crossing. Apparently, France and the U.S. are now cooperating to persuade Egypt to implement measures with teeth:

Meanwhile, the international diplomatic effort being led by the United States, France, Britain and Egypt is still focused on an initiative to deploy an international force of experts and troops that would assist Egyptian authorities in dealing with the tunnel system Hamas has built along the Philadelphi Route, which borders Sinai. 

According to a political source in Jerusalem, France and the U.S. are working hard on Egypt to get it to agree to the initiative. 

"If a solution is found, we will have no problem in immediately bringing the operation to an end," the Israeli source said (Ha'aretz). 

Can the Egyptians be convinced that the internationalization of the crossings is in their best interest?

My sense is that the Egyptians themselves do not want the fighting to end yet, and are hoping for further attacks on Hamas's military forces and political infrastructure:

Meanwhile, Egypt denied on Tuesday a report that President Hosni Mubarak had told European ministers on a peace mission that Hamas must not be allowed to win the ongoing war in Gaza. 

Haaretz reported on Tuesday that Mubarak made the comment on Monday to a visiting European Union delegation, which included several European foreign ministers. "If an Israeli newspaper published comments such as these, non-attributed, from a closed meeting, how credible can it be?" said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossam Zaki (Ha'aretz).

Mubarak's Proposal

These are the details of the Mubarak proposal announced at Sharm, as reported in Ha'aretz. My translation / paraphrase with interspersed commentary follows.

ביום שני הציג סרקוזי לאולמרט יוזמה עליה שוחח עם שיא מצרים, חוסני מובארק, פירט אתמול את עיקרי הצעתו להפסקת האש המיידית בשארם א-שייח, שם נפגש עם נשיא צרפת, ניקולא סרקוזי. על פי ההצעה, ישראל והפלגים הפלשתיניים צריכים להסכים להפסקת אש מיידית לתקופה מוגבלת, שתאפשר מעבר בטוח לסיוע הומניטרי. מצרים תזמין גם את ישראל וגם את הפלשתינאים לפגישה דחופה שמטרתה להגיע להסדרים מידיים ולביטחונות שיבטיחו כי ההסלמה הנוכחית לא תישנה ולאחר מכן תזמין שוב את הרשות הפלשתינית ואת הפלגים הפלשתיניים כדי להגיב למאמציה להשגת פיוס לאומי.

With Sarkozy at his side, Mubarak announced his own proposal for an immediate cease fire. Under the proposal, Israel would have to agree on an immediate cease fire with the Palestinian factions for a limited period of time' that will put into effect a safe, humanitarian corridor. Egypt will also invite Israel and the Palestinians for an urgent meeting with the goal of arriving at immediate security arrangements that will guarantee that the present escalation will not be repeated. After that, it will again invite the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian factions in order to respond to its [i.e., the PA's - ?] efforts to achieve national reconciliation.

This version of the Egyptian proposal leaves a lot to be desired. It seems to give Hamas and the other "factions" equal representation at the negotiating table and would represent a victory in Hamas's struggle for legitimacy. I do not see why it should emerge from this fighting strengthened in this way. But it could be that the Egyptians are simply being careful and trying to manage a way to put the PA back in power - at least as far as the border crossings go. This is still not a viable solution.

The same article also discusses Sarkozy's plan for international engineering experts to be engaged on BOTH the Israeli and Egyptian sides of the border (where exactly? it's not clear whether this is talking about the Philadelphi corridor) to monitor Egyptian efforts to control the smuggling through tunnels. This sounds like a much weaker version of the proposal which would see the U.S. army engineering corps involved in destroying tunnels and making sure they stay that way. Thus, this option also does not seem feasible:

ביום שני הציג סרקוזי לאולמרט יוזמה עליה שוחח עם מובארק, לפיה יוקם מנגנון מיוחד של מומחי הנדסה שיפעל בצדו המצרי של הגבול ועוד מנגנון שיופעל בצד הישראלי. הכוח יפעל לצד כוחות הביטחון המצרים, ותפקידו יהיה לסייע אך גם לפקח ולעקוב אחרי הפעילות המצרית ולדווח על התקדמות הטיפול במנהרות. סרקוזי שביקר אתמול גם בדמשק, אמר בשיחה עם כתבים כי "הסכם הפסקת אש אינו רחוק".

