Hanin Zuabi the Flotilla Heroine

Footage released by Israel Army Radio seems to contradict claims by Balad MK Hanin Zuabi that she saw "no people carrying clubs" aboard the ship. It also shows her arguing with Israeli soldiers attempting to evacuated wounded activists. She can be heard insisting to an army soldier several times that the activists "want to stay here [on the ship]." Zuabi, who became the darling of flotilla fans in Israel, credited herself with having assisted in the evacuation of wounded activists from the ship.

I've mapped out the home provinces of each of the activists who were killed and placed a marker in each province's capital. The data are based on a Zaman article (Turkish English-language newspaper) that appeared last weekend.

Those who died appear to have been from all over Turkey. They may well have met up before and prepared/trained together in the months that preceded the flotilla, but they're not all from the same approximate area (other than most of them being from Anatolia). We probably cannot derive too much meaning from geographical plot, but it does help rule out the hypothesis that I had considered according which the people who attacked the soldiers were a bunch of young people from the same small town. TO the contrary, the median and mean age of those killed was about 31.

My assumption is that most of those killed were directly engaged in fighting with the soldiers, but it's possible that some people were in the wrong place at the wrong time. What's clear is that the actions of a small group of hot heads completely changed the mind state of the boarding party and increased the threat perception they had, compelling the soldiers to use lethal force.

Imagine Israelis Protesting in Lebanon or Yemen...

An article published today in Ha'aretz (no English version available yet) by Fadi Ayadat indicates that almost all of the hundreds of activists from the Gaza Flotilla were deported today, save for seven individuals whose injuries did not permit their transport. The majority of activists (450), including, apparently, Europeans, were flown to Turkey, but another 100 from different parts of the Arab world, were sent off to the Allenby Bridge, which is generally used by Palestinians to enter Jordan. Previous news reports indicated that there were even individuals from Yemen among the activists. Most interesting to me was the fact that 5 activists were Lebanese and deported back to Lebanon via the Rosh ha-Niqra crossing between Lebanon and Israel.

One female representative of the Turkish Red Crescent who came to oversee the deportation of Turkish citizens was quoted as saying that the injured activists had been treated well in Israeli hospitals and that they did not face any overt hostility from the local population while treated.

Can anyone imagine Israeli civilians going to Turkey or a country in the Arab world to participate in a major act of civil disobedience, or to clash with the local authorities? It would be absolutely unthinkable.

Analysis of Flotilla Video

Highlights use of paintball guns and speculates about tactics used by commandos boarding the Marmara.

Breakdown of Flotilla Activists' Countries of Origin

From Ha'aretz:

Israel gave the following breakdown of countries and numbers of those activists ordered expelled, excluding the nine killed and the seriously wounded in Monday's raid:

Australia 3; Azerbaijan 2; Italy 6; Indonesia 12; Ireland 9; Algeria 28; United States 11; Bulgaria 2; Bosnia 1; Bahrain 4; Belgium 5; Germany 11; South Africa 1; Holland 2; United Kingdom 31; Greece 38; Jordan 30; Kuwait 15; Lebanon 3; Mauritania 3; Malaysia 11; Egypt 3; Macedonia 3; Morocco 7; Norway 3; New Zealand 1; Syria 3; Serbia 1; Oman 1; Pakistan 3; Czech Republic 4; France 9; Kosovo 1; Canada 1; Sweden 11; Turkey 380; Yemen 4.

The Marmara Incident - Preliminary Notes

Everyone involved in this blog probably had the same initial reaction of disbelief, shock and sadness when they heard about the deaths (so far, 9 confirmed) that resulted from Monday morning's IDF raid on the Marmara. Now that more information has become available, however, this incident has become somewhat less unfathomable to me.

It is now clear that the IDF troops who boarded the Marmara encountered very violent and determined resistance that caught them completely off-guard. News reports indicate that they were not armed with lethal rifles (only paint ball rifles??) and that they carried hand guns as a last resort. Looking at the way in which they boarded the ship, it's almost certain that the boarding commandos did not expect to use their weapons and did not expect to engage in truly violent confrontations. As a result, as they touched down on the deck of the ship, they were overpowered and separated from each other. The most definitive video clip, shown only by Israeli media so far, to my knowledge, shows soldiers being bludgeoned and one of them being tossed over the deck. On Ynet, that video clip provided by the IDF spokesperson is followed up with testimony from a soldier with a broken arm who recounts how he and his comrades landed on deck the Marmara with their paint ball rifles strapped on their backs, not in their hands, and how the activists started beating them to a pulp with metal clubs. The soldier goes on to describe how his paint ball rifle was destroyed, and how he tried to reach for his handgun but found out that his arm was broken. Throughout this, he saw other soldiers down on the ground, still receiving beatings. The Ynet-supplied video stops there. I have yet to see video evidence that shows what happened next, but my assumption is that a few soldiers opened fire at that point.

Comments by ministers and senior officers to the Israeli press reveal that they had no idea that this scenario - definitely the worst case scenario - was more than a remote possibility. Previous incidents of this sort were resolved with minimal violence, resulting either in the granting of passage to the Gaza Strip in one case or in vessels being towed to Israel.

Clearly, there was an intelligence failure in this particular case. The decision to use naval commandos also seems quite ludicrous in hindsight. This was a policing operation on the high seas that should have been handled by units with crowd control experience.

Some readers of this post may disagree with the blockade of the Gaza Strip and with the rationale behind the boarding, but I am quite convinced that few will dispute that it seems highly likely, based on the evidence we've seen so far, that the IDF soldiers involved in the raid resorted to lethal force as a last-resort measure and in self-defence. Whether they should have been sent on this kind of a mission is the bigger question.

Note: The IDF video footage is now available on the BBC News website.

The IDF spokesperson's YouTube channel now has a clip up from the naval commandos' radio communications in which a soldier reports hearing live fire from the activists "down below".

Hamas Economy

I'm not holding my breath for a popular uprising in Gaza against Hamas, but I found this article by Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel interesting because it highlights the economic and political structures on which Hamas, like the Palestinian Authority, depends for its hold on power. Apparently, Hamas has been unable to pay its many "civil servants" their wages for the past two months.

Modern Trade Routes and Ancient Gazan Artifacts

I was disappointed to find no word of the whereabouts of a huge hoard of early (?) Hellenistic coins found near Rafah in January in this recent article on Gazan antiquities from the Christian Science Monitor. I tried to investigate the issue earlier this year. I asked a friend at the American Numismatic Society who works in the region, and on contemporary coinage from the Arabian peninsula, but he hadn't heard anything.

But what caught my eye in this article was the assertion by Abu Ahmed, a black market antiquities dealer from Gaza, that in his view the biggest market for these artifacts is in Israel. There is huge money in "Biblical" antiquities, and so many different people profit from it. Of course many of the people who profit most from off-the-record sales of these objects live in Israel. It is disconcerting to the say the least that despite tight border controls Gaza is still a major exporter of this stuff to Israel. The Israeli Antiquities Authority and the IDF can do better.

Jimmy Carter's Hamas Delusion

BY AMOS

Jimmy Carter is in Damascus today and had the following to say after his meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and before checking in with Hamas head Khalid Mishal:

"I don't believe there is any possibility to have peace between the Palestinians and Israel unless Hamas is involved directly in harmony with Fatah.

"My own preference is for the United States government to find a way at a very [early] date to have direct discussions with the Hamas leadership.

"The first step has to be reconciliation between the Palestinian leaders to have a stable foundation to negotiate effectively with the Israeli leaders.

"I will be discussing with [Hamas] if they are willing to make the commitments for peaceful relations with Israel in the future and accept the overall requirements for peace and accommodation."

This is all silliness. The only terms under which Hamas would agree to any sort of "harmony" with Fatah is if such an agreement were to extend the Islamists' power and legitimacy. If Fatah does agree to such a settlement, it will mean that its leadership has effectively surrendered. In any case, any Fatah-Hamas reunion is not in Israel's interest nor in that of the U.S. At least not as long as we are talking about the same Hamas that exists today.

Hamas today derives its power from Syrian and Iranian money, training and weapons, and from its security organization in Gaza. Its legitimacy in Palestinian society is based on its religious vision, social welfare organizations, electoral success, and its uncompromising stance against Israel, which it has demonstrated with its successful terrorist attacks. Neither its bases of legitimacy nor its sources of power make a rapprochement with Israel at all likely. Hamas is therefore irrelevant to a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It thus has very little to offer to the U.S. The U.S., like Israel, would do much better to focus on the West Bank, at least as long as Fatah maintains power there.

In the meantime, Israel will probably have to live with Gaza being ruled by Hamas. Unfortunately, the scenarios in which Hamas might be removed from power are limited to the following,

1. internal revolt
   
2. military defeat of Hamas as political and security force
   
3. end of sponsorship by Iran and Syria
   

none of which will take place any time soon.

"I Hate the Name Hamas"

More and more reports are appearing in the international press about dissatisfaction with Hamas in Gaza, though these are balanced by quotations from the official Hamas organs. Thus, in The Guardian, we first read about these thoughts from a Hamas minister:

At the al-Filisteen mosque in the Rimal area of Gaza City on Friday, the imam was preaching the necessity of brotherhood and unity. But on the steps after prayers, Hamas's economics minister explained what the conditions for Palestinian unity involved. Senior Hamas officials are demanding that the conditions for reconciliation should include an end to negotiations with Israel and to the peace process, a unity agreement under a banner of "resistance", and continued Hamas control of Gaza.

"Everyone recognises the need for reconciliation among Palestinians," said Abu Rushdi Zaza. "It will happen immediately if the Palestine Liberation Organisation [dominated by Fatah] can be rebuilt. But it must be understood that Hamas is the government. If international institutions want to do rebuilding projects in Gaza, then that is fine - but they must do it under our supervision.

The paper also quotes at length a pro-Hamas parliamentarian from the West Bank:

Mahmoud Musleh, a Palestinian legislative council member aligned with Hamas, added: "The organisation that should be talking for the Palestinian people is the PLO. But it has not been speaking. If it does not rehabilitate itself, there will be dramatic changes. At present it does not represent the Palestinian people. They can longer make decisions. They do not own the power."

He continued: "There is a new balance of power emerging. For the first time, through the steadfastness of the resistance in Gaza, we have seen Israel's project halted."

And then, in the last paragraph we encounter a passage that is starting to become a cliche of sorts in the Western press. An ordinary Gazan, after checking that no one is listening, pours out his true feelings about Hamas:

And if one place is the symbol of the destruction wreaked in Gaza, it is the demolished houses of the Samouni family in Zeitoun, a place where the stink of death still seeps from out of the rubble.

A member of the family, who lost his father and his son, asks not to be identified for fear of being beaten by Hamas - as others were during the war - for criticising it. "No one from Hamas has come to offer us help. None of the leaders has been here. We were farmers, not fighters with a militant faction.

He pulls out a crumpled photograph showing a wedding scene. "This was my father. This, my son. After what happened to us here, I hate the name Hamas."