But, read further on:

ביום שני הציג סרקוזי לאולמרט יוזמה עליה שוחח עם שלשום חשף "הארץ" את התוכנית המצרית כפי שהציגה מובארק. מקורות ערביים הדגישו כי ההצעה המצרית אינה אמורה לכלול את פתיחת מעבר רפיח, אלא לאחר הגעה להסכם שיאפשר נוכחות של כוחות הרשות במקום, או לחלופין של כוח בינלאומי. ההצעה המצרית גם אינה עוסקת במרחב הפעולה של החמאס סמוך לגבול עם ישראל. נציגי החמאס המשיכו אתמול לדון במתווה הפסקת האש עם אנשי המודיעין המצרי. הנציגים אמורים לשוב לדמשק ולהתייעץ עם צמרת הארגון. 

"Arab sources" qualified the Egyptian proposal. First of all, it would not result in an opening the Rafah crossing. That's quite convenient for the Egyptians, who do not want Gazans pouring into Sinai and beyond. The Rafah crossing into Egypt would only be opened after an agreement  that would allow the presence of Palestinian Authority forces on location. Basically, the PA would be re-inserted into the Gaza Strip, after having been expelled by Hamas. The other alternative: an international force. According to the source, the Egyptian proposal also doesn't address the area of operations for Hamas near the Israeli border. This could be the go-ahead for Israel to establish a security zone during the current round of fighting. Hamas representatives are currently meeting with Egyptian intelligence to sketch a cease fire agreement; they'll be heading back to Damascus for consultations with the leadership there.

A New Order for Gaza - Israel's Interests

Philadelphi Corridor

Current objectives:

1. Get the international community to force a settlement on Hamas under which it commits to a cessation of rocket attacks without preconditions.

2. Figure out a viable solution for the arms smuggling problem that involves credible powers who can be trusted to guarantee Israel's security.

"What to do about Hamas' arms smuggling currently appears to be the main sticking point holding up a cease-fire agreement. Israel is holding intensive talks with the United States in an effort to reach a deal that would be acceptable to Egypt. The proposals include sending in the U.S. Army's engineering corps to systematically destroy the entire Philadelphi Road, where the smuggling tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border are located. 

Three years ago, on the eve of the disengagement, then GOC Southern Command (and now Deputy Chief of Staff) Dan Harel proposed digging a canal the entire length of the Philadelphi Road to thwart the smuggling. At the time, his idea was dismissed as crazy. So Israel withdrew without any arrangements in place for Philadelphi, and the tunnels under the road became a smuggling superhighway for the rockets now being launched at Be'er Sheva, Ashdod and Gedera."

Source: Amos Harel in Ha'aretz.

In France, we read a slightly different spin on this option in Le Figaro

Plutôt que des observateurs, Israël serait prêt à accepter une force internationale active pour contrôler les 14 km de la frontière et éviter la reconstruction des tunnels détruits depuis le début de l'offensive militaire d'Israël à Gaza, il y a dix jours. Israël suggère que les Etats-Unis fournissent des troupes du génie chargées des tunnels. C'est une façon de remettre toute décision au 20 janvier, jour de l'investiture du président Barack Obama...

Il se trouve que le général James Jones, conseiller pour la sécurité nationale du nouveau président américain, a été chargé en novembre 2007 par Condoleezza Rice d'une mission sur les questions de sécurité liées aux négociations israélo-palestiniennes. L'ancien Chef d'état major des forces de l'Otan avait rédigé un rapport critique de l'armée israélienne et favorable au déploiement dans les territoires palestiniens d'une force internationale sous commandement de l'Otan. Cette idée pourrait bien devenir à l'ordre du jour.