Fallout from the Gaza War

Hamas agrees to allow Fatah forces to patrol Rafah crossing (Ha'aretz):

The London-based Asharq al-Awsat reported Saturday that Hamas has suggested representatives of the Palestinian Authority be stationed at the Rafah crossing, but that they be residents of Gaza, not the West Bank. 

Also on Saturday, Hamas officials laid out some of their conditions for a continuation of the Gaza truce and for the release of captured Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit. 

Hamas spokesman Ayman Taha told Asharq Al-Awsat that his group wants European Union and Turkish troops to patrol Gaza's border crossings with Israel

I'm sure the heads of Hamas made these suggestions on their own initiative.

Assad  congratulates Hamas on 'victory' over IDF in Gaza (Ha'aretz)

According to the article, Assad told Meshal, currently in exile in Damascus, that the Palestinian peoples' response to Israel Defense Forces operation "Cast Lead" was evidence of their "commitment to their inalienable rights to their land and homes, and of their deep faith in their ultimate victory over occupation and aggression." 

More cheap words from Assad.  

The delegation reportedly told Syrian officials that Syria is the first stop in a tour of countries in the Middle East in order to "express their gratitude to them for standing by the Palestinian people during the aggression."

Mubarak must be ecstatic.

Egyptian official: Israel achieved all of its military goals in Gaza (Ha'aretz)

An Egyptian official has said that Israel achieved all of its military objectives during "Operation Cast Lead" in the Gaza Strip, having exacted serious blows to Hamas and it's infrastructure, according to an article published in the Arabic-language daily Al-Hayat on Saturday. 

The official is quoted in the article as saying that senior Hamas leaders are still in hiding out of fear of Israel Defense Forces strikes, and that Israel is not interested in pursuing a new calm or Tahadiyeh with the militant group. 

Egypt is not letting Hamas forget this.

ANALYSIS / The IDF model that failed in Lebanon succeeded  in Gaza (Amos Harel, Ha'aretz)

The Egyptian daily Al-Ahram reported this week that the head of Hamas' political bureau in Damascus, Khaled Meshal, expressed disappointment at the Arab reaction to the operation during a closed session of the Arab summit in Qatar. Not only did Hamas remain almost alone in the campaign against Israel, it also suffered a painful blow in the military confrontation. The best proof of this was its agreement to an unconditional cease-fire while IDF troops were still in the Gaza Strip. Al-Ahram reports that Meshal admitted that he had not expected the Israeli reaction to be so severe and sustained - the same sentiment that was expressed by Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon two and half years ago. 

Outwardly, Hamas broadcast a different message. Military Intelligence tends to give Hamas high grades for the credibility of its announcements in ordinary times. But since the start of the ground operation, Hamas' fabrications have gone off the charts. One of the organization's spokesmen claimed this week that Hamas had expelled the IDF from the Gaza Strip. The spokesman of the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military wing, admitted to losing only 48 of its men in the fighting. And how many Israeli soldiers were killed? Forty-nine, according to Hamas (in reality, 10 soldiers were killed). Conversations with residents of Ramallah and East Jerusalem indicate that from their point of view, Hamas won. They claim that Hamas withstood Israeli military pressure and that the IDF struck only civilians in the Gaza Strip. Asked why they think Hamas stopped firing rockets, they explain that it was a good-will gesture to Barack Obama on the occasion of his inauguration.

More deadly stupidity.

Gaza agreement eludes Arab leaders (Al Jazeera)

Arab leaders have pledged $2bn to help reconstruct the Gaza Strip after a three week Israeli offensive that devastated the territory's infrastructure, left 1,300 Palestinians dead, and thousands more displaced.

But there have been disagreements over how the aid will find its way into Gaza, with countries including Saudi Arabia concerned about giving funds directly to Hamas, which currently administers the Gaza Strip.

Rifts over Israel

"They [the Arab leaders] decided to confine themselves in a general statement to postpone differences," Al Jazeera's Hashem Ahelbarra reported from Kuwait.

"Saudis and Egyptians are very sceptical of [giving money to] Hamas for one reason," he said.

It will be interesting to see who wins this battle. Qatar's position has been dynamic over the past two years. Once in a while they support the Saudi line and at other times they subtly undermine their bigger neighbor. This time, Qatar has made no bones about its position. The emirate's stance during the Gaza War made it possible to speak of a Syrian-Qatari axis in support of Hamas and aligned with Iran. So far, Qatar has confined its war to one of words, or, more precisely, images - through its widely-watched al Jazeera outlet. The Egyptians and the Saudis must be fuming, but it remains to be seen whether the Arab masses will stay riled up long enough to present a serious threat to the security apparatuses of these regimes. 

Hamas's Offer Falls Short

Egyptian FM Ahmed Abu El Gheit (Photo: NATO)

Hamas's press conference did not yield a major breakthrough for Israel. Although Hamas seems to have reversed its earlier opposition to a cease fire, its public statements appear designed to dispel the sense that it is conceding anything. Furthermore, Hamas's various branches are sending out contradictory messages, as usual. It might be best to ignore what they have to say though, and to focus on the messages being sent out by Egypt and by Hamas-Gaza.

According to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Hamas has agreed to the Egyptian version of the cease fire, which calls for an immediate end to the "aggression against Gaza," an opening of the crossings, and the withdrawal of the [Israeli] troops from the Strip. The Hamas people ("our brothers in Hamas") have conveyed their agreement to the Egyptians, who will in turn pass it on to the Israelis (Ha'aretz):

שר החוץ המצרי, אחמד אבו אל-ריט אמר הערב, כי החמאס הסכימה לנוסחה המצרית להפסקה מיידית של התוקפנות על עזה, פתיחת המעברים ונסיגת הכוחות בפנים הרצועה. לדבריו, נציגי החמאס הודיעו לאנשי המודיעין המצרי על עמדתם ובכוונת מצרים להעביר לישראל את מה שהושג בדיונים עם האחים מהחמאס. 

These kinds of terms again seem unacceptable to me. Of course, there is a chance that the goal here is to allow Hamas to save face in public. The problem is that Hamas itself seems to think the cease fire makes too many concessions to Israel. Muhamad Nasr, a member of the political wing of Gaza, who took part in the negotiations with Egypt, disagreed with the announcement that Hamas had agreed to the Egyptian initiative. He elaborated that Hamas still has problems with aspects of the agreement:

מוחמד נאסר חבר הלשכה המדינית של החמאס שהיה שותף לשיחות הסתייג מההודעה לפיה היוזמה המצרית מקובלת על החמאס. לדבריו, ההיענות של החמאס למאמצי המצרים, אין משמעותם כי החמאס הסכים ליוזמה המצרית. יש עדיין סוגיות במחלוקת ואנחנו עדיין דוחפים את הנושא.

One positive note is that, at least according to Al-Arabiya, Hamas has agreed to the deployment of Palestinian Authority police officers to guard the Rafah border crossing, together with European monitors. Such an agreement represents a blow to Hamas, which had kicked the PA out of Gaza earlier. It would also amount to a victory for Egypt and for the other powers supporting Abu Mazen. For Israel, on the other hand, this is not a real victory. Assuming that the PA officers manage to stay in control of the crossing, they will be hard-pressed to do Israel's bidding for it. They do not represent a solution of the arms smuggling problem. And what will happen when the PA and Hamas "reconcile"?

All in all, the agreement looks good for Egypt and the PA. It was interesting to read the Hamas delegation's statement that they had considered only the Egyptian initiative. Mubarak must be pleased that his message to Hamas has hit home: we are your only salvation.

For Israel, on the other hand, Hamas's position is wholly unsatisfactory. Obviously, Israel cannot agree to a cease fire under these terms. Fortunately, Israel has some time to formulate its own conditions and to back them up with the threat of "stage 3," even if opposition to the full-scale deployment of ground forces in Gaza is growing in the military and government.

In other news, according to the IDF, Palestinians fired a phosphorus bomb at Israel yesterday. Human rights organizations have previously accused Israel of using white phosphorus in civilian areas, which, many argue, is illegal under the Geneva Conventions. The Israeli military argues that it employs phosphorus mainly for smoke screens and that its use of the chemical does not violate the conventions. Rights groups have also accused the U.S. of having used the weapon against insurgents in Iraq.

Cast Lead: Achievements So Far

Map showing the Philadelphi Corridor

Although the IDF build-up on the border to Gaza is continuing, there are signs that Israel is hesitant about entering the "third stage" of Operation Cast Lead. The political and military echelons are still assessing whether a significant expansion of operations is worth it. As always in the Middle East, some dramatic event may drastically alter their assessments with immediate consequences. But for now, let us take stock of what has been accomplished and what remains to be done.

1) There is no doubt that at this point in time, Israel has weakened Hamas's political and military organizations. 

2)  the IDF has clearly re-established its deterrence force against the Palestinians and against other actors in the region. 

3) the army and government have made progress in finding ways to reduce Palestinian arms smuggling. 

4) the operation revealed the extent of Hamas's missile capabilities, averting a possible surprise in the future.

5) Cast Lead has managed to dent rocket firing in the short term, and has increased the pressure on Hamas to do so over the long term. 

The means by which Israel has achieved its objectives have not been pretty. From the beginning, the army treated this as a war rather than a policing operation. The IDF assumed correctly that Hamas would use civilian sites for defensive and offensive purposes. Mosques, hospitals, and residences have all served Hamas as storage depots, launching sites, and booby-trapped defensive installations so far in this war.  Thus, the army was aggressive from the outset. Air strikes flattened suspected traps, and ground troops called in planes, helicopters, and artillery whenever they encountered resistance that might embroil them in a deadly ambush or remote-controlled bombing. So far, this strategy has proven very effective at reducing IDF casualties. It has also led to the deaths of many Hamas fighters. Hamas miscalculated in thinking that the IDF would shy away from such tactics and that it would therefore be able to inflict many casualties on the invading forces. The greatest victims of this miscalculation have of course been the civilians of Gaza. I do not share the view that the civilian casualties will strengthen Hamas over the long term. Such an argument could have been made if Hamas had distinguished itself in the fighting; so far it has not done so, and it has proven incapable of protecting its population. 

The question now is whether, given these achievements, Israel is already in a position to force Hamas to agree to a truce that will represent a satisfactory improvement of the status quo ante, or whether such an outcome will require more fighting. Any cease fire must set the conditions for a permanent attenuation of Hamas. The good news is that Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, and the U.S. are all interested in the reduction of Hamas's standing in the region. Egypt has certainly increased its standing vis-a-vis Hamas as a result of the IDF operation, and it will be eager to solidify these gains. It may very well do so by re-inserting forces loyal to the PA into Gaza through a stage-managed "reconciliation." The more difficult problem is finding a way to combat Hamas's ability to smuggle weapons into Gaza. Although a number of options have been suggested, none of them can actually be relied upon by Israel. The various Arab or European offers of help in border monitoring or even tunnel detection will not do the trick. The bulk of the work has to be accomplished during this operation. 