The columnist seems to be arguing that Israel's insistence on having the U.S. play a lead role in a tunnel monitoring scenario is a way to delay the cease fire until January 20. This is silly. Of course the only acceptable solution for Israel would be one that puts the U.S. in a lead role. It's interesting that the writer then links these demands for a Gazan solution to James Jones's old report arguing for a NATO force in the West Bank. That's a pipe dream, and will not become "l'ordre du jour" anytime soon.

Means employed by Israel:

Weaken Hamas militarily and hold out possibility of utter devastation.

Risks:

1. Hamas will not agree to any settlement.

2. Arms smuggling will not be curtailed even after measures are implemented.

3. IDF may prove unsuccesful in current operations on the ground, giving Hamas a public relations victory.

4. Settlement may end up legitimating Hamas rule and strengthen the organization in the international arena.

The Diplomatic Circus

Turkish PM Erdogan

Israel's "Operation Cast Lead" has generated a number of interesting diplomatic moves and rifts that give us some insights into the ambitions of various powers in the region.

Most remarkable have been Egypt's repeated pronouncements that Hamas itself is to blame for the crisis. The regime feels confident enought to withstand both foreign and domestic pressure, even as Nasrallah has castigated Mubarak for his alleged support of Israel. It is clear that Egypt wants Hamas weakened and is willing to tolerate large numbers of Palestinian casualties for this to happen. Egypt is asserting itself as the power broker in the Israeli-Gazan conflict, and making both the Iranians and Syrians look like idle talkers. The message to Hamas: we are your only road to salvation. 

The Jordanians are looking on quietly, hoping that the Israelis finish the job quickly, with as few Palestinian casualties as possible. They seem more antsy than the Egyptians about the operation's implications for them.

Among the Europeans, the French have played the most visible role in efforts to achieve a cease fire. Until now, their efforts have not achieved very much on the ground. Although Sarkozy has blamed Hamas for the eruption of violence, he has also tried to push for a quick end to the fighting. I am not sure what exactly France is up to. My sense is that Sarkozy is trying to seize an opportunity for France to establish another foothold in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Unlike the Egyptians, the French do not seem to place as high a priority on weakening Hamas. It is possible that they may even support a partial legitimization of the Hamas government in Gaza, which would be achieved through an insertion of French monitors at the Philadelphi corridor, to guard against the militarization of the Strip via underground tunnels. 

I am not sure how the Egyptians are responding to these moves. However it may be packaged, such international monitors on the Egyptian side of the border represent an affront to Egyptian sovereignty. Furthermore, Egypt may well want to keep some weapons against Israel in its arsenal, by preserving the option of turning a blind eye to Hamas or other Palestinian smuggling.

One can be sure that the Germans are watching France's high-profile diplomacy very carefully. Meanwhile, Angela Merkel is probably pursuing German objectives with a little more tact and efficacy than Sarkozy. 

The other regional power that has made headlines since the Gaza operation began is Turkey. Erdogan's condemnations of Israel have been especially damning. They seem to reflect Turkish public opinion but they are also, likely, connected to Turkey's efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel. Turkey has invested significantly in the Syrian track and sees the current conflict as a blow against its efforts and its standing in the Arab world. The Turks have also long sought a normalization of Hamas's rule over Gaza - I am not sure why this has been important to them (ideological reasons?).  

Qatar, as usual, is using the opportunity to strike blows at the Saudis, who are very quietly toeing the Egyptian-Jordanian-American line. 

For the U.S. and Israel the priority is that Hamas emerge visibly weakened from "Operation Cast Lead." Whatever cease fire emerges must look quite different also from the Lebanese solution.  Peace Now cannot mean War Tomorrow.

More on that in a future post.