With these factors in mind, it is in Israel's interest to prolong the operation, while keeping it at the current intensity. Reserves do not have to be poured into heavy urban combat in Gaza City or the refugee camps. They can continue to chip away at Hamas at the current fashion, in the north of the strip, while in the south, Israel gathers intelligence on and destroys the tunnel networks. The operations in southern Gaza could conceivable continue even after the inauguration of President-elect Barack Obama. Israel and the U.S. share an interest in putting in place mechanisms for a management of the Philadelphi Corridor that will diminish the flow of arms and terrorists from the Sinai Peninsula into Gaza and possibly vice versa.

Update on Diplomatic Initiatives

Officers of the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah at a Medal ceremony. 

The mission has been on standby since June 9, 2007 (EU BAM Rafah)

Israel has agreed to setting up a "humanitarian corridor," which amounts to a daily, unilateral cease fire around Gaza City, between 1 and 4 pm. This will take some of the pressure off the Foreign Ministry as the diplomatic initiatives being discussed by various powers multiply.

The Israeli cabinet's deferral of a vote (Ha'aretz English) on expanding the ground operation must also be viewed as an attempt to show Israel's interest in a cease fire rather than the continuation of war. However, the conditions for a cease fire to go into effect are strict: an end to rocket fire and a commitment by the powers to combating the arms smuggling in a viable and proactive manner. It's unlikely that these prerequisites can be met soon. For one, Hamas's latest statement rejecting  a permanent truce with Israel only serve to strengthen arguments against a cease fire. More importantly, the proposal to internationalize the struggle against the arms smuggling tunnels still faces Egyptian opposition. It will be difficult to arrive at a solution that significantly upgrades border security. No one will accept a return to the days when impotent EU monitors "observed" the Rafah crossing. Apparently, France and the U.S. are now cooperating to persuade Egypt to implement measures with teeth:

Meanwhile, the international diplomatic effort being led by the United States, France, Britain and Egypt is still focused on an initiative to deploy an international force of experts and troops that would assist Egyptian authorities in dealing with the tunnel system Hamas has built along the Philadelphi Route, which borders Sinai. 

According to a political source in Jerusalem, France and the U.S. are working hard on Egypt to get it to agree to the initiative. 

"If a solution is found, we will have no problem in immediately bringing the operation to an end," the Israeli source said (Ha'aretz). 

Can the Egyptians be convinced that the internationalization of the crossings is in their best interest?

My sense is that the Egyptians themselves do not want the fighting to end yet, and are hoping for further attacks on Hamas's military forces and political infrastructure:

Meanwhile, Egypt denied on Tuesday a report that President Hosni Mubarak had told European ministers on a peace mission that Hamas must not be allowed to win the ongoing war in Gaza. 

Haaretz reported on Tuesday that Mubarak made the comment on Monday to a visiting European Union delegation, which included several European foreign ministers. "If an Israeli newspaper published comments such as these, non-attributed, from a closed meeting, how credible can it be?" said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossam Zaki (Ha'aretz).

Mubarak's Proposal

These are the details of the Mubarak proposal announced at Sharm, as reported in Ha'aretz. My translation / paraphrase with interspersed commentary follows.

ביום שני הציג סרקוזי לאולמרט יוזמה עליה שוחח עם שיא מצרים, חוסני מובארק, פירט אתמול את עיקרי הצעתו להפסקת האש המיידית בשארם א-שייח, שם נפגש עם נשיא צרפת, ניקולא סרקוזי. על פי ההצעה, ישראל והפלגים הפלשתיניים צריכים להסכים להפסקת אש מיידית לתקופה מוגבלת, שתאפשר מעבר בטוח לסיוע הומניטרי. מצרים תזמין גם את ישראל וגם את הפלשתינאים לפגישה דחופה שמטרתה להגיע להסדרים מידיים ולביטחונות שיבטיחו כי ההסלמה הנוכחית לא תישנה ולאחר מכן תזמין שוב את הרשות הפלשתינית ואת הפלגים הפלשתיניים כדי להגיב למאמציה להשגת פיוס לאומי.

With Sarkozy at his side, Mubarak announced his own proposal for an immediate cease fire. Under the proposal, Israel would have to agree on an immediate cease fire with the Palestinian factions for a limited period of time' that will put into effect a safe, humanitarian corridor. Egypt will also invite Israel and the Palestinians for an urgent meeting with the goal of arriving at immediate security arrangements that will guarantee that the present escalation will not be repeated. After that, it will again invite the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian factions in order to respond to its [i.e., the PA's - ?] efforts to achieve national reconciliation.

This version of the Egyptian proposal leaves a lot to be desired. It seems to give Hamas and the other "factions" equal representation at the negotiating table and would represent a victory in Hamas's struggle for legitimacy. I do not see why it should emerge from this fighting strengthened in this way. But it could be that the Egyptians are simply being careful and trying to manage a way to put the PA back in power - at least as far as the border crossings go. This is still not a viable solution.

The same article also discusses Sarkozy's plan for international engineering experts to be engaged on BOTH the Israeli and Egyptian sides of the border (where exactly? it's not clear whether this is talking about the Philadelphi corridor) to monitor Egyptian efforts to control the smuggling through tunnels. This sounds like a much weaker version of the proposal which would see the U.S. army engineering corps involved in destroying tunnels and making sure they stay that way. Thus, this option also does not seem feasible:

ביום שני הציג סרקוזי לאולמרט יוזמה עליה שוחח עם מובארק, לפיה יוקם מנגנון מיוחד של מומחי הנדסה שיפעל בצדו המצרי של הגבול ועוד מנגנון שיופעל בצד הישראלי. הכוח יפעל לצד כוחות הביטחון המצרים, ותפקידו יהיה לסייע אך גם לפקח ולעקוב אחרי הפעילות המצרית ולדווח על התקדמות הטיפול במנהרות. סרקוזי שביקר אתמול גם בדמשק, אמר בשיחה עם כתבים כי "הסכם הפסקת אש אינו רחוק".

But, read further on:

ביום שני הציג סרקוזי לאולמרט יוזמה עליה שוחח עם שלשום חשף "הארץ" את התוכנית המצרית כפי שהציגה מובארק. מקורות ערביים הדגישו כי ההצעה המצרית אינה אמורה לכלול את פתיחת מעבר רפיח, אלא לאחר הגעה להסכם שיאפשר נוכחות של כוחות הרשות במקום, או לחלופין של כוח בינלאומי. ההצעה המצרית גם אינה עוסקת במרחב הפעולה של החמאס סמוך לגבול עם ישראל. נציגי החמאס המשיכו אתמול לדון במתווה הפסקת האש עם אנשי המודיעין המצרי. הנציגים אמורים לשוב לדמשק ולהתייעץ עם צמרת הארגון. 

"Arab sources" qualified the Egyptian proposal. First of all, it would not result in an opening the Rafah crossing. That's quite convenient for the Egyptians, who do not want Gazans pouring into Sinai and beyond. The Rafah crossing into Egypt would only be opened after an agreement  that would allow the presence of Palestinian Authority forces on location. Basically, the PA would be re-inserted into the Gaza Strip, after having been expelled by Hamas. The other alternative: an international force. According to the source, the Egyptian proposal also doesn't address the area of operations for Hamas near the Israeli border. This could be the go-ahead for Israel to establish a security zone during the current round of fighting. Hamas representatives are currently meeting with Egyptian intelligence to sketch a cease fire agreement; they'll be heading back to Damascus for consultations with the leadership there.

A New Order for Gaza - Israel's Interests

Philadelphi Corridor

Current objectives:

1. Get the international community to force a settlement on Hamas under which it commits to a cessation of rocket attacks without preconditions.

2. Figure out a viable solution for the arms smuggling problem that involves credible powers who can be trusted to guarantee Israel's security.

"What to do about Hamas' arms smuggling currently appears to be the main sticking point holding up a cease-fire agreement. Israel is holding intensive talks with the United States in an effort to reach a deal that would be acceptable to Egypt. The proposals include sending in the U.S. Army's engineering corps to systematically destroy the entire Philadelphi Road, where the smuggling tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border are located. 

Three years ago, on the eve of the disengagement, then GOC Southern Command (and now Deputy Chief of Staff) Dan Harel proposed digging a canal the entire length of the Philadelphi Road to thwart the smuggling. At the time, his idea was dismissed as crazy. So Israel withdrew without any arrangements in place for Philadelphi, and the tunnels under the road became a smuggling superhighway for the rockets now being launched at Be'er Sheva, Ashdod and Gedera."

Source: Amos Harel in Ha'aretz.

In France, we read a slightly different spin on this option in Le Figaro

Plutôt que des observateurs, Israël serait prêt à accepter une force internationale active pour contrôler les 14 km de la frontière et éviter la reconstruction des tunnels détruits depuis le début de l'offensive militaire d'Israël à Gaza, il y a dix jours. Israël suggère que les Etats-Unis fournissent des troupes du génie chargées des tunnels. C'est une façon de remettre toute décision au 20 janvier, jour de l'investiture du président Barack Obama...

Il se trouve que le général James Jones, conseiller pour la sécurité nationale du nouveau président américain, a été chargé en novembre 2007 par Condoleezza Rice d'une mission sur les questions de sécurité liées aux négociations israélo-palestiniennes. L'ancien Chef d'état major des forces de l'Otan avait rédigé un rapport critique de l'armée israélienne et favorable au déploiement dans les territoires palestiniens d'une force internationale sous commandement de l'Otan. Cette idée pourrait bien devenir à l'ordre du jour.

The columnist seems to be arguing that Israel's insistence on having the U.S. play a lead role in a tunnel monitoring scenario is a way to delay the cease fire until January 20. This is silly. Of course the only acceptable solution for Israel would be one that puts the U.S. in a lead role. It's interesting that the writer then links these demands for a Gazan solution to James Jones's old report arguing for a NATO force in the West Bank. That's a pipe dream, and will not become "l'ordre du jour" anytime soon.

Means employed by Israel:

Weaken Hamas militarily and hold out possibility of utter devastation.

Risks:

1. Hamas will not agree to any settlement.

2. Arms smuggling will not be curtailed even after measures are implemented.

3. IDF may prove unsuccesful in current operations on the ground, giving Hamas a public relations victory.

4. Settlement may end up legitimating Hamas rule and strengthen the organization in the international arena.

The Diplomatic Circus

Turkish PM Erdogan

Israel's "Operation Cast Lead" has generated a number of interesting diplomatic moves and rifts that give us some insights into the ambitions of various powers in the region.

Most remarkable have been Egypt's repeated pronouncements that Hamas itself is to blame for the crisis. The regime feels confident enought to withstand both foreign and domestic pressure, even as Nasrallah has castigated Mubarak for his alleged support of Israel. It is clear that Egypt wants Hamas weakened and is willing to tolerate large numbers of Palestinian casualties for this to happen. Egypt is asserting itself as the power broker in the Israeli-Gazan conflict, and making both the Iranians and Syrians look like idle talkers. The message to Hamas: we are your only road to salvation. 

The Jordanians are looking on quietly, hoping that the Israelis finish the job quickly, with as few Palestinian casualties as possible. They seem more antsy than the Egyptians about the operation's implications for them.

Among the Europeans, the French have played the most visible role in efforts to achieve a cease fire. Until now, their efforts have not achieved very much on the ground. Although Sarkozy has blamed Hamas for the eruption of violence, he has also tried to push for a quick end to the fighting. I am not sure what exactly France is up to. My sense is that Sarkozy is trying to seize an opportunity for France to establish another foothold in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Unlike the Egyptians, the French do not seem to place as high a priority on weakening Hamas. It is possible that they may even support a partial legitimization of the Hamas government in Gaza, which would be achieved through an insertion of French monitors at the Philadelphi corridor, to guard against the militarization of the Strip via underground tunnels. 

I am not sure how the Egyptians are responding to these moves. However it may be packaged, such international monitors on the Egyptian side of the border represent an affront to Egyptian sovereignty. Furthermore, Egypt may well want to keep some weapons against Israel in its arsenal, by preserving the option of turning a blind eye to Hamas or other Palestinian smuggling.

One can be sure that the Germans are watching France's high-profile diplomacy very carefully. Meanwhile, Angela Merkel is probably pursuing German objectives with a little more tact and efficacy than Sarkozy. 

The other regional power that has made headlines since the Gaza operation began is Turkey. Erdogan's condemnations of Israel have been especially damning. They seem to reflect Turkish public opinion but they are also, likely, connected to Turkey's efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel. Turkey has invested significantly in the Syrian track and sees the current conflict as a blow against its efforts and its standing in the Arab world. The Turks have also long sought a normalization of Hamas's rule over Gaza - I am not sure why this has been important to them (ideological reasons?).  

Qatar, as usual, is using the opportunity to strike blows at the Saudis, who are very quietly toeing the Egyptian-Jordanian-American line. 

For the U.S. and Israel the priority is that Hamas emerge visibly weakened from "Operation Cast Lead." Whatever cease fire emerges must look quite different also from the Lebanese solution.  Peace Now cannot mean War Tomorrow.

More on that in a future post.

Go In

Much of my thinking about the current operation has been guided by a hidden axiom, that Israel cannot, under any circumstances, reoccupy the Gaza Strip. I am starting to think that this premise was mistaken. The time has come for a ground operation that commits enough forces to the task of defeating Hamas.

As I read the editorials by commentators advocating a return to the tahadiyeh or cease fire, I am growing increasingly convinced that they are too optimistic about the possibility of reaching a durable accommodation with Hamas. Furthermore, in their desire to avert a ground operation by the IDF, some of these commentators are drawing imaginary red lines that have long been crossed. Thus, Steven Klein writes that

If the rockets continue, Israel would be free of the restraint dilemma it has confronted since the dawn of the Oslo era, while Hamas would emerge as the sole party responsible for the continuation of hostilities. Israel would then enjoy more support from its allies for subsequent military operations. 

But isn't this what the disengagement from Gaza was supposed to accomplish? Has Hamas not had opportunities to accumulate goodwill by ending its terrorist activities? What has really prevented the organization from ceasing its attacks on Israel? If Hamas were truly interested in peace with Israel, it would have found a way to demonstrate the sincerity of its intentions. It is time to stop supplying Hamas with excuses. Just like Hizbullah, Hamas will always find some reasons for  continuing the armed struggle - border crossings, prisoner exchanges, lifting of restrictions in the West Bank, and the list goes on.  And if met, each one of these preconditions for peace will further erode Israel's position vis-a-vis Hamas, as unfortunately, the Gaza evacuation did.

The truth is that Hamas has very little to offer Gazans other than a continuation of the "resistance" against Israel. Let's face it, Gaza is a demographic, environmental, and economic catastrophe. Plus, Hamas's Iranian and Syrian backers have no interest in removing this thorn in Israel's side.  What then could another cease fire, along the lines of the previous one, possibly accomplish? I think it would simply delay the inevitable future showdown.

The problem is that the longer an organization like Hamas stays in power and the more legitimacy it gets, the more difficult it will be to remove it from power once it becomes clear that it doesn't have an interest in ever normalizing relations with Israel. 

Thus, I think Israel has no option but to put all its resources toward crushing Hamas. This means putting boots on the ground - and a lot of them. I know that many people say that a "defeat" of Hamas is impossible. I agree that it's difficult. But I'm thinking about Russia's invasion of Georgia. Saakashvili was seriously weakened and will most likely lose the upcoming elections. Georgia's military power is destroyed. It will take decades before Georgia ever challenges Russia again. Even worse, it has probably lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia for good. 

The Russians exited Georgia at their own pace, with a cease fire agreement that represented a clear victory for them. On paper and on the ground, the current Georgian regime was utterly defeated. Russia and its allies accomplished this with utter ruthlessness, decimating the Georgian army even once the initial Georgian assault had been repulsed, and not showing very much consideration for civilians either. We don't know how many forces the Russians lost, but the casualties they endured were not insignificant. But could anyone say that it was not worth it for Russia? Has the Georgian war undermined Russia's legitimacy anymore than Putin already had? It is true that today Russia is in trouble, but its problems now have far more to do with the global economic crisis than the after-effects of the war with Georgia. 

It is true that innocent Palestinian civilians will die, if there is a ground operation. But no state can be expected to show more concern for the welfare of its enemy's civilian population than for the lives of its own people. Israel is not embarking on a quest to secure more land or resources for Israeli civilians; it wants only to protect its citizens from daily rocket attacks. 

Everyone asks what will happen on the day after an invasion of the Gaza Strip. Ideally, Israel will leave Gaza with a durable peace agreement, based on ideological commitments and facts on the ground. If that proves unattainable, Israel will have to contemplate ruling Gaza again, in a similar manner in which it controls the West Bank, minus the settlers.

Quo Vadis, IDF?

As a number of commentators are pointing out, "Operation Cast Lead" has reached a critical point. It looks like the air force is starting to run out of significant targets to hit. Israel has destroyed Hamas's major above-ground military installations and has bombed the known tunnels. The trouble is that rockets are still flying, and with more effect than before the war. Have Minister of Defense Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Gabriel Ashkenazi sufficiently absorbed the lessons of the Lebanon war to maintain the initiative against Hamas? 

If the IDF proves incapable of staying on the offensive, it may as well push for an improved cease fire now. Otherwise, it can only be Lebanon all over again: a tentative ground operation, with many casualties, that fails to make a dent in the enemy's rocket-firing capabilities. Granted, the air force has inflicted significant casualties on Hamas and, at least temporarily, disoriented its leadership and troops. Israel also did well to prepare its citizens for a potentially lengthy engagement, that may see many of them confined to bunkers. 

But the tide can turn quickly. Should Hamas score a major hit against a civilian site, prove successful in defending against Israeli armor, or ambush a reconnaissance platoon, Israel will be drawn into a media contest similar to the one waged against Nasrallah in 2006. 

A ground operation would have to train overwhelming force on strategic sites and persons, and move with rapid speed. The truth is that we do not know Hamas's defensive capabilities. No doubt, the group has carefully studied the Hizbullah playbook. Accordingly, we could expect to see heavy use of anti-tank weapons against armor as well as infantry, and IEDs along the lines of those used to stop the tank pursuing the kidnappers of Gilad Shalit. 

The question is what the objectives - understood in a more limited, tactical sense - of a ground operation would be. What sites can be seized and held with purpose? Does it make sense to land troops from the sea, in addition to entering the Strip with tanks and infantry from the north and east?

More important, of course, are the larger strategic objectives of "Operation Cast Lead." The foolish comment by Haim Ramon, which formulated the objective as "bringing down Hamas," does not bode well. It sets Israel up for failure. 

Invading Gaza?

Video: Israel's Foreign Ministry Addresses the People of Gaza

Let's assume that Hamas is a rational political actor. What did the organization hope to achieve with the barrage of rocket, mortar, and missiles that it has fired at Israeli civilians since the conclusion of the cease fire? There are two separate but linked strategic aims that the Hamas government in Gaza is pursuing:

1. maintaining control over and legitimacy among the Gazan population against the challenges of other terrorist factions and Fatah

2. deterring Israel from attacking Hamas's fighters, political leadership, and infrastructure.

In order to maintain both control and legitimacy, Hamas has to reconcile two contradictory objectives. First, it has to ensure that the border crossings which deliver food, oil, and other supplies into Gaza stay open. Second, it has to prove its military superiority over other factions and local strongmen, by being at the forefront of the terrorist struggle against Israeli civilians and attacks on soldiers.

As far as Hamas's strategic objectives go, I am increasingly convinced that protecting Gaza's civilian population from being injured or killed by Israeli air force strikes and ground operations are not a priority. In fact, Hamas wants to draw Israel into bombing operations or incursions that will lead to dramatic footage of dead Palestinian "martyrs" being aired on Al Jazeera and other Arab television networks. Such deaths hardly seem to hurt Hamas's legitimacy, as they tend rather to stoke feelings of revenge and mobilize civilians to put aside dissatisfaction with their government in favor of unity against the enemy.

The calculus for Israel, on the other hand, looks different. The Israeli government's main aim is to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks - whether in the form of rockets or suicide bombings. Because of Hamas's commitment to armed struggle against Israel and its rejection of peace negotiations, the state of Israel has viewed Hamas's removal from power as a means to safeguarding Israel's security.  A cease fire of limited duration, while providing some relief to Israeli civilians, is clearly not a viable long-term solution. The problem is that assuming Israel succeeded in dislodging Hamas from power, it is hardly realistic to expect Fatah to take over and stop rocket fire on Israel. 

Israel's best bet, therefore, seems to me, to threaten Hamas with destruction - of its legitimacy and control in Gaza - while simultaneously holding out a deal by which Hamas might stay in power if it ceases its rocket attacks on Israel and other terrorist operations. 

All this is easier said than done, of course. On the military front, the following is precisely what Israel does not need:

"If the Qassam [rocket] fire does not stop, the Israel Defense Forces will fight you with the same might with which it fought Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War," said Hanegbi (Kadima), speaking to Army Radio (Ha'aretz).

Hanegbi wants a repeat of the Lebanon War? I.e., a hundred plus rockets raining on Israeli civilians every day for a month and many dead soldiers? The truth is that we do not know whether the IDF will be able to restrain Hamas's rocket attacks even if it embarks on a major ground operation. Might is not enough. The IDF will have to demonstrate a significant improvement in its rocket hunting capabilities in order to prevent a repeat of July 2006. 

Beyond the military option, Israel must create as much diplomatic space as possible to maintain a crippling embargo on Gaza, should the Hamas government continue to terrorize Israeli civilians. It has come to the point where all measures ought to be on the table - including cutting off Gaza's power and certainly closing all crossings. Israel's message to Hamas and its supporters must be unambiguous: stop your terrorism in words and deeds, and you can live in peace and perhaps even prosperity.